William Rupert v. Susan Bond;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM RUPERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUSAN BOND; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-15831
D.C. No. 5:12-cv-05292-BLF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
William Rupert appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging violations of state law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) relating to a dispute arising out of Oregon estate
plans. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 11 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)); Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127
(9th Cir. 2010) (personal jurisdiction); Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d
638, 643 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissal based on Noerr–Pennington). We affirm.
The district court properly determined that the California based defendants
are immune from liability under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine because Rupert
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants’ actions to defend
against Rupert’s prior lawsuit were objectively baseless or deprived the litigation
of its legitimacy. See id. at 643-644 (under Noerr–Pennington, “those who petition
any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory
liability for their petitioning conduct” (citation omitted)); see also Freeman v.
Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
circumstances where the “sham litigation” exception to the Noerr–Pennington
doctrine applies).
The district court properly dismissed all claims against the non-resident
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115,
1121-23 (2014) (discussing the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction and
stating that “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum”); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801-802 (9th
Cir. 2004) (requirements for general and specific personal jurisdiction); Butcher’s

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Union Local No. 498, United Food & Comm. Workers v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d
535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986) (requirements for nationwide service in an action alleging
RICO violations).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Rupert’s
complaint without leave to amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that a district court may dismiss without leave where amendment would
be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002)
(district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it has
afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rupert’s motions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) because Rupert failed to demonstrate any
grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and
listing grounds warranting reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s request for oral argument (Docket Entry No. 63) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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