Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMON SAUL SILVA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TROY BACON, Captain, King County
Correctional Facility; GARRETT
FERREIRO, Sergeant, King County
Correctional Facility; DALE PORTER,
Officer, King County Correctional Facility;
TODD CLARIN, Officer, King County
Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35937
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00619-RAJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 15, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Ramon Saul Silva appeals pro se from the district
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 29 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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court’s summary judgment in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Shakur v. Schriro, 514
F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Silva’s First
Amendment claim for damages because Silva failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant Bacon substantially burdened the exercise of
Silva’s religious beliefs. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (9th Cir.
2015) (elements of a § 1983 free exercise claim); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (when alleging that prison regulations violate a plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights, the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of
prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it[]”).
The district court properly denied Silva’s requested injunctive relief as moot
because Silva failed to show a reasonable expectation of reincarceration at the
King County Correctional Facility. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1995) (applicability of the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to the mootness doctrine); see also Wiggins v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009,
1011 (9th Cir. 1985) (possibility of reincarceration at certain facility too
speculative to trigger “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception).
AFFIRMED.
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