Yang Cao v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YANG CAO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-70549
Agency No. A087-874-281
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 14, 2021**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Yang Cao, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review factual findings for substantial
evidence, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations
under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir.
2010). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on
inconsistencies between Cao’s testimony and the documentary evidence
concerning her parents’ place of residence, Cao’s employment, and the length of
her detention; and based on Cao’s demeanor. See id. at 1048 (adverse credibility
determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”); see also Manes v.
Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (IJ made “explicit reference to
particular unrecorded aspects of demeanor” which is sufficient to provide “specific
examples” of demeanor as required). Cao’s contentions that she was denied an
opportunity to explain any discrepancies fail, see Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083,
1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (opportunity to explain may be provided through direct
examination), and her explanations do not compel a contrary conclusion, see
Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (IJ not required to accept
explanations for inconsistencies). Substantial evidence also supports the finding
that Cao did not present corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish her
eligibility for relief. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(petitioner’s documentary evidence was insufficient to independently support
claim).
In the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Cao’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156
(9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of Cao’s CAT claim
because it was based on the same evidence found not credible, and Cao does not
point to any other evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that it is more
likely than not she would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the
government if returned to China. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Cao’s remaining contentions
regarding the merits of her asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims. See
Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts are not required to
decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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