United States of America v. ALBERT LAMONT HECTOR, AKA Hector Allen, AKA Cartoon, AKA Lil Cartoon, AKA…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALBERT LAMONT HECTOR, AKA
Hector Allen, AKA Cartoon, AKA Lil
Cartoon, AKA lilcartoon, AKA Lamont
Murkison, AKA Sean Murks,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50009
D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00486-PA-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Following a jury trial, Albert Lamont Hector was convicted on one count of
distribution of cocaine base and one count of possession of cocaine base with
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was also
convicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 130 months of
imprisonment on each of the three counts, to be served concurrently. Hector now
appeals his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate Hector’s sentences on all counts of conviction and
remand for full resentencing.
Hector’s 130-month term of incarceration on the felon-in-possession count
was unlawful because it exceeded the statutory maximum of 10 years. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Although Hector did not raise that objection in the district
court, the government concedes that the imposition of a sentence in excess of the
statutory maximum is plain error. See United States v. Lomow, 266 F.3d 1013,
1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (subsequent history omitted). We therefore vacate the
sentence imposed for that count.
The parties disagree about how the error on the felon-in-possession count
should affect Hector’s sentencing for the other counts. Hector asks us to vacate his
entire sentence, while the government asks that we vacate only the sentence
imposed for the felon-in-possession count and otherwise affirm.
Under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s sentence on
multiple counts of conviction “constitute[s] a single ‘package’ reflecting his

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overall offense conduct rather than separate and independent sentences on each
count,” and thus “the degree to which each offense contributes to the total sentence
is usually affected by the other offenses of conviction.” United States v. Radmall,
340 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). For that reason, “remand of all sentences is
often warranted” when there is an error with respect to one sentence. United States
v. Evans-Martinez, 611 F.3d 635, 645 (9th Cir. 2010).
To be sure, an error in the sentence on one count does not always require
vacatur of sentences on other counts. In Evans-Martinez, for example, we declined
to vacate one of the defendant’s sentences after identifying error in others. Id. But
in that case, “the statements made by the district court at the sentencing hearing”
established definitively that “the district court would impose the same sentence on
remand.” Id.; see id. at 645 n.16. Here, by contrast, the record does not make clear
whether the error on the felon-in-possession count affected the district court’s
sentencing determination on the other counts. We conclude that the better course is
“to vacate all of the sentences imposed and to authorize the district court to begin
the sentencing process afresh,” thereby allowing the district court to impose the
total punishment that it considers appropriate after correcting the error. United
States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1997); see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).
Hector raises two other challenges to his sentence: he argues that the district
court erred in imposing an enhancement under Sentencing Guidelines

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§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony
offense, and that the district court did not adequately explain its rejection of his
request for a below-Guidelines sentence. Because we remand for a full
resentencing, we do not address those arguments.
VACATED and REMANDED.

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