26 CO 30M, 24SC319 People v. Dominguez, Javier

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

May 11, 2026
AS MODIFIED June 15, 2026

2026 CO 30M

No. 24SC319, People v. Dominguez-Equal Protection Doctrine -Multiple
Convictions -Culpable Mental State.

In this appeal, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether (1) a
division of the court of appeals erred in concluding that the defendant's conviction
for attempted patronizing a prostituted child plainly violated Colorado's equal
protection doctrine because that conviction prohibited the same conduct as
attempted inducement of child prostitution, for which the defendant was also
convicted, but carried a higher sentence; and (2) the trial court erred by declining
to instruct the jury on the applicable mental state for the crime of soliciting for
child prostitution, which the defendant contends is "intentionally."

As to the first issue, the court concludes that any error as to whether the
defendant's conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child violated
Colorado's equal protection principles was not obvious and, therefore, was not
plain. Accordingly, the court reverses the division's contrary judgment and
vacates its merits analysis on that question.

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As to the second issue, the court concludes, in accordance with its decision
in Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44, 1 4, 570 P.3d 1022, 1024, that the culpable mental
state for soliciting for child prostitution is "knowingly," and the court further
concludes, as did the division below, that the instructions given, when read as a
whole, properly instructed the jury on that element.

Accordingly, the court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part
the division's judgment, and it remands the case for further proceedings.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 30M

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC319
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1144

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:
Javier Vega Dominguez.

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Vacated in Part, and Case
Remanded with Directions
en banc
May 11, 2026

Opinion modified, and as modified, petition for rehearing DENIED. EN BANC.
June 15, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General & Assistant Solicitor General

Aric Smith, Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

Kamela Maktabi, Deputy Public Defender

Denver, Colorado

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 We granted certiorari to consider whether (1) a division of the court of
appeals erred in concluding that defendant Javier Vega Dominguez's conviction
for attempted patronizing a prostituted child plainly violated Colorado's equal
protection doctrine because that conviction prohibited the same conduct as
attempted inducement of child prostitution, for which Vega Dominguez was also
convicted, but carried a higher sentence; and (2) the trial court erred by declining
to instruct the jury on the applicable mental state for the crime of soliciting for
child prostitution, which Vega Dominguez contends is "intentionally."1

12 As to the first issue, we conclude that any error as to whether Vega
Dominguez's conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child violated
Colorado's equal protection principles was not obvious and, therefore, was not

1 Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:

1\. Whether the court of appeals improperly held that Colorado's
equal protection doctrine was plainly violated by respondent's
conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child because it
prohibited the same conduct as attempted inducement of child
prostitution.

2\. Whether the trial court reversibly erred by failing to instruct the
jury on a required mental state for the crime of soliciting for child
prostitution, and whether the required mental state for soliciting
for child prostitution is intentionally.

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plain. Accordingly, we reverse the division's contrary judgment, and we vacate
its merits analysis on that question.

T3
As to the second issue, we conclude, in accordance with our decision in
Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44, 1 4, 570 P.3d 1022, 1024 ("Randolph II"), that the
culpable mental state for soliciting for child prostitution is "knowingly," and we
further conclude, as did the division below, that the instructions given, when read
as a whole, properly instructed the jury on that element.

14
4 Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the
division's judgment, and we remand this case to allow the division to consider the
issues that Vega Dominguez raised below but that the division did not reach in
light of its disposition.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

15
J.S., who was fifteen years old at the time, went to Walmart with his father.
While they were at the store, Vega Dominguez approached J.S. and asked J.S. if he
was with anyone else. Vega Dominguez then offered J.S. money if J.S. would sell
pornographic movies and vibrators for him. Vega Dominguez also offered J.S.
money for oral sex and asked J.S. to go to his house to have sex with him and see
the pornographic movies. J.S. declined each of these offers, and Vega Dominguez
gave J.S. his phone number.

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16
J.S. then told his father about the encounter, and he and his father contacted
the police.

17 Law enforcement later commenced an undercover operation in which a
detective representing himself as J.S. initiated text message exchanges with Vega
Dominguez. During these exchanges, Vega Dominguez asked J.S. how old he was,
and J.S. said that he was fifteen years old. Vega Dominguez then asked J.S. for
naked photos of himself and offered to pay J.S. for sex.

18 The detective portraying J.S. subsequently arranged to meet Vega
Dominguez in person. When Vega Dominguez arrived and stopped near the
agreed location, the police arrested him and found lubricant in his vehicle. Vega
Dominguez was later charged with (1) soliciting for child prostitution; (2) sexual
exploitation of children; (3) criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted
child; and (4) criminal attempt to commit inducement of child prostitution.

19 The case proceeded to trial, and, as pertinent to the issues before us, the trial
court gave the jury the following instructions:

Instruction No. 15

A crime is committed when the defendant has committed a voluntary
act prohibited by law, together with a culpable state of mind.

....

The culpable state of mind is as much an element of the crime as the
act itself and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, either by
direct or circumstantial evidence[.]

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In this case, the applicable state of mind is explained below:

A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully" with respect to conduct or
to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he
is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such a circumstance
exists. A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully", with respect to a
result of his conduct, when he/she is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause the result.

(Emphasis added.)

Instruction No. 16

The elements of the crime of Soliciting for Child Prostitution are:

1\.
That the defendant,

2\.
in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3\. solicited another,

4\.
for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child.

110
The jury found Vega Dominguez guilty on all four counts, and the trial court
subsequently sentenced him to six years in the Department of Corrections for
soliciting for child prostitution, six years for sexual exploitation of a child, six years
to life for criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child, and four
years for criminal attempt to commit inducement of child prostitution. The
sentences on the solicitation, attempted patronizing, and attempted inducement
counts were to run concurrently with one another, and the sentence on the
exploitation count was to run consecutively to those counts.

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111 Vega Dominguez then appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that (1) as
applied to him, the crime of attempted patronizing a prostituted child prohibited
the same conduct as the crime of attempted inducement of child prostitution but
the former carried a harsher sentence, and thus his attempted patronizing
conviction violated his equal protection rights; and (2) the mens rea for the crime
of soliciting for child prostitution is "intentionally" and the trial court therefore
erred by instructing the jury that it was "knowingly." People v. Dominguez, 2024
COA 32, 11 1, 9, 551 P.3d 1205, 1207-08. Vega Dominguez had not preserved
either of these issues for appeal. Id. at 1 8, 551 P.3d at 1208.

112 In a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals
vacated the conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child and therefore
remanded for amendment of the mittimus but otherwise affirmed the judgment of
conviction. Id. at | 2, 551 P.3d at 1207.

113 In support of its ruling regarding the attempted patronizing count, the
division, reviewing for plain error, id. at 18, 551 P.3d at 1208, noted that
"Colorado's guarantee of equal protection is violated where two criminal statutes
proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly," id. at
[ 16, 551 P.3d at 1209 (quoting Dean v. People, 2016 CO 14, [ 14, 366 P.3d 593, 597).
The division further observed that, when evaluating an as-applied equal
protection challenge like the one before it, courts consider whether, in the

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circumstances under which the defendant acted, the pertinent statutes punish
identical conduct and whether a reasonable distinction may be drawn between the
conduct proscribed by the two statutes. Id. at | 17, 551 P.3d at 1209. To establish
such a reasonable distinction, the division noted, the statutory classifications of the
crimes at issue must be "based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably
related to the general purposes of criminal legislation." Id. at | 18, 551 P.3d at 1209
(quoting People v. Tarr, 2022 COA 23, 1 59, 511 P.3d 672, 684, rev'd on other grounds,
Tarr v. People, 2024 CO 37, 549 P.3d 966).

114 Turning to the statutes at issue, the division opined that the crime of
attempted patronizing a prostituted child carries a harsher penalty than does the
crime of attempted inducement of child prostitution, yet, in the division's view,
on the facts presented, the respective statutes proscribed the same conduct, thus
resulting in an equal protection violation. Id. at [] 20-21, 30, 551 P.3d at 1209-11.
115 The division further concluded that this violation was obvious in light of a
prior division's decision in People v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, 465 P.3d 146, and also
substantial, thus amounting to plain error. Dominguez, 1 30, 551 P.3d at 1211. In
Maloy, 1 22, 465 P.3d at 154, the division had concluded that, as applied to the
defendant's conduct in that case, the defendant's conviction for patronizing a
prostituted child violated the defendant's right to equal protection because the
crimes of pandering of a child and inducement of child prostitution penalized the

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same or more culpable conduct as patronizing but carried lighter sentences. In
reaching this conclusion, the Maloy division noted that a "critical facial difference"
between inducement and patronizing was that inducement required proof that
money or another thing of value was exchanged, whereas patronizing
criminalized the same conduct but did not necessarily require proof that money
or something of value was exchanged. Id. at | 33, 465 P.3d at 155. Because, on the
facts presented, however, money was exchanged, the Maloy division concluded
that the defendant's conduct violated both statutes in precisely the same way. Id.
at 1 34, 465 P.3d at 155.

116 Rejecting the People's argument that Maloy was distinguishable on multiple
grounds, the division below extended the Maloy division's analysis to conclude
that Vega Dominguez's equal protection rights had been plainly violated in this
case. Dominguez, T1 2, 27-30, 551 P.3d at 1207, 1210-11.

117 As to the second issue, the division, following another division's opinion in
People v. Randolph, 2023 COA 7M, 131, 528 P.3d 917, 923 ("Randolph I"), aff'd,
Randolph II, 1 67, 570 P.3d at 1036, initially determined that the mens rea for
soliciting for child prostitution is "knowingly," not "intentionally." Dominguez,
[ 10, 551 P.3d at 1208. The division then proceeded to address Vega Dominguez's
alternative argument that even under Randolph I, the elemental instruction for the
soliciting count was erroneous because it did not include any mens rea. Id. at | 11,

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551 P.3d at 1208. Although the division noted that Vega Dominguez did not raise
this issue until his reply brief and that divisions generally do not address
arguments raised for the first time at that stage of the briefing, the division
nonetheless addressed the issue and concluded that the omission of the applicable
mental state from the elemental instruction for soliciting for child prostitution was
not plain error because another instruction (Instruction No. 15) had correctly
advised the jury as to the applicable mental state. Id. at [[ 11-12, 551 P.3d at 1208.
118 The People petitioned for certiorari, and Vega Dominguez cross-petitioned.
We granted both the petition and the cross-petition.

## II. Analysis

119 We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review. We then turn to
the question of whether the division correctly determined that the trial court had
plainly erred in entering judgment on the jury's guilty verdict for attempted
patronizing a prostituted child. We end by examining whether the trial court
plainly erred in declining to include the applicable mental state in the elemental
instruction for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution.

### A. Standard of Review

120 Vega Dominguez raised both his equal protection and jury instruction
claims for the first time on appeal to the division below, and thus, those claims
were not preserved. We review unpreserved constitutional and nonconstitutional

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errors for plain error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, 1 14, 288 P.3d 116, 120. Plain
error is both obvious and substantial. Id. Obvious error must ordinarily
contravene a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or Colorado
case law. Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, 1 16, 390 P.3d 832, 835. An error is substantial
when it so undermines the fundamental fairness of a trial as to cast serious doubt
on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Hagos, [ 14, 288 P.3d at 120.

121 With respect to jury instructions, we have observed that a "court's failure to
instruct the jury properly does not constitute plain error if the relevant instruction,
read in conjunction with other instructions, adequately informs the jury of the
law." People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). We have further opined that
an erroneous jury instruction does not ordinarily constitute plain error when the
issue is uncontested at trial or the record contains overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's guilt. Id.

122 We review a statute's constitutionality, both facially and as applied, de
novo. Dean, 1 8, 366 P.3d at 596.

### B. The Attempted Patronizing a Prostituted Child Count

123 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Colorado Constitution does
not contain an equal protection clause, we have construed our constitution's due

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process clause, Colo. Const. art. II, § 25, to imply a similar guarantee, Dean, [ 11,
366 P.3d at 596. "Equal protection of the laws assures the like treatment of all
persons who are similarly situated." Id.

124 We have long held that "Colorado's guarantee of equal protection is
violated where two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes
that conduct more harshly." People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81, 1 14, 476 P.3d 351, 354
(quoting Dean, 1 14, 366 P.3d at 597). Similarly, we have said that "separate
statutes proscribing with different penalties what ostensibly might be different
acts, but offering no intelligent standard for distinguishing the proscribed
conduct, run afoul of equal protection under state constitutional doctrine." Id.
(quoting People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 75 (Colo. 1981)). Accordingly, we have
observed that "to overcome an equal protection challenge, 'a person of average
intelligence' must be able to distinguish the conduct proscribed by one offense
from the conduct proscribed by another." Id. (quoting People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5,
[ 36, 409 P.3d 338, 344). In addition, "the distinction between the two offenses
must be 'sufficiently pragmatic' to 'permit an intelligent and uniform application
of the law."" Id. (quoting Marcy, 628 P.2d at 78).

125 An as-applied constitutional challenge like that at issue asserts that a
provision is unconstitutional under the circumstances in which a party has acted
or is planning to act. People v. Hernandez, 2025 CO 13, 1 14, 566 P.3d 995, 998. A

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holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied prevents the statute's future
application in a similar context but does not render it completely inoperative. Id.
Accordingly, in an as-applied challenge, a court considers whether certain actions
are unconstitutional applications of the law, not whether the statute at issue
should be deemed unconstitutional in all of its possible applications. Id.

126 As pertinent here, section 18-7-405.5(1), C.R.S. (2025), defines the crime of
inducement of child prostitution and provides, "Any person who by word or
action, other than conduct specified in section 18-7-403(1)(a)[, C.R.S. (2025)],
induces a child to engage in an act which is prostitution by a child, as defined in
section 18-7-401(6)[, C.R.S. (2025)], commits inducement of child prostitution."

127 Section 18-7-406(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), defines the crime of patronizing a
prostituted child and states, "Any person who performs any of the following with
a child not his spouse commits patronizing a prostituted child: (a) Engages in an
act which is prostitution of a child or by a child, as defined in section 18-7-401(6)
or (7) .... "
☒

128
Sections 18-7-401(6) and (7), in turn, define the relevant statutory phrases:

(6) "Prostitution by a child" means either a child performing or
offering or agreeing to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio,
cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not
the child's spouse in exchange for money or other thing of value or
any person performing or offering or agreeing to perform any act of
sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal
intercourse with any child not the person's spouse in exchange for
money or other thing of value.

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(7) "Prostitution of a child" means either inducing a child to perform
or offer or agree to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio,
cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not
the child's spouse by coercion or by any threat or intimidation or
inducing a child, by coercion or by any threat or intimidation or in
exchange for money or other thing of value, to allow any person not
the child's spouse to perform or offer or agree to perform any act of
sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal
intercourse with or upon such child. Such coercion, threat, or
intimidation need not constitute an independent criminal offense and
shall be determined solely through its intended or its actual effect
upon the child.

[29 Both inducement of child prostitution and patronizing a prostituted child
are class 3 felonies. § 18-7-405.5(2), § 18-7-406(2). Criminal attempt to commit a
class 3 felony is a class 4 felony. § 18-2-101(4), C.R.S. (2025).

130 In addition, criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child is
defined as a "[s]ex offense," § 18-1.3-1003(5)(a)(X), (b), C.R.S. (2025), and a person
who is convicted of a sex offense is a "[s]ex offender," § 18-1.3-1003(4). Subject to
exceptions not pertinent here, a trial court is required to sentence a sex offender to
the custody of the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term of at least
the minimum of the presumptive sentencing range for the level of offense
committed and a maximum of the sex offender's natural life. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a),
C.R.S. (2025). The trial court thus sentenced Vega Dominguez to six years to life
for the conviction of criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child.

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131 Criminal attempt to commit inducement of child prostitution, however, is
not defined as a "[s]ex offense" under section 18-1.3-1003(5)(a). The trial court thus
sentenced Vega Dominguez to four years for that conviction.

132 Here, as noted above, the division concluded that the trial court had plainly
erred in entering judgment on the attempted patronizing count because, in the
division's view, on the facts presented, the attempted patronizing count punished
the identical conduct as the attempted inducement count but punished the
conduct more harshly.

133 Even assuming error by the trial court in this regard, however, we conclude
that any error was not plain. As noted above, for an error to be plain it must be
obvious. See Hagos, 114, 288 P.3d at 120. And to be obvious, the error must
ordinarily contravene a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or
Colorado case law. Scott, 1 16, 390 P.3d at 835.

134 Here, any error did not contravene a clear statutory command, a well-settled
legal principle, or Colorado case law. Although to conclude otherwise, the
division principally relied on another division's opinion in Maloy, Maloy is
distinguishable.

135 In Maloy, 1 21, 465 P.3d at 154, the division determined that the evidence
had established that the defendant's conduct fell under the "prostitution of a
child" prong of the patronizing statute, which required the prosecution to prove

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either that (1) the defendant induced a child to perform certain sexual acts with
another by coercion, threats, or intimidation or (2) the defendant induced a child
by coercion, threats, or intimidation, or in exchange for money or another thing of
value, to allow another to perform sexual acts on the child. Because money was
exchanged in that case, the division believed that the defendant's conduct violated
the patronizing and inducement statutes in the same way. Id. at 1 34, 465 P.3d at
155.

136 Here, in contrast, substantial evidence supported Vega Dominguez's
conviction for attempted patronizing under the prostitution "by a child" prong of
the statute, which required the prosecution to prove, not inducement of a child to
act, but that a child performed, or offered or agreed to perform, certain sexual acts
in exchange for money or another thing of value. § 18-7-401(6), § 18-7-406(1)(a).
Accordingly, the facts at issue here involved potential distinctions between
patronizing and inducing that were not at issue in Maloy.

137 In addition, Maloy involved completed acts of patronizing and inducement,
see Maloy, 11 3-8, 465 P.3d at 151-52, whereas the present case involved attempted
acts and therefore different statutory elements.

138 These distinctions demonstrate that any error by the trial court as to the
equal protection issue (and we need not and do not opine that the trial court, in
fact, erred here) did not contravene either a clear statutory command, a

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well-settled legal principle, or Colorado case law. Indeed, this appears to explain
why the division below reached its conclusion by professing to extend Maloy's
analysis here. Dominguez, 12, 551 P.3d at 1207. Absent a clear statutory
command, a well-settled legal principle, or Colorado case law, however, by
definition, any error was not obvious and, therefore, was not plain. See Scott, [ 16,
390 P.3d at 835.

139 For these reasons, we reverse the division's judgment on the equal
protection issue, and we vacate its analysis on the merits of whether the entry of a
judgment of conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child, on the facts
presented, violated Colorado's equal protection doctrine.

### C. Jury Instruction for Soliciting for Child Prostitution

140 Vega Dominguez asserts that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury
on the pertinent mental state for soliciting for child prostitution, which he
contends was "intentionally." Because Vega Dominguez did not preserve this
issue, our review is for plain error. See Hagos, 1 14, 288 P.3d at 120.

141 Section 18-7-402(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), which defines the crime of soliciting for
child prostitution for which Vega Dominguez was charged, provides, in pertinent
part, "A person commits soliciting for child prostitution if he ... [s]olicits another
for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child .... "

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142 In Randolph II, 1 4, 570 P.3d at 1025, we held that the culpable mental state
for soliciting for child prostitution under section 18-7-402(1)(a) and section
18-7-402(1)(b) is "knowingly," i.e., the same mental state designated in section
18-7-402(1)(c). Accordingly, we reject Vega Dominguez's contention that the
applicable mental state for this crime is "intentionally."

143 Vega Dominguez alternatively contends that even if the applicable mental
state is "knowingly," the trial court erred in not including that mens rea in the
elemental instruction for soliciting for child prostitution. As noted above,
however, the trial court did instruct the jury as to the applicable state of
mind - "knowingly" -in a separate instruction. Specifically, Instruction No. 15
provided that Vega Dominguez's culpable state of mind "[i]n this case" was
"knowingly" or "willfully," terms that the instruction defined identically, as
quoted above. The instruction further provided that "[a] crime is committed when
the defendant has committed a voluntary act prohibited by law, together with a
culpable state of mind" and that "[t]he culpable state of mind is as much an
element of the crime as the act itself . .. . " Instruction No. 15 thus advised the jury
that to convict, it had to find that Vega Dominguez possessed the applicable
culpable state of mind as to each crime charged, and the instruction further
correctly stated that this mens rea was "knowingly" (or the identically defined
"willfully").

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144 In light of the foregoing, we perceive no error -much less plain error-in
the trial court's instruction as to the appropriate mental state for the crime of
soliciting for child prostitution.

145 Accordingly, we affirm the division's judgment as to Vega Dominguez's
conviction for soliciting for child prostitution.

## III. Conclusion

146 For these reasons, we conclude that the division erred when it determined
that the trial court had plainly erred in entering a judgment of conviction on the
jury's verdict finding Vega Dominguez guilty of attempted patronizing a
prostituted child, notwithstanding what the division perceived to be an equal
protection violation. In our view, even had the trial court erred in this regard, any
error was not obvious and therefore was not plain.

147 We further conclude that the trial court did not err, much less plainly err, in
the manner in which it instructed the jury as to the applicable mental state of
"knowingly." Specifically, we conclude that when read as a whole, the
instructions properly advised the jury as to the applicable mental state, even
though that mens rea was not included in the elemental instruction for soliciting
for child prostitution, but rather was included in a general instruction regarding
the applicable mental state.

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148
Accordingly, we (1) reverse the portion of the division's opinion concluding
that the trial court had plainly erred in entering a judgment of conviction on the
jury's verdict finding Vega Dominguez guilty of attempted patronizing a
prostituted child, and we vacate the division's analysis on the merits of that issue;
(2) affirm the portion of the division's judgment upholding Vega Dominguez's
conviction for soliciting for child prostitution; and (3) remand this case to allow
the division to consider the issues that Vega Dominguez raised below but that the
division did not reach in light of its disposition.