Emilia Herrera Cardenas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EMILIA HERRERA CARDENAS, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1565
Agency No. A208-307-984
Agency No. A208-307-985
Agency No. A208-307-986
Agency No. A208-307-987
Agency No. A208-307-988
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, BRESS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Emilia Herrera Cardenas (“Herrera”) and her minor children, natives and
citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“the
Board”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
FILED
DEC 12 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). We review the Board’s factual findings, including what a persecutor’s
motive may be, under the deferential substantial evidence standard.
Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550, 552 (9th Cir. 2023). We deny the
petition. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and the procedural history,
we need not recount them here.
I
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal relief. To be eligible for asylum or withholding, an
applicant must demonstrate a “nexus” between past or anticipated persecution and
a statutorily protected ground, such as membership in a particular social group
(PSG). Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2017). Because
family is a “quintessential” PSG, Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
2015), family membership can satisfy the nexus requirement where the applicant
demonstrates that “family membership was a reason motivating [a persecutor] to
target her.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2023).
Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Herrera
failed to demonstrate a nexus between past or feared persecution and a protected
ground. Herrera testified that her husband and brother-in-law were both kidnapped
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for ransom by members of a local cartel. Both men owned and operated several
taxis, which provided a “very stable economic situation” for the family. After
Herrera’s family members were released for ransom, the cartel demanded that they
begin paying a monthly extortion fee in exchange for the ongoing safety of their
families. Herrera’s husband complied with this demand for several years, until he
left Mexico in 2011, at which point the cartel began contacting Herrera, demanding
that she pay the monthly fee in his stead. When asked why her family was
targeted, Herrera testified that “it all has to do with money.”
This record supports the agency’s conclusion that Herrera failed to
demonstrate that the cartel’s actions were motivated by anything other than general
desire for financial gain. The record does not disclose that the cartel expressed
animus towards Herrera’s family, apart from its economic interests, or that the
cartel referenced Herrera’s or her family’s political beliefs.
“Where the record indicates that the persecutor’s actual motivation for
threatening a person is to extort money . . . the record does not compel finding that
the persecutor threatened the target because of a protected characteristic. . . .”
Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1019. “An alien’s desire to be free from harassment
by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no
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nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
2010).
Because a “lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive” of eligibility
for asylum and withholding, we must deny the petition. Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841
F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016).
II
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Herrera failed
to show she is more likely than not to be tortured if returned to Mexico, and is
therefore not entitled to relief under the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Herrera’s
prediction of future torture is based on the unusual phone call she received after
reporting her extortion to the police. Because Herrera did not provide
corroborative evidence that the call was not a routine follow-up, the record does
not compel the conclusion that the police were indeed cooperating with the cartel.
PETITION DENIED.
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