United States v. 2020-12-10 | 18-72343 | MARCOS GARCIA-CARRILLO V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCOS ALEJANDRO GARCIA-
CARRILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-72343
Agency No. A209-795-992
MEMORANDUM
*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2020
**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and BOULWARE,
***
District
Judge.

Petitioner Marcos Alejandro Garcia-Carrillo seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ ("BIA") dismissal of his appeal of the immigration judge’s
FILED
DEC 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
* * *
The Honorable Richard F. Boulware II, United States District Judge
for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

("IJ") denial of reconsideration of Petitioner’s motion to reopen his removal
proceedings. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d
960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002), we deny the petition.
Accepting Petitioner’s explanation for his late arrival to his immigration
hearing—a lost driver for Uber—as true, see Arredondo v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 801,
806 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that, on a motion to reopen, the agency generally
"must accept as true the facts stated in the petitioner’s affidavits unless they are
inherently unbelievable" (quoting Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.
1991)) (brackets omitted)), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Petitioner did not present exceptional circumstances that excused his failure to
appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (providing that an IJ may rescind her
order for removal in absentia "if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear
was because of exceptional circumstances").
We cannot materially distinguish Petitioner’s misfortune from that of the
petitioner in Arredondo, who, we held, did not provide "exceptional
circumstances" when she arrived late to court because of her car’s mechanical
failure. 824 F.3d at 806. As in Arredondo, Petitioner "left little margin for error"
for a relatively common travel snafu, whether that be a lost driver, an overheated
car, or Los Angeles’ notorious traffic. Id. Nor does Petitioner contend that he is
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"facially eligible for [a] status adjustment," such that denial of his motion to reopen
constitutes the "unconscionable result of deporting an individual eligible for relief
from deportation." Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002).
PETITION DENIED.
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