Global Voice Group Sa v. Republic of Guinea

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 14, 2025 Decided May 29, 2026
No. 25-7033
GLOBAL VOICE GROUP SA,
APPELLANT
v.
R EPUBLIC OF GUINEA,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-02100)
Alexander H. Loomis argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the briefs were Dennis Hranitzky and Owen B.
Smitherman.
James H. Boykin III argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief were Carter Rosekrans, Winthrop Jordan, and
Kayahan Cantekin.
Before: H ENDERSON, KATSAS and GARCIA, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LEC RAFT H ENDERSON , Circuit Judge: This case
stems from a contractual dispute between the Republic of
Guinea (Guinea) and Global Voice Group SA (Global Voice),
a Seychellois company that offers financial and
telecommunications services. Global Voice sued Guinea,
seeking confirmation of an arbitral award and recognition of a
foreign court judgment. The district court dismissed both
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that
Guinea is immune from suit. Global Voice challenges both
dismissals.
This appeal can be resolved by applying two recent
decisions of the Court. We cannot conclude on this record that
the district court lacked jurisdiction of Global Voice’s
award-confirmation claim because its dismissal of that claim
failed to account for our holding in TIG Insurance v. Republic
of Argentina, 110 F.4th 221 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Separately, our
decision in Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corp., 143 F.4th 496 (D.C. Cir. 2025), confirms
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Global
Voice’s judgment-recognition claim. Accordingly, we vacate
the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim, affirm the
dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim and remand the
award-confirmation claim to the district court.
I. Background
“[P]remised upon the ‘perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns,’” the “doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity has been recognized since early in the
history of our Nation.” Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553
U.S. 851, 865 (2008) (quoting Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812)). Because this immunity is
“a matter of grace and comity” and not a constitutional
command, Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.

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480, 486 (1983), its contours have shifted over time,
see Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U.S. 264,
271–72 (2023) (summarizing the evolution of our Nation’s
approach to foreign sovereign immunity).
Today, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., governs whether a foreign state
is immune from suit in the United States. The FSIA provides
“a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of
immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its
political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,”
Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488, and “codifies a baseline
principle of immunity,” Turkiye Halk Bankasi, 598 U.S. at 272.
It also includes a series of “exceptions to that principle.” Id.
This framework constitutes “the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court.” Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439
(1989). Thus, in the absence of an applicable FSIA exception,
a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of a suit brought
against a foreign state. See Borochov v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 94 F.4th 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
Relevant here, the FSIA’s arbitration exception abrogates
a foreign state’s sovereign immunity if an “action is
brought . . . to enforce an [arbitration] agreement made by the
foreign state . . . or to confirm an award made pursuant to such
an agreement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). To determine whether
an arbitration agreement was “made by the foreign state,” id.,
we ask whether the agreement “legally binds that sovereign to
arbitrate with the party opposing . . . sovereign immunity,” TIG
Ins., 110 F.4th at 231.
The FSIA’s waiver exception abrogates a foreign state’s
sovereign immunity in any case “in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” 28

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U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). “The FSIA does not specifically define
what will constitute a waiver ‘by implication.’” Khochinsky v.
Republic of Poland, 1 F.4th 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)). For decades, however, we have
“followed the ‘virtually unanimous’ precedents construing the
implied waiver provision narrowly.” Creighton Ltd. v.
Government of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013,
1017 (2d Cir. 1991)).
In 2009, Global Voice entered into an agreement related to
Guinea’s telecommunications industry (Partnership
Agreement). With what entity or entities Global Voice
contracted is a matter of dispute. The Partnership Agreement
defined its parties as Global Voice and the Postal and
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Guinea (PTRA),
a public legal entity established under Guinean law. The
Partnership Agreement was signed not only by representatives
from Global Voice and the PTRA but also by Guinea’s
Minister of Telecommunications and New Information
Technologies. The Partnership Agreement obligated Global
Voice to assist the PTRA in creating a “regulatory framework”
for the Guinean telecommunications industry and to “[p]rovide
and install control tools for the State of Guinea, giving it the
capacity to view and bill” telecommunications traffic. J.A. at
219. It also contained a clause (Arbitration Agreement) that
subjected the “Parties . . . to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris.” J.A. at 225.1
1 The Partnership Agreement was amended twice. Neither
amendment altered the Arbitration Agreement and both amendments
referred to Global Voice and the PTRA as the parties to the
Partnership Agreement. The first amendment contained signatures of

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The relationship between Global Voice and the PTRA
deteriorated quickly. By early 2012, the PTRA owed Global
Voice more than $13 million in unpaid invoices. Global Voice
and the PTRA attempted to resolve their differences but those
efforts failed. In 2016, Global Voice took the position that it
was owed more than $103 million under the Partnership
Agreement. When the PTRA refused to pay, Global Voice
submitted a request for arbitration against the PTRA and
Guinea to the International Chamber of Commerce.2
The PTRA and Guinea contended that the arbitral tribunal
lacked personal jurisdiction of Guinea, arguing that the
Republic signed the Partnership Agreement “as [a] supervising
authority” only and “did not consent to being a party” to that
agreement. J.A. at 51. The arbitral tribunal rejected the
argument, concluding that Guinea was both a “party to” and
“beneficiary of” the Partnership Agreement and was therefore
bound by the Arbitration Agreement. J.A. at 55. On the merits,
the arbitral tribunal found that the PTRA and Guinea failed to
satisfy their obligations under the Partnership Agreement and
awarded Global Voice more than $21 million in damages, in
addition to fees and costs (Arbitral Award).
the original three signatories but the subsequent one was signed by
Global Voice and the PTRA only.
2 The International Chamber of Commerce is a French-based
nongovernmental organization. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns
& Co., 165 F.3d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1999). The Chamber oversees the
International Court of Arbitration, which has resolved commercial
disputes for more than a century. See Marc Jonas Block, The Benefits
of Alternate Dispute Resolution for International Commercial and
Intellectual Property Disputes, 44 Rutgers L. Rec. 1, 18 (2016).

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Hoping to annul the Arbitral Award, the PTRA and Guinea
sought relief in the Court of Appeal of Paris.3 That court
declined to annul the Arbitral Award and entered a judgment
requiring the PTRA and Guinea to pay €200,000 in costs (Paris
Judgment). Guinea and the PTRA challenged the Paris
Judgment in France’s highest court, the Cour de Cassation.4
That challenge ultimately failed.
Seeking confirmation of the Arbitral Award and
recognition of the Paris Judgment, Global Voice sued
Guinea—but not the PTRA—in our district court. Guinea
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
arguing that it is immune from suit as a sovereign state. Global
Voice disagreed, taking the view that jurisdiction was proper
under the FSIA’s arbitration and waiver exceptions.
In ruling on Guinea’s motion to dismiss, the district court
did not distinguish between Global Voice’s
award-confirmation claim and its judgment-recognition claim.
It began by considering its jurisdiction under the FSIA’s
arbitration exception and framed the relevant inquiry as
whether “Guinea was a party to the Arbitration Agreement.”
Glob. Voice Grp. SA v. Republic of Guinea, No.
1:22-cv-02100, 2025 WL 522048, at *12 (D.D.C. Feb. 18,
3 The Court of Appeal of Paris is one of several intermediate
appellate courts in France. See Frederick H. Lawson, The Approach
to French Law, 34 Ind. L.J. 531, 538 (1959); France.com, Inc. v.
French Republic, 992 F.3d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 2021).
4 Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal
System from an American Perspective, 12 B.U. Int’l L.J. 57, 65
(1994); see also id. (observing that “the mission of the Cour de
Cassation is to maintain uniformity in the application of French
law”).

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2025). It rejected Global Voice’s argument that “French
contract law” governs the question of Guinea’s status as a
party, but it did not provide its own view as to what law
governs. Id. at *13. Applying an unspecified body of law, the
district court concluded that Global Voice failed to show
that Guinea was a party to the Arbitration Agreement. Id. at
*12–14. In its view, the signature of Guinea’s Minister of
Telecommunications and New Information Technologies,
Guinea’s involvement in the negotiation of the Partnership
Agreement and the benefits Guinea received from that
agreement were insufficient to establish party status. It thus
concluded that “this suit does not fall within the FSIA’s
arbitration exception.” Id. at *14.
The district court also concluded that the FSIA’s waiver
exception does not apply. In reaching this conclusion, it did not
express a view on whether a nation implicitly waives sovereign
immunity by signing the New York Convention and agreeing
to arbitrate in the territory of another signatory. Id. at *14–15.5
In the district court’s view, even if a nation could waive
sovereign immunity by such conduct, Guinea did not waive its
immunity because it “never agreed to arbitrate the dispute that
resulted in [Global Voice’s] award.” Id. at *15.
Finding the FSIA’s arbitration and waiver exceptions
inapplicable, the district court concluded that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and accordingly dismissed the suit. Id. at
*15–16. Global Voice challenges that dismissal on appeal.
5 “The New York Convention is a multilateral treaty that
addresses international arbitration.” GE Energy Power Conversion
Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432, 438
(2020).

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II. Analysis
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
questions of law de novo and factual determinations for clear
error. Doe v. Taliban, 101 F.4th 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2024). The
district court did not evaluate Global Voice’s two claims
separately but we do so here.6 Exercising our discretion to
“consider jurisdictional questions in any order that we deem
prudent,” we begin with the award-confirmation claim. Meza
v. Renaud, 9 F.4th 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
A. Award-Confirmation Claim
We cannot sustain the district court’s conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction of Global Voice’s award-confirmation
claim. It concluded that the FSIA’s arbitration exception does
not provide a basis for jurisdiction because Guinea was not a
party to the Arbitration Agreement. See Glob. Voice, 2025 WL
522048, at *12–14. That focus is too narrow.
The FSIA’s arbitration exception applies if an “action is
brought . . . to enforce an [arbitration] agreement made by the
foreign state . . . or to confirm an award made pursuant to such
an agreement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). In TIG Insurance v.
Republic of Argentina, we rejected the argument that such an
agreement can be made only by a foreign state that was a party
to the agreement. 110 F.4th 221, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
6 Our claim-by-claim approach comports with the Court’s
general practice in FSIA cases, see Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health
Org., 29 F.4th 706, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and is particularly
appropriate here in light of “the conceptual difference between
arbitral awards and foreign court judgments on arbitral awards,”
Comm’ns Imp. Exp. S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, 757 F.3d 321, 330
(D.C. Cir. 2014).

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Recognizing that many principles of contract law “allow a
contract to be enforced . . . against nonparties,” id. at 234
(quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631
(2009)), we held that the relevant question is whether the
arbitration agreement in question “legally binds [the] sovereign
to arbitrate with the party opposing . . . sovereign immunity,”
id. at 231. To answer whether an arbitration agreement legally
binds a sovereign to arbitrate, a court must first determine
“what source of law governs the question of enforcement” of
the agreement. Id. at 235. It “must then determine whether,
under that law,” the sovereign is bound to arbitrate. Id. Here,
the district court made neither determination; that is, it failed to
determine whether, under the relevant body of law, the
Arbitration Agreement bound Guinea to arbitrate, whether as a
party or a nonparty.
We do not conclude that the district court had jurisdiction
of Global Voice’s award-confirmation claim. We hold only
that the district court should have applied the inquiry set forth
in TIG Insurance in ruling on Guinea’s motion to dismiss. We
therefore vacate the dismissal of Global Voice’s
award-confirmation claim and remand for further
proceedings.7
B. Judgment-Recognition Claim
Global Voice also challenges the district court’s dismissal
of its judgment-recognition claim and argues that jurisdiction
7 Because the district court’s failure to apply TIG Insurance is
dispositive, we do not reach Global Voice’s other arguments, “many
of which are nevertheless substantial.” United States v. Butler, 504
F.2d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The district court may
consider whether the PTRA is a “political subdivision” of Guinea
and, if so, whether the PTRA and Guinea are one and the same for
purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the

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was proper under the FSIA’s arbitration and waiver exceptions.
Both paths to jurisdiction, however, are foreclosed by our
decision in Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corp., 143 F.4th 496 (D.C. Cir. 2025).8
First, the arbitration exception abrogates a foreign state’s
immunity in an action “to enforce an [arbitration] agreement
made by the foreign state . . . or to confirm an award made
pursuant to such an agreement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). In
Amaplat, we recognized that this language makes no mention
of foreign court judgments and declined “to expand the reach
of the arbitration exception beyond its plain terms.” 143 F.4th
at 502. We therefore held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception
does not abrogate a foreign state’s immunity in an action
seeking recognition of a foreign court judgment. Id. This case
is virtually on all fours with Amaplat. It is true that the Amaplat
plaintiffs sought only recognition of a foreign court judgment
and Global Voice seeks recognition of a foreign court judgment
and confirmation of an arbitral award. But the existence of a
second claim lacks jurisdictional significance because we make
FSIA immunity determinations on a claim-by-claim basis.
arbitration or waiver exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a); see Transaero,
Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151–53 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205,
213–15 (4th Cir. 2011); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579,
591–97 (2d Cir. 2006).
8 That Amaplat was issued after the district court dismissed
Global Voice’s judgment-recognition claim does not prevent us from
relying on Amaplat as the basis for affirming that dismissal. See
Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501,
515–16 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (affirming the dismissal of claims brought
under the Alien Tort Statute in light of a later-issued Supreme Court
decision). In so relying, we decline Global Voice’s request to revisit
Amaplat.

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Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health Org., 29 F.4th 706, 714 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); see Broidy Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. State of Qatar, 982
F.3d 582, 590 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020). Amaplat therefore applies
with full force here and the FSIA’s arbitration exception does
not apply to Global Voice’s judgment-recognition claim.
Amaplat is similarly dispositive with respect to the FSIA’s
waiver exception. Global Voice contends that Guinea
implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by signing the New
York Convention. But we held in Amaplat that a nation does
not “waive immunity from judgment recognition actions” by
“[s]igning the New York Convention.” 143 F.4th at 503. This
holding also applies with equal force irrespective of whether a
judgment-recognition claim stands alone or is brought
alongside another claim. See Rodriguez, 29 F.4th at 714
(explaining our claim-by-claim approach to making immunity
determinations under the FSIA). The FSIA’s waiver exception
is therefore inapplicable.
Because neither the FSIA’s arbitration exception nor its
waiver exception provided a basis for the district court to
exercise jurisdiction, and in the absence of any other applicable
exception, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Global
Voice’s judgment-recognition claim.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s
dismissal of Global Voice’s award-confirmation claim, affirm
the dismissal of its judgment-recognition claim and remand to
the district court for proceedings consistent herewith.
So ordered.

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