United States of America v. CLAUDIA CASTILLO GUZMAN, AKA Claudia Castillo, AKA Claudia Castro, AKA Claudia…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CLAUDIA CASTILLO GUZMAN, AKA
Claudia Castillo, AKA Claudia Castro, AKA
Claudia Guzman, AKA Claudia Castillo
Guzman, AKA Claudia Guzman-Castillo,
AKA Claudia Penaloza, AKA Claudia
Castillo Penaloza, AKA Claudia Rubio,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-50181
D.C. No.
8:19-cr-00155-DOC-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: R. NELSON, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
After engaging in multiple sales of drugs and firearms to undercover agents,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Appellant Claudia Castillo Guzman (“Guzman”) was indicted and pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The district
court sentenced her to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment.
Guzman argues that the district court violated Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by failing to explicitly rule on her objections to the
presentence report (“PSR”), and imposed a procedurally erroneous sentence by
failing to adequately explain its sentencing decision, consider Guzman’s claim of
sentencing manipulation, and address her eligibility for safety valve relief under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f).1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742, and we affirm.
1. Under Rule 32(i)(3)(B), the district court “must—for any disputed
portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute
or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). We have “mandated strict compliance with Rule 32,
explaining that the rulings must be express or explicit.” United States v. Doe, 705
F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
However, a district court is not required to resolve legal disputes; “[w]hen a
1 Because Guzman’s claims fail on the merits, we do not reach the
government’s waiver arguments.

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defendant fails to make specific allegations of factual inaccuracy in a PSR, a
district court has no obligation under Rule 32(i)(3)(B).” United States v.
Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013).
Here, the district court was not required to explicitly resolve Guzman’s
objections to the PSR’s recommended total offense level because she raised only
legal arguments based on the government’s alleged sentencing manipulation and
her eligibility for safety valve relief. Because she did not object to factual
inaccuracies in the PSR, she failed to trigger the requirements of Rule 32. See
United States v. Petri, 731 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A specific factual
objection addresses a factual inaccuracy; it does not merely object to
recommendations, opinions, or conclusions.”).
2. The district court did not procedurally err in calculating the
Guidelines or in explaining its below-Guidelines sentence. A district court “must
adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review
and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 50 (2007). “Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines
to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, the district court identified
the Guidelines range as a starting point. The court then made an individualized
assessment of Guzman’s case, varying downward after hearing argument and

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expressly considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—including Guzman’s
horrific childhood, her efforts at rehabilitation, her criminal history, and the
circumstances of the crime, which involved the sale of firearms—and concluded
that the mandatory minimum sentence was appropriate. Thus, the district court
adequately explained the sentence it imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Cherer,
513 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Sylvester Norman
Knows His Gun, III, 438 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2006) (the requirement that a
district court sufficiently consider the Guidelines as well as the § 3553(a) factors
“does not necessitate a specific articulation of each factor separately, but rather a
showing that the district court considered the statutorily-designated factors in
imposing a sentence”)).
3. Guzman’s “sentencing manipulation” argument also fails.
“‘[S]entencing manipulation’ occurs when the government increases a defendant’s
guideline sentence by conducting a lengthy investigation which increases the
number of drug transactions and quantities for which the defendant is responsible.”
United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 2015). We have explained
that “[t]o prove sentencing manipulation, a defendant must show ‘that the officers
engaged in the later drug transactions solely to enhance his potential sentence,’”
and that relief for sentencing manipulation is generally found in “‘only the extreme
and unusual case’ involving ‘outrageous governmental conduct.’” Id. (citations

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omitted).
In her objections to the PSR, Guzman stated that “[t]here is a valid argument
to be made regarding sentencing manipulation,” but she did not make that
argument, or point to any evidence that the government engaged in outrageous
conduct by prolonging its investigation with the sole purpose of increasing her
sentence. Guzman’s suggestion that the government could have arrested her after
the first methamphetamine sale is insufficient. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d
1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e decline to adopt a rule that, in effect, would find
‘sentencing manipulation’ whenever the government, even though it has enough
evidence to indict, opts instead to wait in favor of continuing its investigation.”).
4. Finally, a district court’s failure to address a defendant’s sentencing
argument “is not procedural error where ‘adequate explanation’ may ‘be inferred
from the PSR or the record as a whole.’” United States v. Flores, 725 F.3d 1028,
1041–42 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th
Cir. 2008)). Guzman argues that she is eligible for safety valve relief under
§ 3553(f)(1), but she did not respond, either at sentencing or on appeal, to the
explanation in the PSR addendum that she was not safety valve eligible under
§ 3553(f)(2) because she pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm. The district court
adequately addressed Guzman’s ineligibility for safety valve relief when it stated
that it did not apply. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th

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Cir. 2013) (“Sometimes the circumstances will call for a brief explanation;
sometimes they will call for a lengthier explanation.” (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at
357)).
AFFIRMED.

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