Peo v. Walker

23CA0967 Peo v Walker 12-26-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0967
Douglas County District Court No. 22CR557
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher Courtland Walker,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 26, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lauren Sposa, Deputy State
Public Defender, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Christopher Courtland Walker, appeals the

judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty

of one count of attempted unlawful sexual contact and one count of

unlawful sexual contact. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution presented evidence at trial from which the

jury could have found the following facts.

¶3 On the night of the events in question, K.P. and her fiancé,

E.T., were living in a hotel room. They had spent the day getting

groceries, and when they returned to their room, K.P. was drunk

and bickering with E.T. As they walked in, they noticed that the

room smelled like marijuana. So, the couple called the front desk

and asked to switch rooms. A staff member came up to investigate

but then left, indicating he needed to check to see if it was possible

to switch rooms.

¶4 Walker, a repeat customer of the hotel, was in a room down

the hall. After overhearing the couple’s request, he knocked on

their door and invited them to his room. He claimed to be an

employee of the hotel and asked them to join him while they waited

for updates about their possible room change.

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¶5 Once everyone was inside Walker’s room, he offered the couple

whiskey and they accepted. Walker then told E.T. that their new

room was ready, and that he should go to the front desk for the

keys. When E.T. arrived at the front desk, however, the employee

there said no one had sent for him and that there was no room

ready.

¶6 E.T. returned to Walker’s room, where he found Walker

offering an already heavily intoxicated K.P. drugs. Over K.P.’s

protests, E.T. attempted to help K.P. back to their room. However,

K.P. was so inebriated that she was unable to walk on her own.

E.T. asked Walker to help him guide K.P., and he did so.

¶7 When they arrived at their room, however, Walker pulled K.P.

inside and closed the door, leaving E.T. locked out. E.T. pounded

on the door and tried to unlock it to no avail and then, believing

that his key had stopped working, went to the front desk to get a

new key. While at the front desk, he learned Walker did not work

for the hotel.

¶8 E.T. returned to the room to try his new key. It did not work.

He pounded on the door while shouting “Police are here,” and

Walker opened it. As E.T. entered, he saw K.P. naked and facedown

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on the bed, “biting her arm.” Her “rearend was in the air” and there

was “blood down both insides of her thighs.” Walker was wearing

all of his clothing except for shoes and socks.

¶9 A fight between K.P., E.T., and Walker ensued. Walker then

left the room. K.P. followed him into the hallway but hit her head

against the wall and fell. E.T. then called 911.

¶ 10 Police arrived a few minutes later. K.P. was on the floor in the

hallway, with E.T. and Walker standing over her. She was shouting

for E.T., severely under the influence, and did not realize she was

naked. At least one police officer suspected that both E.T. and

Walker might have been under the influence of methamphetamine

but he never confirmed his suspicions.

¶ 11 The police took K.P. to the hospital for a forensic examination.

She initially refused to be examined, stating that she did not have

sex and nothing physical happened between herself and Walker.

However, she later reported to the nurse that she “knew sexually

something was wrong.”

¶ 12 Although the examination revealed signs of blunt trauma on

K.P.’s cervix, potentially caused by a fingernail, and an abrasion on

her labia, the examiner stated it was impossible to determine if

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these injuries occurred simultaneously or if they were the result of

nonconsensual sex. DNA collected from Walker’s underwear and

K.P.’s genital swabs contained a mixture of the victim’s DNA and

the defendant’s DNA. Other swabs, including a penile swab from

Walker, were inconclusive.

¶ 13 Several days later, Walker was charged with attempted sexual

assault against K.P. and third degree assault against E.T. The jury

found Walker guilty of the lesser included offenses of attempted

unlawful sexual contact and unlawful sexual contact and acquitted

him of the third degree assault charge. The trial court sentenced

Walker to 364 days in county jail.

II. Motion for Mistrial

¶ 14 Walker contends the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion for a mistrial after a prosecution witness

referenced K.P.’s history of sexual trauma. We are not persuaded.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 15 Before trial, Walker filed a motion in limine that sought to

preclude evidence about K.P.’s history of suffering sexual abuse,

which was unrelated to the case against Walker. The prosecutor

did not oppose the motion and said that she did not “anticipate

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anything like this coming in.” She also told the court that she

would “advise the witnesses regarding past sexual history trauma

and habits or conduct.”

¶ 16 During trial, however, while testifying for the prosecution

about K.P.’s initial indecision about undergoing a sexual assault

examination, a police officer made the following statement:

And while I was speaking with her [at the
hospital, about] how she was confused with
the timeline of them all being in [Walker’s]
room and her saying that he was making
advances on her and she’s been a victim of this
in the past . . . .

¶ 17 At this point, the prosecutor cut the officer off. Defense

counsel objected, and then at a bench conference, moved for a

mistrial. Counsel argued that the statement evoked sympathy for

K.P., whose credibility was central to the prosecution’s case, and

claimed the prosecutor had violated a court order by failing to

advise the officer that he should steer clear of K.P.’s history while

testifying. The prosecutor maintained that she had, in fact, taken

steps to ensure that the witness knew of the prohibition, but the

witness stated that he had not been told of or read any such

instruction.

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¶ 18 Although the court was critical of the prosecutor’s failure to

confirm that the witness had been advised of the restrictions on

testimony about K.P.’s past trauma, it declined to order a mistrial.

The court acknowledged the importance of K.P.’s testimony to the

case, but it noted, among other things, that the prosecutor did not

intentionally elicit the offending testimony and quickly stopped the

witness once she realized what was happening, and that the jury —

which had actively submitted questions throughout the trial — did

not inquire further about the disclosure. The court offered to

provide a curative instruction to the jury, but defense counsel

declined out of concern that such an instruction would only

highlight the inappropriate testimony.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 A mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if

prejudice to a defendant is so substantial that it cannot be

remedied by other means. People v. Dore, 997 P.2d 1214, 1221

(Colo. App. 1999). A trial court can better evaluate any adverse

effect that improperly admitted evidence might have on a jury than

can a reviewing court. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, the

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trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed on

review. People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo. App. 1996).

¶ 20 Factors relevant to whether a mistrial is warranted include the

nature of the inadmissible evidence, the weight of admissible

evidence of guilt, and the value of a cautionary instruction. People

v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶ 11.

C. Analysis

¶ 21 We perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

denying Walker’s motion for a mistrial.

¶ 22 The reference to K.P.’s history of sexual trauma was not

substantially prejudicial. While we agree that the statement

violated the court’s order (and the parties’ agreement), it was both

vague and fleeting. Cf. People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo.

1984) (a single, unelicited, nonspecific reference to the defendant’s

past criminal acts did not require a mistrial). The prosecutor did

not intentionally elicit the statement; moreover, she immediately cut

the witness off when she realized what was happening and never

referred to the testimony again. See People v. Everett, 250 P.3d

649, 663 (Colo. App. 2010) (affirming denial of mistrial when the

improper reference was “fleeting and ambiguous” and not “an

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intentional circumvention” of the trial court’s order excluding the

evidence). In addition, based on its observation of the jury —

which, the court noted, had been very active throughout the trial —

and the lack of any follow-up questions about the statement from

the jurors, the trial court inferred that the officer’s reference to

K.P.’s history did not have an adverse effect on the jury. See Ned,

923 P.2d at 274-75.

¶ 23 The trial court also offered to instruct the jury to disregard the

improper testimony. The defense chose not to request such an

instruction to avoid calling attention to it. Thus, the defense

tactically decided not to pursue one means of curing any potential

prejudice. See Vigil v. People, 731 P.2d 713, 716 (Colo. 1987); cf.

Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1054 (Colo. 2005) (“The

lack of an objection may demonstrate the defense counsel’s belief

that the live argument, despite its appearance in a cold record, was

not overly damaging.” (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965,

972 (Colo. 1990))).

¶ 24 The isolated reference to K.P.’s past trauma was not so

prejudicial that it necessitated a mistrial. Thus, we conclude that

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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s

motion.

III. Cross-Examination

¶ 25 Walker contends that the trial court violated his constitutional

right to confrontation when it limited his cross-examination of K.P.

Specifically, Walker claims that his attorney should have been

permitted to question K.P. about the fact that the first time she

accused Walker of assault and agreed to cooperate with the

prosecution was while she was being held in the Arapahoe County

Jail on pending misdemeanor charges. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 26 Walker was charged with attempted sexual assault and third

degree assault in May 2022. However, it was not until nearly nine

months later, in February 2023, that prosecutors spoke with K.P.

about the incident. Their first meeting took place pursuant to a

subpoena in the Arapahoe County Jail, where K.P. was being held

after she was arrested on misdemeanor charges in another case.

According to defense counsel, it was during this meeting that K.P.

first “indicate[d] that she was touched or penetrated in any way” by

Walker.

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¶ 27 At trial, Walker’s counsel attempted to impeach K.P.’s

credibility by pointing out that she had not begun cooperating with

prosecutors until she was interviewed at the jail. Addressing the

prosecutor’s relevance objection, defense counsel argued that “the

fact that the first time she ever said she was penetrated by Mr.

Walker is when she’s being interviewed by the DAs in the jail” bore

on K.P.’s credibility because the circumstances of the interview gave

her “motive and bias” to implicate Walker. In response, the

prosecutor maintained that the location of the meeting was

irrelevant for two reasons: (1) she and her co-prosecutor in Walker’s

case “had no involvement” in K.P.’s misdemeanor case and did not

“make any promises” in exchange “for her testimony in this case”;

and (2) the misdemeanor charges on which K.P. was being held at

the time of the interview had been dismissed before Walker’s trial.

The court sustained the objection.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 “Appellate review of a possible Confrontation Clause violation

is de novo.” Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 198 (Colo. 2002).

Otherwise, we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of discretion. Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162, 167 (Colo. 1992). A

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court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, which necessarily occurs when it

misapplies the law. Id.

¶ 29 At trial, criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to

confront the witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo.

Const. art. II, § 16. This right is primarily secured through cross-

examination. Margerum v. People, 2019 CO 100, ¶ 10 (citing Davis

v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)). “[T]he scope and duration

of cross-examination is controlled by the trial court, and judges

have wide latitude under the Confrontation Clause to impose

reasonable limits on cross-examination because of concerns about

harassment, prejudice, repetition, or marginal relevance.” Kinney v.

People, 187 P.3d 548, 559 (Colo. 2008). But a trial court may err if

it “prohibits or severely limits inquiry into the potential bias of the

witness.” Id. “A defendant makes out a Confrontation Clause

violation by showing that he or she ‘was prohibited from engaging in

otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness,’” and thereby to

expose jurors to facts from which they could “appropriately draw

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inferences” related to the witness’s reliability. Id. (quoting Delaware

v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)).

¶ 30 In the context of cross-examination on a witness’s pending

criminal matters, these principles indicate that confronting a

witness with “mere arrests or pending charges . . . , without more,”

is generally improper. People v. King, 498 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Colo.

1972). This is because “want of credibility may not logically be

inferred from naked accusations of which the law presumes a

person innocent until convicted.” Id.

¶ 31 However, this general rule has an important exception.

“Although evidence of pending charges cannot be admitted to

challenge a witness’s general credibility, this evidence is admissible

to show a witness’s motive, bias, prejudice, or interest in the

outcome of a trial.” Kinney, 187 P.3d at 559 (emphasis added).

“[T]he partiality of a witness is always relevant.” Margerum, ¶ 10

(emphasis added). Thus, a defendant can demonstrate a

Confrontation Clause violation on appeal by “merely show[ing]” that

there is a “possibility . . . the witness’s testimony was being

influenced by a . . . mere hope . . . of [] leniency with the pending

charge in exchange for favorable testimony against the defendant”

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and that the trial court “severely limit[ed]” cross-examination

regarding this potential source of bias. Kinney, 187 P.3d at 559-60.

C. Analysis

¶ 32 Relying primarily on Kinney and Margerum, Walker contends

that defense counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine

K.P. about the circumstances of her jail interview because those

circumstances shed light on her credibility. But Kinney and

Margerum both involved witnesses who had criminal matters

pending at the time they testified. As a general rule, criminal

matters that are pending at the time of a witness’s testimony are

always relevant to a witness’s credibility due to her vulnerable

position. See Margerum, ¶ 13; Kinney, 187 P.3d at 552. It does not

follow, however, that a crime victim who merely agrees to be

interviewed by law enforcement during the pendency of her own

criminal charges, without more, is in an equally vulnerable position.

See Kinney, 187 P.3d at 559 (explaining that a pending charge (and,

a fortiori, a dismissed charge) is not enough on its own to be

admissible to challenge a witness’s credibility).

¶ 33 This is not to say that a witness or victim facing charges at the

time she speaks to police (i.e., before testifying) could never be

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influenced by the hope or promise of leniency. For example, in Van

Arsdall, a key witness in a murder trial agreed to speak to the

prosecutor in exchange for having a pending charge against him

dropped. 475 U.S. at 676. The witness “denied that the agreement

had affected his testimony,” and the trial court prohibited the

defense from cross-examining him about it. Id. The Supreme

Court held that this ruling violated the Confrontation Clause

because allowing cross examination on this topic would have given

a reasonable jury a “significantly different impression” of the

witness’s credibility. Id. at 680.

¶ 34 Here, while the charges against K.P. were dismissed at some

point before Walker’s trial, nothing in the record suggests that the

dismissal was part of a bargained-for exchange between K.P. and

the prosecution or that the pending charges against K.P. otherwise

influenced her statement regarding Walker. See id. at 676 (noting

that the witness “acknowledged that the drunkenness charge had

been dropped in exchange for his promise to speak with the

prosecutor about the murder”); see also Kinney, 187 P.3d at 559-61

(possibility of influence was shown based on prosecutor’s favorable

treatment of witness who was facing charges in the same

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jurisdiction). Indeed, the prosecutor expressly denied that she

made any promises of leniency when she spoke to K.P. about

Walker’s case. And Walker’s arguments to the contrary are

speculative. Defense counsel conceded that she had “no idea why”

the charges against K.P. were dismissed, and there is nothing in the

record suggesting that the district attorney’s office made any offer of

leniency to K.P. or deviated in any way from its normal protocols

when deciding whether to pursue the misdemeanor charges that

were pending at the time of her interview.

¶ 35 In short, because there was no indication that K.P.’s

statements to law enforcement were influenced by a hope or

promise of leniency in her pending misdemeanor case, we are not

persuaded that the jury would have been left with a significantly

different impression of her credibility had the trial court allowed the

defense to cross-examine her concerning the circumstances of her

interview. Walker thus falls short of establishing that his right to

confrontation was violated.

IV. Disposition

¶ 36 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.

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