Ronnie C. Brown v. JEFF MACOMBER, Warden and JIMMY WALKER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONNIE C. BROWN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JEFF MACOMBER, Warden and JIMMY
WALKER,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 16-56330
D.C. No.
2:08-cv-08405-SVW-DTB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 6, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,*** District
Judge.
FILED
JUN 07 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

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Petitioner Ronnie Brown (Brown) appeals the district court’s final judgment
dismissing Brown’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the
dismissal of a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds, including whether
equitable tolling applies. See Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2016). A
district court’s findings of fact and mental competency determinations are
reviewed for clear error. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012).
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s determination that a
petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Roberts v. Marshall, 627
F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010).
1. The district court’s ruling denying equitable tolling was not erroneous. A
habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling upon showing “(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way and prevented timely filing.” Fue, 842 F.3d at 653 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The equitable tolling standard is “a very high bar, and is
reserved for rare cases.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted).
On September 14, 1998, Brown pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon
and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. His conviction became final sixty
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days later, and the statute of limitations began to run on November 13, 1998. The
last date for Brown to file his federal petition seeking habeas corpus relief was
November 13, 1999. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Brown constructively filed
his petition on December 8, 2008. Therefore, without the benefit of equitable
tolling, Brown’s petition was untimely by nine years.
The district court did not commit clear error when it determined that Brown
failed to diligently pursue his petition and that no extraordinary circumstance
prevented timely filing. Based on Brown’s extensive medical record, the district
court correctly found that Brown suffered from some sort of mental impairment.
Indeed, Brown’s medical record is replete with evidence of psychosis.
But, Brown actually filed a state habeas petition on December 6, 2007,
demonstrating that on that day, he was not “prevented [from] timely filing.” See
Fue, 842 F.3d at 653. Over the course of the next year, Brown filed additional
habeas petitions in state court, but did not file his federal habeas petition until
December 8, 2008. Thus, even giving Brown the benefit of the doubt on equitable
tolling until December 6, 2007, there was a one-year period in which he was not
prevented by his mental disease from filing a federal habeas petition, and the
district court therefore did not err in finding Brown’s petition untimely. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (one-year statute of limitations).
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2. The district court acted within its discretion when denying Brown an
evidentiary hearing. “[A] district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings
to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner's allegations of
mental incompetence” where the record is amply developed. Roberts, 627 F.3d at
773. Consisting of over 7,000 pages, Brown’s record was amply developed, and
provided the district court with sufficient evidence to make an informed
determination regarding Brown’s mental competence. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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