Wendy Veronica Rosales-Barillas; Daniela Alejandra Lezama-Rosales v. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Wendy Veronica Rosales-Barillas; Daniela
Alejandra Lezama-Rosales,
Petitioners,
v.
Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-915
Agency Nos. A213-081-190
A213-081-191
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Wendy Veronica Rosales-Barillas, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirming an immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Rosales’s adult daughter, Daniela Alejandra Lezama-Rosales, was
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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included in Rosales’s asylum application. We review “the agency’s factual
findings . . . for substantial evidence.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th
Cir. 2013). Under that standard, we must accept the agency’s factual findings
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
1. Rosales sought asylum and withholding of removal on the basis of her
membership in the proposed particular social groups of Salvadoran women,
single Salvadoran women, Salvadoran female supervisors, and Salvadoran
female factory supervisors. Regardless of whether those groups are cognizable,
Rosales has not demonstrated that she suffered or would suffer any harm on the
basis of her membership in them.
“Purely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of
political opinion” or other protected grounds. Antonyan v. Holder, 642 F.3d
1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1777, 1181 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2000)). The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s finding that the threats
against Rosales and her daughter were acts of “purely personal retribution” by a
coworker, and substantial evidence supports that finding. After Rosales
appeared to take part in a coworker’s firing, the coworker told Rosales that she
“was going to pay for it.” Rosales testified that a man later told her, “because
[you] fired” the coworker, “something might happen to [your] daughter.” When

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the immigration judge asked whether the threat to Rosales was “simply on
account of a personal dispute,” Rosales, through counsel, said “[i]t very well
may be.” Substantial evidence therefore supports the agency’s denial of the
asylum and withholding of removal claims.
2. Applicants for protection under the CAT must demonstrate that they
will be tortured “with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s affirmance of the
immigration judge’s finding that Rosales did not make the requisite showing
here. Rosales argues that her “attempts to obtain assistance from the police were
rejected,” because she could not provide an address for the woman who
threatened her. But “[e]vidence that the police were aware of a particular crime,
but failed to bring the perpetrators to justice, is not in itself sufficient to
establish acquiescence in the crime. Instead, there must be evidence that the
police are unable or unwilling to oppose the crime.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). The Board reasonably concluded that
Rosales did not present such evidence.
3. Rosales also argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel
during proceedings before the agency. Rosales did not raise this claim before
the Board, so we lack jurisdiction to consider it. Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213
F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000); see Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1062
(9th Cir. 2021) (“The proper way to raise and exhaust an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in this situation is through a motion to reopen before the

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agency.”).
The motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.
PETITION DENIED.

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