United States v. 2020-11-03 | 19-55890 | WILLIAM NIBLE V. FINK | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM NIBLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FINK; T. DIAZ,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

B. SELF; et al.,

Defendants.

No. 19-55890

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-02849-BAS-
RBM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2020
**

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner William Nible appeals pro se from the district

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 3 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First and
Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of the confiscation of a rune set that
was mailed to Nible. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nible’s First
Amendment free exercise claim because Nible failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the confiscation of his rune set substantially burdened
the practice of his religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir.
2015) (explaining that a prisoner “asserting a free exercise claim must show that
the government action in question substantially burdens the ... practice of [the
prisoner’s] religion”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nible’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim because Nible had an adequate post-deprivation
remedy under California law. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th
Cir. 1994) (no due process claim for deprivation of property where California law
provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy).
The district court properly dismissed Nible’s state law tort claims alleging
violations of Tile 15 of the California Code of Regulations because the cited
regulations do not create a private right of action. See Thurman v. Bayshore
Mgmt., Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 146-47 (Ct. App. 2012), abrogated on other

3 19-55890
grounds by ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 448 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2019) (statutory
language or legislative history must clearly indicate an intent to create a private
right of action).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.