James Linlor v. Chase Bankcard Services, Inc.; Chase Bank USA, N.a.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES LINLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHASE BANKCARD SERVICES, INC.;
CHASE BANK USA, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-56200
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-
KSC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 19, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
James Linlor appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his action alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gorman v. Wolpoff
& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 26 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 18-56200
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Linlor failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact to whether defendants’ investigation of
Linlor’s dispute was unreasonable. See id. at 1154 (setting forth responsibilities of
furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Linlor’s request for
additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because Linlor
did not show how additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment.
See Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-1101 (9th Cir.
2006) (setting forth the standard of review and upholding the denial of request for
a continuance where plaintiff “did not identify the specific facts that further
discovery would have revealed or explain why those facts would have precluded
summary judgment”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Linlor’s requests for
sanctions because Linlor did not show that defendants failed to comply with their
discovery or Rule 11(b) obligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (providing that if
a party fails to provide information required by Rules 26(a) or (e), the party is not
allowed to use that information on a motion or at trial unless the failure was
substantially justified or harmless); Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1126-
27 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review and criteria for the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions); Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th

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3 18-56200
Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough we review every discovery sanction for an abuse of
discretion, we give particularly wide latitude to the district court's discretion to
issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” (citation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.

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