Peo in Interest of LTF

23CA1777 Peo in Interest of LTF 07-18-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1777

El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30167

Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.T.F. and E.T-F., Children,

and Concerning D.J.T.,

Appellant,

and

W.F.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

Yun and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 18, 2024

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County

Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee the People

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for

Appellant D.J.T.

Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for

Appellee W.F.

1

¶ 1 D.J.T. (mother) appeals the judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for L.T.F. and E.T-F. (children) to W.F. (father). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about

mother’s substance abuse and physical abuse of the children.

1

The

juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected as

to mother.

¶ 3 Shortly after, father moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR). After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile

court awarded father sole decision-making responsibility for and

physical custody of the children. The court also awarded mother

supervised parenting time and ordered a step-up parenting plan to

allow mother to progress to unsupervised parenting time. The step-

up plan was conditioned on mother engaging in substance abuse

treatment and providing a limited release of information to father.

The APR order recognized that the “parties may modify the

1

The Department named two additional children in the petition,

but they are not subject to the order allocating parental rights.

2

parenting time.” The court certified the APR order into a domestic

relations case and closed the dependency and neglect case.

II. Analysis

¶ 4 The Children’s Code applies to determinations of allocations of

parental responsibilities in dependency and neglect proceedings.

See People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶¶ 18-19. Once an APR

order is entered, a certified copy of the juvenile court’s order is filed

into the district court, and jurisdiction transfers to the district

court. See § 19-1-104(6)(b), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 5 An APR is within the juvenile court’s discretion, and we will

not disturb its determination when that ruling is supported by the

record. See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo.

App. 2003). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

“manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies the law.” People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,

¶ 60.

¶ 6 Mother doesn’t challenge the juvenile court’s APR order as it

relates to decision-making authority or custody. Instead, she

contends that the juvenile court erred by ordering that she “could

3

not petition the domestic relations court to step down and adjust

her [parenting time] until certain conditions were met.”

¶ 7 But we see nothing in the APR order that places any

restrictions or preconditions on mother’s ability to seek

modification. Indeed, the APR order plainly recognizes that the

parties may modify parenting time. And while the APR order

outlines conditions to allow mother to step up to unsupervised

parenting time, the order neither tethers the parenting time

provisions to mother’s ability to move to modify parenting time in

the district court nor restricts mother’s right to seek modification in

the district court. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2023 (allowing a

district court to modify parenting time “whenever such order or

modification would serve the best interests of the child”).

2

¶ 8 Because nothing in the APR order prevents mother from

moving to modify parenting time in the district court, we disagree

that the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering the APR.

2

It doesn’t appear that mother has asked the district court to

modify parenting time. Thus, we have no basis to consider mother’s

theory that such a motion would be denied because she hasn’t met

certain conditions.

4

III. Disposition

¶ 9 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.