Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility and Center for Environmental Health v. Lee M. Zeldin, As Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 21, 2025 Decided May 1, 2026
No. 24-5294
P UBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL R ESPONSIBILITY
AND C ENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH,
APPELLANTS
v.
LEE M. ZELDIN, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED S TATES
ENVIRONMENTAL P ROTECTION A GENCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
P ROTECTION A GENCY ,
APPELLEES
INHANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
INTERVENOR
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:24-cv-02194)
Robert M. Sussman argued the cause for appellants. With
him on the briefs was Paula Dinerstein.
Christopher Anderson, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief

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were Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Robert N. Stander, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
Robert P. Stockman, Attorney.
Jessica L. Ellsworth argued the cause for intervenor in
support of appellees. With her on the brief were J. Tom Boer,
Susan M. Cook, Marlan Golden, and J. Andrew Mackenzie.
Catherine E. Stetson entered an appearance.
Before: P ILLARD and WALKER , Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS .
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge: This case involves an
action under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 15
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., filed in the District Court by Appellants,
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”)
and Center for Environmental Health (“CEH”), against the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Appellants allege
that EPA has failed in its responsibilities under TSCA to
address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid
(“PFOA”), one of a class of per- and polyfluoroalkyl
substances (“PFAS”), formed during the fluorination of plastic
containers.
Appellants’ complaint focuses on TSCA section 4(f), id.
§ 2603(f), which requires EPA to “initiate applicable action”
within 180 days of receiving information “which indicates to
the [agency] that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude
that a chemical substance or mixture presents a significant risk
of serious or widespread harm to human beings.” Appellants
allege that EPA possessed damning information regarding the
risks of PFOA by March 29, 2023 and that the information was

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sufficient to trigger the agency’s obligation to act under section
4(f). In the alternative, Appellants invoke TSCA section
7(a)(2), id. § 2606(a)(2), to argue that EPA has a
nondiscretionary duty to bring an enforcement action to abate
an imminent hazard posed by PFOA generated by Appellee-
Intervenor Inhance Technologies, LLC (“Inhance”), a
company engaged in the fluorination process.
The District Court dismissed the case for two principal
reasons. First, the court held that EPA had fulfilled any
nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a
request for comment, rendering Appellants’ primary claim
moot. See Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. Regan, 2024 WL
5075828, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024). Second, the court
expressed skepticism that section 7(a)(2) imposes on EPA a
nondiscretionary duty to bring an enforcement action, and,
even if it did, the court found that duty had not been triggered.
Id. at *5-6. The District Court thus concluded that Appellants’
claim “falls outside the terms of . . . TSCA’s citizen-suit
provision.” Id. at *6.
We affirm, but on grounds different from those relied upon
by the District Court. On the record before us, we conclude that
the complaint filed by PEER and CEH must be dismissed
because Appellants have failed to establish that they have
associational standing upon which PEER and CEH rely in
pursuing this action in federal court.
To establish associational standing, an organization must
show “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane
to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Implicit in the first prong

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of the Hunt test is that the organization “has either members or
any equivalent affiliates.” Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278
F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). As we explain below, PEER and
CEH have failed to make the requisite allegations to establish
their standing.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “an
association may have standing solely as the representative of
its members.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). This
form of associational standing is always available to a
traditional “voluntary membership organization” that “has
identified members and represents them in good faith.”
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 201 (2023). Alternatively, an
organization may assert associational standing if it
demonstrates that it “is the functional equivalent of a traditional
membership organization.” Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25.
Appellants have not made either showing.
Appellants are concededly not traditional membership
organizations. And to be the functional equivalent of a
membership organization, a group must be “sufficiently
identified with and subject to the influence of those it seeks to
represent.” Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. DOT, 957 F.3d
1359, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Appellants seek
to represent PEER and CEH’s “[b]oard members, supporters[,]
and staff.” Compl. ¶ 29, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 13. But PEER
and CEH have “given us no insight” into how either
organization relates with these purported supporters. Viasat,
Inc. v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Indeed, there
is nothing in Appellants’ Complaint or in the evidence
presented to the District Court that supports PEER and CEH’s
claims of associational standing.

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Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever adopted
such an expansive conception of associational standing
pursuant to which an employee’s influence over her employing
organization suffices to make her the “functional equivalent”
of a member on whose behalf the organization may assert
associational standing.
Associational standing rests on the assumption that there
is a meaningful alignment of an organization’s interests and the
interests of a constituency that the organization seeks to
protect. Under Hunt, that alignment is demonstrated where the
organization’s purpose is to advance the interests of its
members, those members are the primary beneficiaries of its
activities, and the organization is sufficiently subject to their
influence to ensure it represents their views. See Hunt, 432 U.S.
at 344-45; see also Flyers Rts., 957 F.3d at 1362. This
framework preserves the sanctity of the relationship between
an organization and its members that justifies an organization
suing as the representative of its members.
Appellants’ theory of standing in this case departs from
these settled principles. Neither PEER nor CEH claims that its
purpose is to serve its employees, nor that its employees are the
primary beneficiaries of its work. Nor are the organizations
meaningfully subject to their employees’ influence in the
relevant sense. Any influence PEER and CEH’s employees
wield arises from their roles as employees obligated to carry
out organizational objectives, not as constituents whose
interests the organizations exist to represent. Employees, in this
structure, are the means by which the organizations act, not the
constituency whose interests define those actions. Treating
PEER and CEH’s employees as “members” would collapse the
distinction between representative and represented that Hunt
presupposes.

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We therefore decline to extend associational standing to
encompass PEER and CEH’s employees acting in their
capacity as employees. Accordingly, we dismiss this action for
lack of jurisdiction because Appellants have failed to establish
their standing.
I. B ACKGROUND
A. Factual and Regulatory Background
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to protect against
chemical substances that “present an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
To achieve that objective, TSCA authorizes EPA to regulate
chemical substances that pose such risks. For example, EPA
may restrict or prohibit such chemicals through rulemaking
under section 6. See id. § 2605. Where risks are more
immediate, TSCA provides an additional complementary
mechanism: under section 7, EPA “may commence a civil
action in an appropriate district court” to address “imminently
hazardous” substances. Id. § 2606(a)(1). Section 7 also directs
EPA to “commence” appropriate action in a district court if
EPA “has not made a rule under [section 6] immediately
effective . . . with respect to an imminently hazardous chemical
substance.” Id. § 2606(a)(2).
Additionally, TSCA contains an action-forcing provision,
section 4(f), which requires EPA, within 180 days of receiving
information indicating that a chemical “presents a significant
risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings,” to either
“initiate applicable action” under relevant TSCA sections “to
prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk” or publish a
finding that the risk is not unreasonable. Id. § 2603(f). In
addition, TSCA section 20 authorizes citizen suits to compel

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EPA’s administrator “to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary.” Id. § 2619(a)(2).
Appellants allege that, by March 29, 2023, EPA possessed
“conclusive data demonstrating that PFOA (i) is carcinogenic
to humans and has no safe level of exposure and (ii) is present
in tens of millions of plastic containers . . . distributed and used
throughout the economy.” Compl. ¶ 113, J.A. 32. They allege
that receipt of such data triggered EPA’s nondiscretionary duty
under TSCA section 4(f) to “initiate applicable action . . . to
prevent or reduce . . . to a sufficient extent” the risks posed by
PFOA formation. Id. ¶ 115, J.A. 32 (citation omitted); see also
id. ¶¶ 113-114, 116, J.A. 32.
Discontent with EPA’s response to these risks, Appellants
and other interested parties petitioned EPA on April 11, 2024,
to initiate rulemaking under TSCA section 6 to prohibit the
manufacture and distribution of PFAS, including PFOA,
generated during container fluorination.
EPA granted the petition on July 10, 2024, stating that “the
agency will promptly commence an appropriate proceeding
under TSCA section 6 associated with the formation of PFOA
[and two other PFAS] during the fluorination of plastic
containers.” J.A. 40 (cleaned up). EPA added that “[a]s part of
that proceeding, [it] intends to request information” regarding
the use of fluorinated containers, available alternatives, and
measures to address the risks posed by these chemicals. Id.
EPA followed through on that commitment on September
30, 2024 by publishing a notice in the Federal Register
requesting public comment on the risks associated with PFAS
formation during fluorination, the prevalence and uses of
fluorinated containers, potential alternatives to fluorination,
and possible regulatory measures.

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B. Procedural History
Appellants filed this citizen suit under TSCA section 20 in
the District Court on July 25, 2024, two weeks after EPA
granted their rulemaking petition and before EPA published the
request for comment. Appellants allege that EPA failed to
perform its nondiscretionary duty under TSCA section 4(f) to
initiate substantive regulatory action within 180 days of
receiving information concerning the risks posed by PFOA. In
their view, neither granting a rulemaking petition nor soliciting
public comment satisfies that obligation. Appellants also allege
that EPA was required under TSCA section 7 to commence a
civil action for injunctive relief against Inhance.
EPA moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
The District Court granted EPA’s motion. See Pub. Emps. for
Env’t Resp. v. Regan, 2024 WL 5075828 (D.D.C. Dec. 11,
2024). Beginning with Appellants’ section 4(f) claim, the court
first assumed, for the purposes of deciding the motion, that
EPA was under a nondiscretionary duty to take applicable
action no later than 180 days after March 29, 2023. However,
the District Court found that EPA had fulfilled that obligation
by publishing the request for comment, which was “explicitly
designed to inform the Agency’s regulation of the relevant
PFAS.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up). Thus, EPA had “kickstart[ed]
the information-gathering process, and . . . successfully
completed the necessary first step of any rulemaking.” Id.
Accordingly, the District Court held that it lacked the power to
award Appellants effective relief on their section 4(f) claim and
that the claim was therefore moot.
Turning to Appellants’ second claim, the District Court
expressed doubt that section 7 imposes a nondiscretionary duty
“given the lack of a deadline that is ‘date-certain’ or ‘readily-

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ascertainable by reference to some other fixed date or event.’”
Id. at *5 (quoting Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 790-
91 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But even assuming that section 7 imposes
a nondiscretionary duty, the court explained that no such duty
had arisen in this case because that duty is triggered only after
EPA proposes a section 6 rule and declines to make the rule
immediately effective. EPA had not proposed such a rule, and,
thus, it was under no mandatory duty to act. Accordingly, the
District Court dismissed Appellants’ section 7 claim,
concluding that it “falls outside the terms of . . . TSCA’s . . .
‘limited waiver of the federal government’s sovereign
immunity.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Physicians Comm. for
Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Appellants timely petition for this court’s
review.
II. ANALYSIS
“[A] showing of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging’
predicate to any exercise of our jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon
Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of”
satisfying the court that it has standing to proceed. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561. At the pleading stage, “[t]he question . . . is
whether plaintiffs have plausibly alleged standing.” In re U.S.
Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 54
(D.C. Cir. 2019). At this posture, “‘we accept the well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor,’ but we do not
assume the truth of legal conclusions or accept inferences that
are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id.
(quoting Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
As noted above, we find that Appellants have failed to

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plausibly allege that either PEER or CEH has standing.
Therefore, we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
A. Associational Standing
Because Appellants are organizations, they can satisfy
“the standing requirements of Article III . . . in two ways.”
Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S. at 199. First, they “can
claim that [they] suffered an injury in [their] own right.” Id.
Second, they can claim “associational standing” as the
representatives of their members. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
Appellants assert this latter theory of “associational” or
“representative” standing.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[e]ven in the
absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing
solely as the representative of its members.” Warth, 422 U.S.
at 511 (citing Nat’l Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam)). At the same time,
the Court has been equally clear that “[t]he possibility of such
representational standing . . . does not eliminate or attenuate the
constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Id. (citing
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). In Warth, the
Supreme Court enumerated certain requirements for an
association “to invoke the court’s jurisdiction” as the
representative of its members:
The association must allege that its members, or any
one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened
injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort
that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit. So long as this can
be established, and so long as the nature of the claim
and of the relief sought does not make the individual
participation of each injured party indispensable to

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proper resolution of the cause, the association may be
an appropriate representative of its members.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court distilled these requirements in Hunt.
There, the Court explained that “an association has standing to
bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
Both Appellants fail at the threshold. “[I]mplicit in the
three-part test articulated in Hunt” is “[t]he assumption that an
organization litigates on behalf of its members.” Am. Legal
Found. (“ALF”) v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, associational standing is
typically claimed by traditional membership organizations
with “common arrangements such as professional associations,
labor unions, social clubs and the like.” Flyers Rts., 957 F.3d
at 1361. However, as explained in the introduction to this
opinion, an organization may also assert associational standing
if it demonstrates that it “is the functional equivalent of a
traditional membership organization.” Fund Democracy, 278
F.3d at 25 (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342-45). Yet, neither
Appellant has plausibly pled that it “has either members or any
equivalent affiliates.” Id.
“In determining whether [Appellants] have standing, the
court may not consider on appeal supplemental declarations
filed after entry of the judgment appealed.” Swanson Grp. Mfg.
LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “This court
and our sister circuits generally have held that declarations that

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were not part of the record before the district court at the time
of a judgment or order are not part of the record on appeal of
that judgment or order.” Id. (compiling cases). Accordingly, we
cannot consider the standing declarations that Appellants
submitted for the first time on appeal. Having reviewed the
materials that are properly before us, we find that Appellants
have not plausibly established that either PEER or CEH has
standing to represent the interests of PEER and CEH’s “[b]oard
members, supporters[,] and staff.” Compl. ¶ 29, J.A. 13.
Appellants concede that they are “not traditional
membership organizations.” Br. of Appellants 28. Instead, they
claim that PEER and CEH are the functional equivalent of such
organizations based on their relationships with those they seek
to represent, i.e., “their supporters, staff[,] and Boards of
Directors.” Id. But Appellants do not suggest that PEER’s or
CEH’s supporters have the requisite roles, responsibilities, or
influence over the organizations to alone satisfy the strictures
of associational standing. To the extent they gesture toward that
position on reply, the argument comes too late. See Fore River
Residents Against the Compressor Station v. FERC, 77 F.4th
882, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“Arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief are forfeited.”). Additionally, although
Appellants, in passing, mention each organization’s Board of
Directors as part of their claims to associational standing, they
do not develop the theory sufficiently to preserve it for our
review. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible
argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do
counsel’s work.”).
We are thus left with Appellants’ concededly novel theory
that their employees’ influence derived from their
responsibilities and roles at PEER and CEH suffice to make
them the “functional equivalents” of members on whose behalf

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the organizations may assert associational standing. Even if we
assume that some employees have some degree of influence
based on “their responsibilities and roles in the
organization[s],” Br. of Appellants 28, this is insufficient to
show that Appellants have associational standing.
B. Requirements for a Functional Equivalent of a
Traditional Membership Organization
To assess whether an organization is the functional
equivalent of a traditional membership organization, this court
looks to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333 (1977). See, e.g., Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25.
In Hunt, the Court held that a state commission – which was
not a “traditional voluntary membership organization” – had
standing to assert the claims of its constituency of apple
growers and dealers. 432 U.S. at 344. The Court offered three
reasons in support of this conclusion. First, the commission’s
“purpose [was] the protection and promotion of the” state’s
apple growers and dealers. Id. “It thus serve[d] a specialized
segment of the [s]tate’s economic community which [was] the
primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution
of this kind of litigation.” Id. Second, the apple growers and
dealers, in turn, “possess[ed] all of the indicia of membership
in an organization.” Id. “They alone elect[ed] the members of
the [c]ommission; they alone [could] serve on the
[c]ommission; they alone finance[d] its activities.” Id. Thus,
“[i]n a very real sense, . . . the [c]ommission represent[ed] the
[s]tate’s growers and dealers and provide[d] the means by
which they express[ed] their collective views and protect[ed]
their collective interests.” Id. at 345. Third, the interests of the
commission were closely tied to those of its constituency in the
pending litigation. See id.

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This court’s application of Hunt in American Legal
Foundation is instructive. We held that ALF, a “media
watchdog” group, could not assert associational standing on
behalf of members of the public who regularly consume news
broadcasts. ALF, 808 F.2d at 90. The court found that ALF
could not satisfy the first prong of Hunt because it “serve[d] no
discrete, stable group of persons with a definable set of
common interests.” Id. Rather, the court explained, “ALF’s
constituency of supporters is completely open-ended” and
could conceivably include “all who read newspapers, watch
television, or listen to the radio.” Id. Turning to Hunt’s second
prong, ALF failed to satisfy the court that its “‘supporters’
play[ed] any role in selecting ALF’s leadership, guiding ALF’s
activities, or financing those activities.” Id. ALF also failed the
third prong of Hunt because “a definable membership body
whose resources and wishes help steer the organization’s
course” is a prerequisite to ensuring the organization’s fortunes
are tied to those of its constituency. Id.
Following Hunt and American Legal Foundation, this
court has declined claims of associational standing based on an
organization’s “past work with various groups of individual
investors,” Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25, and a magazine’s
relationship with its “readers and subscribers,” see Gettman v.
DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We have also
rejected claims of associational standing where it was
“unclear” whether the organization was “the sort of
organization that would qualify as a ‘membership association’
for purposes of our standing analysis.” Sorenson Commc’ns,
LLC v. FCC, 897 F.3d 214, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted); see also, e.g., Viasat, 47 F.4th at 782 (denying
associational standing where the organization provided “no
basis to determine whether the requisite elements of standing
have been met”).

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Here, too, Appellants fail to satisfy the requirements of
associational standing under Hunt and its progeny.
C. Appellants Fail to Establish that PEER or CEH Is
the Functional Equivalent of a Traditional
Membership Organization
As discussed, Appellants argue that PEER and CEH have
standing to represent the interests of their employees,
supporters, and Boards of Directors “based on their
[employees’] responsibilities and roles in the organization.” Br.
of Appellants 28. However, this court has never held that such
influence suffices to make an employee the “functional
equivalent” of a member on whose behalf the organization may
assert associational standing. For the reasons discussed below,
we decline to do so here.
First, PEER and CEH cannot claim their employees as
“members” under the first prong of Hunt. In Hunt, the state
commission satisfied the inquiry because “its purpose [was] the
protection and promotion of the” state’s apple growers and
dealers, who were, in turn, “the primary beneficiary of its
activities.” 432 U.S. at 344. Here, by contrast, neither PEER
nor CEH claims that its purpose is to advance the interests of
its employees as such, nor that its employees are the primary
beneficiaries of its work. Rather, PEER purports to “speak[] on
behalf of environmental and public health professionals, land
managers, scientists, enforcement officers, and other civil
servants dedicated to upholding environmental laws and
values.” Compl. ¶ 31, J.A. 13-14. Meanwhile, CEH claims to
“work to protect people and the environment from toxic
chemicals by engaging with communities, consumers, workers,
government, and the private sector to demand and support
business practices that are safe for public and environmental
health.” Id. ¶ 26, J.A. 12.

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In neither case are employees the constituency whose
interests define the organization’s mission. Nor could they be.
Employees serve as the means by which an organization acts,
not the constituency it represents. Treating them as “members”
would collapse the distinction between representative (the
organization and its agents) and represented (the members) that
Hunt presupposes.
Without any sort of distinction between representative and
represented, Appellants’ claimed membership also suffers the
defect identified in American Legal Foundation. There, this
court found that the “media watchdog” group’s “constituency
of supporters” was too “open-ended” because it “could,
consistent with [its] ‘institutional commitment,’ purport to
serve all who read newspapers, watch television, or listen to the
radio.” ALF, 808 F.2d at 90. In this case, Appellants have not
identified any distinct group of “supporters” who might reflect
a constituency. And extending PEER and CEH’s already broad
institutional commitments to the “public” to also include their
own employees would render any purported constituency even
more incoherent. In sum, on the record before the court, we
conclude that PEER and CEH do not serve a “discrete, stable
group of persons with a definable set of common interests,” id.,
so as to plausibly support a claim for associational standing.
Second, Appellants cannot rely on their employees’
influence over their employing organizations to satisfy the
second prong of Hunt. Appellants argue that PEER and CEH
satisfy the “indicia of membership” inquiry because they are
“sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence of
those they seek to represent, even though they do not possess
all three indicia of membership considered in Hunt.”
Appellants’ Reply Br. 22 (cleaned up) (quoting Flyers Rts., 957
F.3d at 1362). But the relevant inquiry is not whether
individuals exert some influence over the organization; it is

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whether the organization is subject to the influence of a
constituency whose interests it exists to represent. See Flyers
Rts., 957 F.3d at 1362. That condition is not met here. Any
influence PEER and CEH’s employees exercise arises from
their roles as employees charged with carrying out
organizational objectives, not from their status as an
independent constituency to whose interests the organizations
are accountable. Influence exercised in service of the
organization’s mission is not the kind of member-driven
control that Hunt contemplates. See 432 U.S. at 344-45
(evaluating whether the commission “represents [its
constituents] and provides the means by which [its
constituents] express their collective views and protect their
collective interests” (emphasis added)). And, as discussed,
Appellants have not “given us . . . insight” into how either
organization relates with its purported supporters. Viasat, 47
F.4th at 781.
Last, as this court observed in American Legal
Foundation, a “definable membership body whose resources
and wishes help steer the organization’s course” is a
prerequisite to establishing a “linkage between [the
organization’s] interest in the outcome of this kind of
litigation and those of its supporters.” 808 F.2d at 90. Here, as
discussed under the first two prongs, Appellants have not
established that either PEER or CEH has a “definable
membership body whose resources and wishes help steer the
organization’s course.” Under these circumstances, it seems
likely that PEER and CEH will “have reasons for instituting a
suit . . . other than to assert rights of” their supporters. Id.
(quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. Allnet Commc’n
Servs., Inc., 806 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Where
such concerns are present, “we cannot conclude, as could
the Hunt Court, that the organization[s] before us [are] the

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functional equivalent[s] of . . . traditional membership
organization[s].” Id.
In American Legal Foundation, our court “counsel[ed]
restraint in straying from the framework of associational
standing crafted in Hunt, even assuming we were at liberty to
do so.” Id. at 91. The same considerations still militate against
an untethered application of Hunt. At the time American Legal
Foundation was decided, the Supreme Court had recently
“reaffirmed the principles [of associational standing]
elaborated in Hunt” in United Automobile Workers v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274 (1986). ALF, 808 F.2d at 91. This court had also
“recently rejected an invitation to relax the requirements for
associational standing articulated in Hunt when doing so
would undermine the ‘theoretical identity’ between
organizations and individuals on which associational standing
is based.” Id. (citing Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr., 806 F.2d
at 1095).
Forty years later, associational standing is so “consistently
applie[d]” and established within our jurisprudence that
challenges to it concern “only the finer points of its operation.”
FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 405 (2024)
(Thomas, J., concurring). At the same time, this court has
consistently adhered to Hunt’s limits. See, e.g., Viasat, 47 F.4th
at 781-82; Sorenson Commc’ns, 897 F.3d at 225; Gettman, 290
F.3d at 435; Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25-26. Here, too,
Appellants fall short of Hunt’s requirements. Thus, permitting
PEER and CEH to proceed would “undermine the ‘theoretical
identity’ between organizations and individuals on which
associational standing is based.” ALF, 808 F.2d at 91.
Although the organizations may be closely aligned with their
employees in an operational sense, they are not identified with
them in the representational sense that Hunt requires.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s
order dismissing the case.
So ordered.

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