Peo in Interest of UDB

26CA0587 Peo in Interest of UDB 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0587
Jefferson County District Court No. 24JV300084
Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of U.D.B., a Child,
and Concerning D.A.B. Jr.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BRENTON
Dunn and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

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¶ 1 D.A.B. Jr. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his
parent-child legal relationship with U.D.B. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and
Families filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the
then-six-year-old child based on concerns of substance use by
mother, educational neglect, and lack of stable housing. At the
time, father was serving a sentence for sexual assault on a child.
The petition included six of the child’s siblings, who have different
fathers. After numerous placement changes, the child was placed
in a foster home with five of her siblings.
¶ 3 The Division moved to terminate father’s parental rights.
Father later moved for a change of placement to his father, the
child’s paternal grandfather, with an aim toward an eventual
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between them. After a
hearing on the motions, the juvenile court denied father’s motion
and terminated his parental rights.
II. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 4 Father contends that the termination judgment was erroneous
because the juvenile court did not sufficiently consider his proposed

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less drastic alternative: placement with grandfather and an
eventual APR between father and grandfather. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 5 When considering whether to terminate a parent’s rights, the
juvenile court must consider less drastic alternatives to
termination. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. It
must do so, though, while giving primary consideration to the
child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.
People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29. For a less drastic
alternative to be viable, it must do more than adequately meet the
child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests. A.M.,
¶ 27.
¶ 6 We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings
only for clear error; if those findings are supported by the record, we
must affirm. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 44, 49.
B. Analysis
¶ 7 The juvenile court found that terminating father’s parental
rights and maintaining the current placement was in the child’s
best interest because of her strong attachment to her siblings and
her serious medical needs, both of which would be served by

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maintaining her current placement. The court was also not
convinced that grandfather could meet the child’s needs or
adequately protect her safety given his ambivalence toward father’s
prior conviction for sexual assault on a child.
¶ 8 The record supports these findings. As to the child’s bond
with her siblings, grandfather testified that he could not take the
siblings and acknowledged that he would be “concerned . . . how
[the child] would be mentally if she was separated from her
siblings.” Mother testified that she wanted to maintain the current
placement because the child had “a good bond with her siblings”
and if the child were removed the child would “have a lot of . . .
problems with that.” Moreover, the child told a caseworker that she
did “not want to live with [grandfather]” because she wanted “to
stay with her siblings.” The caseworker expressed concern about
the child’s mental health if she were separated from her siblings
because she was “very bonded to her siblings, and that ha[d] been
the only consistent thing in her life.”
¶ 9 As to concerns about grandfather’s ability to care adequately
for the child, the caseworker explained that the child had “a gray
matter disorder, . . . endocrinology issues,” and “a heart murmur.”

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These conditions required “extraordinary care.” Because
grandfather “struggled with communication throughout the case,”
the caseworker worried that he would not be able to “keep up with
[the child’s] medical appointments” or “keep track of [her]
medication.”
¶ 10 There were also concerns about grandfather’s ability to protect
the child in light of the nature of father’s conviction. The
caseworker testified that grandfather did not “fully grasp the
severity” of father’s sexual assault conviction and was “minimizing
the concern[].” The caseworker thus worried that grandfather might
not “appropriately supervise” contact between father and the child.
¶ 11 Father does not meaningfully dispute any of this evidence or
attempt to show that the juvenile court clearly erred in relying on it.
Instead, father argues that, in declining to place the child with
grandfather, the juvenile court failed to apply the statutory
presumption under section 19-3-507(1)(b.5), C.R.S. 2026, in favor
of placement with kin. To the contrary, though, the court expressly
acknowledged the presumption but found it rebutted. Specifically,
the court found that the presumption “has been rebutted” by

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evidence that “[i]t’s in the child’s best interest to remain in her
current placement.”
¶ 12 Father also argues that the Division failed to identify and
contact other paternal relatives as less drastic placement options.
But the Division is not required “to make intensive, ongoing efforts
to identify placement options with relatives,” but rather only to
“evaluate a reasonable number of the people identified by the
parents as placement options.” People in Interest of C.N.T., 2026
COA 47, ¶¶ 58-59. Here, father’s treatment plan required him to
complete a relative affidavit, but the record does not contain a
completed relative affidavit from him. And, despite maintaining
regular contact with the caseworker, father did not disclose any of
the relatives he now identifies on appeal. The caseworker testified
that the Division conducted a diligent search and contacted all
identified family and kin but discovered no additional placement
options. And father does not allege that any of the paternal
relatives he identifies for the first time on appeal could have taken
the child and her siblings, as the juvenile court found was in the

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child’s best interest. So we are not convinced that the termination
judgment is erroneous for this reason.1
¶ 13 Grandfather’s willingness to care for his granddaughter is
laudable, and we join the juvenile court in expressing our respect.
We also find no fault with the juvenile court’s observation that a
relationship with her grandfather was “very valuable” to the child.
But in light of the ample evidence that maintaining the child’s
current placement was in her best interest, we cannot say that the
juvenile court clearly erred in rejecting an APR to grandfather as a
less drastic alternative to termination of father’s rights.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 14 Father argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to investigate and develop his claim that there was a less
drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
1 On appeal, father points to Department of Human Services Rule
7.304.52(C), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4, and suggests that the
Division failed to follow its regulations regarding family search.
While father cited this regulation a single time below in the context
of arguing for placement with grandfather, he did not argue to the
juvenile court that the Division had not followed this regulation.
We decline to address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See
People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14.

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A. Applicable Law
¶ 15 Parents have a statutory right to counsel in dependency and
neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2026; A.R.
v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. Ineffective-assistance claims in such
proceedings are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). See A.R., ¶¶ 48-49, 60. To establish ineffective assistance,
a parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at ¶¶ 48,
60.
B. Analysis
¶ 16 We need not decide (and thus do not address) whether father’s
counsel’s performance fell below the range of professionally
competent assistance because father has not shown that he was
prejudiced. Father’s assertions do not specifically show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged failure to
disclose additional paternal relatives, the result of the termination
hearing would have been different.

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¶ 17 The juvenile court repeatedly noted that it was in the child’s
best interest to remain with her siblings. On appeal, father
provides information regarding other paternal relatives of the child
that, he claims, would have been good placement candidates. But
he does not allege that any of these other relations could have taken
the child and her siblings any more than grandfather could have.
So even assuming he could establish the facts alleged in his brief,
those facts would not have changed the result of the hearing.
¶ 18 Because father has not sufficiently alleged prejudice, we
decline to disturb the termination judgment. See A.R., ¶ 63.2
IV. Disposition
¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.
2 To the extent father argues that counsel was ineffective in other
respects, such as by failing to request a continuance, he did not
develop such arguments, so we will not address them. See People
in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35 (We will not consider a claim
that is “merely a bald assertion without argument or
development.”).