Parental Resp Conc M L

23CA1848 Parental Resp Conc ML 12-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1848
Boulder County District Court No. 22DR30217
Honorable Bruce Langer, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.L., a Child,

and Concerning Logan Smith,

Appellee,

and

Maike Leberl,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Yun and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 19, 2024

Bridge to Justice, Bruce Wiener, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee

Russel Murray III, P.C., Russel Murray III, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this proceeding to allocate parental responsibilities between

Maike Leberl (mother) and Logan Smith (father), mother appeals the

denial of her motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. We affirm and remand to the district court for a

determination of father’s reasonable appellate attorney fees.

I. Background

¶2 Mother is an Austrian citizen. She spends time and works in

both Austria and Colorado. Father lives and works in Colorado.

The parties have one child, born in Austria in May 2021.

¶3 In June 2022, while mother was in Colorado, father filed a

petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) in the

district court in Boulder. At that point, the child had traveled

between Austria and Colorado several times, spending a total of

about eight months in Colorado.

¶4 Mother moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that under the

Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA), §§ 14-13-101 to -403, C.R.S. 2024, the district court did

not have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination.

According to mother, Colorado was not the child’s home state, the

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child did not have significant connections to Colorado, and, in any

event, Colorado was an inconvenient forum for the APR proceeding.

¶5 The court held an evidentiary hearing at which two experts in

Austrian law testified. Following the hearing, the district court

ruled that while neither Colorado nor Austria was the child’s home

state,1 the child had significant connections to Colorado, allowing

the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The court later

entered orders allocating parental responsibilities.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶6 Mother contends that the district court erred by determining

that it had significant-connection jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

We disagree.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶7 In Colorado, district courts are courts of general jurisdiction.

Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709, 712 (Colo. 2009). Their

jurisdictional powers are only limited by statute or constitutional

provision. Id.

1 For purposes of the UCCJEA, a foreign country is treated as if it

were another state. See § 14-13-104(1), C.R.S. 2024.
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¶8 “The UCCJEA is one such limiting statute: It ‘prescribes the

circumstances under which jurisdiction that otherwise is conferred

by constitution or statute can be exercised in a given case.’” People

in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Under the

UCCJEA, a Colorado court has jurisdiction to make an initial child

custody determination only under the following circumstances:

• Colorado is the child’s home state (meaning the state in which

the child has lived for at least 182 consecutive days

immediately before the commencement of the proceeding) on

the date the proceeding begins. §§ 14-13-201(1)(a), 14-13-

102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

• No other state can exercise “home state” jurisdiction under a

similar provision of law, and (1) the child and at least one

parent have a significant connection with Colorado and

(2) substantial evidence is available in Colorado concerning

the child’s care, protection, training, and personal

relationships. § 14-13-201(1)(b).

• All courts having jurisdiction under subsection 14-13-

201(1)(a) or (b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the

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ground that Colorado is a more appropriate forum. § 14-13-

201(1)(c).

• No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under

subsections 14-13-201(1)(a), (b), or (c). § 14-13-201(1)(d).

¶9 On appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, we review the court’s findings for clear error

and its legal conclusions de novo. Sterling Ethanol, LLC v. Colo. Air

Quality Control Comm’n, 2017 COA 26, ¶ 7.

B. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Issue Orders

¶ 10 The district court first examined whether it had home state

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Because the child had not lived in

Colorado for the 182 consecutive days preceding father’s filing of

the petition, the court concluded that Colorado was not the child’s

home state.

¶ 11 But it also concluded that Austria was not the child’s home

state. The comparable Austrian jurisdictional standard — “habitual

residence” — was not satisfied because the child had not lived in

Austria for six consecutive months. See § 14-13-201(1)(b); S.A.G.,

¶ 26.

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¶ 12 Next, the district court examined whether it had significant-

connection jurisdiction. To do so, the court looked at mother’s and

the child’s ties to Colorado. Mother appears to argue that the court

erred by considering irrelevant facts in concluding that it had

jurisdiction.2 We are not persuaded.

¶ 13 The UCCJEA does not define the term “significant connection”

or provide specific factors for courts to consider in making the

significant connection determination. Under our case law, however,

courts may consider factors including the parent’s and child’s

length of residence in the state, the parent’s and child’s connections

to family and friends, and the parent’s employment in the state.

See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.C.B., 2015 COA 42,

¶¶ 18, 21. Other jurisdictions have likewise held that courts should

consider a “wide variety of ties” in determining whether a child has

2 To the extent mother argues that substantial evidence of the

child’s care, protection, and relationships is not available in
Colorado or that Colorado is an inconvenient forum, see § 14-13-
207(1), C.R.S. 2024 (a district court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if “it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under
the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum”), the arguments are too undeveloped for us to
review. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020
COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12, aff’d, 2021 CO 56.
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a significant connection to a particular state. See, e.g., DeLima v.

Tsevi, 921 N.W.2d 89, 96-97 (Neb. 2018) (courts should consider

factors including the child’s relationship with extended or blended

family members, enrollment in school or daycare, participation in

social activities, access to medical care, and the parent’s

employment or family ties).

¶ 14 Here, the district court properly considered various factors in

making its factual findings.

• The child had resided in Colorado for “60% of her life.” See

B.C.B., ¶ 17 (considering the length of time the child spent in

Colorado prior to the commencement of the APR action); State

v. Winegar, 2017 ND 106, ¶ 13 (concluding that significant-

connection jurisdiction existed where, among other factors,

the child had spent the “majority of his life” in the state).

• Mother owns a rental property in Boulder. See In re Ari S.,

285 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 124 (Ct. App. 2021) (mother’s land

ownership in the state showed a significant connection).

• Mother had “been working [in Boulder] while on parental leave

in Austria” and had registered a limited liability company in

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the state. See B.C.B., ¶ 18 (considering parent’s employment

history); In re Marriage of Diaz, 845 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Ill. App.

Ct. 2006) (considering fact that mother intended to find

employment in the state); cf. Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 3

(in determining whether a parent “presently reside[s]” in a

state for purposes of the UCCJEA, the court should consider

where a parent maintains her professional licensure).

• Mother had collected unemployment benefits in Colorado. See

H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054,

1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (relying on mother’s frequent moves

between two states and her receipt of social services); DeLima,

921 N.W.2d at 96 (listing “the availability of government

assistance” as a factor).

• Mother paid taxes in Colorado. Cf. Brandt, ¶ 3.

• Mother has a Colorado driver’s license. See Wagner v. Wagner,

2005 PA Super 377, ¶ 26 (considering as one factor showing a

significant connection that parent had a driver’s license from

the state).

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• Maternal grandparents who share caretaking responsibilities

have a permanent residence in Boulder. See B.C.B., ¶ 18;

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Grant ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 307

P.3d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (considering where

grandparents live if they contribute to the care of the child); In

re T.B., 497 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App. 2016) (considering

grandparent residence when children lived with grandparent

for period of time).

• Mother has a boyfriend, described as the child’s “factual

father,” who lives and works in Colorado. See B.C.B., ¶¶ 18,

21 (considering family ties and caretaking responsibilities); In

re S.J.A., 272 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. App. 2008) (considering

fact that mother’s fiancé lived in the state).

¶ 15 And, contrary to mother’s assertion, the court also considered

evidence of mother’s connection to Austria. The court noted that

mother and the child “have Austrian citizenship[,] have access to

Austria’s generous social benefits . . . [and mother] has a job

awaiting her [in Austria].” However, the court did not find credible

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mother’s testimony that she planned to settle permanently in

Austria.

¶ 16 Because mother failed to include a transcript of the

jurisdiction hearing in the record on appeal, we must presume that

all of the court’s findings are supported by record evidence. See In

re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 The court appropriately weighed the evidence adduced at the

hearing and concluded that the child had a more significant

connection to Colorado than to Austria. Mother essentially asks us

to reweigh the evidence and make alternative credibility findings to

reach a contrary conclusion. But we may not reweigh evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the district court. See In re

Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22. Accordingly, we discern no

error in the court’s determination that it had significant-connection

jurisdiction.

¶ 18 Mother’s conclusory reference to the “Hague Convention” does

not convince us otherwise. Mother did not raise the Hague

Convention in the district court (except to argue that it did not

apply to this case), she does not explain which provision of the

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Hague Convention applies, and she does not cite any authority

relevant to the issues in this case.3

C. Attorney Fees

¶ 19 Father requests an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees

on the ground that mother’s appeal is frivolous. See C.A.R. 39.1; §

13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 20 An appeal may be frivolous as filed or as argued. Calvert v.

Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45. An appeal is frivolous as filed when

there is “no legitimately appealable issue[ ].” Id. It is frivolous as

argued when the appellant “fail[s] to set forth . . . a coherent

assertion of error, supported by legal authority” in a manner

consistent with C.A.R. 28. Id. (quoting Castillo v. Koppes-Conway,

148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).

¶ 21 We conclude that mother’s appeal is frivolous as argued.

Although we have done our best to discern mother’s argument on

3 The two cases on which mother relies, Monasky v. Taglieri, 589

U.S. 68 (2020), and In re S.L., 503 P.3d 244 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021),
involve child abductions. As the Kansas court explained, the Hague
Convention applies when a child who was habitually residing in one
signatory state is wrongfully removed to, or retained in, another
state, and it requires the latter state to order the return of the child.
503 P.3d at 258. This case does not involve a child abduction.
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appeal, her briefing did not assist us much in that endeavor. The

briefing neither “coherently explain[s] why the district court erred”

nor includes any citations to relevant authority that show an error

occurred. Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d 857, 860 (Colo. App. 2011);

Castillo, 148 P.3d at 292 (appeal was frivolous as argued where

opening brief failed to set forth identifiable assertions of error with

citations to authorities).

¶ 22 Furthermore, in violation of this court’s appellate rules, see

C.A.R. 28(a)(5), mother’s briefing does not contain citations to the

record. The appellate rules are not mere technicalities but are

designed to facilitate appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015

COA 66, ¶ 10. When a party fails to direct us to relevant portions of

the record, “appellants place the burden of searching records on us”

and on the opposing party. O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631

(Colo. App. 2010). Mother also failed to provide a transcript of the

jurisdiction hearing, which likewise hindered our ability to conduct

a thorough review.

¶ 23 Based on these deficiencies in mother’s briefing, we exercise

our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the case to the district

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court to determine reasonable appellate attorney fees. However,

father is entitled only to fees incurred in preparing and filing the

answer brief and not to fees expended in filing motions, which, in

our view, unnecessarily expanded the appellate litigation.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded with

instructions for the trial court to award father his reasonable

appellate attorney fees.

JUDGE YUN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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