Kendra White v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENDRA WHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-15789
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00706-TLN-
CMK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 5, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Kendra White appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v.
Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The ALJ provided germane reasons for giving little weight to the opinion of
treating Nurse Shirley Rigg and specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the
Work Status Report submitted by Dr. Oliver. Dr. Oliver’s note excused White
from work for one day and provided no additional details regarding her impairment
or workplace limitations. Nurse Rigg’s note similarly does not detail any specific
functional limitations and only excused White from work for 60 days. The ALJ
found that Nurse Rigg’s note conflicted with her own treatment notes indicating
that White’s exam results were relatively normal, and that White need only avoid
hazards such as heights or climbing. These relatively normal exam findings were
consistent with a second letter from Nurse Rigg to White’s employer, FedEx,
indicating in October 2013 that White needed a neurology consult to return to her
“usual employment,” but that White could work in a position that avoided height
hazards and machinery, and was able to work in a “clerical position.”
Additionally, Rigg’s assessment in the treatment notes that White could perform
clerical work and work that avoided hazards was supported by the assessments of
the state agency physicians, Dr. Pan and Dr. Amon, who indicated that White
needed “hazard limits only.” The ALJ did not err because these assessments were
consistent with the medical record as a whole, which did not provide objective

-- 2 of 3 --

3
medical evidence to support White’s allegations of a worsening seizure condition
or the frequency of seizures she reported in her “Seizure Schedule” and her
testimony at the hearing. Nor does the evidence support White’s argument on
appeal that clerical work would be “too stressful” for her, because the medical
evidence shows normal psychological exams, and White did not allege any mental
impairment as the basis for her disability application.
The ALJ’s assessment that White could perform her past relevant work was
based on the assessment of White’s RFC, which was supported by substantial
evidence. On the basis of that assessment, the ALJ posed specific questions to the
vocational expert that accounted for White’s impairments due to her seizure
disorder, and White does not identify any error in the ALJ’s questioning of the VE.
See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ must
propose a hypothetical that is based on medical assumptions supported by
substantial evidence in the record that reflects each of the claimant’s limitations.”).
The ALJ did not err in determining that White could perform her past relevant
work, as it was within the limitations set by the proper assessment of White’s RFC.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --