Robert Shedler v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT SHEDLER,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71167
Agency No. A213-210-869
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of an Immigration Judge
Submitted October 19, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
NOV 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Robert Shedler, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions for review of an
immigration judge’s affirmance of an asylum officer’s negative credible fear
determination in expedited removal proceedings. We dismiss the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.
Congress has provided that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” an
order of removal made under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), which governs expedited
removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii); see Guerrier v. Garland, 18
F.4th 304, 308–09 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that, while this court “[g]enerally . . . ha[s]
jurisdiction to review final orders of removal,” it does not “have jurisdiction to
review an expedited removal order except as provided in subsection (e) of section
1252,” which provides a limited exception for certain habeas corpus proceedings)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Shedler challenges only the
substantive reasoning of the immigration judge’s order of removal, and makes no
due process or other constitutional claim. The limited exceptions to
§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) clearly do not apply here, so that provision strips us of
jurisdiction to hear Shedler’s claims.
Petitioner’s reliance on Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829 (9th Cir.
2016), is misplaced, as that case concerned jurisdiction over reasonable fear review
proceedings, not credible fear review proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B).
These two types of proceedings are governed by different sets of rules concerning

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our review. See, e.g., Singh v. Barr, 982 F.3d 778, 783–84 (9th Cir. 2020)
(distinguishing “a reasonable fear determination in the context of a reinstatement of
a prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)” from “a credible fear
determination under § 1225(b)(1)” and finding no jurisdiction to review denial of a
motion to reopen the latter). Consequently, although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii)
does not deprive us of jurisdiction to hear a petition concerning a reasonable fear
review proceeding, it does strip us of jurisdiction to hear a petition concerning a
credible fear review proceeding, which is the petition now before us. Since we are
without authority to hear it, Shedler’s petition must be dismissed.
PETITION DISMISSED.

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