Unite Here International Union v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITE HERE INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK
INDIANS,
Respondent-Appellant.
No. 17-16599
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-00384-TLN-EFB
MEMORANDUM*
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK
INDIANS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITE HERE INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-16600
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-01057-TLN-EFB
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 14, 2018
San Francisco, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
SEP 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Before: RAWLINSON, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
1. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (the Tribe) appeals from the
district court’s order granting UNITE HERE International Union’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings in the Union’s action to compel arbitration. We affirm.
The Tribe argues that the question of arbitrability is for the court to decide.
Even assuming without deciding that the Tribe is correct, we agree with the Union
that the parties’ dispute is arbitrable. The dispute at issue concerns the
interpretation of Section 5(a) of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which
forbids the Tribe to “directly or indirectly state or imply opposition to the selection
by Bargaining Unit Employees of the Union as their exclusive representative.”
The Union alleges that the Tribe terminated two employees for supporting the
Union, in violation of this provision. In Section 10 of the MOA, the parties agreed
to submit “any disputes over the interpretation or application of [the] Agreement”
to arbitration. Because the parties’ dispute concerns the interpretation and
application of a provision of the MOA, we conclude that the dispute is covered by
the arbitration provision in Section 10.
Additionally, if we had any doubts about the scope of the arbitration
provision, the presumption of arbitrability lends further support to our conclusion.
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). Given
the broad language of the arbitration provision, we cannot say “with positive

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assurance that [it] is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582–83 (1960). Finally, the Tribe’s challenges to the rest of the contract—
regarding the legality of interpreting the MOA to cover the termination dispute,
and the scope of the sovereign immunity waiver—are for the arbitrator to decide.
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444–46 (2006).
2. The Tribe also appeals from the district court’s order granting the
Union’s motion to dismiss in the Tribe’s action for declaratory relief. We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining jurisdiction over
the declaratory action. The district court properly balanced “concerns of judicial
administration, comity, and fairness to the litigants.” Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991). The issues in the declaratory action
were duplicative of those raised in the action to compel arbitration.
3. The parties’ requests for judicial notice are DENIED.
AFFIRMED.

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