Robin Heinig v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN HEINIG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-35159
D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01698-AA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 27, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: D. NELSON, CLIFTON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Robin Heinig appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 27 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, we must uphold the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1107
(9th Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ thoroughly evaluated the medical opinion evidence
and provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to
discount the opinions of Heinig’s treating physician. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017).
The ALJ properly gave little weight to Dr. Alan Mersch’s opinions that
Heinig was disabled because the opinions were conclusory. Additionally, the
opinions were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, including
contemporaneous treatment notes, physical exam findings, and Heinig’s daily
activities. The ALJ properly discounted Dr. Mersch’s opinion that Heinig was
disabled because the ultimate determination of medical disability is reserved for
the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). The ALJ also provided specific
and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Mersch’s 2012 checkbox form opinion
because the form permitted the physician to choose only between “light” and
“sedentary” work, which itself suggests the form was not intended to convey an
objective medical opinion regarding the full range of possibilities for a claimant’s

-- 2 of 4 --

3
functional capacity. The checkbox form also lacked substantive support for any of
its conclusions about Heinig’s functional limitations.
The ALJ also gave germane reasons for discounting the opinion of physician
assistant Emily Rogers. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Rogers’s opinion was
inconsistent with her treatment notes, which indicated that Heinig was stable and
her medication was making a significant difference in her life and that Heinig
could perform household chores and continue volunteering at a local animal
shelter.
The ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount Heinig’s
symptom testimony because the ALJ reasonably concluded that the alleged
severity of Heinig’s symptoms was contradicted in the record. See Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ properly considered Heinig’s “prior
inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the
claimant that appears less than candid.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
1039 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ noted several inconsistencies between Heinig’s
testimony and the evidence in the record, including the objective medical evidence,
and Heinig’s daily activities, which displayed a higher level of functioning than her
reported symptoms would otherwise suggest. The ALJ also properly considered
the fact that Heinig had lost her previous job due to business layoffs, not due to her
impairments. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). By

-- 3 of 4 --

4
detailing these inconsistencies, which are supported by substantial evidence, the
ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Heinig’s testimony. See id.
The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred at step four because the ALJ
classified Heinig’s past relevant work as “Call Center Supervisor” but listed the
DOT number for “Customer Service Representative, Supervisor,” rather than the
classification for “Supervisor, Order Takers,” which was the position Heinig had
actually held. However, the ALJ properly concluded that even if Heinig could not
perform her past relevant work, there were other jobs Heinig could perform,
including mail sorter, office helper, and storage facility rental clerk, which existed
in significant numbers in the national economy. Because the ALJ made this
alternative step-five finding, any error at step four was harmless. See Tommasetti,
533 F.3d at 1042.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --