Alejandro Flores-Martinez v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEJANDRO FLORES-MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73827
Agency No. A200-975-940
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 12, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GILSTRAP, ***
District Judge.
Petitioner Alejandro Flores-Martinez entered the United States without valid
documentation and was subsequently convicted of petty theft in 1990 and 1994. The
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable James Rodney Gilstrap, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
AUG 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Government initiated removal proceedings and Petitioner applied for cancellation of
removal and other relief. Petitioner initially conceded that he was statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal based on his two prior petty theft convictions.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pretermitted the request for cancellation and denied
Petitioner’s other requests for relief. Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the BIA’s dismissal, alleging that a change of law affected
Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. The BIA denied the motion and
the instant appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and
we deny the petition.
We review de novo the BIA’s determination of questions of law. Castillo-
Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2009). BIA rulings on motions to
reopen and reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion and are “reverse[d] only
if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005).
Petitioner urges this Court to overturn this Circuit’s long-standing precedent
that petty theft under Cal. Penal Code (“CPC”) § 484(a) is categorically a crime
involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), and thus, an offense that would disqualify an
applicant for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Petitioner
argues that since Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2015), held that

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California petty theft is not a categorical match to the federal definition of theft, then
it should follow that his petty theft convictions are not categorically CIMTs.
“[W]e have consistently held that acts of petty theft constitute crimes of moral
turpitude” under California law. Castillo-Cruz, 581 F.3d at 1160 (collecting cases).
Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch did not change or affect this holding. Accordingly, the BIA
did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
PETITION DENIED.

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