2025 CO 62, 24SC8, Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Center

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
December 8, 2025

2025 CO 62

# No. 24SC8, Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care-First Amendment - Anti-SLAPP Statute-Public Issue or Issue of Public Interest

This case requires the supreme court to interpret the phrase "in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest" under Colorado's anti-SLAPP
statute. § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (2025). The supreme court now sets forth a
two-step test to determine whether particular speech or conduct falls within the
statute's protection.

First, a court must determine whether an objective observer could
reasonably understand that the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light
of its content and context, was made in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Second, the court
must examine the relationship between the challenged speech or conduct and the
public issue or issue of public interest identified and ask whether the challenged
activity contributed to public discussion or debate regarding that issue. The
supreme court additionally holds that a defendant's motive is not relevant to

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determining whether their challenged speech or conduct is made "in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest" under
section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV). Rather, a defendant's motive is only relevant when
determining whether a plaintiff has established a reasonable likelihood that they
will prevail on a claim under section 13-20-1101(3)(a).

Here, the division correctly concluded that the petitioners' statements could
reasonably be understood to be made in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest. But it erroneously determined that the petitioners' statements
were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because they were made primarily
for the purpose of airing a private grievance. In addition, the division mistakenly
focused on the petitioners' personal motives when it concluded that the posts
didn't contribute to any broader public discussion about pet health care or connect
to any issue of public interest.

Accordingly, the supreme court reverses the judgment of the court of
appeals and remands the case to the division with directions to return the case to
the trial court to apply the two-step test outlined in the opinion.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2025 CO 62

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC8
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA1611

Petitioners:
Jennifer Lind-Barnett and Julie Davis,

V.

Respondent:
Tender Care Veterinary Center, Inc.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
December 8, 2025

Attorneys for Petitioners:
Zansberg Beylkin LLC
Steven D. Zansberg
Denver, Colorado

Kane Law Firm, P.C.
Mark H. Kane
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:
Relevant Law
Tanner W. Havens
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Public Citizen and Public Participation Project:

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Covenant Law PLLC
Ian Speir
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Yelp Inc .:
Azizpour Donnelly, LLC
Katayoun A. Donnelly
Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE GABRIEL, and JUSTICE SAMOUR joined.
JUSTICE HART did not participate.

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11
"Speech is often provocative and challenging." Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). "But our legal tradition recognizes the importance of speech
and other expressive activity even when-perhaps especially when-it is
uncomfortable or inconvenient." Geiser v. Kuhns, 515 P.3d 623, 635 (Cal. 2022). The
Colorado General Assembly enacted the anti-SLAPP ("strategic lawsuit against
public participation") statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. (2025), to safeguard this
tradition against those who attempt to use litigation to chill speech.

12 The statute does this by allowing a defendant who claims the statute's
protection to file a special motion to dismiss in the very early stages of litigation.
The defendant has the burden to show that the conduct underlying the plaintiff's
claim falls within the statute-i.e., that the claim arises from the defendant's
exercise of their right of petition or free speech. L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123,
T 21, 523 P.3d 1280, 1285; see also § 13-20-1101(3)(a). Then, the burden shifts "to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a 'reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim."" Rosenblum v. Budd, 2023 COA 72, 1 24, 538 P.3d 354, 362 (quoting
§ 13-20-1101(3)(a)). If the plaintiff makes this showing, the case proceeds; if they
do not, the case is dismissed. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr., Inc. v. Lind-Barnett, 2023
COA 114, 1 14, 544 P.3d 693, 697.

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T3
The General Assembly explicitly identifies four acts in the anti-SLAPP
statute that constitute "[a]ct[s] in furtherance of a [defendant's] right of petition or
free speech." See § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I)-(IV). These warrant the statute's protection.
The last of these enumerated protected acts, the one at issue here, is a catchall
provision. It provides that "[a]ny other conduct or communication in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest."
§ 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV). The anti-SLAPP statute does not define this phrase, nor has
this court. This case requires us to do so.

14 After Jennifer Lind-Barnett and Julie Davis (collectively, "petitioners")
posted a large number of negative online reviews about Tender Care Veterinary
Center, Inc. ("TCVC") and refused to take them down, TCVC sued them for
defamation. Petitioners filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP
statute, arguing that their reviews concerned a public issue or an issue of public
interest under the statute. The district court denied the special motion.

15 A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district court. Tender Care,
1 1, 544 P.3d at 695. The division concluded that the petitioners' posts offered
consumers important information about veterinary services and thereby
implicated a public issue. Id. at TT 23-26, 544 P.3d at 699-700. However, it also
concluded that because the purpose of petitioners' posts was "to exact some

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revenge by putting [TCVC] out of business," the posts did not contribute to any
broader public discussion about pet health care or connect to any broader issue of
public concern. Id. at 11 30-31, 544 P.3d at 701. Therefore, in the division's view,
the petitioners' posts were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 1 37,
544 P.3d at 702.

16 We conclude that the division erred. To determine whether particular
speech or conduct concerns a public issue or an issue of public interest as those
terms are used in the anti-SLAPP statute, a court must apply a two-step test.1 First,
the court must determine whether an objective observer could reasonably
understand that the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its
content and context, was made in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Second, the court must

1 Confusingly, appellate courts deciding anti-SLAPP cases use the phrase
"two-step test" (and the related phrases "step one" and "step two") to mean
different things. Some courts, like the division below, use this language to refer to
the standard for dismissal under section 13-20-1101(3)(a). That part of the
anti-SLAPP statute provides that a defendant filing a special motion has the
burden to show that the conduct underlying the plaintiff's claim fall within the
statute. If the defendant does so, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish
a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the claim. Id. However, we follow the
lead of the California Supreme Court in FilmOn.com Inc. v. Double Verify Inc.,
439 P.3d 1156 (Cal. 2019), and Geiser, 515 P.3d at 631, and use the phrase "two-step
test" to refer, instead, to the standard we discuss at length in this opinion. That is,
the standard a court must apply in determining if the speech or conduct is made
"in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest" under
section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV).

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examine the relationship between the challenged speech or conduct and the public
issue or issue of public interest identified, and ask whether the challenged activity
contributed to public discussion or debate regarding that issue. We additionally
hold that a speaker's motive is not relevant to determining whether the challenged
speech or conduct is made "in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest" under section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV).

17
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand
the case to the division with directions to return this case to the trial court to apply
the two-step test outlined in this opinion.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

18
In January 2022, Lind-Barnett, a "long time [sic] breeder, trainer, sitter and
caregiver" for both small and large animals in Colorado, took her dog, Pinkerbell,
to TCVC for emergency veterinary services. Lind-Barnett reported that Pinkerbell,
who was sixteen days old, was unable to nurse and had an increased respiratory
rate. A veterinarian examined Pinkerbell and released her back to Lind-Barnett's
care, explaining that Pinkerbell was constipated and that Lind-Barnett should rub
Pinkerbell's belly. The next morning, Pinkerbell was still ill, so Lind-Barnett took
her to a different veterinary clinic. Pinkerbell was diagnosed with pneumonia and
successfully treated. Several days later, Lind-Barnett contacted TCVC, explained

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that it had improperly treated her dog, and requested a refund. TCVC declined to
do so.

19
Lind-Barnett subsequently posted a lengthy online review to TCVC's
Facebook page detailing her "horrid experience" at TCVC. In the post, she accused
TCVC of malpractice and retaliation for "speaking out publicly about their awful
clinic." For example, Lind-Barnett posted the following comments:

The vets here are not only incompetent, but cruel. When I tried to
address a SERIOUS issue of malpractice with them they used LIES
and INTIMIDATION methods to try and shut me up. One of my
clients was threatened with a lawyer by them for speaking out
publicly about their awful clinic. Apparently, speaking the truth in
[sic] now called slander. I don't care about a lawsuit and in fact, if
they do come after me I will gladly take them down in court.

....

Thankfully I have a background in health-care and didn't listen to
their bullying and ignorance. I was able to save my dog's life after
they almost killed her through their ignorance. And then of course
tried to blame me for their lack of care.
[laughing crying emoji].

....

Tender care ... ha! There is nothing about them that resonates with
tender OR care. More like belligerence and avoidance. Do yourself a
favor, drive the extra 20 minutes for the best care possible and AVOID
a travesty in your home and a hole in your pocket.

110
A month later, Davis took her dog, Spicy, to TCVC because Spicy was
experiencing difficulty walking and seemed off-balance. A veterinarian examined
Spicy and diagnosed her with a resolved seizure. Davis took Spicy home, and

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when she continued to have symptoms overnight, Davis took her to a different
veterinary clinic, which diagnosed her with vestibular disease and provided
treatment.

111 Around this time, Lind-Barnett reposted her review to her own Facebook
page and four different community-based Facebook pages.2 Upon seeing these
posts, Davis responded to Lind-Barnett, commenting on the quality of care that
Spicy had received at TCVC, TCVC's business practices, and Davis's own
interactions with TCVC's staff. For example, Davis posted the following
comments:

I was just there this past weekend when I needed someplace close . . . .
[N]ot only did they misdiagnose my dog but they sent me home with
blood work that indicated a near fatal level of potassium ... . I took
her elsewhere and they were in shock my dog was discharged.
Thankfully my girl survived and is on the mend. Between my
experience this past weekend and what you say, I am totally done. It
seems going to no vet is better than them.

....

It sounds like you [Lind-Barnett] did the best you could with the
information you had. It's not your fault they employ less than
adequate doctors and staff. They broke your trust.

2 TCVC's practice is in Falcon, Colorado. Lind-Barnett posted comments on
several community Facebook pages for the area surrounding Falcon, including the
Black Forest Community Facebook Page; the Falcon, Peyton, Calhan, Black Forest
and Surrounding Areas Community Facebook Page; the Calhan, CO and
Surrounding Areas Community Facebook Page; and the Neighborhood Network
of Black Forest and Surrounding Areas Community Facebook Page.

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.
.

.

.

And regardless if [you, Lind-Barnett, are] ... 100% correct or just a
raving loon - they should not have treated her the way they did after
the fact. That alone shows a lack of professionalism and respect and
speaks to how they choose to operate what should be a business of
compassion and understanding. To blame your client for their
animal's illness just because they posted a bad review? Seriously?
Who are these people? I was angry enough at the "care" I got. But to
harass someone over a bad review? Do they have any self control?

112 Across the various Facebook pages, the posts received dozens of reactions
and garnered more than 140 comments. One community member applauded
Lind-Barnett's posts as a community service, writing: "[Lind-Barnett] is using the
community page to warn our community about her very serious experience with
a business in our community. It is exactly what this page is for -sharing
information about our community." Another commented: "Thank you for posting
this. It may save lives." Some individuals chimed in with their own experiences
with the clinic, while others expressed outrage at the conduct of the management
that Lind-Barnett described.

113 TCVC demanded that the petitioners remove their posts. When they
refused to do so, TCVC sued both for defamation per se based on 104 of
Lind-Barnett's statements and ten of Davis's statements. Petitioners filed a special
motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their online
posts recounting their experiences at TCVC and with its staff satisfy the statute's
public-concern requirement.

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114 The district court denied the special motion to dismiss. First, the court
concluded that the statements did not fall within the protections of the anti-SLAPP
statute because the petitioners' statements were "a private business dispute" that
failed to address "matters of public interest or a public issue." Second, the court
determined that even if the conduct did fall within the statute's scope, the case
couldn't be dismissed because TCVC had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of
prevailing on its claims.

115 Petitioners appealed. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision. Tender Care, 11, 544 P.3d at 695. The division observed that
because the petitioners' statements were not made in connection with any
executive, legislative, or judicial body or function, the protections of the
anti-SLAPP statute applied only if the statements were made "'in connection with'
a 'public issue' or 'an issue of public interest."" Id. at | 18, 544 P.3d at 697-98
(quoting § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(III)-(IV)). It explained that although "internet sites
available to the public (like Facebook) are 'public forums"" for anti-SLAPP
purposes, not every post on these public forums involves a public issue or an issue
of public interest. Id. at [ 19, 544 P.3d at 698. The division acknowledged that the
statute does not define public issue or issue of public interest. Id. at 1 20, 544 P.3d
at 698. But because "California's anti-SLAPP statute closely resembles Colorado's
statute," the division examined California courts' interpretations of the same terms

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in California's anti-SLAPP law. Id. at TT 16, 20-21, 544 P.3d at 697, 698-99 (citation
omitted).

116 Then, analogizing to California cases that recognize online postings about
the quality of medical care as issues of public concern or interest, the division
reasoned that the quality of veterinary services may implicate an issue of public
interest, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Id. at 11 23-26, 544 P.3d at
699-700.

117 The division emphasized, however, that the analysis under the statute "does
not end with the identification of a public concern, issue, or interest to which
statements could theoretically relate." Id. at 1 27, 544 P.3d at 700. Instead, it
explained, "the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate." Id. at | 28, 544 P.3d at 700 (quoting FilmOn.com Inc. v. Double Verify Inc.,
439 P.3d 1156, 1166 (Cal. 2019) ("FilmOn")). The division then concluded that the
petitioners' posts did not contribute to any broader public discussion about pet
health care or connect to any broader issue of public concern (e.g., "veterinary
diagnostic issues, shortages in or access to veterinary care, oversight of
veterinarians, the general quality of care for animals outside large cities,
veterinarians' lack of training for the care of smaller dogs, or how overbreeding
can cause health problems for certain animals"). Id. at 1 30, 544 P.3d at 701.

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Rather, the purpose of the posts was "to exact some revenge by putting [TCVC]
out of business." Id. at | 31, 544 P.3d at 701. And, it concluded, even if it assumed

a couple of the diagnostic statements went beyond defendants'
parochial issues concerning their pets' disputed diagnoses and
connected to some broader public discussion, when a plaintiff pleads
claims based on both protected and unprotected conduct, anti-SLAPP
protections don't apply if "the protected conduct 'is merely
incidental' to the unprotected conduct."

Id. at [ 32, 544 P.3d at 701 (quoting Comstock v. Aber, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 601 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012). Finding that "the numerous posts expressing Lind-Barnett's
personal animosity toward the business" "far eclipsed" the posts related to the
alleged misdiagnoses, the division concluded that the core of the petitioners'
statements did not rest on protected speech so those statements were not protected
by the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 11 33, 36, 544 P.3d at 701-02.

118 Petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court, which
we granted.3

3 We granted certiorari to review the following issues:

1\. Whether Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute imposes a "nexus"
requirement that demands a defendant's speech encourage,
facilitate, or contribute to a general debate before that speech is
made "in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest."

2\. Whether the same standard for "matter of public concern" under
Colorado's substantive law regarding defamation and invasion of
privacy applies equally to the "matter of public interest" provision
of Colorado's anti-SLAPP Act.

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## II. Analysis

119 We begin by setting forth our rules of statutory construction and the
applicable standard of review. Next, we review the anti-SLAPP statute. Then,
informed by the California Supreme Court's analysis in FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1166,
and Geiser, 515 P.3d at 631 (interpreting California's identical anti-SLAPP
provision), we adopt a two-step test to determine when speech or conduct is made
"in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest" under
section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV).

## A. Standard of Review and Canons of Statutory Construction

120 We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard of review and the
relevant principles of statutory construction. McBride v. People, 2022 CO 30, 1 21,
511 P.3d 613, 616. Statutory interpretation involves questions of law, which we
review de novo. Miller v. Amos, 2024 CO 11, 1 11, 543 P.3d 393, 396. When
interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the General
Assembly. Nieto v. Clark's Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, 1 12, 488 P.3d 1140, 1143. To do
so, "we look to the entire statutory scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious,

3\. Whether Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute requires courts to
evaluate a speaker's motive when determining whether the speech
in question was made "in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest."

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and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we apply words and phrases in
accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting Blooming Terrace
No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake St., LLC, 2019 CO 58, 1 11, 444 P.3d 749, 752). When the
plain language is unambiguous, we apply the statute as written. Id.

## B. Colorado's Anti-SLAPP Statute

121 The General Assembly adopted the anti-SLAPP statute to "encourage
continued participation in matters of public significance" and ensure that this
participation is not "chilled through abuse of the judicial process."
§ 13-20-1101(1)(a). The statute's stated purpose "is to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and
otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law
and, at the same time, to protect the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits
for demonstrable injury." § 13-20-1101(1)(b).

122 The statute lays out the process a court must follow when evaluating a
special motion to dismiss. To begin, the court must decide whether the defendant
has shown that the plaintiff's claim arises from an act "in furtherance of the
[defendant's] right of petition or free speech." § 13-20-1101(3)(a). The General
Assembly explicitly identified four acts that satisfy this requirement:

(I) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding or any other official proceeding
authorized by law;

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(II) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

(III) Any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest; or

(IV) Any other conduct or communication in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.

§ 13-20-1101(2)(a).

123 If the conduct or speech qualifies as one of these acts, the court must then
determine whether "the plaintiff has established that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." § 13-20-1101(3)(a). If the
plaintiff makes this showing, the case proceeds; if they do not, the case is
dismissed. Tender Care, 1 14, 544 P.3d at 697.

## C. Colorado's Anti-SLAPP Statute Requires a Court to Apply a Two-Step Analysis to Determine if Challenged Speech or Conduct Concerns a Public Issue or an Issue of Public Interest

124 As we previously observed, Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute does not define
the phrase "in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest."
§ 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV). Petitioners argue that this language is expansive,
encompassing speech or conduct that "reasonably touches upon any topic of
potential interest to those not directly involved in the incident at issue." (Emphasis

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omitted.) TCVC, by contrast, contends that the statutory language is narrower,
requiring that the speech or conduct "bear a nexus to encouraging, facilitating, or
contributing to the asserted public interest." We disagree with both parties.

125 The question of what qualifies as speech or conduct "in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest" under section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV) is an
issue of first impression in Colorado. "Under such circumstances, we may look to
the decisions of other jurisdictions as persuasive authority." LaFond v. Sweeney,
2015 CO 3, 1 19, 343 P.3d 939, 945. Here, we look to the identical provision in
California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4) (West 2025),
and the cases interpreting it for guidance in construing and applying
section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV). See, e.g., L.S.S., 1 20, 523 P.3d at 1285.

126 Two recent cases, in particular, guide our consideration of the issues before
us. In FilmOn, a distributor of web-based entertainment programming sued
DoubleVerify Inc., a website-monitoring company, for trade libel, tortious
interference with contract, and tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage. 439 P.3d at 1160. The distributor, FilmOn.com Inc., claimed that
Double Verify distributed confidential reports to its clients falsely indicating that
FilmOn.com's websites included adult content and copyright infringing material.
Id. at 1159. DoubleVerify filed a special motion to dismiss under California's
anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 1158. The trial court granted the motion, concluding

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that the reports implicated matters of public interest because the public had a
demonstrable interest in knowing what content is available on the internet,
especially with respect to adult content and copyright infringing material. Id. at
1159-60. The court of appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court granted
FilmOn.com's petition for certiorari review. Id. DoubleVerify argued that the
reports implicated matters of public interest. Id.

127 The California Supreme Court rejected DoubleVerify's argument after
applying a two-step test to examine the report's content and context. Id. at 1165.

First, we ask what "public issue or [] issue of public interest" the
speech in question implicates-a question we answer by looking to
the content of the speech. Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation
about some matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that
context proves useful.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

128 Under step one, the court noted that although Double Verify's reports "seem
to qualify" as issues of public interest "in the abstract," "[d]efendants cannot ...
defin[e] their narrow dispute by ... slight reference to the broader public issue."
Id. at 1167. Under step two, the court evaluated the broader context in which
Double Verify issued the reports, specifically examining whether the company's
conduct furthered the public conversation on an issue of public interest. Id. With
respect to context, the court explained that the statute's catchall provision
"demands 'some degree of closeness' between the challenged statements and the

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asserted public interest." Id. at 1165 (quoting Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385,
392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). "[I]t is not enough that [a] statement refer to a subject of
widespread public interest; [it] must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate." Id. at 1166 (quoting Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 506 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004)). The court noted that what "contribute[s] to the public debate,"
Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 506, is a fact-intensive inquiry that could "differ based
on the state of public discourse at a given time, and the topic of contention."
FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1166.

129 In holding that DoubleVerify's reports did not qualify for anti-SLAPP
protection, the court focused on DoubleVerify's for-profit status, the confidential
nature of the reports, and the private use of the reports. Id. at 1167. So, even
though the content of the reports "is, broadly speaking, one of public interest,"
they "are too tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate, and
too remotely connected to the public conversation about those issues, to merit
protection under the catchall provision." Id. at 1159.

130 In Geiser, the California Supreme Court concluded that sidewalk picketing
"to protest a real estate company's business practices after the company evicted
two long-term residents from their home" constituted protected activity within
the anti-SLAPP statute. 515 P.3d at 626. Applying both steps of the FilmOn test,
the court held that, although the demonstration may have involved a private

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dispute, the "public issue that is reasonably implicated by defendants'
demonstration comes into view when the challenged conduct is situated within its
broader context." Id. at 633. The broader context, according to the court, included
(1) the identity of the demonstration's speakers and participants; (2) the picket's
location; and (3) the purpose and timing of the protest. Id. So, the involvement of
approximately thirty members of a housing advocacy organization in the protest;
its occurrence on a public sidewalk outside the residence of a major real estate
development company's CEO; and the protest's rebuke of residential
displacement practices after a couple had been evicted from their long-term home,
all "give rise to a reasonable inference that the demonstration implicates
controversial real estate practices that many individuals and communities find
destabilizing." Id. The court concluded that through this contextual lens, which
the court clarified must be considered at step one and step two, the sidewalk
protests are best understood as furthering discussion of a public issue or an issue
of public interest. Id. at 635.

131 Adopting the reasoning set forth by the California Supreme Court in
FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1165, and Geiser, 515 P.3d at 631, we now hold that a court
analyzing a special motion to dismiss under section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV) must
conduct a two-step inquiry to determine if the challenged speech or conduct is
made "in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest."

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132 Under step one, a court must determine whether an objective observer could
reasonably understand that the speech or conduct, considered in light of its
content and context, is made in connection with a public issue or issue of public
interest, even if it also implicates a private dispute. An anti-SLAPP motion fails at
this step "[o]nly when an expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably
be understood as implicating a public issue." Geiser, 515 P.3d at 634. When
evaluating this question, a court must discern what qualifies as speech or conduct
that implicates a public issue or an issue of public interest. In our view, "it is
doubtful an all-encompassing definition" of such speech or conduct could be
provided. Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392.

133 We, however, view California's case law instructive insofar as it distills the
characteristics of this type of speech or conduct. See Geiser, 515 P.3d at 629.
Statements that tend to implicate a public issue or an issue of public interest
typically fall into one of three nonexhaustive categories: (1) those which "concern[]
a person or entity in the public eye"; (2) "conduct that could directly affect a large
number of people beyond the direct participants"; or (3) "a topic of widespread,
public interest." Id. at 629-30 (quoting Rivero v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun.
Emps., AFL-CIO, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). An additional
consideration includes whether the issue has "been the subject of extensive media
coverage." Id. at 630 (quoting Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392-93).

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134 We caution courts when conducting this analysis against trying to "discern[]
a single topic of speech." Id. at 631 (quoting FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1165). Speech is
"rarely 'about' any single issue." Id. (quoting FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1165). Thus,
speech that arises from or concerns a private dispute does not automatically strip
away the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. "[T]hose who speak on public
issues are often driven to do so by circumstances that affect them personally." Id.
at 634. For example, "[a] [person] who has suffered workplace harassment might
be moved to speak out about [their] own experiences. The fact that [they]
foreground[] harms [they themselves have] experienced does not mean an
objective observer could not reasonably understand [their] story, in context, to
implicate societal issues of workplace harassment." Id.

135 Under step two, a court must examine the relationship between the
challenged speech or conduct and the public issue or issue of public interest
identified and ask whether the challenged activity contributed to public discussion
or debate regarding that issue. The broader context in which the challenged
activity occurred is critical to this inquiry. See FilmOn, 439 P.3d at 1167; Geiser,
515 P.3d at 632-33. This means a court must, at step two, examine the audience,
the speaker, the location, and the purpose of the speech or conduct. All these
inform whether the challenged statements contributed to the public discussion or
debate on the public issue or issue of public interest. Geiser, 515 P.3d at 633.

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136 Turning now to the division's opinion, we conclude that the division
initially correctly identified the two-step test to determine whether speech or
conduct is protected by the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.
§ 13-20-1101(2)(a)(IV). We further conclude, however, that the division ultimately
strayed from that test.

137 To begin, we agree with the division's assessment that consumer
information about veterinary services implicates a public issue since "the welfare
of animals, including pets, is an important concern of our society." Tender Care,
T 24, 544 P.3d at 699 (quoting In re Marriage of Isbell, No. B173850, 2005 WL
1744468, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2005) (unpublished opinion)). However, we
disagree that the petitioners' statements were not protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute because they were made primarily for the purpose of airing a private
grievance. Id. at 1 35, 544 P.3d at 702. Simply put, the division decided that
because most of the petitioners' statements expressed personal animosity toward
TCVC, none of their statements were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at
TT 33, 36, 544 P.3d at 701-02.

138 Said differently, the division essentially weighed the petitioners' private
concerns against their public ones. That is not the pertinent test. Plus, there is no
reason why speech cannot be made in connection with both a private dispute and
a public issue or an issue of public interest. As the Geiser court made explicit, even

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though a sidewalk protest stemming from a private eviction dispute "might have
served the purpose of facilitating a repurchase of the property, . . . it also served to
draw attention to the alleged unfairness of the business practices" by which the
family was evicted. 515 P.3d at 634-35.

139 Here too, even though the petitioners' posts stemmed from perceived
inadequate veterinary care for their pets, the posts could reasonably be
understood, in context, to implicate a public issue or an issue of public interest
regarding the quality of services and care at a licensed veterinary facility. That is,
while the petitioners' animosity was palpable, these were not purely private
concerns. And the broader contextual factors surrounding the petitioners' posts,
including the speakers, the audience, the targeted locations, and the purpose of
the posts, reveal how the petitioners' statements contributed to the public debate
on these topics. Specifically, Lind-Barnett, as a "long time [sic] breeder, trainer,
sitter and caregiver" for both small and large animals in Colorado, sought to spur
a broader conversation about quality veterinary services and practices. What's
more, the posts reached an audience of potentially hundreds-if not
thousands - of members of their local community. Plus, by garnering more than
140 comments and receiving dozens of reactions, the posts prompted members of
the community to consider TCVC's veterinary practices as well as the quality of
veterinary services more broadly.

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## D. A Defendant's Motive Is Not Relevant to the Public Issue or Public Interest Analysis

140 Petitioners argue that motive is irrelevant to the question of whether speech
or conduct is made in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
They contend that, to the extent a defendant's motivation plays any role in an
anti-SLAPP analysis in relation to defamation claims, it should be limited to
determining whether a plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of
prevailing on their claim under section 13-20-1101(3)(a). Conversely, TCVC
argues that motive is a relevant and probative factor in determining whether
speech concerns a public issue or an issue of public interest because it informs the
context of that speech. We agree with petitioners.

141 The division focused on the petitioners' motives when it decided that the
posts didn't contribute to any broader public discussion about pet health care or
connect to any issue of public interest. Tender Care, 130, 544 P.3d at 701.
Specifically, the division determined that the petitioners' posts were intended "to
exact some revenge by putting [TCVC] out of business" and simply reflected
"personal animosity toward the business." Id. at 11 31, 33, 544 P.3d at 701.

142 To be sure, a defendant's motive is relevant in determining whether a
plaintiff has established a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on a
claim under section 13-20-1101(3)(a). For instance, when a defendant's allegedly
defamatory statements involve a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must

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ultimately prove, among other things, that the defendant "published the
statements with actual malice, instead of mere negligence." Coomer v. Salem Media
of Colo., Inc., 2025 COA 2, 1 23, 565 P.3d 1133, 1143.

143 But, before a court reaches that issue under our anti-SLAPP statute, it must
first apply the two-step test to determine if the challenged speech or conduct was
made in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In our view,
the question of motive is not pertinent at this stage of the analysis. In this regard,
we depart from the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in
interpreting its anti-SLAPP statute.

144 In Geiser, the court observed that a defendant's motivation "may be relevant
and, if objectively reasonable, will inform the analysis [at step one]." 515 P.3d at
634. The court emphasized, however, that motivation is not dispositive and, if not
objectively reasonable, will not carry weight. Id. We disagree regarding the
relevance of this evidence. A defendant's motive for speaking, whether objectively
reasonable or not, doesn't answer whether the challenged speech is made in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. A defendant may well
have a malicious motive for their speech or conduct, but the challenged activity
still may implicate a public issue or an issue of public interest. Similarly, a
defendant's motive for speaking doesn't answer whether the challenged speech

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contributes to the public discussion or debate regarding a public issue or an issue
of public interest.

145 Moreover, consideration of motive at this stage may lead to illogical results
under the anti-SLAPP statute if two defendants, for instance, utter exactly the same
words in exactly the same way, but one is motivated by personal animus and one is
not. See, e.g., Lowell v. Wright, 512 P.3d 403, 420 (Or. 2022). Instead, the proper
inquiry at step one and at step two requires a court to examine each statement, in
light of its context, to determine if the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute apply.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case
to the division with directions to return this case to the trial court to apply the
two-step test outlined in this opinion.

## III. Conclusion

146 To determine whether particular speech or conduct concerns a public issue
or an issue of public interest as those terms are used in the anti-SLAPP statute, a
court must apply a two-step test. First, the court must determine whether an
objective observer could reasonably understand that the speech or conduct,
considered in light of its content and context, is made in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest, even if it also implicates a private dispute.

147 Second, the court must examine the relationship between the challenged
speech or conduct and the public issue or issue of public interest identified, and

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ask whether the challenged activity contributed to public discussion or debate
regarding that issue. We additionally hold that a defendant's motive is irrelevant
when determining whether challenged speech or conduct is made in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

148 Because the division did not apply the correct legal standard and because it
erroneously focused on the petitioners' personal motives, we reverse the judgment
of the court of appeals and remand the case to the division with directions to return
this case to the trial court to apply the two-step test outlined in this opinion.