Marriage of Beck

23CA0820 Marriage of Beck 08-15-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0820

Jefferson County District Court No. 22DR30455

Honorable Russell Klein, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Thomas Albert Beck,

Appellant,

and

Tina Marie Beck,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE YUN

Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 15, 2023

Peak Legal Services, LLC, Todd Narum, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

The Wollard Law Firm, PC, Eric D. Wollard, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, for

Appellee

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¶ 1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Thomas Albert

Beck (husband) and Tina Marie Beck (wife), husband appeals the

district court’s allocation of the marital estate. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The parties married in 1997. During the marriage, wife

sustained serious injuries in a car accident and received over

$600,000 from personal injury settlements related to that accident.

¶ 3 The parties later separated, and in 2019, husband moved to

Oklahoma to help his son start Whitewater Hash (a marijuana

wholesale business). Shortly after the business closed, husband

initiated the dissolution case.

¶ 4 After a hearing, the district court dissolved the marriage. In

allocating the marital estate, the court found that the parties’ home

was worth $775,000, they had used $410,000 from wife’s personal

injury settlement to purchase it, and they had used at least some of

the settlement proceeds to complete $240,000 in renovations to the

home. The court awarded the home to wife and, in dividing its

marital equity, the court ordered that wife first receive $410,000

and that the parties then equally divide the remaining $365,000.

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¶ 5 The court also found that husband dissipated $262,000 when

he used marital funds for Whitewater Hash and concealed what

happened to those funds. The court factored these funds into its

allocation of the marital estate and ordered that wife’s share of

these funds ($131,000) be offset against husband’s share of the

marital home.

¶ 6 As for the remaining marital assets, the court allocated to

husband about $30,000 more of the marital equity from their

vehicles, accepted the parties’ allocation of bank accounts, and

divided their personal property. And the court ordered wife to pay

husband approximately $16,000.

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II. Property Division

¶ 7 Husband contends that the district court’s property division

must be reversed because the court (1) improperly awarded wife a

disproportionate share of the marital estate by giving her

substantially more of the marital home’s equity and (2) incorrectly

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To the extent husband suggests that the district court erred by

calculating this payment “[t]o equalize the parties,” he does not

develop any legal or factual argument in support of that suggestion.

We therefore do not address it. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29.

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found that he dissipated $262,000 in connection with Whitewater

Hash. We reject his contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital

estate in such proportions as it deems just. See § 14-10-113(1),

C.R.S. 2023; LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 61. We will not disturb

the court’s decision absent a showing that it abused its discretion,

meaning that it acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair manner, or it misapplied the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros,

2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28; see also Hall v. Moreno, 2012 CO 14, ¶ 54

(explaining that, when reviewing the court’s decision, we consider

whether the decision fell within the range of reasonable options).

B. The Marital Home’s Equity

¶ 9 We are not persuaded that the district court abused its

discretion by awarding wife a disproportionate share of the marital

home’s equity.

¶ 10 A court’s division of the marital estate must be equitable based

on the facts and circumstances of the case; it does not need to be

equal. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. To achieve an

equitable division, the court considers all relevant factors, which

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may include the spouses’ contributions to the acquisition of marital

property, the value of property set aside to each spouse, the

spouses’ economic circumstances, and any change to the value of

the spouses’ separate property. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d).

¶ 11 The funds from a personal injury settlement arising during the

marriage, as well as the assets acquired from that settlement, are

marital property. In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 50 (Colo.

App. 1993). In dividing those marital assets, the court should

consider the effect the personal injury had on the marital estate,

which may include lost income, medical expenses, inability to meet

marital obligations, and any other relevant circumstances. Id.; see

also In re Marriage of Fields, 779 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶ 12 The court found that most of the marital estate’s equity was

comprised of the marital home, which it found was worth $775,000.

In dividing the home’s equity, the court found that wife had suffered

significant injuries from her car accident, which restricted her

physical activity and prevented her from returning to her previous

lifestyle. It also found that her injuries precluded her from working

a full-time job and that she could not earn a regular income. The

court further found that wife had endured numerous medical

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procedures and will continue to incur medical expenses after the

dissolution. And it found that the parties used a significant portion

of wife’s personal injury settlement to purchase the marital home

and that these funds were designed to help address wife’s future

needs. After considering these and other relevant circumstances,

the court determined that wife was entitled to a greater share of the

home’s equity and allocated to her $592,500 and to husband the

remaining $182,500.

¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings on wife’s economic

circumstances, ongoing medical needs, and contribution to the

acquisition of the marital home. Wife testified that she sustained

severe back injuries from the accident and that due to those

injuries, she could not work more than twenty hours per week and

would require accommodation from any future employer. She said

that her estimated economic losses over her lifetime from the

accident may exceed $1 million and that presently she only received

an annuity payment of $1,037 per month. Wife also testified that

she was constantly in pain, had undergone approximately twenty

surgeries and medical procedures, and required ongoing medical

care to treat her injuries. And she said that the parties purchased

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the marital home by using $410,000 of the proceeds from the

personal injury settlement and that they also relied on those funds

to pay for the home’s renovations. Given these circumstances, the

court acted within its discretion by allocating the home’s equity

disproportionately in wife’s favor. See § 14-10-113(1)(a), (c); Wright,

¶ 10 (affirming an unequal allocation supported by the record).

¶ 14 Husband argues that the court failed to consider his present

economic circumstances. Not so. In its ruling, the court found that

husband was unemployed and received $2,200 per month from his

social security benefits. It also noted that he had about forty years

of experience operating construction businesses and working in the

construction industry and that, before the dissolution proceeding,

he helped his son operate Whitewater Hash. Although husband

highlights other evidence that he believes established a financial

situation worse than wife’s, we presume that the court considered

all the evidence when it reached its decision. See In re Marriage of

Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989). And we may not set aside its

resolution of the conflicting evidence when, as here, the record

supports its decision. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141,

¶ 45; see also In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo.

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App. 2009) (“[T]he court need not make specific findings as to each

statutory factor as long as the findings made are sufficient to allow

the reviewing court to determine that the decision is supported by

competent evidence.”).

¶ 15 Husband also argues that the court did not adequately

consider the effect wife’s injury had on the marital estate when it

allocated this asset. See Simon, 856 P.2d at 50. But as noted

above, the court considered the factors it found relevant, including

wife’s lost income, the restrictions on her earning potential, and her

medical procedures and expenses. See id. While husband believes

that other factors, such as his financial support of the family

following the accident, could have led to a more equal allocation, it

was within the court’s sole discretion to weigh the relevant factors

when determining an equitable allocation of the marital estate, and

we must defer to its determination supported by the record. See

Powell, 220 P.3d at 959; see also Evans, ¶ 45.

¶ 16 We thus are not persuaded that the court abused its

discretion by allocating to wife a disproportionate share of the

marital home’s equity. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525,

538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n appellate court must not disturb the delicate

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balance achieved by the [district] court in [its] division of property

. . . unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”).

C. The Dissipated Funds

¶ 17 Husband next contends that the district court erred by finding

that he dissipated $262,000 related to Whitewater Hash because

the evidence did not establish that he used the funds for an

improper or illegitimate purpose in contemplation of the divorce.

We disagree.

¶ 18 Generally, a court values marital property as of the date of the

permanent orders hearing when the hearing precedes the entry of

the decree. § 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Turner, 2022 COA

39, ¶ 15. But when the court finds that a party dissipates a marital

asset, that asset is valued as of the date it last existed. In re

Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996); see also

Hunt, 909 P.2d at 542 (noting that a court may consider a party’s

economic fault when allocating the marital estate). Dissipation can

occur when a party depletes a marital asset for improper or

illegitimate purposes in contemplation of the dissolution. See Finer,

920 P.2d at 331; In re Marriage of Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992,

995 (Colo. App. 1999). When a reasonable showing of dissipation is

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made, it becomes incumbent on the party who depleted the marital

asset to establish that it was depleted for a proper purpose. In re

Marriage of Martinez, 77 P.3d 827, 830 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 19 Whether a party dissipated marital property is a question of

fact, and we will uphold the court’s determination when the record

supports it. See id. at 830-31.

¶ 20 The court found that husband took $262,000 of the parties’

marital funds and put it into Whitewater Hash. The court found

that husband had a duty to disclose and respond to discovery

requests concerning the business and his use of these marital

funds. The court also found that husband had the ability to

provide this information, noting that he had access to the

business’s financial information, was involved in its operations, and

possessed “boxes” of documents related to the business. But, the

court found, husband had taken no steps to account for the

$262,000. The court acknowledged that husband submitted a

document purportedly showing the business’s financials, but it

found that this document was likely created “in an effort to prevent

the [c]ourt from making an adverse inference” against him and that

it had “no credible evidentiary value.” The court determined that,

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given husband’s conduct and his concealment of the financial

information concerning the depletion of these funds, he had

dissipated this $262,000.

¶ 21 Contrary to husband’s suggestion, the record supports the

court’s reasonable inference that he improperly depleted these

funds in contemplation of the divorce. Wife testified that husband

took these marital funds after the parties had separated and during

a time when they were discussing the dissolution of their marriage.

Indeed, wife said that husband told her that if she cooperated with

funding Whitewater Hash he would “give [her a] divorce.” Moreover,

the record reveals that within months of purportedly closing

Whitewater Hash, husband filed the dissolution petition. See In re

Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 27 (“[W]e must construe the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”). And

given the court’s finding, supported by the evidence, that husband

failed to disclose financial information related to Whitewater Hash

and his use of the $262,000, the court could draw a negative

inference against him and find that he improperly depleted these

marital funds. See In re Marriage of Sgarlatti, 801 P.2d 18, 19

(Colo. App. 1990). From this evidence, the court reasonably

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concluded that husband improperly depleted the $262,000 in

contemplation of their divorce. See Martinez, 77 P.3d at 830-31; cf.

In re Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. App. 1984)

(“Just as a spouse’s actions in contribution to and preservation of

the marital estate are relevant factors, . . . so are a spouse’s actions

in depletion of the marital estate.”) (citations omitted).

¶ 22 Still, husband argues that the business merely failed and that

his testimony showed that he used the funds for a proper purpose.

But the court disagreed, finding that his testimony and other

evidence concerning Whitewater Hash and his use of these funds

“was not credible.” We must defer to this finding. See In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that the

district court determines the credibility, weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence); see also Martinez,

77 P.3d at 831 (noting that the district court was free to disbelieve a

party’s testimony that his expenditures of marital funds were not

improper dissipation in contemplation of the dissolution).

¶ 23 The district court therefore did not err by determining that

husband dissipated $262,000 of marital funds.

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III. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.