Yannet Ruiz-Quijas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YANNET RUIZ-QUIJAS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70947
Agency No. A098-391-044
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 11, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, GRABER, Circuit Judge, and L. BURNS,***
District Judge.
Yannet Ruiz-Quijas petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
decision. The IJ denied Ms. Ruiz-Quijas’s claim for withholding of removal under
8 U.S.C. § 1231, et seq., because, among other reasons, she established neither
membership in a cognizable particular social group nor nexus to a protected ground.
The IJ denied relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because Ms.
Ruiz-Quijas failed to establish a likelihood of torture with acquiescence by the
Mexican government.
1. Ms. Ruiz-Quijas’s brief before the BIA did not develop any argument about
why the IJ erred in determining that she had established neither membership in a
cognizable particular social group nor nexus. See Abebe v. Mukaskey, 554 F.3d
1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Petitioner will therefore be deemed to have exhausted
only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.”). Because Ms.
Ruiz-Quijas failed to exhaust administrative remedies, we lack jurisdiction to review
the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Section] 1252(d)(1)
mandates exhaustion and therefore generally bars us, for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, from reaching the merits of a legal claim not presented in administrative
proceedings below.”).
2. Ms. Ruiz-Quijas also failed to exhaust her CAT claim, because her brief
before the BIA did not mention CAT and provided neither reasons nor argument
explaining why the IJ erred in denying her CAT claim. See Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1208.

-- 2 of 3 --

3
We therefore lack jurisdiction over Ms. Ruiz-Quijas’s challenge to the IJ’s denial of
CAT protection. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 678.
Because we lack jurisdiction over both of Ms. Ruiz-Quijas’s claims, the
petition must be dismissed. See Alvarado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.
2014) (dismissing petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where petitioner did
not sufficiently exhaust before the BIA his argument challenging the IJ’s decision).
PETITION DISMISSED.

-- 3 of 3 --