Susan Qashu, Ph.d., Also Known As Pamala L. v. Marco Rubio

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 9, 2025 Decided April 10, 2026
No. 24-5201
SUSAN QASHU, PH.D., ALSO KNOWN AS PAMALA L.,
APPELLANT
v.
MARCO RUBIO,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-01077)
Natasha R. Khan argued the cause for appellant. On the
briefs were Joanna Wasik, Madeleine Gates, Regina Wang,
Brian Wolfman, and Jonathan Corn, and Morgan F. Flitt, Matt
Grabianski, Sara Brizio, Shreya Sarin, and Grace Seifert,
Student Counsels. Ryan C. Downer entered an appearance.
Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Jane M. Lyons,
Assistant U.S. Attorney. Lshauntee J. Robertson, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WALKER, Circuit
Judge, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
WALKER, Circuit Judge: Susan Qashu sued the
Department of State for a failure to accommodate her
disability, discrimination based on that disability, and
retaliation for her disability-related complaints.
The district court granted summary judgment to the State
Department.
We affirm.
I. Background
The American Association for the Advancement of
Science promotes “science, engineering, and innovation
throughout the world for the benefit of all.” Mission and
History, American Association For The Advancement Of
Science, https://perma.cc/4FTE-A9VU. Among its many
programs is a fellowship at the State Department. The
fellowship lasts one year, with the possibility of a second year
if mutually desired by AAAS, the State Department, and the
fellow.
The State Department hired Susan Qashu as an AAAS
fellow to begin in February 2016. Because Qashu is visually
impaired, the State Department’s Disability and Reasonable
Accommodation Division provided her with several
accommodations. The accommodations included software to
help Qashu read her computer screen, and noise-cancelling
headphones to help her hear the software read to her.

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Qashu’s year did not go well. She says the State
Department gave her screen-reading software that did not work
well enough and then failed to promptly provide her with
people to read aloud from her computer screen. The State
Department also placed her in an office that was not
sufficiently quiet, and the noise interfered with the use of her
screen-reading software. In addition, she claims her supervisor
“berated” her and “screamed” at her. JA 245.
In June 2016, Qashu received a letter from AAAS offering
to renew her fellowship for another year, beginning next
February. AAAS asked her to sign and return the renewal
paperwork by June 10. When Qashu proposed delaying the
return of the renewal paperwork until June 16, AAAS agreed.
But after proposing several changes to the renewal paperwork
over the next several weeks, Qashu did not return it.
The State Department and AAAS eventually decided to
rescind her renewal offer. A new letter from AAAS, dated July
19, noted that the deadline to submit renewal paperwork had
passed “more than a month ago” and that discussions with
Qashu and the State Department showed their interests were
“not aligned to result in a mutually beneficial renewal year.”
JA 231.
In August 2016, halfway through her fellowship year,
Qashu filed a formal complaint with the State Department’s
Office of Civil Rights. In it, she alleged discrimination based
on her disability and reprisal. Her evidence included an email
documenting demeaning comments by her supervisor, the
denial of professional opportunities, and the rescission of her
renewal offer.
About seven weeks later, Qashu met with colleagues to
discuss the departure of the leader of an ocean-acidification

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portfolio. When asked directly, Qashu did not recommend
herself to take the departing leader’s place. Nor did anyone
else recommend her. And the State Department later made a
different fellow the leader.
Around the same time, on September 26, Qashu emailed
the Director of the Disability and Reasonable Accommodation
Division to compliment their work. Qashu said they had
accommodated her “COMPLETELY” and
“BEAUTIFULLY.” JA 196.
Qashu later made several accommodation requests in
October and November 2016. In October, she renewed a
request from earlier in the spring for an office space away from
loud office equipment and talkative co-workers. In November,
she requested help to have someone read what was being
displayed on her computer because her adaptive software was
not working. She also reported issues with her computer
shutting down, not displaying the login screen correctly, and
making a “grinding” sound. JA 465.
A little more than five years after her fellowship ended in
February 2017, Qashu sued the State Department. She alleged
mistreatment related to her disability in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. That Act incorporates the standards of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and applies them to federal
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f).
In her complaint, Qashu said that the State Department
failed to accommodate her disability. She also said that the
State Department discriminated against her in a manner similar
to the discrimination alleged in her August 2016 administrative
complaint. And she said that the State Department retaliated
against her for requesting an accommodation and for filing her
administrative complaint.

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The district court awarded summary judgment to the State
Department.
II. Standard of Review
The court reviews the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Ramos v. Garland, 77 F.4th 932, 934 (D.C.
Cir. 2023). All evidence will be viewed “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Minter v. District of
Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
III. Analysis
Under the standards of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, incorporated by the Rehabilitation Act, federal agencies
may not “discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also 29
U.S.C. § 791(f).
Qashu argues that by failing to accommodate her,
discriminating against her, and retaliating against her, the State
Department violated the Rehabilitation Act.
We hold that it didn’t.
A. The State Department Did Not Deny a Reasonable
Accommodation Request by Qashu
To show that an employer failed to accommodate a
disability, an employee must first prove that (1) the employee
is disabled, (2) the employer knew of the disability, and (3) the

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employer denied the employee’s request for a reasonable
accommodation. Ali v. Regan, 111 F.4th 1264, 1268-69 (D.C.
Cir. 2024); see also Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (“a reasonable accommodation is one employing a
method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of
cases” (emphasis omitted)). The employee has the “initial
burden” of showing that the preferred accommodation is
possible. Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
employee’s accommodation request would impose “undue
hardship” on the employer. Ali, 111 F.4th at 1269 (quoting 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A), 12112(b)(5)(A)). This burden is met
if the employer offers an accommodation “that is reasonable,
even if it is not the one preferred by the employee.” Id.
In this case, the first two elements are undisputed. Qashu
is disabled. And the State Department knew of her disability.
That leaves the third element — whether the State
Department denied a request by Qashu for a reasonable
accommodation.
A request for a reasonable accommodation requires an
exchange of information between the employer and the
employee, known as the “interactive process.” Ali, 111 F.4th
at 1274. The “interactive process” is the “back-and-forth
between employer and employee” that should result in enough
information for the employer to “‘determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3)). However, the interactive process is “not an
end in itself.” Id. (cleaned up). “It is a means to the end of
determining what reasonable accommodations are available”
that will allow the requestor to perform essential job functions.
Id. (cleaned up). In order to prove that an employer denied a
request for a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff must

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demonstrate that the employer “ended the interactive process
or that it participated in the process in bad faith.” Minter v.
District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned
up).
1. February 2016 to September 2016
We do not need to dwell on Qashu’s accommodation
requests from early-February 2016 to late-September 2016.1
That’s because, on September 26, Qashu complimented the
Disability and Reasonable Accommodation Division for
accommodating her “COMPLETELY” and
“BEAUTIFULLY.” JA 196. So for the time before September
26, no reasonable jury could find that the State Department
denied Qashu’s reasonable requests for accommodations.
Even if Qashu had concerns about other aspects of her
treatment on the job, the record makes clear that her concerns
did not relate to the Department’s participation in the
interactive process concerning her accommodations: Qashu’s
August 2016 EEO complaint does not contain allegations
concerning any failure of accommodation (but only alleges
discrimination and retaliation).
2. October 2016 to February 2017
Qashu claims that three requests were denied after
September 2016.
First, in October, Qashu renewed a request for a quieter
office, which she had previously requested in the spring. But
1 Qashu asserts that she made accommodation requests for shared
office equipment. However, Qashu fails to identify what
accommodations she requested or when she made any requests
involving the shared office equipment.

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that claim fails because the State Department moved her to a
new, quiet office later in the month. And in the interim, Qashu
had the use of noise-cancelling headphones, which the State
Department provided when she first started. Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“the employer need only provide some reasonable
accommodation”) (cleaned up).
Second, Qashu requested readers — people who would
read aloud to her because the screen-reading software on her
computer did not work well enough. But that claim fails
because the State Department provided her with readers when
they were available. Though weeks sometimes passed before
a reader could assist Qashu, the State Department had to
balance her requests with the requests of other visually
impaired employees. And it had already provided Qashu with
screen-reading software, imperfect though the software was.
Lastly, Qashu argues that the State Department denied a
reasonable accommodation for a desktop computer that could
run two adaptive software applications, Zoomtext and JAWS,
without issues.2 But the record demonstrates that the State
Department worked diligently with Qashu to fix her desktop
throughout her fellowship. Even though some problems took
time to resolve, causing frustrating lapses in functionality,
Qashu has not met her burden in demonstrating that the State
Department ended the interactive process or operated in bad
faith. And Qashu admits that the State Department ultimately
resolved the adaptive software issues in November 2016.
2 Though Qashu also contends that she made requests for alternative
meeting notifications on her desktop, Qashu does not point to any
notification-related requests after her first two months on the job.

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We do not fault Qashu for preferring a quiet office before
October, readers sooner than she received them, and a faster
response from IT. But disability law requires reasonable, not
perfect, accommodations. See Ali, 111 F.4th at 1286
(Randolph, J., dissenting); see also Noll v. International
Business Machines Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“employers are not required to provide a perfect
accommodation or the very accommodation most strongly
preferred by the employee”). And no reasonable jury could
find that the State Department denied a reasonable
accommodation when it participated in good faith in an
interactive process to resolve Qashu’s concerns.
B. The State Department Did Not Discriminate Against
Qashu
To show disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that she “suffered an adverse employment action . . . because
of” her disability. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196
(D.C. Cir. 2008). Once the plaintiff makes her prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the adverse
action was taken “for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006). If the
employer offers such an explanation, a plaintiff can counter by
demonstrating that the employer’s stated reasons were
pretextual. Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
Here, Qashu identifies two allegedly adverse employment
actions. The first is the State Department’s decision to rescind
its offer to renew Qashu’s fellowship. The second is its

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decision not to make Qashu the leader of an ocean-acidification
portfolio.3
Both discrimination claims fail. The State Department has
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
allegedly adverse actions. And no reasonable jury could find
that those reasons were pretextual. Id.
1. The Decision to Rescind Qashu’s Renewal Offer
Recall that the State Department at first agreed to renew
Qashu’s fellowship. Qashu does not deny that this was a bona
fide renewal offer. And when Qashu objected to several terms
in the initial renewal letter, the State Department agreed to
“modify the language” to address her concerns. JA 228. Yet
Qashu never responded to the updated offer, despite the State
Department’s request that she “confirm” that she was “on
board.” Id. A week later, the State Department rescinded its
offer.
The State Department rescinded Qashu’s offer because it
concluded Qashu was not sufficiently interested in continuing
the fellowship. That is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
And for two reasons, no reasonable jury could conclude that
Qashu has shown that the State Department’s reason was
pretextual.
First, people eager to continue a fellowship don’t usually
fail to promptly accept an updated renewal offer that addresses
their previously expressed concerns, especially when the
original deadline has been extended by more than a month.
3 Qashu also argues that there was a change in her responsibilities
after the ocean-acidification portfolio was assigned to a different
fellow, but the record indicates otherwise.

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Qashu has never claimed that she did not receive the email
agreeing to her requests or did not have an opportunity to
accept the updated offer before it was revoked. Second, if the
State Department had been inclined to discriminate based on
Qashu’s disability, it would not have offered to renew her
fellowship in June 2016 when it was already well aware of
Qashu’s vision impairment and the myriad ways that it made
her job more difficult. In other words, something changed
between June and July, and it wasn’t Qashu’s disability.
2. The Decision Not to Give Qashu The Ocean-
Acidification Portfolio
The State Department also offers a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for not assigning Qashu to lead the
ocean-acidification portfolio: No one, including Qashu herself,
proposed that she take on that role. And here again, no
reasonable jury could find that the State Department’s reason
was pretextual. It is not reasonable to fault an employer for
failing to select an employee who does not recommend herself
during a discussion about the selection.4 In addition, the record
belies Qashu’s claim that her ocean-acidification duties
4 Qashu argues that the unpleasant conduct of one of her supervisors,
Dave Sohier, is evidence of discriminatory animus that could
demonstrate pretext. But Sohier played no role in reassigning the
portfolio. Qashu also asserts that Sohier’s supervisor, Evan Bloom,
demonstrated animus by turning his back to Qashu whenever she
entered his office. But while rude, that is not enough for a jury to
infer discrimination, especially considering that Bloom came to
Qashu’s defense at other times, stating that “she was good enough to
continue for a second year.” JA 396. Cf. Hairston v. Vance-Cooks,
773 F.3d 266, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that certain statements
were not “infused with racial undertones based on common usage”
and were insufficient to infer discriminatory intent).

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dramatically changed, which further undermines an inference
that her supervisors were intent on discriminating against her.
C. The State Department Did Not Retaliate Against Qashu
Retaliation claims are subject to the same burden-shifting
framework as discrimination claims. Walker, 798 F.3d at 1091.
A plaintiff must first show that she suffered a materially
adverse employment action because “she had brought or
threatened to bring a discrimination claim.” Baloch, 550 F.3d
at 1198. Then the employer may rebut the plaintiff’s prima
facie case by identifying the legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for its decision. Walker, 798 F.3d at 1092. The plaintiff may
then attempt to demonstrate that the employer’s reason was
pretextual. Id.
Qashu claims that the State Department rescinded her
renewal offer because she requested an accommodation. But
she does not identify which accommodation request allegedly
prompted retaliation. Even if she had, as we have already held,
no reasonable jury could find pretext in the nondiscriminatory
reason given by the State Department for rescinding her
renewal — i.e., apparent lack of interest in the renewal. Supra
III.B.1.
Qashu also claims that the State Department denied her the
ocean-acidification portfolio and hired her colleague because
she filed an administrative complaint alleging discrimination.
But here again, our holding above forecloses Qashu’s claim.
No reasonable jury could find pretext in the State Department’s
nondiscriminatory reason for not assigning her the
portfolio — that reason was her failure to recommend herself
at a meeting where recommendations were solicited. Supra
III.B.2.

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* * *
We affirm the district court’s decision.
So ordered.

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