Rocelia Jeronimo Domingo De Cruz; v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

20-72765Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit16 nov. 2021

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROCELIA JERONIMO DOMINGO DE
CRUZ; et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72765
Agency Nos. A208-304-629
A208-304-630
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 8, 2021**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Rocelia Jeronimo Domingo de Cruz and her child, natives and citizens of
Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Conde
Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny in part and
dismiss in part the petition for review.
As to petitioners’ claim of past persecution based on insults and
mistreatment Domingo de Cruz experienced as a child, substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that the experiences did not rise to the level of
persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003)
(persecution is “an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment
our society regards as offensive” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As to harm
from gang members, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination
that petitioners did not establish a nexus to a protected ground, including their
Mayan ethnicity. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (an
applicant “must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial”);
Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be
free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). To the extent petitioners contend
they established membership in a particular social group, we lack jurisdiction to
consider the issue. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004)
(court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). We also

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lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ contention that the IJ erred in analyzing
past persecution. See id. We reject as unsupported by the record petitioners’
contention that the BIA erred in analyzing past persecution.
As to petitioners’ claim of future persecution, substantial evidence supports
the agency’s determination that petitioners failed to establish their fear is
objectively reasonable. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006)
(petitioner failed to present “compelling, objective evidence demonstrating a well-
founded fear of persecution”); see also Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094-95
(9th Cir. 2010) (fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable, in part,
because similarly-situated family members remained in petitioner’s home country
unharmed); Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (evidence of
discrimination was insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution).
Thus, petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach petitioners’ remaining
contentions regarding their asylum and withholding of removal claims. See
Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are
not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).
In the opening brief, Domingo de Cruz does not challenge, and therefore
waives, the agency’s denial of her CAT claim. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706

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F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding petitioner waived challenge to
issue not specifically raised and argued in his opening brief).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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