United States v. 2020-11-20 | 19-17087 | DAVID ANDREWS V. B. MARTINEZ | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID ANDREWS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

B. MARTINEZ, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-17087

D.C. No.
7-cv-04363-YGR

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzales Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2020
**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

David Andrews appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of employees of the California Board of Parole Hearings and the
Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California. The facts are known to the
parties, so we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 20 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
I
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Andrews’s
deprivation of due process claims related to the denial of parole release.
A
While there is a California-created liberty interest in parole release,
McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901–03 (9th Cir. 2002), the procedures
required for due process are “minimal.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220
(2011). Under Swarthout, the prisoner receives adequate process when he has “an
opportunity to be heard” and is provided “a statement of the reasons why parole
was denied.” Id. “The Constitution does not require more.” Greenholtz v. Inmates
of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
B
Undisputed facts in the record show that Andrews had an opportunity to be
heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.
Andrews’s November 2015 and March 2016 hearings were continued so that he
could collect documents and prepare his presentation to the parole board. Andrews
had notice of his September 2016 hearing and submitted documents for the board’s
consideration, which the parole hearing panel acknowledged. During the hearing,
Andrews actively participated. He testified, asked questions, and objected to
certain evidence. He had multiple opportunities to clarify or to correct the record.

3
At the close of the hearing, Andrews received a thorough explanation of the
reasons he was denied parole release. These undisputed facts end the federal
inquiry. Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711,
717 (9th Cir. 2011). Any further “responsibility for ensuring that the
constitutionally adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are
properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s
business.” Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222.
II
Defendants-Appellees are also entitled to qualified immunity from
Andrews’s civil damages claims because they did not violate clearly established
law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Neither the Supreme Court
nor the Ninth Circuit has established greater due process protections than the
minimal ones described above, so Defendants-Appellees could reasonably believe
the parole hearing provided to Andrews passed constitutional muster.
AFFIRMED.