Matthew Tye v. County of Los Angeles;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW TYE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-56528
D.C. No. 8:17-cv-01831-RGK-KES
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2019**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Matthew Tye appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from his state
court plea agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 25 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 18-56528
(9th Cir. 2014) (abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6)); Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Tye’s claim under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), because success on this claim would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Tye did not allege that his conviction
or sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 4887 (holding that if “a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”). To the
extent Tye’s Brady claim relates to a potential need to present mitigating evidence
at a future resentencing, his claim is not ripe. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S.
296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Tye’s due process claim because Tye
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that he was deprived of constitutionally

-- 2 of 4 --

3 18-56528
adequate process in state court. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se
pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Portman v. County of Santa Clara,
995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth elements of procedural due process
claim).
The district court properly denied Tye’s request for injunctive relief because
the district court was required to abstain from interfering with Tye’s then-pending
state court appeal under the Younger abstention doctrine. See ReadyLink
Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 758-59 (setting forth requirements for Younger abstention
in civil cases); Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617, 621 (9th Cir.
2003) (setting forth exceptions to Younger abstention and concluding that claimed
constitutional violation “does not, by itself, constitute an exception to the
application of Younger abstention”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
certain state court documents. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-
89 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and describing items subject to
judicial notice on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

-- 3 of 4 --

4 18-56528
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Appellees’ motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 12) is granted.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --