Marriage of Propst

23CA2155 Marriage of Propst 11-27-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2155
Arapahoe County District Court No. 16DR924
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Chad Alan Propst,

Appellee,

and

Courtney Ann Propst,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Tow and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 27, 2024

The W Law, Carolyn C. Witkus, Jon Eric Stuebner, Denver, Colorado for
Appellee

West Group Law & Policy, Suzanne M. Taheri, Englewood, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding between

Courtney Ann Propst and Chad Alan Propst, Courtney1 appeals the

district court’s order that adopted the magistrate’s order

terminating spousal maintenance. We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 The eleven-year marriage between Courtney and Chad was

dissolved in 2018. They have three children together. While

married, Chad worked in the insurance industry and earned

around $500,000 per year. Courtney worked as a stay-at-home

parent for most of the marriage. She previously worked as a

pharmaceutical sales representative and earned approximately

$80,000 per year.

¶3 As a part of the stipulation to dissolve their marriage, the

parties entered into a memorandum of understanding in which

Chad agreed to pay Courtney $11,500 per month in spousal

maintenance for five years. The stipulation also resolved a separate

civil action Chad had brought against Courtney in 2017 for

1 Because Courtney and Chad share the same last name, we refer to

them by their first name to avoid confusion. We mean no
disrespect by doing so.

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defamation, after learning that she had publicly accused him of

multiple crimes, including sexually abusing their children and

participating in a sex trafficking ring. The parties agreed to dismiss

all civil claims and counterclaims with prejudice, and the court

permanently enjoined Courtney from discussing the basis of the

allegations in the defamation suit.

¶4 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the

department) filed two different dependency and neglect actions

related to their children. The first action was initiated during the

marital dissolution proceedings and was dismissed after a trial.

The second action was opened shortly after the marriage’s

dissolution was final.

¶5 In 2019, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent

or neglected as to Courtney and terminated her parental rights.

The court dismissed the dependency and neglect claim as to Chad

and awarded him sole custody of the children. The court also

issued a permanent protective order against Courtney that required

her to remove defamatory internet postings about Chad and

prohibited her from publishing similar information about him and

the children.

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¶6 In 2019, Courtney moved for an award of permanent

maintenance alleging that she was unable to work because of

several medical ailments including post-traumatic stress disorder

and skin cancer diagnoses. The magistrate denied her motion after

noting that the juvenile court had previously found that she did not

meet the criteria for either medical condition.

¶7 In May 2020, Chad filed a contempt motion against Courtney

after she once again publicly accused him of sexually abusing the

children. Chad responded by filing a second defamation lawsuit.

The court found Courtney in contempt for violating the permanent

injunction and sentenced her to five months in jail.

¶8 While she was serving her sentence, Courtney continued

making defamatory statements about Chad. The department

subsequently filed three additional contempt actions against

Courtney for violations of the permanent protection order. After

finding her in contempt in each action, the court sentenced her to

multiple consecutive six-month jail terms.

¶9 Courtney failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the

second defamation action, and the district court entered judgment

against her in the amount of $1.75 million. In November 2020,

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Chad moved to reduce or terminate the spousal maintenance award

on the bases that (1) his financial circumstances significantly

changed because of substantial attorney fees associated with the

continuous litigation; (2) Courtney’s defamatory statements caused

him to lose business opportunities that reduced his income;

(3) Courtney’s financial needs had decreased because of her

incarceration; and (4) he was now the children’s sole financial

provider.

¶ 10 On April 6, 2021, the magistrate entered an order terminating

spousal maintenance. The magistrate found that Courtney’s

conduct — namely, her continued noncompliance with court orders

and filing of a “substantially vexatious” spousal maintenance

motion — caused Chad to incur approximately $700,000 in legal

costs and that there was a continuing and substantial change in

circumstances that rendered the original maintenance award

unfair.

¶ 11 Courtney appealed the magistrate’s order to the district court.

The district court adopted the magistrate’s findings regarding

whether there was a substantial and continuing change that

justified the modification of the original maintenance award but

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remanded the matter for further findings regarding the parties’

current financial circumstances and their ability to earn a living.

Neither party appealed this order.

¶ 12 In July 2023, the magistrate terminated Courtney’s spousal

maintenance after making the following additional findings:

• Chad’s bank statements supported his contention that he

lacked the ability to continue paying spousal

maintenance.

• Chad incurred over $500,000 in attorney fees related to

the dependency and neglect, defamation, and contempt

actions.

• Courtney’s financial circumstances had changed because

of her incarceration and the termination of her parental

rights.

• Chad was solely responsible for the children’s expenses

including significant therapy costs.

• Courtney’s testimony regarding her alleged expenses and

debts was not credible.

• Courtney had approximately $260,000 in her bank

account.

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• Due to her incarceration, Courtney had limited financial

needs and living expenses.

• Courtney previously earned approximately $80,000 per

year as a pharmaceutical representative and should be

able to work productively upon her release.

¶ 13 Courtney timely sought district court review of the

magistrate’s second order. The district court reiterated that

because it had previously adopted the magistrate’s finding that

there were changed circumstances sufficient to warrant

modification, the only issue on remand was what maintenance

amount, if any, was appropriate based on the parties’ current

financial circumstances and ability to earn a living.

¶ 14 After thoroughly reviewing the magistrate’s remand order, the

district court found that the additional findings related to Chad and

Courtney’s current financial circumstances and ability to make a

living justified the decision to terminate spousal maintenance.

Courtney appeals the district court’s order.

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II. Spousal Maintenance Modification

¶ 15 Courtney argues that the district court erred by concluding

the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by terminating spousal

maintenance. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 16 Spousal maintenance modification orders are reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 7. A

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of

Nevedrova, 2024 COA 112, ¶ 6.

¶ 17 A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision under C.R.M.

7(a) may not alter the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9); In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022

COA 29, ¶ 22. Our review of the court’s decision is effectively a

second layer of appellate review, and, like the district court, we

must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless there is no

record support for them. Id.

¶ 18 If a party seeks review of a decision to which the parties’

consent to the magistrate hearing the case was not required, any

appeal must be taken within twenty-one days of the date of the

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written order (or within fourteen days if the parties were present for

the court’s ruling). C.R.M. 7(a)(1), (5). Parties who fail to seek

district court review of a final order within the applicable deadline

may not seek review of the order before this court. C.R.M. 7(a)(11).

¶ 19 After the briefs were filed in this appeal, another division of

this court concluded that a reviewing district court has no authority

to remand a case to the magistrate for additional findings. See In re

Marriage of Matheny, 2024 COA 81, ¶ 19. Instead, the district

court is required to conduct additional proceedings as necessary to

fully adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the parties. Id. at ¶ 22.

Neither party raised the issue addressed in Matheny, whether in

their principal briefs or through supplemental authority. In any

event, because we now have a definitive final order from the district

court, we do not address the propriety of the district court’s remand

order.

B. Spousal Maintenance Modifications

¶ 20 When evaluating an initial request for spousal maintenance, a

court must make findings concerning (1) the amount of each party’s

income; (2) the marital property assigned to each party; (3) the

parties’ financial resources; (4) reasonable financial need as

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established during the marriage; and (5) federal tax implications for

both the payor and the recipient of the maintenance award. § 14-

10-114(3)(a)(I)(A)-(E), C.R.S. 2024. Maintenance awards must be

“in an amount and for a term that is fair and equitable to both

parties and shall be made without regard to marital misconduct.” §

14-10-114(2).

¶ 21 In contrast, to prevail on a motion to modify an existing

maintenance order, the moving party has the burden of showing

that there are changed circumstances that are “so substantial and

continuing as to make the terms unfair.” §14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S.

2024. In evaluating whether to terminate or modify the

maintenance award, the court may consider the factors outlined in

section 14-10-114(3). § 14-10-114(5). But the primary focus in

such circumstances is the parties’ present financial circumstances

and ability to earn. Young, ¶ 37.

C. Application

¶ 22 Courtney essentially raises two challenges to the magistrate’s

findings. She argues first that the magistrate improperly focused

on her alleged culpability in causing Chad to incur significant debt

rather than focusing on her financial needs. Second, Courtney

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contends that the magistrate failed to consider the pertinent factors

under section 14-10-114(3), particularly, her financial needs and

Chad’s substantial income. We address and reject each contention

in turn.

1. Culpable Behavior

¶ 23 The district court found that Chad incurred over $500,000 in

attorney fees related to the litigation of the defamation and

contempt actions and noted that Chad lost out on promotion

opportunities due to Courtney’s defamatory conduct. Because the

order acknowledges the correlation between Chad’s financial losses

and Courtney’s conduct, she argues that the magistrate improperly

based the termination of spousal maintenance on Courtney’s

perceived culpability. We disagree.

¶ 24 Although the district court considered the financial

consequences of the ongoing litigation, the order neither ascribes

blame to Courtney nor states that her behavior is the reason for

terminating the existing maintenance award. Rather, the district

court emphasized the magistrate’s findings to explain how, under

the present circumstances, Chad could not afford to continue

paying maintenance. Because neither the district court nor the

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magistrate abused its discretion by acknowledging the financial

consequences of Courtney’s actions, Courtney’s argument fails.

2. Section 14-10-114(3) Factors

¶ 25 Courtney also argues that the district court erred by adopting

the magistrate’s order because the magistrate did not apply section

14-10-114(3)’s factors. Courtney is mistaken.

¶ 26 In Young, a division of this court held that when determining

whether to modify maintenance, a court may but is not required to

consider the statutory factors outlined in section 14-10-114(3).

Young, ¶ 12. And irrespective of whether the court considers the

section 14-10-114(3) factors, the parties’ present financial situation

and ability to earn are the central factors in determining whether

modification or termination of the existing maintenance award is

appropriate. Young, ¶ 37. Although we are not bound by the

division’s holding in Young, we see no reason to depart from it.

¶ 27 Thus, we reject Courtney’s argument that the district court

and the magistrate in this case erred by not considering all of the

section 14-10-114(3) factors. Consistent with the directive in

Young, the magistrate made extensive findings about the parties’

current financial circumstances and their ability to earn a living.

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¶ 28 The magistrate found that Courtney had $260,000 in her bank

account and that her testimony regarding outstanding debts was

not credible. Furthermore, the magistrate concluded that

Courtney’s claims about her health were unfounded, and she

should be able to find gainful employment upon her release from

custody. Additionally, the magistrate noted that she was no longer

financially responsible for the children.

¶ 29 In comparison, the magistrate found persuasive Chad’s

evidence that he could not afford to continue paying maintenance.

The magistrate also found persuasive the evidence that Chad

presented concerning the children’s significant expenses, including

the extensive therapy needed to address their emotional distress

resulting from Courtney’s conduct. It was also undisputed that, at

the time of the hearing, Chad was the children’s sole provider.

¶ 30 Because there was record support for the magistrate’s finding

that Courtney could adequately support herself and that Chad’s

present financial situation had significantly deteriorated, the

district court did not error by concluding that the magistrate did

not abuse his discretion by terminating spousal maintenance.

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III. Disposition

¶ 31 The district court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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