Ghulam Ali v. Michael Regan, Administrator, U.s. Environmental Protection Agency

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 7, 2024 Decided August 9, 2024
No. 22-5124
GHULAM ALI,
APPELLANT
v.
MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:17-cv-01899)
Daniel S. Volchok, appointed by the court, argued the
cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on
the briefs was Amy Lishinski and Allison Schultz, appointed by
the court.
Ghulam Ali, pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.
Rosa M. Koppel and Carolyn Wheeler were on the brief
for amicus curiae the Disability Rights, Education, and
Defense Fund, et al. in support of appellant.

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Johnny H. Walker, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. On the brief were Brian P. Hudak, Jane M.
Lyons, and Sean M. Tepe, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. R. Craig
Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.
Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.
Ghulam Ali has worked as a career Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) economist since 1997. EPA had
long been aware that Ali suffered from severe allergies and had
provided him a workspace that for years had accommodated
his health needs. Yet in 2011, EPA placed a worker known for
wearing heavy perfume in the cubicle right next to Ali. Ali
complained about the consequences to his health and ability to
work. After agreeing that Ali’s allergies were a disability that
qualified for accommodation, EPA offered Ali a take-it-or-
leave-it accommodation of 100% telework. Ali rejected that
accommodation, sought to engage the EPA in accommodation
discussions, and, when those efforts failed, filed suit under the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791.
Whether, under these circumstances, offering only 100%
telework, with no in-office alternative, was a reasonable
accommodation for Ali’s disability depends on the resolution
of myriad factual disputes. But the district court did not allow
Ali’s claim to reach a jury, instead concluding as a matter of
law that Ali caused a breakdown in discussions with EPA and
therefore bore sole responsibility for any failure to settle on an
appropriate accommodation.

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We reverse. We have previously held that an employee
who renders an employer unable to provide an
accommodation—say, by withholding relevant information
that the employer requested—cannot complain that the
employer denied a reasonable accommodation. See Ward v.
McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31–32 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But Ali
provided all the information that EPA requested. Ali also
proposed accommodations, which EPA rejected or ignored.
Then Ali, like EPA, rejected a proposed accommodation—one
that would force him to leave the workplace permanently. The
relevant question therefore is whether EPA’s final proffered
accommodation was reasonable. As to that question, there is
ample record evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to
rule for either party, making the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of EPA improper.
I
The Rehabilitation Act aims to “maximize opportunities
for individuals with disabilities” to participate in “competitive
integrated employment” and to “ensure that the Federal
Government plays a leadership role in promoting the
employment of individuals with disabilities[.]” 29 U.S.C.
§ 701(b)(2)–(3). The Act aimed to combat discrimination
against the “millions of Americans [who] have one or more
physical or mental disabilities[.]” Id. § 701(a). As amended,
the law recognizes that “disability is a natural part of the human
experience [that] in no way diminishes” individuals’ rights to
“live independently[,]” “enjoy self-determination[,]” “make
choices[,]” “contribute to society[,]” “pursue meaningful
careers[,]” and “enjoy full inclusion and integration in the
economic, political, social, cultural, and educational
mainstream of American society[.]” Id.

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The Rehabilitation Act’s “basic tenet is that the
Government must take reasonable affirmative steps to
accommodate the handicapped, except where undue hardship
would result.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 28 (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2
F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Those steps include
implementing workplace accommodations for federal
employees, whom the Rehabilitation Act, since 1992, protects
according to the same “standards applied under” the American
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. See
29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Ward, 762 F.3d at 28.1
The ADA, for its part, prohibits most non-federal
employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). A “qualified individual” is an individual “who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). One form of
prohibited discrimination is to “not mak[e] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability[.]” Id.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
Federal employees may sue to enforce their rights under
the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). To prevail, an
employee must allege and prove that: (1) he is disabled, (2) his
employer had notice of the disability, and (3) the employer
denied his request for a reasonable accommodation. Stewart v.
St. Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305, 1307–1308 (D.C. Cir.
1 Where relevant, this opinion accordingly cites ADA and
Rehabilitation Act cases without distinction.

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2010). The employee bears the “initial burden” of showing that
a reasonable accommodation is possible. Carter v. Bennett,
840 F.2d. 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Once that showing is made,
an employer may still avoid liability by showing that the
proposed accommodation would impose an “undue hardship”
on the employer’s operations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A),
12112(b)(5)(A); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Barth, 2 F.3d at 1189.
An employer fully satisfies its statutory obligation by offering
an accommodation that is reasonable, even if it is not the one
preferred by the employee. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156
F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Reasonable accommodations “include * * * making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9). They also include “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.” Id.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
regulations further specify that “reasonable accommodations”
include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work
environment * * * that enable an individual with a disability
who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that
position,” as well as “[m]odifications or adjustments that
enable * * * [an] employee with a disability to enjoy equal
benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [the
employer’s] other similarly situated employees without
disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)–(iii).

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In practice, “[w]hether an accommodation is ‘reasonable’”
is often a fact-intensive question “determined by a close
examination of the particular circumstances.” Jankowski Lee
& Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1996); see
Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379,
385 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Whether or not something constitutes a
reasonable accommodation is necessarily fact-specific * * *
[and] must be [determined] on a case-by-case basis.”). That is
because “[f]ew disabilities are amenable to one-size-fits-all
accommodations.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 31.
Because an appropriate accommodation will often turn on
specific facts concerning the employee’s disability and the
employer’s workplace, the employee and employer frequently
need to share information to find a workable solution. Ward,
762 F.3d at 31; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (Employers may
need “to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
individual * * * in need of the accommodation * * * [to]
identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome
those limitations.”). We have described this “interactive
process” as “‘a flexible give-and-take’ between employer and
employee ‘so that together they can determine what
accommodation would enable the employee to continue
working.’” Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005)); see
Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1167 & n.4. (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (similar).
EEOC guidance elaborates on the process of identifying a
reasonable accommodation. In many cases, “the appropriate
reasonable accommodation may be so obvious” that no “step-
by-step” dialogue will be needed. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.9. For instance, when “an employee who uses a
wheelchair requests that his or her desk be placed on blocks to

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elevate the desktop above the arms of the wheelchair and the
employer complies, an appropriate accommodation has been
requested, identified, and provided[.]’” Id.
In other cases, “neither the individual requesting the
accommodation nor the employer can readily identify the
appropriate accommodation” without dialogue. 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630.9. In such cases, the EEOC guidance advises
that the employer “should”:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine
its purpose and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to
ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed
by the individual’s disability and how those
limitations could be overcome with a reasonable
accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be
accommodated, identify potential accommodations
and assess the effectiveness each would have in
enabling the individual to perform the essential
functions of the position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be
accommodated and select and implement the
accommodation that is most appropriate for both the
employee and the employer.
Id.
While freely sharing information will often facilitate
finding an appropriate accommodation, the withholding of
information by an employee or employer may stymie such

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efforts. Yet “[n]either party should be able to cause a
breakdown in the [interactive] process for the purpose of either
avoiding or inflicting liability.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 805). So if an employee
withholds requested information that is relevant to determining
the existence of a disability or the appropriate accommodation
for it, that employee may bear responsibility for the breakdown
of the interactive process, which would foreclose a failure-to-
accommodate claim. Id. at 32–33 (affirming grant of summary
judgment to employer where employee did not respond to
repeated requests for medical information, such that “no
reasonable juror could have found that the [employer], rather
than [the employee], was responsible for the breakdown”);
Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1307–1308 (employee could not mount
failure-to-accommodate claim where employee resigned
without ever providing requested medical information needed
to document disability). By the same token, “an employer who
fails to engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk that
it will erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a
statutorily disabled employee, and thereby violate the ADA.”
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
II
A
Ghulam Ali works as an economist in EPA’s Office of
Science and Technology. He has long suffered from severe
allergies that “may result in, among other things, bleeding,

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itchy skin, rashes, face and arm swelling, as well as difficulty
breathing, seeing, walking, and sleeping.” J.A. 258.2
For about ten years, Ali worked in a private office at the
EPA. Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67 (D.D.C. 2016),
aff’d, 727 F. App’x 692 (D.C. Cir 2018). But following an
office reshuffling around 2007, Ali was temporarily allowed to
work from home for a few months before being permanently
moved to a cubicle.
Ali sued, claiming, among other things, that EPA failed to
accommodate his allergies. Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 61–63.
Ali’s failure to provide requested medical information,
however, showed that he “voluntarily abandoned the
interactive process,” and doomed his reasonable-
accommodation claim. Id. at 79–80.
Ali then returned to work in the cubicle without further
incident for over four years. But in 2011, EPA moved a co-
worker known for sporting particularly pungent cologne to the
desk next to Ali. J.A. 6, 100. The cologne triggered Ali’s
allergies and also made another colleague nauseous. J.A. 6,
234.
On November 17, 2011, Ali emailed two supervisors
about his allergic reactions and asked to be moved to a private
office or a small conference room. Though Ali’s email did not
mention the heavily cologned colleague, one of the supervisors
emailed back in less than an hour to ask if the co-worker’s
cologne was “the source” of the allergies, which Ali promptly
confirmed. J.A. 235. Ali’s supervisor also offered the
“immediate remedy” of relocating Ali to an “unoccupied cube”
2 In recounting the facts, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Ali, as he is the party opposing summary judgment.
Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1165.

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in a different section, while she worked on a more “permanent
solution.” J.A. 235.
Ali responded that the new cubicle was also “very
perfumy” and that other free cubicles were located near printers
that separately triggered his allergies or had “problems of one
kind or another.” J.A. 236. He reiterated his request to “move
to some sort of a room instead of a cubicle[,]” while also
mentioning that “management” had told him that the heavily
perfumed colleague would be moved if the cologne became an
issue. J.A. 236.
EPA did not respond to Ali’s email. Two months later,
Ali formally requested an accommodation under the
Rehabilitation Act based on his allergies, attaching multiple
doctors’ letters documenting his disability. When his
supervisor twice asked for more current medical information,
undisputed evidence shows that Ali promptly supplied it.
On June 21, 2012, EPA, in a letter signed by one of Ali’s
supervisors, Denise Hawkins, “determined [Ali] to be a person
with a disability” based on his allergies. J.A. 205; see J.A. 206
(“Your exposure to various kinds of allergens that include not
only environmental allergens but also volatile organic
compounds and products like paint, petroleum derivatives,
perfumes, any kind of fragrances or odors, and several other
materials, can cause detrimental effects on your health and lead
to chronic diseases like asthma, chronic dermatitis and severe
effects on the immune system.”).
The same letter stated that “[a]t this time I would like to
meet with you to explore and discuss what accommodation, if
any, may be effective[.]” J.A. 206. The letter advised that
Hawkins, “[a]fter discussing th[e issue] with” Ali, would have
“the authority to determine what reasonable accommodation, if
any, will be offered.” J.A. 206 (emphasis added). Then, “[a]t

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the appropriate time,” Hawkins would “submit an offer of
reasonable accommodation” to Ali. J.A. 206.
Yet that same day—without meeting with Ali or engaging
in any further discussion with anyone—Hawkins sent Ali a
letter that “[a]pproved” Ali’s request for an accommodation.
The only accommodation offered was: “Permission to work at
home full time.” J.A. 208.3
Ali had not requested to work from home, nor spoken to
anyone at EPA about potential telework. He later testified that
EPA, at the time it made its offer, did not “know[] anything of
what the situation is at my home.” J.A. 71, H’rg Tr. 49:9–10.
Ali, after all, had successfully worked in the office for the four
years prior to the heavily perfumed colleague’s arrival next to
his cubicle.
Ali responded by letter to EPA’s offer, stating that he had
“thought about working from home” and that it was “not a good
option.” J.A. 213. He reiterated his request for a private room
and proposed locations where one might be available. After
receiving no response, Ali followed up by email on July 5th
and July 11th to reiterate his request. There is no record of any
response from EPA to those emails.
In subsequent months, Ali also tried speaking directly with
Hawkins about the situation. Hawkins testified that she offered
him support for working from home, such as by offering to
supply him with a printer for home use, or allowing him to
explore hybrid work options. Ali also told an Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor that he had
3 While both the letter and approval form are dated June 21,
2012, the record does not indicate whether they were delivered to Ali
simultaneously.

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advised Hawkins that he could not work from home because
printing at home exacerbated his symptoms. EPA Br. 28–29.
Ali tried moving among cubicles, including ones farther
from the heavily perfumed employee, but continued suffering
symptoms. EPA also offered Ali an air filter, but Ali asserted
that air filters had not sufficed to trap his allergens in the past,
and so he continued to request a new office.
Ali also tried a different tack: He directly asked his co-
worker to stop wearing cologne. But the co-worker refused. In
addition, Ali sent follow-up emails in January 2013 identifying
two purportedly empty rooms in a different division’s office
area and asking to be moved to them. EPA did not respond.
Finally, in March 2013, Ali sent an email complaining
about a different colleague’s “scented products” and asking
that the colleague be moved. J.A. 241. An EPA supervisor
responded five days later that Ali “ha[d] been offered a
reasonable accommodation of 100% telework and ha[d]
declined the offer.” J.A. 241. The supervisor offered to
“reopen that discussion if [Ali] would like to reconsider”
telework, but argued that moving the colleague would not help
because all the cubicles “share[] the same common space and
recirculated air.” J.A. 241. Ali responded that proximity to
contamination mattered to his allergies and emphasized that he
“would be glad to discuss or settle the issues.” J.A. 241. It
does not appear that EPA responded to that offer for further
discussion. Ali continued sending emails as late as June 2014
reiterating his request for a contained room and identifying
spaces he thought were available. J.A. 242.
B
Ali filed a formal complaint with EPA’s Office of Civil
Rights in September 2012 that alleged EPA denied him a

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reasonable accommodation and asserted unlawful-retaliation,
hostile-workplace, and other discrimination claims. At an
agency hearing, Ali testified that he rejected the offer of 100%
remote work for several reasons. He said, first, that he “didn’t
want to take a chance on that situation again” because the last
time he had teleworked, “[l]awyers got involved.” J.A. 70–71,
Hr’g Tr. 45:8–46:4. Ali added, secondly, that his house was
“not suitable for working from home” permanently because he
lacked an “office space set up.” J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 46:15–20.
Third, he explained that he could “not print things” at home
because he “get[s an] allergic reaction to emissions from
printers[,]” and would have nowhere to go if that happened at
home. J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 47:1–4. Finally, Ali explained that his
job requires him to be “in touch with other people, talking to
them, brainstorming and that sort of thing, and get[ting] some
feedback from these people.” J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 47: 13–19. Yet
if he is excluded from working in the office, he “won’t be able
to go to the office” and “won’t be able to become a team
leader[]” or “communicate with other people.” J.A. 71, Hr’g
Tr. 47:6–9.
Hawkins testified that Ali’s requested accommodation of
a single office was impracticable because there were no vacant
offices available in her division. See J.A. 104–105, Hr’g Tr.
181:5–182:22. Hawkins also said that telework “would be
more effective than a private office” because there was “no
evidence that the air inside an office would be any different
from air circulating around a cubicle.” J.A. 44. She
commissioned an air-quality test that she said showed “no
appreciable difference between the quality of the air in an
office and in a cubicle.” J.A. 103, H’rg Tr. 176:10–19.4
4 The report found that “carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide,
relative humidity and temperature readings” were all within

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Hawkins also testified that “privacy issues” prevented her or
other managers from asking that Ali’s perfumed colleague stop
wearing his cologne. J.A. 102, Hr’g Tr. 172:15–173:5.
The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of EPA, and
the EEOC upheld that decision on appeal. J.A. 25.
C
Ali then filed suit pro se, alleging that EPA failed to
accommodate his disability and discriminated against him in
several ways. The district court granted EPA summary
judgment on all claims. As to Ali’s Rehabilitation Act claim,
the district court concluded that Ali “failed to act in good faith
during the interactive process” because he “rejected telework”
without providing any explanation. J.A. 267–268.
Ali appealed, and EPA moved for summary affirmance.
We summarily affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment with respect to all claims other than those under the
Rehabilitation Act. Order 1–2, Mar. 15, 2023.
III
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review “grants of summary judgment de novo[.]”
Waggel v. George Washington University, 957 F.3d 1364, 1371
(D.C. Cir. 2020). We view all evidence “in the light most
favorable to the” nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
“acceptable ranges” both by the cubicle and in a private EPA office.
J.A. 216–217. It also found that fungal levels were about twice as
high in the cubicle area than the office, but that both levels were
within generally acceptable ranges. J.A. 216–217.

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inferences in that party’s favor. Id.; accord Talavera v. Shah,
638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may
be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
IV
The district court erred in dismissing this case on the
ground that Ali had caused a breakdown in the interactive
process. EPA never requested any information that Ali
withheld, nor is there any evidence that Ali otherwise interfered
with EPA’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligation to offer a
reasonable accommodation or to engage in discussions with
him about a proper accommodation. Instead, this case turns on
the reasonableness of EPA’s proposed final accommodation,
which it offered without first meeting with Ali to discuss
accommodation options. On this record, answering those
questions depends upon the resolution of disputed material
facts that a jury must resolve. The district court’s grant of
summary judgment to EPA accordingly was in error.
A
There is no dispute in this case that Ali is a qualified
individual with a disability, or that Ali had been successfully
working in a cubicle in the office for over four years before
EPA moved the strongly scented employee next to him. As a
result, the Rehabilitation Act required EPA to offer Ali a
reasonable accommodation for his disability. 29 U.S.C.
§ 791(f); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). So the only question
in this case is whether, as a matter of law, EPA offered such an
accommodation, or whether the reasonableness of the offered
accommodation turns on the resolution of materially disputed
facts and circumstances, and so must be resolved by a jury.

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Yet the district court’s decision centered around the
interactive process between Ali and EPA and, in particular,
found that Ali had caused it to break down. That framing,
however, has confused a procedural means with the substantive
accommodation ends mandated by the Rehabilitation Act.
Nothing in the Rehabilitation Act requires that employers
or employees follow a specific process for identifying a
reasonable accommodation, interactive or otherwise. Rather,
EEOC regulations and our prior cases recognize that some kind
of back-and-forth between employer and employee “may be
necessary” to enable the employer “[t]o determine the
appropriate reasonable accommodation[.]” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis added); see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–32.
That is because “[f]ew disabilities are amenable to one-size-
fits-all accommodations.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 31. And an
employer will often need information about (i) the particular
nature of an individual’s disability, (ii) the effect of the
disability, the workplace’s design, or the employer’s practices
on the employee’s ability to work productively, and (iii) the
type of accommodation sought. That is information “typically
possessed only by the individual or her physician.” Id. at 31.
Employees, for their part, may need information about the
employer’s resources, capabilities, and successful past
accommodation processes for analogous disabilities, as well as
the impact of various accommodations on the proper
functioning of the workplace. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.9; Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th
Cir. 2000).
“[I]nteractive process” is the label federal regulations and
case law have given to this exchange of information, which
often can facilitate the identification of an appropriate
accommodation. Ward, 762 F.3d at 31; see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630

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app. § 1630.9. The interactive process, though, “is not an end
in itself[.]” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 347
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)). It is a means to the end of
“determining what reasonable accommodations are available”
that will allow a qualified individual with a disability “to
perform the essential job functions of the position sought.” Id.
(quoting Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1016); see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–
32 (explaining that the need for and extent of information
sharing varies from case to case).
Precisely because this process may be necessary to enable
a reasonable accommodation, we have held that an employee
that materially obstructs the informational exchange—for
example, by withholding relevant medical information—
cannot prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim. Ward, 762
F.3d at 31–35; Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1306–1307. That is
because an employer that is still reasonably waiting for
information relevant to the formulation of an appropriate
accommodation cannot be blamed for “not making [a]
reasonable accommodation[].” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);
see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–35; Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1306–1307.
For example, in Ali’s previous lawsuit, we affirmed dismissal
of his failure-to-accommodate claim because, after EPA
requested “medical documentation” that would substantiate
Ali’s disability and allow EPA to evaluate accommodations,
“Ali never provided the additional documentation that the EPA
requested despite follow-up communication from” EPA.
Pruitt, 727 Fed. App’x at 695–696. Ali thereby “abandon[ed]
the interactive process,” depriving EPA of information needed
to offer an accommodation, and “never reengaged in [the
informational exchange] before filing suit.” Id. at 696.
In contrast, the record in this case does not establish that,
as a matter of law, Ali frustrated the interactive process and

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caused a breakdown in the employer-employee dialogue. And
it certainly does not establish that Ali prevented EPA from
offering a reasonable accommodation.
To start, Ali provided all the information that EPA
requested of him. See, e.g., J.A. 205 (noting that Ali provided
additional medical information when “additional
documentation was requested”). EPA nowhere argues that Ali
withheld information needed to formulate an accommodation.
Quite the opposite. EPA readily determined that Ali was a
qualified individual with a disability and understood that a
reasonable accommodation would have to address his
workplace allergens. With all requested information in hand,
EPA was able to formulate and to offer Ali what it evidently
considered to be a reasonable accommodation: “[p]ermission
to work at home full time.” J.A. 208.
Where Ali and EPA disagree is whether EPA’s proposed
accommodation was reasonable. Ali’s suit therefore turns on
who is right about that question—not on some antecedent
process failure.
In holding otherwise, the district court faulted Ali for his
supposed “unwillingness to explain his rejection of the
telework offer[.]” J.A. 269. There are two problems with this
assignment of blame. First, whether Ali explained his rejection
is a disputed material fact. The EEO Counselor who
investigated Ali’s complaint wrote that Ali did inform EPA that
he could not work from home because printing at home, with
the attendant exposure to printer chemical fumes, would
exacerbate his symptoms. EPA Br. 28–29; but see J.A. 47
(Hawkins’ statement that Ali “did not mention these reasons”
to her).
Second, EPA never asked Ali whether he had additional
reasons for rejecting telework. In fact, the record does not

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19
indicate that EPA spoke with Ali at all about an appropriate
accommodation between the time it determined he qualified for
one and its proffer of the 100% telework accommodation.
Instead, EPA presented its offer as an apparent fait accompli,
without ever discussing with Ali the effectiveness or
reasonableness of 100% telework for Ali’s work. EPA did so
despite having told Ali that it would “meet with [him] to
explore and discuss what accommodation, if any, may be
effective,” and that it would make its accommodation offer
only “[a]fter discussing this with you,” J.A. 206 (emphasis
added).
To be sure, nothing in the law obligated EPA to engage in
an interactive process with Ali to the extent it was able to offer
a reasonable accommodation without doing so. What matters
here is that EPA’s promise to work with Ali and then prompt
breaking of that commitment does not remotely evidence, as a
matter of law, that it was Ali who caused some sort of
breakdown in the interactive process. And to the extent that
EPA claims it needed more information from Ali, a reasonable
jury could find, on this record, that it was EPA that jumped the
gun by acting without discussing options in advance with Ali.
Notably, in subsequent communications, Ali repeatedly
tried to reengage EPA in discussions about alternative
accommodations. For instance, he followed up on June 28,
July 5, and July 13, 2012, to reiterate his request for a private
working space. EPA appears, on this record, not to have
responded to any of these follow-ups. Later on, when Ali once
again complained about a colleague’s cologne triggering his
allergies, a supervisor responded that “[y]ou have been offered
a reasonable accommodation of 100% telework and have
declined the offer.” J.A. 241. That supervisor indicated a
willingness to “reopen that discussion if [Ali] would like to
reconsider” the telework offer, but not otherwise. J.A. 241. In

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20
response, Ali expressed his eagerness “to discuss or settle the
issues,” J.A. 241, but there is no evidence that EPA replied to
Ali’s invitation for dialogue. A jury could reasonably conclude
from this series of communications that EPA believed it had
fully complied with all statutory obligations by offering Ali
telework and that further conversation was unnecessary.
The dissenting opinion argues that EPA’s failure to ask for
Ali’s reasons for declining telework is irrelevant because “it is
the party who ‘fails to communicate’ and does not share
information who bears the blame for breaking down the
interactive process.” Dissenting Op. 8 (quoting Ward, 762
F.3d at 32). But we have never previously affirmed summary
judgment for the employer on interactive-process grounds
where an employee failed to volunteer information, rather than
provide requested information. Contrast Ward, 762 F.3d at
32–33 (“The interactive process broke down” when the
employer “set forth in writing precisely the information it
needed” and the employee “did not respond but instead
resigned six days later”); Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1307–1309
(similar). This is especially true when it was the employer that
broke its promise to talk with the employee—and so to hear the
employee’s views—before formulating a final accommodation
proposal. After all, EEOC guidance contemplates that the
employer “should” identify accommodations “[i]n consultation
with the individual to be accommodated[.]” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app. § 1630.9.
The dissenting opinion also argues that EPA’s failure to
engage Ali in further discussions before offering telework was
reasonable because “EPA knew that Ali had asked to work
from home in the past.” Dissenting Op. 2–3. But the record
suggests that Ali’s prior work-from-home stint played no role
in EPA’s accommodation offer. Denise Hawkins—the
supervisor who proposed Ali’s permanent work-from-home

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21
accommodation—averred that she did not “know of any time
that Mr. Ali tried to telework,” and that she “was not an EPA
employee in March 2007,” and so “ha[d] no knowledge of any
actions taken or not taken at that time.” J.A. 47, 49. Given that
evidence, a reasonable jury could choose not to credit
arguments by EPA that the accommodation proposed by
Hawkins was grounded in the belief that permanent telework
was a reasonable solution based on the 2007 experience.
In any event, this record does not establish as a matter of
law that Ali failed to communicate, given evidence a
reasonable jury could credit that he remained in near-
continuous communication with supervisors, and it was the
EPA that frequently failed to respond. In addition, Ali, after
receiving EPA’s accommodation offer, may reasonably have
expected that EPA would make good on its same-day
representation that Hawkins would reach out to him to “discuss
what accommodation, if any, may be effective.” J.A. 206.
Of course, EPA could rest on its offer of telework if that
offer was reasonable as a matter of law within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act. After all, “‘[a]n employer is not
required to provide an employee th[e] accommodation he
requests or prefers[;] the employer need only provide some
reasonable accommodation.’” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (quoting
Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996)).
But the consequence of making Ali a take-it-or-leave-it offer
without first discussing it with him is that EPA, and not Ali,
must bear the risk that evidence may show its offer was
unreasonable. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 (“[A]n employer
who fails to engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk
that it will erroneously overlook an opportunity to
accommodate a statutorily disabled employee, and thereby
violate the ADA.”). For present purposes, our only point is that
Ali’s effort to reengage with EPA and EPA’s brushing off of

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22
those entreaties negates any inference that Ali was responsible
for some kind of process failure.5
B
1
EPA argues, in the alternative, that its 100% telework offer
fully satisfied the Rehabilitation Act, as a matter of law, since
the proposed accommodation was “plainly reasonable.” EPA
Br. 12–16, 22–33. That is also the primary ground on which
the dissenting opinion would affirm. Infra at 1–6. But because
a jury could find on this record that EPA’s proposed
accommodation was not reasonable, the district court’s grant
of summary judgment cannot be upheld on that basis.6
5 The district court analogized “[t]he breakdown * * * in
process * * * to what occurred in Luolseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178
F.3d 731, 732–737 (5th Cir. 1999).” J.A. 269. There, an employer
withdrew a previously offered accommodation while offering
alternative arrangements. Id. at 733–734. The employee “stayed
silent, and quit.” Id. at 738. The employee thereby failed to engage
in the interactive process at all. As a consequence, the employee
could not proceed with a failure-to-accommodate claim since there
was no suggestion that the employer “would not consider other
possible accommodations if [the employee] brought them to its
attention.” Id. at 739. Luolseged could not be more different from
the situation here, where Ali repeatedly pressed other possible
accommodations, while EPA refused to budge from its telework
offer.
6 The district court resolved the case only on the ground that
Ali pretermitted the interactive process. This court, though, may
affirm based on any ground preserved in the record, even if not relied
upon by the district court. For that reason, we address EPA’s

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23
Deciding the reasonableness of a given accommodation
not uncommonly involves context-based decisions ill-suited
for summary judgment. See Dean v. University at Buffalo Sch.
of Med. and Biomed. Sciences, 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir.
2015). As a result, “the same accommodation might be
appropriate for one disability and inappropriate for another,” or
appropriate for one employee or one workplace and not for
another. Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement,
52 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he same disability
may require different accommodations for different
employees[.]”); see also Jankowski Lee, 91 F.3d at 896; Turner
v. Hershey Chocolate United States, 440 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir.
2006); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 833
(4th Cir. 1994); McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of
Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1993); Frye v. Aspin,
997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d
558, 562 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990).
Oftentimes, this kind of “fact-specific” question “must be
resolved by a factfinder.” Noll v. IBM Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94
(2d Cir. 2015). Yet there may be cases where the undisputed
evidence establishes that a proffered accommodation is so
plainly effective as to permit summary judgment. See Noll, 787
F.3d at 93–94 (finding no issue of material fact where IBM
offered a deaf employee “several accommodations[,]”
including “ASL interpreters, * * * transcripts [of certain
videos] upon request, and * * * [the ability to] view certain
videos (such as the CEO’s Annual Broadcast) with captioning”
to be able to learn from training videos). But so long as
sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find that a
proposed accommodation is unreasonable, summary judgment
alternative argument. United States ex rel. Health v. AT&T, Inc., 791
F.3d 112, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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24
on the basis of that accommodation is improper. See
Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1165.
Here, there is sufficient record evidence to allow a
reasonable jury to find that EPA’s telework offer was not a
reasonable accommodation for Ali. Ali testified below that he
could “not print things” at home because he “get[s] allergic
reaction[s] to emissions from printers[,]” and would have
nowhere to go if that happened at home. J.A. 71. Ali also
emphasized that, if he were absent from the office, he would
not “be able to become a team leader” or “communicate with
other people[,]” both of which are important to his job, which
requires him “to be in touch with other people, talking to them,
brainstorming and that sort of thing, and get some feedback
from these people.” J.A. 71. In addition, Ali pointed out that
his home was “not suitable for working” there permanently
because he lacked an “office space set up[.]” J.A. 71. Lastly,
Ali expressed concern about the durability of such an
arrangement because the last time he was allowed to work
remotely in 2007, “[l]awyers got involved.” J.A. 70–71.7
Given all that evidence, a reasonable jury could decide that
100% remote work would not “enable [Ali] to perform the
essential functions of [his] position.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).
Ali’s concern that full-time remote work would prevent
him from communicating with colleagues and becoming a team
leader has particular salience under the Rehabilitation Act.
Forcing an employee who was hired for an in-person position
and who had successfully worked in-person for almost fifteen
7 In Ali’s prior lawsuit, he said that working from home had
caused him to be “subjected to ridicule,” with colleagues accusing
him of “touring a foreign country” or being “on vacation.” Ali, 179
F. Supp. 3d at 65.

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25
years to switch to full-time telework as a condition of
accommodating his disability may materially alter that
employee’s conditions of employment and prospects for equal
work and advancement. These concerns sit at the heart of the
Rehabilitation Act’s aim of integrating disabled employees
into the workplace and eliminating segregation and the stigma
it creates. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3)(F) (“[D]isability is a
natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes
the right of individuals to * * * enjoy full inclusion and
integration in the economic, political, social, cultural, and
educational mainstream of American society[.]”); id.
§ 701(b)(2) (The Rehabilitation Act aims to “maximize
opportunities for individuals with disabilities * * * for
competitive integrated employment[.]”); Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (“Unjustified isolation
* * * is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability.”); Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(The Rehabilitation Act protects against “the continuing
stigma” of having “at one time had a disability,” which may
persist even after medical treatment).
Recall that an employer’s statutory obligation is to not
“discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to * * * the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f). One particular form
of discrimination outlawed by the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act is to “limit[], segregat[e], or classify[] a job applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of such applicant or employee because of the disability
of such applicant or employee.” Id. § 12112(b)(1); see 29
U.S.C. § 791(f). An employer cannot comply with its statutory
obligation to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee by
simultaneously violating the employer’s statutory obligation to

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26
avoid unreasonably limiting or segregating that same
employee. See Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059–1060 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Employer’s offer that employee work alone at a new location
was “unreasonable accommodation” that may violate ADA’s
prohibition on segregation.); cf. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.
§ 1630.2(o) (Though reassignment to a different position may
constitute a reasonable accommodation, “[r]eassignment may
not be used to limit, segregate, or otherwise discriminate
against employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments to
undesirable positions or to designated offices or facilities.”);
Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234, 240–241 (4th
Cir. 2021) (“[R]eassignment is the ADA’s accommodation of
‘last resort’ and * * * should be held ‘in reserve for unusual
circumstances.’”) (quoting Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs.,
LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1014 (4th Cir. 2020)).
Of course, remote work may well be a reasonable
accommodation in many cases. See EEOC, Work at
Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation (Feb. 3,
2003), https://perma.cc/3CYS-RZ4A. But “[n]ot all persons
with disabilities need—or want—to work from home.” Id.
Offering a willing employee a remote-work option is very
different from forcing remote work on an unwilling employee
as the sole option for accommodating that employee’s
disability. In the latter case, the factual record would have to
justify the reasonableness of such forced segregation, such as
by showing the absence of an integrative reasonable
accommodation. Cf. Duda, 133 F.3d at 1059–1060
(Employee’s claim “that he was forced to transfer to a new
location and to work alone * * * is a clear claim of forced
reassignment or of an unreasonable accommodation” for a
disability); Wirtes, 996 F.3d at 241 (“[O]ther reasonable forms
of accommodation [should] take precedence over
reassignment” so as “keep[] [disabled employees] in their

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27
present job[s] rather than “hurl[] them into an unfamiliar
position.”) (formatting modified).8
In short, whether proposed by the employer or requested
by the employee, the reasonableness of telework cannot be
presumed. Instead, like many accommodation judgments, the
reasonableness of a telework accommodation turns on whether
it will enable a specific employee “to perform the essential
functions of [his] position” in a specific workplace, which will
often be a fact-sensitive inquiry. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii);
see Owens, 52 F.4th at 1335. The same principle applies to
determining whether a telework accommodation will
unreasonably segregate or limit that employee by virtue of his
disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). As a result, requiring
an employee who has successfully worked in the office for
years to leave the workplace permanently as the sole means for
accommodating a disability—without first discussing it with
him or exploring integrative alternatives—risks running afoul
of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA’s integrative mandates,
depending on the fact-specific record in each case.
Having said that, it always remains an employee’s burden
to establish that some reasonable accommodation exists.
Carter, 840 F.2d at 65. As a result, an employee who objects
to remote work will need to show the feasibility of some other
option. Id. And an employer willing to offer remote work but
not some other accommodation may show that another
8 The ADA and Rehabilitation Act also require employers to
make reasonable accommodations so that a disabled job applicant
could perform the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B); 29 U.S.C.
§ 791(f). We need not address here whether imposing remote work
as an upfront accommodation for a job applicant might differ from
offering it as an accommodation to an employee already hired for
and previously performing in an in-person position.

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28
accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] business[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(5)(A).
There may therefore be cases where the absence of a feasible
integrative accommodation makes remote work a reasonable
option, even if the employee objects to it. All we decide here
is that, at the summary-judgment stage and on this record, Ali
met his burden to come forward with sufficient evidence
showing that remote work was not a reasonable option.9
The dissenting opinion reasons that, because Ali worked
from home for several months in 2007, EPA’s 2012 permanent
telework offer must have been reasonable. See infra at 2–5.
We agree that a reasonable jury could accept that argument.
But we disagree that it must do so as a matter of law on this
record. Specifically, whatever the circumstances that allowed
Ali to work from home for a few months five years earlier, they
do not, as a matter of law, negate Ali’s evidence that, as of
2012, (i) he lacked an adequate home-office set-up, (ii) printing
would be a health problem, and (iii) working from home would
9 As to the existence of reasonable alternatives, Ali represented
below that various private spaces were available in which he could
work, while EPA maintains that office spaces were not available.
Similarly, EPA introduced an air-quality assessment showing “no
appreciable difference between the quality of air in an office and in
a cubicle,” J.A. 103, while Ali’s doctor suggested that Ali could
“limit his occupational exposure to all allergens [by working] in an
isolated office environment,” J.A. 206. Those factual disputes are
for a jury to resolve. The dissenting opinion would resolve them
now, suggesting that allergens throughout the office or on Ali’s
commute would prevent him from working as effectively there as he
could at home. Infra at 1–2. But that conclusion ignores that Ali
worked successfully in EPA’s shared office space for four years,
until EPA chose to locate an employee known throughout the office
for his powerful perfumes right next to Ali.

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29
compromise his ability to communicate and brainstorm with
colleagues.10
Nor does the record demonstrate that the 2007 telework
stint was undisputedly successful or replicable. Ali testified
that, in 2007, he was “able to manage” telework for a relatively
“short” period. J.A. 174–175. Then too, he lacked “an office
set up,” but nonetheless made do by putting a computer on a
table “because [he] didn’t have any option.” J.A. 174.
Importantly, Ali also testified that he “didn’t have a lot of
work” in 2007, but that he does “nowadays.” J.A. 175. And
EPA ultimately required Ali to return to the office, casting
doubt on whether telework actually allowed Ali to perform his
job effectively in 2007.
2
EPA asks us to ignore Ali’s testimony enumerating many
reasons why EPA’s proposed telework accommodation was
not reasonable on the ground that these “post-hoc concerns”
were not communicated to it before this litigation. EPA Br.
28–32. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, nothing in the Rehabilitation Act or precedent
imposes a duty on the individual with a disability to turn over
10 The dissenting opinion argues that EPA did not offer Ali a
“permanent telework” accommodation, but rather a “flexible” mix of
in-person and telework as needed. Dissenting Op. 5. But EPA itself
repeatedly referred to its accommodation as involving “[p]ermission
to work at home full time,” J.A. 208, “100% working from home,”
J.A. 54, or “100% telework,” J.A. 241. In any event, the fact that
EPA now says that it would have allowed Ali to work in the office
occasionally says nothing about its willingness to accommodate his
disability in the office. On that point, its sole accommodation offer
remained work-from-home.

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30
each piece of evidence before litigation or else lose the chance
to use it. If EPA sought to elaborate the grounds for its
rejection of Ali’s proposed private-office accommodation, it
could of course introduce evidence beyond what it
communicated to Ali before litigation—like its litigation
argument that the temporary telework in 2007 supported the
reasonableness of the accommodation. We see no reason why
Ali should be held to a different standard.
Keep in mind too that, during the workplace-
accommodation process, employees with disabilities rarely
proceed with lawyers in tow. The process is meant to be
“informal” and constructive. Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). Employees may not understand at this
early juncture what additional information is needed from
them, much less that they should spontaneously offer
information that the employer never requested. Especially in a
case like this, where the employer elected to offer its proposed
accommodation without engaging the employee in discussions
as it had promised to do. Further, some of Ali’s reasons for
why 100% telework might not constitute a reasonable
accommodation—a compromised ability to work with
teammates or to take on leadership roles—involve fairly
commonplace concerns that EPA does not claim surprised it.
Of course, as noted earlier, an employee who renders their
employer unable to offer a reasonable accommodation by
withholding necessary information or concealing relevant facts
can hardly complain of being denied one. See Ward, 762 F.3d
at 32. But EPA’s argument on its alternative ground for
affirmance is about the reasonableness of its proffered
accommodation as a matter of law, not a breakdown in the
interactive process.

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31
EPA may ultimately convince a jury that its 100%
telework offer was reasonable. But, given the evidence in this
case, EPA has given us no reason to hold that a jury could not
conclude otherwise.
Second, and in any event, there is record evidence that Ali
communicated at least one of his concerns regarding EPA’s
proposed telework accommodation to EPA. During his
interview with an EEO counselor, Ali told the counselor that
he had told Ms. Hawkins “that the telework option would not
work because if he had to print [at home] then his symptoms
would get worse.” EPA Br. 28–29. Hawkins maintains that
Ali did not tell her as much. Resolution of that fact dispute is
for juries, not for summary judgment.
EPA responds that this evidence is irrelevant because (1)
Ali’s specific disability involved allergic reactions to a co-
worker’s perfume rather than printer fumes; (2) Ali did not
show he needed to print at home; and (3) EPA could have found
ways to accommodate any printing needs consistent with Ali’s
working remotely. EPA Br. 29–30. None of these arguments
allows resolution of this case at summary judgment.
On the first point, EPA itself recognized Ali’s disabling
allergies are triggered by “exposure to various kinds of
allergens that include not only environmental allergens but also
volatile organic compounds and products like paint, petroleum
derivatives, perfumes, any kind of fragrances or odors, and
several other materials.” J.A. 206. In fact, a report EPA
commissioned identified “copiers and printers” as one source
of “volatile organic compounds.” J.A. 219–220. And EPA
agreed with Ali’s doctor’s recommendation that Ali should
“limit his occupational exposure to all allergens in an isolated
office environment.” J.A. 206. Ali’s complaints that led to
EPA’s accommodation offer also specifically identified

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32
“fumes from printers” as a “toxic” irritant. J.A. 236. That all
adds up to record evidence that would allow a reasonable jury
to conclude that the disability recognized by EPA included
exposure to printer fumes.
As for the second point, EPA’s argument that Ali
introduced no evidence he would need to print at home is flatly
contradicted by EPA’s own evidence. Ali’s supervisor, Denise
Hawkins, told an EEO counselor that “Ali would need to print
articles from the Internet whether he worked at home or at the
office.” J.A. 47. She also stated that EPA was willing to
provide Ali a home printer if he lacked one, further rebutting
any inference that Ali did not need to print as part of his regular
job duties.11
On EPA’s third argument, perhaps EPA could have found
ways to solve any printing problem—but perhaps not. The
record is not conclusive either way. Since we must draw all
reasonable inferences in Ali’s favor at this stage, EPA’s
argument about unoffered and unexamined alternatives cannot
support summary judgment in its favor.
In short, Ali adduced ample evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to find that 100% telework was not a
reasonable option, including evidence that it would isolate him
at work and prevent him from collaborating with colleagues, as
well as evidence about potential inadequacies and health
hazards in any work-from-home setup. There is evidence that
11 While Ali would also need to print at work, Ali testified at his
deposition that, when in the office, he had been able to print files “far
away” from his desk, and that printing at home would not provide
that option. J.A. 89–90. It is therefore not the case that Ali “offered
no plausible reason why he would have fared better if he was printing
from a private office.” Dissenting Op. 3. Ali in fact offered an
explanation that a reasonable jury could credit (or not).

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33
Ali communicated at least one of these concerns to EPA prior
to the lawsuit, and the remainder are sufficiently evidenced to
be presented to a jury. Accordingly, EPA’s 100% telework
offer was not so plainly reasonable as to overcome all of the
disputed material facts in the record and allow summary
judgment in EPA’s favor.
3
EPA finally suggests that we may affirm because “Ali
effectively accepted EPA’s initial, informal offer of a
reasonable accommodation in the form of changing cubicles.”
EPA Br. 16. EPA argued in the district court that Ali “rejected”
that very same accommodation. Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF.19) at 7. EPA’s argument is therefore
forfeited. See Elliott v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 596
F.3d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010 (“[W]e will not consider for the
first time on appeal arguments that a [party] entirely failed to
raise in the trial court.”); Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 135
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
In any event, there is record evidence that EPA proposed
changing cubicles as only a temporary solution. One of Ali’s
supervisors offered that option following Ali’s initial
complaint as “an immediate remedy” meant for “the mean
time[,]” while EPA “implement[s] a permanent solution.” J.A.
235. Beyond that, Ali repeatedly tried switching cubicles and
explained that doing so did not solve his problem. J.A. 236.
There is accordingly record evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to conclude either that EPA never formally
offered cubicle-switching as its permanent reasonable
accommodation or that any such offer was not a reasonable
accommodation in the circumstances of this case.

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34
V
After determining that Ali had a qualifying disability, EPA
offered Ali a 100% telework option that a jury might or might
not find reasonable. The central question in this case, in other
words, turns on a quintessential factual dispute that needs to be
resolved by a jury. While EPA and Ali might have explored
other accommodation options, we cannot conclude as a matter
of law that any failure to do so rested solely on Ali or that Ali’s
conduct prevented EPA from formulating a reasonable-
accommodation proposal.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to EPA and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.12
So ordered.
12 This court appointed Daniel S. Volchok of Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP to present arguments in favor of Ali’s
position. He was assisted on the briefs by Amy Lishinki, Julie Aust,
Allison Schultz, and Joshua Feinzig, also of Wilmer Hale. We thank
each of them for their able assistance in presenting this case.

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RANDOLPH , Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I would uphold the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Environmental Protection Agency.
With several “ifs” and “buts,” the Rehabilitation Act
requires federal agencies to adapt the working conditions of its
qualified, but disabled, employees. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). Ghulam Ali, an economist
working at EPA, sought among other relief $300,000 in
damages, claiming that EPA violated those provisions.
The material facts are these. Ali began working at EPA in
1997. In 2011, he told his supervisors that a colleague’s cologne
was causing him to experience allergic reactions. He formally
requested to be moved to a private office in early 2012. EPA
instead offered to let Ali work from home. Ali rejected that
offer. Because the evidence shows that EPA’s proposed
arrangement would have enabled Ali to “perform the essential
functions of [his] position,” EPA was entitled to summary
judgment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8).
EPA determined that Ali needed an accommodation
because he suffered “detrimental effects on [his] health” from
“exposure to various kinds of allergens.” The agency accepted
Ali’s doctor’s suggestion that he “limit his occupational
exposure to all allergens in an isolated office environment.” In
EPA’s building, however, the shared HVAC system made air
quality largely identical everywhere. And even if Ali had a
private office, he would need to take public transportation to get
to the office and then regularly pass through heavily trafficked
common areas, bathrooms, hallways, and elevators. In such
settings, Ali would have no way to avoid encountering allergens.
For these reasons, EPA proposed that Ali work at home where
he would have “more control” over the air quality.

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2
Ali had already worked from home in the past. In 2007,
EPA authorized Ali to telework for approximately six months
after he experienced an allergic reaction. In his deposition, Ali
testified that he “was able to work from home” and “sustain
[him]self during that time period”—in other words, that he “was
able to manage it.” He also testified in an administrative
proceeding that working from home “became pretty nice.” In
fact, Ali found it so “nice” that, when ordered to return to the
office, he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission claiming that EPA was failing to
accommodate him by refusing to allow him to keep working
from home. Ali cannot dispute that EPA reasonably
accommodated him in 2007 by letting him work remotely. 1
So why was EPA’s identical work proposal no longer
reasonable in 2012? Ali has no rational answer and neither does
the majority opinion. The mere fact that Ali had more work to
do in 2012 does not by itself explain how or why completing
that work at home would have been unreasonable in ways that
it had not been five years earlier.
In 2012, as in 2007, Ali would have been able to perform
the essential functions of his position while working from home.
Had he worked remotely, he would have avoided the
“detrimental [health] effects” from allergens in the office that
led to his accommodation request. And EPA knew that Ali had
1 The majority opinion points to Ali’s claim in an earlier lawsuit
that his coworkers “ridicule[d]” him for working from home in 2007.
Majority Op. 24 n.7 (citation omitted). That unsubstantiated
allegation cannot be used at the summary-judgment stage. See Durant
v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

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3
asked to work from home in the past.2 Teleworking thus
promised to “address” and “mitigat[e]” the challenges Ali faced
as a result of his disability by reducing his risk of exposure to
allergens. Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d
232, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2018). That is exactly the kind of
reasonable accommodation that the law demands. See id.
Ali claims that there were enough downsides to EPA’s
proposal that a jury should get to decide whether it was
reasonable. But none of these alleged downsides is sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact. For example, Ali
testified that he “didn’t want to take a chance on” remote work
again given the dispute he previously had over returning to the
office. That is a complaint about the accommodation process,
not a claim that he could not have carried out any of his duties
from home.
Ali’s most substantial argument about why telework was
inadequate is that he would be unable to print materials from
home lest he experience an allergic reaction to emissions from
the printer. But Ali offered no plausible reason why he would
have fared better if he was printing from a private office. That
failure is critical.
Ali claimed that printer fumes in the office repeatedly
caused him to suffer adverse reactions. He regularly needed to
go to the printer to collect materials he had printed. Moving him
to a private office would not have changed that. His cubicle was
already located “far away” from the printers. So Ali’s risk of
2 Ali’s immediate supervisor in 2012 testified that she was not
aware of the events of 2007. But she formulated EPA’s offer with
“input” from and in coordination with the director of Ali’s division,
who believed that remote work was the “best option” in part because
she knew of Ali’s prior desire to work from home.

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4
exposure to printer emissions if he had a private office would
have been the same as, or perhaps even greater than, if he had
worked from home. And Ali would have had more flexibility at
home to control the location of the printer.3
His remaining objections have even less force. Ali did not
explain how or why telework would inhibit his career
development and communication with coworkers in 2012, but
not in 2007. Cf. Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). It is true that remote work has the potential to isolate
employees from their colleagues. See, e.g., Langon v. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
But, again, Ali had already worked from home for an extended
period and yet he identified no professional setbacks he
experienced as a result. To the contrary, at that time he opposed
EPA’s efforts to bring him back into the office and insisted that
he wanted to keep working from home. And Ali’s own
proposal—working out of a private office in a different
division—also would have physically isolated him from his
colleagues in the building.
Similarly, Ali’s insistence that his home’s lack of a
designated office space made it unsuitable for telework falls
short in light of his prior experience. He admitted that he
“manage[d]” to work without a formal office setup for many
months by setting up a table with a computer in his living room.
Ali described that experience as “pretty nice” and made it clear
to EPA at the time that he wanted to keep that arrangement. His
later and unexplained change of heart cannot create a genuine
3 The majority opinion credits Ali as testifying that he would not
be able to print “‘far away’ from his desk” at home. Majority Op. 32
n.11 (quoting J.A. 89–90). But Ali never testified that he would be
unable to situate a printer far from his home work area.

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5
dispute of fact. Cf. Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026,
1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Even if working from home on a longer-term basis may
have presented different challenges than his prior stint, Ali never
articulated as much. He also never discussed with EPA the
particulars of what working from home would entail. So Ali
“cannot benefit from this uncertainty” by assuming that EPA
would not have found ways to help him telework effectively.
EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 472 (5th Cir. 2009).
EPA told Ali that it was amenable to “consider[ing] other
accommodations” if full-time remote work did not prove to be
effective. For instance, EPA was “willing to buy [Ali] a printer
or any other equipment that he needed so that he could do his
job.” And Ali was informed that EPA was “completely
flexible” on allowing him to work in-office some of the time.
To frame EPA’s proposal as only offering Ali “permanent
telework,” as the majority does, Majority Op. 3, 20–21, 27–28,
obscures EPA’s willingness to tailor the work-from-home
accommodation to Ali’s needs.
In any event, Ali was entitled to a reasonable
accommodation, not a “perfect” one. Noll v. IBM Corp., 787
F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015). EPA did not bear the responsibility
of “alleviating any and all challenges” Ali’s disability presented.
Hill, 897 F.3d at 238. Nor was Ali entitled to refuse to work
from home unless he was given a “state-of-the[-]art” home
office setup. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9. The
majority opinion uncritically credits most of Ali’s complaints
about EPA’s offer as sufficient to create doubt about whether the
offer was reasonable.4 But the majority opinion nowhere
4 Ali’s last objection—which the majority sensibly ignores—is
that his wife did not “want [him] to work at home.” In the face of
repeated questioning, Ali would not give a single reason for his wife’s

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6
explains why the only other option on the table—a private
office—would have been reasonable in light of its logistical
complications and conjectural benefits. Work from home may
not have been everything Ali desired, but any reasonable jury
would find that EPA satisfied its duty under the Rehabilitation
Act to extend Ali a reasonable accommodation.
Because EPA’s offer was reasonable, it is irrelevant that Ali
would have preferred a private office. An employer need not
provide an employee’s “request[ed] or prefer[red]”
accommodation but must only “provide some reasonable
accommodation.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). The employer has “ultimate discretion” to select its
preferred reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.9. If one option is “less expensive,” for example, or
“easier . . . to provide,” the employer is free to select it for that
reason. Id. EPA rejected Ali’s request for a private office
because none was available in his division. That was reason
enough for EPA to insist on its own, reasonable proposal. It had
no duty to determine whether other EPA divisions elsewhere in
the building had vacant offices or to evict another employee
from his or her office to make room for Ali. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9(d); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1177
(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
That suffices to resolve this case. As the district court
rightly held, however, the so-called interactive process provides
an additional basis for granting EPA summary judgment.
An interactive process between employer and employee
“may be necessary” to discuss the nature of the employee’s
opposition. If Ali cannot veto an otherwise reasonable
accommodation, see infra, then neither can his wife.

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7
disability and identify potential accommodations. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3). The process is not itself a ground for holding
liable an employer that has offered the employee a reasonable
accommodation. See Brigham v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 57
F.4th 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases). But the
interactive process does matter if the employee causes the
process to break down. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31–35
(D.C. Cir. 2014). An employer has not failed to “mak[e]
reasonable accommodations,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), if the
employee abandoned the process before a resolution could be
reached or did not engage in the process in good faith.
That describes this case. EPA acted reasonably in working
with Ali to find a suitable accommodation, but then Ali short-
circuited the interactive process. The same day Ali informed
EPA officials that he had an allergic reaction, one of them
offered him the “immediate remedy” of relocating to a different
cubicle. Another helped him prepare and submit a formal
accommodation request. And when Ali provided stale and
vague medical documentation, his supervisor gave him the
opportunity to submit more detailed information. EPA then
extended him an accommodation offer—the precise “end” that
the interactive process is meant to achieve. Sansone v. Brennan,
917 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2019).
In response, Ali delivered a handwritten note that said, “I
thought about working from home. It is not a good option.”
The note offered no explanation but simply reiterated his
demand for a private office. Once Ali rejected the offer, EPA
“was not . . . required to extend another” or to negotiate further.
Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1013 (4th
Cir. 2020).
Even so, EPA continued to try to help Ali. It asked Federal
Occupational Health to conduct an air-quality assessment in a

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8
private office and Ali’s cubicle. It turned out that both locations
had similar and acceptable levels of various chemicals, volatile
organic compounds, and fungi. This indicated to EPA that there
was “no appreciable difference” in air quality between a cubicle
and an office.
EPA also explored other ways to alleviate Ali’s symptoms.
Management extended him a “standing offer” to move to
another cubicle, and so he tried a number of different cubicles
until he settled on one that he preferred. He was also offered an
air filter for his cubicle, which he declined.
These active and persistent efforts to understand Ali’s
medical condition, help him through the accommodation
process, and then seek to find a reasonable solution “bore all the
hallmarks of good faith” on EPA’s part.5 Ward, 762 F.3d at 34.
Ali, by contrast, rejected multiple suggestions without any
explanation and thus “obstructed the process.” Id. at 32 (citation
omitted).
The majority faults EPA because it “never asked Ali” why
he rejected the telework offer. Majority Op. 18. But it is the
party who “fails to communicate” who bears the blame for
breaking down the interactive process. Ward, 762 F.3d at 32
(citation omitted). One side cannot stay silent and sit on
relevant information, even if the other side has not specifically
requested that information. See EEOC v. Methodist Hosps. of
Dall., 62 F.4th 938, 950 (5th Cir. 2023); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259
5 Although EPA’s letter recognizing Ali’s disability suggested
that his supervisor would meet with him to discuss the situation before
offering an accommodation, it seems that no such discussion happened
before EPA sent Ali its telework offer that same day. Even so, Ali
made no mention of wanting a meeting (much less of expecting one)
when he responded to EPA’s offer by rejecting it out of hand.

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9
F.3d 48, 53–54 & n.11 (1st Cir. 2001); Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144
F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1998). Only Ali could say why
work from home was not to his liking, but he chose to keep that
knowledge to himself instead of sharing it with EPA to keep the
process going. EPA therefore was not obligated to probe
beyond Ali’s unexplained and emphatic rejection of the remote
work offer.6 See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d
318, 333 (3d Cir. 2003); Hypes ex rel. Hypes v. First Com.
Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Ali cannot show that EPA denied him a reasonable
accommodation, so I would affirm the district court’s order
granting EPA summary judgment.
6 Ali and EPA dispute whether he informed EPA of his concerns
about being able to print from home. Even if he raised the issue at
some point before filing suit, there is no indication that he did so in
conjunction with his note turning down EPA’s offer.

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