Omar Mahmoud Elsoudy v. University of Arizona, in its official capacity;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OMAR MAHMOUD ELSOUDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, in its official
capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-15777
D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00508-RCC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Omar Mahmoud Elsoudy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal discrimination and retaliation claims,
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Elsoudy’s APA claim because Elsoudy
failed to identify a final agency action. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178
(1997) (for an agency action to be final, it “must mark the consummation of the
agency’s decision-making process” and “must be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095,
1104 (9th Cir. 2007) (federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear an APA
claim if there is no final agency action).
The district court properly dismissed Elsoudy’s remaining claims because
Elsoudy failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that although pro se
pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Furnace v. Sullivan, 705
F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth pleading requirements for a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Huey v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327, 333 (9th Cir.
1997) (setting forth the elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional

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distress under Arizona law); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439,
1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for a Title VI
discrimination claim), overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); McMurtry v.
Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 293 P.3d 520, 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (setting forth
elements for a claim of negligence under Arizona law).
Elsoudy’s motion for injunctive relief (Docket Entry No. 5) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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