Doc Society and International Documentary Association v. Marco Rubio

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 13, 2024 Decided June 27, 2025
No. 23-5232
DOC SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTARY
ASSOCIATION,
APPELLANTS
v.
MARCO RUBIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND KRISTI NOEM, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:19-cv-03632)
Carrie DeCell argued the cause for appellants. With her
on the briefs were Jameel Jaffer, Katie Fallow, Anna Diakun,
Joshua Polster, and Rachel Levinson-Waldman.
Sophia Cope was on the brief for amicus curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation in support of appellants.

-- 1 of 10 --

2
Simon C. Brewer, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Brian M.
Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
Daniel Tenny and Nicholas S. Crown, Attorneys.
Before: WALKER, CHILDS and PAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS.
CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the Secretary of State may require that
applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas provide
information needed to confirm their identity and to enforce the
immigration and nationality laws. Pursuant to that authority,
the Secretary has adopted a policy (the “social media policy”)
that requires visa applicants to disclose information relating to
their activities on social media platforms.
Plaintiffs Doc Society and International Documentary
Association (IDA)—two organizations that promote
documentary filmmaking around the world—challenge the
social media policy as violating the First Amendment and the
Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs assert that they have
organizational standing to bring these claims because the social
media policy impedes their core activities. IDA additionally
asserts associational standing, on behalf of members allegedly
injured by the policy.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs have identified cognizable
injuries-in-fact traceable to the social media policy, they have
not adequately alleged that a favorable outcome in this action
would likely redress their claimed injuries. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims. We therefore
reverse the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs have

-- 2 of 10 --

3
standing, vacate the remainder of the district court’s order, and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
A.
To be admitted to the United States, non-citizens generally
must hold a visa. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a), 1182(a)(7). To secure
a visa, non-citizens must file a “proper application” before a
U.S. consular officer. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (B). A visa
application may ask non-citizens to disclose their name, age,
sex, date and place of birth, as well as “such additional
information necessary” for “the enforcement of the
immigration and nationality laws as may be by regulations
prescribed.” Id. § 1202(a) (immigrant visas); see id. § 1202(c)
(non-immigrant visas). After completing the relevant forms,
visa applicants are typically interviewed by a consular officer.
Id. § 1202(e), (h); 22 C.F.R. §§ 40.1(l)(2), 41.102, 42.62. A
consular officer may then require that visa applicants provide
additional information if the consular officer believes that the
information provided in the application is inadequate to
establish the applicant’s eligibility. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.103(b)(2),
42.63(c).
In 2019, the State Department adopted a social media
policy for visas. Applicants are now required to disclose on
their written visa applications any usernames, handles, and
other identifying information associated with accounts they
have used over the last five years to access social media
platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and
YouTube. The policy makes no exception for disclosure of
pseudonyms or usernames created for anonymous use.
B.

-- 3 of 10 --

4
Plaintiffs are two documentary film organizations that
work with filmmakers and other partners in the United States
and around the world. Doc Society is a non-profit organization
that supports documentary filmmakers. IDA is a membership-
based association of documentary filmmakers. Doc Society’s
partners and IDA’s members (collectively “Plaintiffs’ partners
and members”) include non-U.S. citizens who intend to apply
or re-apply for visas, as well as U.S. citizens who benefit from
collaboration with non-citizens.
C.
Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the social media
policy, claiming that it exceeds the Secretary’s statutory
authority, that it is arbitrary and capricious agency action, and
that it violates First Amendment rights to speech and
association. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief
and expungement of all information collected as a result of the
social media policy. The Government moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to
state a claim. The district court found that Plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged organizational standing, but that they failed
to state a claim under the First Amendment or the
Administrative Procedure Act. The district court then
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We have jurisdiction
to consider Plaintiffs’ timely appeal of the district court’s final
order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
“We begin—and end—with standing.” Murthy v.
Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024). “We review the district
court’s standing determinations de novo.” Williams v. Lew,
819 F.3d 466, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “To satisfy the

-- 4 of 10 --

5
requirements of Article III standing in a case challenging
government action, a party must allege an injury in fact that is
fairly traceable to the challenged government action, and ‘it
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Nat’l Wrestling
Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 937 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992) (quotations and citation omitted)). On this
complaint, Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that a favorable
decision vacating the social media policy is likely to redress
their claimed injuries, and they therefore lack standing to
pursue this action.
A.
We first consider Plaintiffs’ assertion of organizational
standing. To establish organizational standing, Plaintiffs must
have suffered a “concrete and demonstrable injury to the
organization’s activities.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation
omitted). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had
organizational standing, as they had: (1) “alleged a cognizable
injury-in-fact because they have been deprived of information
on which their regular activities rely”; (2) “[t]hat injury is
traceable to [the Government’s] conduct because the
informational vacuum was caused by [the social media policy];
and (3) “an order vacating the [social media policy] would
restore the desired information.” J.A. 341–42. But even
assuming that the district court is correct that Plaintiffs have
identified a cognizable injury-in-fact that is traceable to the
social media policy, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that
a favorable outcome would redress their claimed injuries.
“Redressability examines whether the relief sought,
assuming that the court chooses to grant it, will likely alleviate

-- 5 of 10 --

6
the particularized injury alleged by the plaintiff.” Fla.
Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663–64 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (en banc). Plaintiffs identify two injuries-in-fact in
support of organizational standing. Principally, plaintiffs claim
an informational injury because the policy has deterred their
partners and members from using social media to share
information that Plaintiffs require to fulfill their work
promoting documentary filmmaking. In the alternative, they
allege that the policy burdens their rights to associate and to
exchange information, because it deters their partners and
members from using social media to discuss documentary
filmmaking and from traveling to relevant events in the United
States. To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ “factual
allegations [or] their logic” must show that a favorable
outcome would redress these injuries. Renal Physicians Ass’n
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 1278
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs, however, offer no specific allegations that their
partners and members are more likely to return to their prior
use of social media or to reconsider their willingness to travel
to the United States if the social media policy were vacated.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that, on a case-by-case basis, consular
officers may require that visa applicants disclose their social
media information during visa applicant interviews. See 22
C.F.R. §§ 41.103(b)(2), 42.63(c); Pl’s Br. 12–13. Visa
applicants may feel equally compelled to limit their use of
social media by the possibility of being asked to produce their
social media information at a consular interview as by the
certainty that they will be required to do so by a blanket policy.
Or they may not. Because the complaint makes no specific
allegations either way, we do not know how Plaintiffs’ partners
and members may weigh these comparative risks. And, by
extension, we do not know the impact their partners and

-- 6 of 10 --

7
members’ perception of these comparative risks will have on
Plaintiffs’ organizational goals and activities.
To show their claimed injuries are redressable, Plaintiffs
rely primarily on allegations regarding traceability. Typically,
plaintiffs may rely on logical inferences from traceability to
establish redressability, as traceability and redressability
“overlap as two sides of a causation coin.” Dynalantic Corp.
v. Dep’t of Def., 115 F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also
Carpenter Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 6 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (“[I]f a government action causes an injury, enjoining
the action usually will redress the injury.”). Plaintiffs state
that their partners and members were deterred from engaging
on social media or traveling to events in the United States by
the social media policy, because they knew that “their speech
and associations [would] be subject to review in connection
with their visa applications,” and they “fear[ed] that their
political speech and associations on social media may subject
them to additional scrutiny and delays in the processing of their
visa applications.” Compl. ¶ 54, J.A. 31. The district court
concluded that “[t]he most logical inference from those
allegations” of traceability was that a favorable outcome would
restore the willingness of Plaintiffs’ partners and members to
use social media platforms and, by extension, provide Plaintiffs
with the information they need for their operations. J.A. 348.
Nevertheless, redressability cannot always be logically
inferred from traceability. “There might be some
circumstances in which governmental action is a substantial
contributing factor in bringing about a specific harm, but the
undoing of the governmental action will not undo the harm.”
Renal Physicians, 489 F.3d at 1278; cf. Murthy, 603 U.S. at
73–74 (noting that enjoining the Government defendants may
or may not affect third-party decisions that led to alleged
injuries). Since a consular officer may still scrutinize a visa

-- 7 of 10 --

8
applicant’s social media activities even if the social media
policy were vacated, it cannot be logically inferred that
Plaintiffs’ injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision
in this case. Because they cannot rely on a logical inference
from traceability to establish redressability, Plaintiffs
necessarily have to provide more specific allegations.1 They
have not done so on this complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
lack organizational standing.
B.
We next consider IDA’s assertion of associational
standing. Having found that both Plaintiffs had organizational
standing, the district court did not consider whether IDA alone
had associational standing. Nonetheless, because we have “an
independent obligation to assure that standing exists,”
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009), we
consider all of Plaintiffs’ assertions of standing, including
those “the district court did not reach,” Hemp Indus. Ass’n v.
DEA, 36 F.4th 278, 289 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2024). An organization
can assert associational standing on behalf of its members if, as
1 At oral argument, Plaintiffs identified Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021), as their best support for
redressability, Oral Arg. Tr. at 29:21–30:7. But Plaintiffs’ reliance
on Bonta is misplaced. Bonta concerned a blanket regulation
requiring charities to identify their donors, even though state
investigators could obtain the same information through a targeted
investigation. Id. at 602–03. Bonta does not concern standing, and it
discusses alternatives to the regulation only when asking whether the
regulation was narrowly tailored for purposes of the First
Amendment challenge. Id. at 613–15; see also In re Navy
Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It is a well-
established rule that cases in which jurisdiction is assumed sub
silentio are not binding authority for the proposition that jurisdiction
exists.”) (quotations and citation omitted).

-- 8 of 10 --

9
relevant here, “at least one of its members has standing,”
having sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact, traceability, and
redressability. See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com.,
928 F.3d 95, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
IDA contends that at least one of its members has been
injured by the social media policy. IDA states that the social
media policy has chilled the speech of “one IDA member
currently residing in the U.S. Midwest,” who “reviewed three
years of social media activity and deleted posts criticizing the
[then-]current U.S. administration.” Compl. ¶ 55, J.A. 31–32.
IDA also states that a member decided against applying for a
visa because of the social media policy, and that another “has
decided not to accept future work in the United States.” Id. ¶
56, J.A. 32. More generally, IDA adds that the social media
policy injures U.S.-citizen members by deterring IDA’s non-
citizen members from engaging with IDA online and from
applying for visas to travel to IDA-sponsored events.2 Even if
IDA has adequately alleged that individual members have
suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact because of the social media
policy, IDA has not sufficiently alleged that such injuries will
likely be redressed by a favorable decision vacating the policy.
2 IDA also suggests a First Amendment injury to support
associational standing based on the alleged deprivation of a non-
citizen member’s right to anonymous speech and free association.
This injury, Plaintiffs appear to suggest, was based on a direct harm
suffered by a party subject to the social media policy and was not
based on the chilling effect of the social media policy. But Plaintiffs
fail to provide specific allegations as to the nature of the injury or
how it would be redressed, and we will not “put flesh on [the] bones”
of an argument raised “only in the most skeletal way.” Gov’t of
Manitoba v. Bernhart, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned
up).

-- 9 of 10 --

10
IDA makes no specific allegations regarding
redressability. IDA suggests these individual members would
return to their online activities or would reconsider their
willingness to travel to the United States if the social media
policy were vacated, because they changed their behavior in
response to the policy. As with organizational standing,
however, the complaint fails to address the likelihood that these
injured members may remain unwilling to engage on social
media or to travel to the United States because of the possibility
that a consular officer could request their social media
information upon applying for a visa. Without more, IDA has
failed to allege its members’ injuries are redressable.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, on this complaint, Plaintiffs
lack organizational and associational standing. Accordingly,
we reverse the district court’s determination that it had
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims as to the merits, vacate the
remainder of the district court’s order, and remand for further
proceedings, including whether Plaintiffs should be granted
leave to amend their complaint.
So ordered.

-- 10 of 10 --