Jack R. Finnegan v. City of Dana Point

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACK R. FINNEGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF DANA POINT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-56360

D.C. No. 8:19-cv-02110-JLS-DFM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2020
**

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Jack R. Finnegan appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the
validity of the sale of his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo dismissals under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall,

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 3 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-56360
341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Finnegan’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it was a “de facto
appeal” of a prior state court decision and Finnegan raised claims that were
“inextricably intertwined” with that state court decision. See id. at 1163-65
(discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d
772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that claims, as well as requests for damages,
are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decisions where federal
adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.