MUSTAFA RAFEEQ BARAZAHI SADDIQ, AKA Michael Allen Sutton v. AMAZON.COM, A corporation owned by Beezos;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MUSTAFA RAFEEQ BARAZAHI
SADDIQ, AKA Michael Allen Sutton,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMAZON.COM, A corporation owned by
Beezos; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-15934
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00620-ROS-
MHB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 17, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Mustafa Refeeq Barazahi Saddiq appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his action alleging copyright infringement and related claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Saddiq’s claim for copyright
infringement because Saddiq failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants violated any exclusive distribution rights. See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (a claim for direct copyright
infringement requires a showing of “volitional conduct” or “causation” by the
defendant).
The district court properly dismissed Saddiq’s claims for violation of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act because Saddiq failed to allege facts sufficient
to show that defendants circumvented any technological control with respect to any
of appellant’s copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
[copyrighted] work.”).
The district court properly dismissed Saddiq’s claim under the Economic
Espionage Act because there is no private right of action for misappropriation of
trade secrets under this criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832; Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)
(criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a private right of action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Saddiq’s second

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amended complaint without leave to amend after providing him multiple
opportunities to state a federal claim. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d
1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and noting that leave
to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Saddiq’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Saddiq did not demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. See Cano v. Taylor, 739
F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional
circumstances” standard for appointment of counsel).
Saddiq’s motion for status or ruling (Docket Entry No. 14) is denied as
moot.
AFFIRMED.

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