26 CO 56 | Omnilex

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Unite for Colorado did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during
the 2020 election cycle and reverses the judgment of the court of appeals.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2026 CO 56
Supreme Court Case No. 24SC281
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA989
Petitioner:
Unite for Colorado,
v.
Respondents:
Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in her official capacity as the
Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew Kline, in his official capacity as the
Colorado Deputy Secretary of State.
Judgment Reversed
en banc
June 29, 2026
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP
Jason R. Dunn
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Peter G. Baumann, Assistant Solicitor General
Denver, Colorado

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This campaign finance dispute arising out of the 2020 election concerns
whether Unite for Colorado (“Unite”) qualifies as an issue committee, a type of
organization subject to registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements under
Colorado’s campaign finance laws.1
¶2 As relevant here, article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado
Constitution defines an issue committee as an organization “[t]hat has a major
purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question.” Unite and
the Colorado Secretary of State2 disagree on two parts of this definition: (1) the
meaning of the phrase “a major purpose,” and (2) whether the phrase “any ballot
issue or ballot question” allows consideration of an organization’s spending on
ballot issue advocacy in the aggregate, or instead limits consideration to the
1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in interpreting the Colorado
Constitution’s “major purpose” standard, Colo. Const. art. XXVIII,
§ 2(10)(a)(I), which qualifies an organization as an “issue committee”
subject to registration, reporting, and disclosures, by adopting a
multifactor test that permits a major purpose finding when an
organization spends 10% or less of its total outlays supporting or
opposing a particular ballot measure.
2 Respondents in this case are the Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in
her official capacity as the Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew Kline, in his
official capacity as the Colorado Deputy Secretary of State. For the sake of brevity,
we refer to them as “the Secretary of State” throughout.

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organization’s activities on a proposition-by-proposition basis. Colo. Const. art.
XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
¶3 First, we interpret the phrase “a major purpose” to require a fact-specific
analysis of an organization’s creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related
activities, as guided by a nonexhaustive list of factors established in case law and
statute at the time of this dispute. In conducting this fact-specific analysis, we
interpret the phrase “any ballot issue or ballot question” to allow consideration of
an organization’s aggregate activity and spending across multiple ballot issues.
¶4 Next, we apply the fact-specific analysis to Unite to determine whether it
meets article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I)’s definition of issue committee. We
conclude that Unite’s decision to engage in statewide ballot issue advocacy soon
after its creation and its in-kind contributions to gather signatures in support of
propositions both weigh in favor of a major purpose. On the other hand, the fact
that Unite spent less than a quarter of its overall spending during the 2020 election
cycle on issue advocacy weighs strongly against a major purpose. Under the
totality of the circumstances, we hold that Unite did not have a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy in 2020.
¶5 For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

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I. Legal Background
¶6 Because this dispute concerns Unite’s activities in 2020, we first summarize
the relevant campaign finance laws applicable at that time.
¶7 Colorado’s campaign finance laws can be traced back to the Campaign
Reform Act of 1974, which focused on the regulation of political committees that
support or oppose the nomination or election of candidates for public office.
Ch. 57, sec. 1, §§ 49-27-101 to -121, 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 261, 261–70. In 1996,
voters updated and reenacted the law via a ballot measure (Amendment 15) as the
Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”). Legis. Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb.,
An Analysis of 1996 Ballot Proposals, at 27–32, 56–67 (1996), https://
historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/191?page=26 [https://
perma.cc/P7K4-4YM9]; Colo. Sec’y of State, State of Colorado: Abstract of Votes Cast
1995–1996, at 159, https://historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/
232?page=168 [https://perma.cc/8SGT-F9A8] (showing the abstract of votes cast
for Amendment 15 in the November 5, 1996 general election). The FCPA included
the regulation of issue committees that support or oppose ballot issues,
§ 1-45-108(1), (3), C.R.S. (1997), and required the disclosure of information about
“contributions received . . . expenditures made; and obligations entered into,”
§ 1-45-108(1), C.R.S. (1997).

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¶8 In 2002, voters adopted Amendment 27, which enshrined comprehensive
campaign finance regulations, including the regulation of issue committees, in the
Colorado Constitution. See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII. Article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a) defines an issue committee as:
any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more
persons, including natural persons:
(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot
issue or ballot question; or
(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess
of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot
question.
Only the first prong of this definition is at issue in the majority of cases, including
this one, because the Secretary of State has interpreted this provision to require an
organization to meet both the major purpose element and spend in excess of two
hundred dollars to qualify as an issue committee. Dep’t of State, 8 Colo. Code
Regs. 1505-6:1.9 (2022).3 Because no party disputes the Secretary of State’s
interpretation, we proceed under this interpretation.
¶9 Article XXVIII requires organizations that qualify as issue committees to
meet the disclosure requirements set out in section 1-45-108, C.R.S. (2025). Colo.
3 We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held,
when interpreting the definition of “political committee” in Amendment 27, that
a two-hundred-dollar spending threshold, standing alone, is unconstitutional.
Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007).

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Const. art. XXVIII, § 7. Section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025), requires issue
committees to “report . . . their contributions received, including the name and
address of each person who has contributed twenty dollars or more; expenditures
made, and obligations entered into by the committee or party.” And the issue
committee must also disclose “the occupation and employer of each person who
has made a contribution of one hundred dollars or more.” § 1-45-108(1)(a)(II),
C.R.S. (2025). Such disclosures must be made every year, even when the issue
committee is inactive. Dep’t of State, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:17.2.3 (2022).
¶10 In 2008, a division of the court of appeals first analyzed article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a)(I) in Independence Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130, 1136–39 (Colo.
App. 2008). There, the Independence Institute argued that the phrase “a major
purpose” was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 1136. The division
rejected the vagueness challenge, reasoning that “[c]onstitutional provisions need
not be so exact as to eliminate any need for [a] fact-specific analysis,” and that an
organization’s “major purpose” could be assessed by “compar[ing] the purposes
stated in its charter, articles of incorporation, and by-laws; the purposes of its
activities and annual expenditures; and the scope of issues addressed in its print
and electronic publications.” Id. at 1139. The division also rejected the
Independence Institute’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge because article

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XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) did “not burden a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech.” Id. at 1140.
¶11 Two years later, a different division of the court of appeals expounded on
the definition of the phrase “a major purpose” in Cerbo v. Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc.,
240 P.3d 495, 501 (Colo. App. 2010). There, the division examined the plain
language definition of the term “major” at the time Amendment 27 passed in 2002.
Id. It concluded that an organization has “a major purpose” of ballot issue
advocacy if it expends “a considerable or principal portion of the organization’s
total activities” on ballot issue advocacy. Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
525 F.3d 274, 328–29 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting)). The division also
applied the phrase to Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc., and relied on several factors to
assess whether the organization’s ballot issue advocacy amounted to a
considerable or principal portion of its activities. Id. at 501–04.
¶12 That same year, the General Assembly passed a new statutory definition of
“a major purpose” that essentially codified the factors identified in Independence
Institute. Ch. 270, sec. 4, § 1-45-103(12), 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1239, 1241. This new
legislation stated that an organization’s “major purpose” could be reflected by:
(1) “[a]n organization’s specifically identified objectives in its organizational
documents”; or (2) “an organization’s demonstrated pattern of conduct based
upon its . . . [a]nnual expenditures in support of or opposition to a ballot issue or

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ballot question” or “[p]roduction or funding . . . of written or broadcast
communications . . . in support of or opposition to a ballot issue or ballot question.”
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2011).
¶13 Finally, in Colorado Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, ¶¶ 32–35,
363 P.3d 727, 731–32, a division of the court of appeals rejected a rule promulgated
by the Secretary of State. The rule sought to clarify that an organization has a
major purpose of ballot issue advocacy if more than 30% of its annual expenditures
are directed to such activity. Id. at ¶ 31, 363 P.3d at 731. The division concluded
that the 30% threshold was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported
by competent evidence and was untethered to the language in section
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2013), that required a broader analysis of an organization’s
“pattern of conduct.” Colo. Ethics Watch, ¶¶ 32–35, 363 P.3d at 731–32 (citing
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2013)).4
4 In addition to these developments, in 2016, the legislature amended section
1-45-108 to exclude “small-scale issue committee[s]” from the general issue
committee disclosure requirements. Ch. 269, sec. 2, § 1-45-108(1.5), 2016 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1113, 1114. Section 1-45-103(16.3)(a), C.R.S. (2025), defines small-scale issue
committees as those that have “accepted or made contributions or expenditures in
an amount that does not exceed five thousand dollars during an applicable
election cycle.”
Finally, in 2022, the legislature again amended the definition of “a major purpose”
in section 1-45-103(12)(b). Ch. 400, sec. 1, § 1-45-103(12)(b), 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws
2851, 2852. However, because the 2022 legislation does not appear to apply
retroactively to Unite’s activities in 2020, we decline to apply those factors to Unite
or otherwise comment on the factors the legislature provided in that legislation.

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II. Facts and Procedural History
¶14 Unite began operations in January 2020 and described itself on its website
as “an issue advocacy organization” with the mission of “support[ing] policies
that increase economic opportunity and greater government transparency” and
“oppos[ing] policies that would be harmful to Colorado’s economic wellbeing,
and efforts to unnecessarily grow the size and reach of government.” Katie
Kennedy, Unite’s registered agent and only board member, and Dustin Zvonek, a
contractor, directed all of Unite’s activities.
¶15 In 2020, Unite spent a total of $17,174,246.70. Of that amount, $4,026,017.26,
approximately 23.4%, was directed to ballot issue advocacy:
• Unite spent $1,500,808.85 opposing Proposition 113, a ballot initiative to
join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, including spending
on advertising, text messages, and direct contributions to Protect
Colorado’s Vote, an issue committee opposing Proposition 113.
• Unite spent $964,998.25 supporting Proposition 116, a ballot initiative to
reduce the state income tax rate. Spending on Proposition 116 included
in-kind contributions for signature gathering to support Energize our
Economy, an issue committee supporting Proposition 116.
• Unite spent $1,560,210.16 supporting Proposition 117, a ballot initiative
to require voter approval of certain new state-owned businesses. This
spending also included advertising to support the initiative and in-kind
contributions for signature gathering to Voter Approval of Fees, an issue
committee supporting Proposition 117.
¶16 In August 2020, members of the public filed a campaign finance complaint
against Unite with the Elections Division of the Department of State (“the Elections

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Division”), alleging that Unite was an issue committee under the definition in
article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of the Colorado Constitution and had failed to
register and make the required disclosures.
¶17 After investigating the complaint, the Elections Division ultimately moved
to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that Unite did not meet article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)’s definition of an issue committee. The Elections Division reached this
conclusion in part because it construed article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) to require a
major purpose of supporting a specific ballot initiative, not a major purpose of
supporting ballot initiatives generally.
¶18 However, then-Deputy Secretary of State, Ian Rayder, disagreed with this
interpretation, denied the motion, and remanded the case back to the Elections
Division with instructions to commence administrative proceedings against Unite
for failing to register as an issue committee and make the required disclosures.
The Elections Division did so, and after proceedings before the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”), the ALJ found that Unite had a major purpose of ballot issue
advocacy because of its activities in connection with Propositions 113, 116, and
117. On review, the new Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher P. Beall, adopted
the ALJ’s findings and conclusions in part.5 The Final Agency Order adopted by
5 The ALJ also held that under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II), spending more
than two hundred dollars on ballot issues or ballot questions qualifies an
organization as an issue committee. But the Deputy Secretary of State ultimately

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the Deputy Secretary of State imposed a $40,000 fine on Unite and required Unite
to register and make the required disclosures.
¶19 Pursuant to section 24-4-106, C.R.S. (2025), Unite sought review of the Final
Agency Order in district court. Unite challenged the Deputy Secretary of State’s
interpretation and application of the major purpose standard and argued that the
requirement to register and make disclosures violated Unite’s First Amendment
rights. The district court reversed the Final Agency Order, concluding that Unite
was not an issue committee. The district court reasoned that the statutory
definition of an issue committee, section 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020), did not
support aggregating Unite’s activity across all three ballot initiatives. The district
court did not rule on Unite’s First Amendment claims. The Secretary of State
appealed the district court’s order.
¶20 A division of the court of appeals unanimously reversed the district court.
Colo. Dep’t of State v. Unite for Colo., 2024 COA 31, ¶ 1, 551 P.3d 687, 693. The
division conducted its own major purpose analysis. Starting with the
constitutional language in article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a), the division held that the
language contemplates an organization’s aggregate conduct across multiple ballot
issues or ballot questions. Id. at ¶¶ 41–43, 551 P.3d at 699. The division also
rejected this interpretation in the Final Agency Order because the ALJ raised the
issue sua sponte without any argument on that point from the Elections Division.

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identified seven factors to guide its analysis of whether Unite had a major purpose
of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Id. at ¶ 38, 551 P.3d at 698.
The division applied these factors and held that Unite had a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Id. at ¶ 58, 551 P.3d at 702.
The division also considered and rejected Unite’s First Amendment claims. Id. at
¶¶ 59–70, 551 P.3d at 702–04.
¶21 Unite petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari. We granted review to
consider the interpretation of the “major purpose” standard.6
III. Standard of Review
¶22 Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo
review. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235. We
accord administrative proceedings a “presumption of validity” and resolve “all
reasonable doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings . . . in favor of the
agency.” Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 1990). That said, such
deference is unwarranted where “the agency’s interpretation is contrary to
constitutional and statutory law.” Gessler, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d at 235.
6 Unite also raises various free speech and freedom of association arguments under
the First Amendment throughout its briefing. Opening Brief for Petitioner at
36–40. We do not address these arguments because we denied certiorari review
of Unite’s First Amendment claims.

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IV. Analysis
¶23 We begin with our guiding principles of constitutional interpretation. We
then analyze the phrase “a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot
issue or ballot question.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I). First, we analyze
the meaning of the phrase “a major purpose” and conclude that it requires a fact-
specific analysis of an organization’s creation, spending, and ballot campaign-
related activities. Second, we examine the phrase “any ballot issue or ballot
question” to determine whether the major purpose analysis allows consideration
of an organization’s aggregate spending across multiple ballot issues. We
conclude that it does. We end our analysis by applying article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)(I) to Unite and hold that Unite is not an issue committee because it did not
have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle.
A. Principles of Constitutional Interpretation
¶24 Our goal when interpreting amendments to the Colorado Constitution is
twofold: effectuate the intent of the framers of our constitution and the people of
the State of Colorado and prevent evasion of the constitution’s legitimate
operation. Markwell v. Cooke, 2021 CO 17, ¶ 33, 482 P.3d 422, 429. To do so, we
start with the plain language of a constitutional provision, giving its terms their
ordinary and popular meanings. People v. Smith, 2023 CO 40, ¶ 20, 531 P.3d 1051,
1055. That said, we may look beyond the plain and ordinary definitions of phrases

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if “they have acquired a technical meaning through . . . judicial construction.”
Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1368 (Colo. 1988); see also Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate
Maj. Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, ¶ 26, 269 P.3d 1248, 1255–56 (applying the legal
meaning of the phrase “express advocacy” in interpreting a different provision of
article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution). We may also consider the objective
the provision sought to achieve and the mischief it sought to avoid. Senate Maj.
Fund, LLC, ¶ 20, 269 P.3d at 1254. In discerning voter intent, we consider the ballot
title and submission clause, as well as the voter Blue Book, “which is the analysis
of ballot proposals prepared by the legislature.” In re Submission of Interrogatories
on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999).
¶25 We favor constructions that harmonize different constitutional provisions
over those that create conflict, and where possible, we adopt a construction
consistent with those given by coordinate branches of government. In re
Interrogatory on House Joint Resol. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23, ¶¶ 32–33, 500 P.3d 1053,
1062–63. We also presume that voters know the existing law when they vote to
amend the constitution. Dwyer v. State, 2015 CO 58, ¶ 19, 357 P.3d 185, 191.
B. The Phrase “a Major Purpose” Demonstrates the Voters’
Intent to Adopt a Fact-Specific Analysis
¶26 Here, we begin with the plain language of the phrase “a major purpose.”
We conclude that the plain language sets an overarching standard for whether an
organization qualifies as an issue committee but sheds little light on how to

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analyze whether an organization meets this standard. So, to better understand
how the voters would have understood the phrase in 2002 when they approved
Amendment 27, we review the origins of the phrase in United States Supreme
Court case law and trace its development in Colorado. We examine the policy
declaration voters approved alongside Amendment 27, the Blue Book that
accompanied Amendment 27 on the ballot, and the voter informational interest
undergirding the disclosure requirements in Amendment 27.
¶27 All these sources of the voters’ intent clarify that the major purpose test is a
holistic, case-by-case assessment of an organization’s creation, spending, and
ballot campaign-related activities to determine whether it spent a considerable or
principal amount of its time and resources engaging in ballot issue advocacy.
¶28 We conclude by highlighting some guiding factors from the legislature and
case law that courts should consider when conducting this analysis.
1. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of “a Major Purpose”
¶29 Common definitions of “major” and “purpose” at the time voters passed
Amendment 27 offer some insight. In 2002, the Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary defined “major” as “notable or conspicuous in effect or scope:
considerable, principal.” Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501 (quoting Major, Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary (2002)). “Considerable” was defined further as
“rather large in extent or degree.” Id. (quoting Considerable, Webster’s Third New

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International Dictionary (2002)). And as of 2002, Black’s Law Dictionary defined
“purpose” as “[a]n objective, goal, or end.” Purpose, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th
ed. 1999). These definitions indicate the voters’ intent to categorize as issue
committees those organizations that spend a considerable or principal amount of
their time and resources on ballot issue advocacy. Finally, we note that by using
the phrase “a major purpose,” voters recognized that organizations could have
more than one major purpose. Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501 (“[B]y using the indefinite
article ‘a,’ the phrase ‘a major purpose’ brings within its ambit organizations for
which promoting a ballot issue is but one major purpose.”).
¶30 Because the phrase “major purpose” has its origins in United States
Supreme Court case law, we turn next to that history.
2. The Origins of the Major Purpose Test and Its
Understanding in 2002
¶31 The Supreme Court first invoked what has come to be called the major
purpose test in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley concerned various
challenges to the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(“FECA”), one of which claimed that FECA’s definition of “political committee”
was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 7–8, 76–80. FECA defined “political
committee” as a group of people that spent over one thousand dollars in a calendar
year for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate. Id.
at 62–63. The Court held that this definition of “political committee” was not

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unconstitutionally vague in part because it “only encompass[ed] organizations
that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate.” Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Because the
Court tied the definition of “political committee” to the organization’s “major
purpose,” federal courts started using the major purpose definition as a test for
whether an organization qualified as a political committee. See, e.g., Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 1982).
¶32 The Supreme Court applied the major purpose requirement ten years later
in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986) (“MCFL”). MCFL concerned a constitutional challenge to a different
provision of FECA that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to make
expenditures “in connection with” a federal election and required that any such
expenditures be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated
fund. Id. at 241. FECA then regulated these separate segregated funds as political
committees. Id. at 253. For a nonprofit corporation like MCFL that engaged in
issue advocacy, this meant that its independent expenditure activity could be
regulated as though MCFL’s major purpose was to further the election of
candidates.

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¶33 The Court ultimately held the provision at issue unconstitutional as applied
to MCFL. Id. at 254–64. It began by summarizing the circumstances of MCFL’s
creation and its activities as an organization—noting when the organization was
created, quoting the organization’s purpose statement in its articles of
incorporation, describing from whom the organization did and did not accept
funding, listing the various types of activities the group pursued in the
community, and detailing its campaign-related spending. Id. at 241–44.
¶34 From all this information, the Court concluded that MCFL was not a
political committee (and therefore could not be subjected to the full panoply of
regulations that accompany political committee status) because it did not have the
major purpose of nominating or supporting a candidate. Id. at 241–42, 252 n.6, 262.
The Court cautioned, however, that “should MCFL’s independent spending
become so extensive that the organization’s major purpose may be regarded as
campaign activity,” then it would be “classified as a political committee” and
subject to FECA’s requirements. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
¶35 In sum, the Court examined the specific facts of MCFL’s creation, spending,
and campaign-related activities to reach its conclusion that campaign activity was
not MCFL’s major purpose. Id. at 241–44, 252 n.6, 262. 7
7 The Federal Election Commission has also interpreted the Court’s case law
regarding the major purpose test as requiring a broad, fact-specific analysis. See
The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 556 (4th

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¶36 We too encountered the major purpose test in the lead up to the passage of
Amendment 27 in 2002. In Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 753–57
(Colo. 2000), we interpreted the earlier statutory definition of issue committee in
the FCPA (Colorado’s Fair Campaign Practices Act). At that time, the FCPA did
not include “a major purpose” in its definition of issue committee but instead
defined an issue committee as “[t]wo or more persons who are elected, appointed,
or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting contributions
and making expenditures to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question.”
§ 1-45-103(8)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2000) (emphasis added). Though an ALJ in Common
Sense Alliance read the major purpose test from Buckley and MCFL into the FCPA’s
definition, we refused to do so because the plain language of the definition omitted
it. Common Sense All., 995 P.2d at 751, 753. We noted that the FCPA’s definition
created a “loophole” that “may be troubling” but refused to read the major
purpose test into the definition because we were “bound by the [FCPA’s] plain
language.” Id. at 755.
Cir. 2012) (highlighting that the Federal Election Commission interprets the major
purpose test as requiring “the flexibility of a case-by-case analysis of an
organization’s conduct that is incompatible with a one-size-fits-all rule” (quoting
Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5601 (Feb. 7, 2007))). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has similarly interpreted article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a) as adopting a version of Buckley’s major purpose test. Colo. Right
to Life Comm., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1155.

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3. Amendment 27’s Passage, the Voters’ Policy Declaration,
the 2002 Blue Book, and the Informational Interest
¶37 It was against this legal backdrop that the voters in 2002 adopted
Amendment 27’s new definition of issue committee:
“Issue committee” means any person, other than a natural person, or
any group of two or more persons, including natural persons:
(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or
ballot question; [and]
(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess
of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot
question.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a) (emphasis added).
¶38 This definition expressly incorporated the same major purpose language
from Buckley and MCFL that we had declined to read into the earlier FCPA
definition in Common Sense Alliance. And because we assume that voters knew the
law at the time, we interpret the definition in section 2(10)(a) as adopting the major
purpose test as articulated in Buckley and MCFL—i.e., as a fact-specific analysis of
an organization’s spending, creation, and ballot campaign-related activities.
Additional evidence of the voters’ intent supports this interpretation.
¶39 The declaration that appears at the beginning of Amendment 27 serves as a
guide to the voters’ intent. See Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550,
555 (Colo. 1998). Specifically, the voters of Colorado declared that

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the interests of the public are best served by . . . full and timely
disclosure of campaign contributions, independent expenditures, and
funding of electioneering communications, and strong enforcement
of campaign finance requirements.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1. This language reveals that the voters’ intent in
adopting Amendment 27 was to ensure robust compliance with and enforcement
of Colorado’s campaign finance law requirements.
¶40 The Blue Book voter guide offers additional insight into the voters’ intent.
In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d at 554. Specifically,
the 2002 Blue Book clarifies that the disclosure provisions focused on the
importance of providing the electorate with sufficient information about who is
spending money to influence elections:
Requiring greater disclosure of who pays for political advertising
provides more information about who is spending money to
influence elections.
Legis. Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2002 Ballot Information Booklet: Analysis
of Statewide Ballot Issues and Recommendations on Retention of Judges, at 6 (2002),
https://hermes.cde.state.co.us/islandora/object/co%3A27117 [https://
perma.cc/7W4L-BFY7].
¶41 This voter “informational interest,” like the major purpose test itself, traces
its origins back to Buckley, where the Court identified it as the first of three
“substantial governmental interests” that can support campaign disclosure
requirements. 424 U.S. at 67–68, 81.

23
¶42 The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this informational interest as a
justification for disclosure requirements in both ballot issue and candidate
elections. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792, n.32 (1978),
for example, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
corporate expenditures to influence certain types of ballot issues, but noted the
importance of disclosure requirements, observing that “identif[ying] . . .the source
of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.” And in Buckley
v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 203 (1999), the Court
observed that such disclosures ensure “voters are informed of the source and
amount of money spent by proponents to get a measure on the ballot.” Id. at 202–
03 (upholding Colorado’s law requiring a ballot issue’s proponents to disclose the
amount spent on collecting signatures). The electorate’s informational interest
appeared again in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 369
(2010), where the Court upheld disclosure requirements in political
advertisements and explained that such disclosures were justified because “the
public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before
an election.”
¶43 The information provided through disclosure requirements can be
particularly valuable for voters assessing ballot propositions because they often

24
concern “divisive and controversial public issues” such as taxation, business
regulation, and hot-button political and social issues. Common Sense All., 995 P.2d
at 756. Given the stakes, voters often face a deluge of sophisticated special interest
groups trying to influence their vote on proposed legislation. It is important to
remember that when Colorado voters exercise the power of initiative, they are
quite literally acting as legislators because the power of the initiative derives from
the legislative power the people have reserved to themselves under the
constitution. Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1) (“The legislative power of the state shall be
vested in the general assembly . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power
to propose laws and amendments to the constitution . . . .”); see also Vagneur v. City
of Aspen, 2013 CO 13, ¶¶ 36–37, 295 P.3d 493, 504 (explaining that voters are
exercising a part of the same legislative power as the General Assembly when they
exercise the initiative power).
¶44 Given this dynamic, the disclosure of information regarding who is
spending money to influence the decisions of Colorado’s electorate is directly
analogous to legislators understanding who is funding the lobbyists trying to
influence their vote. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (noting that the Court has
upheld disclosure requirements for lobbyists because “Congress ‘has merely
provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to
influence legislation’” (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)));

25
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“More than fifty years
ago, the Supreme Court held that the public disclosure of ‘who is being hired, who
is putting up the money, and how much’ they are spending to influence legislation
is ‘a vital national interest.’” (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625–26)). Without this
information, “the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the
voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal.” Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625. The purpose of disclosure
requirements is to bring this essential information to light. Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 371 (“[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”).
4. The Major Purpose Test Requires Analyzing an
Organization’s Creation, Spending, and Ballot
Campaign-Related Activities
¶45 Colorado voters adopted a definition of “issue committee” against a
backdrop of case law that applied a fact-specific analysis. They prefaced it with a
declaration insisting on full and timely disclosures and strong enforcement of
campaign finance laws. And the Blue Book indicates that voters wanted to ensure
access to full and accurate information about who is trying to influence their vote.
For these reasons, we conclude that analyzing whether an organization has a
“major purpose” of ballot issue advocacy requires a holistic, case-by-case
assessment of an organization’s creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related

26
activities to determine whether it spent a considerable or principal amount of its
time and resources engaging in ballot issue advocacy.
¶46 We adopt a case-by-case analysis also to avoid interpretations that allow for
easy evasion of the constitution’s requirements. We have long considered it an
obligation to “construe the constitution in such a manner as will prevent . . .
evasion of its legitimate operation.” Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201,
207 (Colo. 1991) (citing Inst. for the Edu. of the Mute & Blind v. Henderson, 31 P. 714,
716 (Colo. 1892)). And campaign finance regulation is an area rife with
sophisticated evasion. See Chisun Lee, et al., Secret Spending in the States, Brennan
Ctr. for Just., at 6–9, 14–18 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/media/210/
download/Report_Secret_Spending_in_the_States.pdf?inline=1 [https://
perma.cc/DC3H-MYC8] (explaining the precipitous rise of undisclosed campaign
finance spending on ballot measure elections, even in states—such as
Colorado—with laws intended to require disclosure); see also McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 176 (2003) (“Experience under the current law
demonstrates that Congress’ concerns about circumvention are not merely
hypothetical.”).
¶47 Accordingly, we agree with and adopt the factors identified by the division
below as guidelines in determining whether an organization has a major purpose

27
of ballot issue advocacy, while cautioning that no single factor is necessarily
dispositive, nor is the list exclusive:
(1) the organization’s specifically identified objectives, as expressed
in its organizational documents or in its public statements (such as on
its website or in correspondence with potential donors);
(2) its activities and annual expenditures relative to its ballot-
measure-related activities and expenditures;
(3) the scope of issues addressed in its print and electronic
publications relative to its ballot-measure-related communications;
(4) the length of time of the organization’s existence relative to its
ballot measure advocacy;
(5) the organization’s structure;
(6) the interrelatedness of the organization and the ballot measure’s
proponents or opponents; and
(7) the various issues with which the organization has been involved.
See Unite, ¶ 38, 551 P.3d at 698.
¶48 Some of these factors can be traced directly to the 2010 legislation. Id. (citing
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020)). And “[w]here possible, courts should adopt a
construction of a constitutional provision in keeping with that given by coordinate
branches of government.” In re Great Outdoors Colo. Tr. Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 538
(Colo. 1996).
¶49 Importantly, all of these factors can also be traced back to the circumstances
the Supreme Court considered in MCFL. Most are drawn from Independence
Institute, 209 P.3d at 1139, and Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501–04. Both of those cases, in

28
turn, relied on Judge Michael’s dissent in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d
at 328–29 (Michael, J., dissenting). And Judge Michael cited the Court’s analysis
in MCFL as support for those elements. Id.
¶50 Although the Court in MCFL did not list these factors explicitly, each factor
captures circumstances the Court deemed relevant in that case. The Court
discussed (1) the organization’s stated purpose, MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241–42; (2) the
purposes of MCFL’s activities and its annual expenditures, id. at 242–43; (3) the
scope of issues MCFL addressed in its various publications, id. at 242–44; (4) the
timing of MCFL’s election-related advocacy relative to its creation as an
organization, id. at 241–44; (5) MCFL’s organizational structure, id. at 241–42,
252–54, 259, 263–64; (6) MCFL’s inability to serve as a “conduit[]” for the direct
spending of other organizations—i.e., its (lack of) interrelatedness with other
organizations, id. at 264; and (7) the various issues in which MCFL had been
involved, id. at 241–44.
¶51 In short, the major purpose test is a flexible, fact-specific analysis of an
organization’s creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities. Because
these factors carry the authority of both our legislature and Supreme Court case
law, we adopt them as a nonexhaustive list of guidelines for courts to rely on when
assessing whether an organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy.

29
C. The Phrase “Any Ballot Issue or Ballot Question” Permits
Aggregation
¶52 The parties also dispute the scope of the phrase “any ballot issue or ballot
question” in article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado Constitution. Unite
insists that “any ballot issue or ballot question” means courts must assess an
organization’s major purpose on a proposition-by-proposition basis.
¶53 As relevant here, Unite supported or opposed three ballot issues during the
2020 election cycle: Propositions 113, 116, and 117. Unite contends that, to qualify
as an issue committee, the court must determine whether it had a major purpose
of supporting or opposing each specific proposition. The Secretary of State argues
the opposite—that a court may assess whether Unite had a major purpose of ballot
issue advocacy by examining the organization’s activities in the aggregate.
¶54 “Any” has an expansive meaning that includes “one or more.” Any,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
any [https://perma.cc/37HA-PXMT]. Colorado courts have consistently
interpreted “any” to mean “all.” See, e.g., Winslow v. Morgan Cnty. Comm’rs,
697 P.2d 1141, 1141 (Colo. App. 1985) (relying on Filmore v. Wells, 15 P. 343, 345
(Colo. 1887)) (interpreting the word “any” to mean “all” when interpreting zoning
requirements in the Colorado code); see also BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of
Revenue, 2016 CO 23, ¶ 18, 369 P.3d 281, 286 (“When used as an adjective in a
statute, the word ‘any’ means ‘all.’” (quoting Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 447

30
(Colo. 2007))); Stamp, 172 P.3d at 447 (construing the phrase “any derivative claim”
to mean “all derivative claims”); Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 405 n.2 (2020)
(explaining that the word “any” has an expansive meaning). Given our
presumption that the voters understood the expansive meaning applied to “any,”
we interpret the plain language of the phrase “any ballot issue or ballot question”
to permit consideration of an organization’s activities across all ballot issues or
ballot questions it supports or opposes.8 Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
¶55 This plain language interpretation of section 2(10)(a)(I) is bolstered by the
voter informational interest that underlies the regulation of issue committees. This
8 Unite points out that the statutory definition of “issue committee” refers to “a
ballot issue or ballot question.” § 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020). It contends that
the statute’s use of the indefinite article “a” and the singular terms “issue” and
“question” indicate that a major purpose must be assessed with respect to an
individual ballot measure. See Opening Brief for Petitioner at 44. We disagree.
First, the legislature’s use of the article “a” is not necessarily more restrictive than
“any.” And in any event, we are bound, first and foremost, by the constitutional
language. Here, the voters chose to use the term “any” and thereby implicate our
case law interpreting “any” to mean “all.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
Unite further contends that if the voters had intended to allow for aggregation of
an organization’s conduct across multiple ballot issues, they would have used
“one or more” for the definition of “issue committee” as they did in the definition
of “political committee.” See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(12)(a) (defining “political
committee” as supporting or opposing the nomination or election of “one or more
candidates” (emphasis added)). Again, we disagree. The voters chose to use the
expansive term “any.” The fact that they used another expansive phrase (“one or
more”) for political committees does not undermine the established, expansive
meaning of “any.”

31
informational interest is only amplified, not diminished, where a group is seeking
to influence the electorate’s vote on more than one measure in an election cycle.
¶56 Finally, we note that Unite’s interpretation that an organization’s activities
must be evaluated on a proposition-by-proposition basis would lead to absurd
results. Under Unite’s view, if an organization devotes literally 100% of its
resources and activity to ballot issue advocacy but spreads those resources equally
across ten separate ballot issues, that organization does not have “a major purpose
of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question” because it has spent
only 10% of its resources on each individual proposition. Such a result cannot be
squared with the voters’ intent in passing Amendment 27.
D. Applying Article XXVIII, Section 2(10)(a) to Unite
¶57 After weighing all of the facts available in the record before us, we conclude
that, while it is a close call, Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot issue
advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Of the seven factors listed above, we find
four relevant to our analysis here.
¶58 First, we assess Unite’s organizational objectives. And although Unite’s
articles of incorporation do not include a purpose statement, Unite described itself
on its website as an “issue advocacy organization” with the goals of “support[ing]
policies that increase economic opportunity and greater government
transparency” and “oppos[ing] policies that would be harmful to Colorado’s

32
economic wellbeing, and efforts to unnecessarily grow the size and reach of
government.” But while Unite calls itself an “issue advocacy organization,” it has
also repeatedly disclaimed in its formal correspondence any status as, or intention
to be, an issue committee. So, this factor does not weigh strongly in either
direction.
¶59 Second, we consider the length of time from Unite’s creation to its ballot
issue advocacy. The record indicates that Unite began actively supporting
Proposition 116 as early as April 2020, only three months after its creation in
January 2020. Given this relatively short period of time between creation and
supporting a ballot issue, this factor weighs in favor of a major purpose finding.
¶60 Third, we compare Unite’s overall activities and expenditures to its ballot-
initiative-related activities and expenditures. Unite spent approximately $1.5
million opposing Proposition 113 (8.7% of its total spending); approximately $965
thousand supporting Proposition 116 (5.6% of its total spending); and
approximately $1.5 million supporting Proposition 117 (9.1% of its total spending).
In sum, Unite spent just over $4 million across three statewide initiatives, and such
a high dollar amount demonstrates a significant commitment to ballot issue
advocacy. But assessing an organization’s major purpose requires comparing its
ballot campaign-related spending with its overall spending. This is essential to
determine whether the ballot campaign-related spending constituted a

33
considerable or principal amount of the organization’s overall spending. Here,
even considering its spending in the aggregate, Unite devoted only 23.4% of its
expenditures during the 2020 election cycle to ballot issue advocacy.
¶61 While we largely align with the division’s analysis elsewhere, we disagree
with the division’s holding that directing less than a quarter of all expenditures to
ballot issue advocacy supports a conclusion that an organization has a major
purpose of ballot issue advocacy. Unite, ¶ 51, 551 P.3d at 701. Spending less than
a quarter of all expenditures on ballot issue advocacy does not reflect a major
purpose because it does not reflect a considerable or principal amount of an
organization’s overall spending. For this reason, we hold that Unite’s ballot-
initiative-related spending, relative to its total annual expenditures, weighs
strongly against a major purpose finding.
¶62 Finally, we examine the interrelatedness between Unite and the
propositions’ other opponents or supporters. The record indicates that Zvonek,
Unite’s contractor, met with Independence Institute, a policy think tank, in April
2020, where he discussed Unite gathering signatures to qualify Proposition 116 for
the ballot. Soon after this meeting, Independence Institute created an issue
committee to support Proposition 116.
¶63 Unite also made approximately $1.5 million worth of in-kind contributions
to issue committees in the form of services, specifically, work to print petitions and

34
gather signatures to get the propositions on the ballot. Because such in-kind
contributions in the form of services require a higher degree of coordination than
purely monetary contributions, they also demonstrate interrelatedness and weigh
in favor of a major purpose finding.
¶64 We emphasize this evidence of interrelatedness because—given the fact-
specific nature of the major purpose analysis—slightly different facts with a
similar amount of spending could support a major purpose finding. Nevertheless,
Unite’s low percentage of overall spending on ballot issue advocacy weighs
strongly enough against a major purpose finding that it counterbalances the
evidence of interrelatedness.
¶65 We do not apply to Unite the remaining factors (three, five, and seven)
because there is insufficient evidence in the record on the facts necessary to assess
those factors, namely the scope of Unite’s activities outside of its ballot issue
advocacy and whether its organizational structure indicates a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy. Again, the seven factors are a nonexhaustive list of
guidelines, and they all may or may not be appropriate in any given case.
¶66 Overall, the totality of the circumstances here leads us to conclude that Unite
did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election
cycle.

35
V. Conclusion
¶67 The voters adopted a major purpose test with broad language and a legal
history of fact-specific analysis. They did so to protect their informational interest
in knowing who is trying to influence their vote and accompanied the test with a
declaration insisting on full and timely disclosures achieved through strong
enforcement. For these reasons, we interpret article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of the
Colorado Constitution to require a fact-specific assessment of an organization’s
creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities. Here, countervailing
facts make Unite’s status a close call. But ultimately, the facts demonstrate that
Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020
election cycle. Therefore, it was not an issue committee pursuant to article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a).
¶68 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

June 29, 2026

# 2026 CO 56

No. 24SC281, Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State-Campaign Finance -
Constitutional Law -Issue Committees.

The supreme court interprets the definition of "issue committee" in article
XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado Constitution and holds that Unite for
Colorado does not qualify as an issue committee. Article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I)
defines an issue committee as an organization that has "a major purpose of
supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question." The supreme court
construes the phrase "a major purpose" to require a fact-specific analysis of an
organization's creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities to

determine whether the organization spent a considerable or principal amount of
its time and resources engaging in ballot issue advocacy. The supreme court
construes the phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question" to allow consideration
of the organization's aggregate spending and activities across multiple ballot
issues. After conducting a fact-specific analysis, the supreme court holds that

Unite for Colorado did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during
the 2020 election cycle and reverses the judgment of the court of appeals.

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 56

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC281
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA989

Petitioner:

Unite for Colorado,

Respondents:
Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in her official capacity as the
Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew Kline, in his official capacity as the
Colorado Deputy Secretary of State.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
June 29, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP

Jason R. Dunn

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Peter G. Baumann, Assistant Solicitor General

Denver, Colorado

CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11
This campaign finance dispute arising out of the 2020 election concerns
whether Unite for Colorado ("Unite") qualifies as an issue committee, a type of
organization subject to registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements under
Colorado's campaign finance laws.1

12 As relevant here, article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado
Constitution defines an issue committee as an organization "[t]hat has a major
purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question." Unite and
the Colorado Secretary of State2 disagree on two parts of this definition: (1) the
meaning of the phrase "a major purpose," and (2) whether the phrase "any ballot
issue or ballot question" allows consideration of an organization's spending on
ballot issue advocacy in the aggregate, or instead limits consideration to the

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the court of appeals erred in interpreting the Colorado
Constitution's "major purpose" standard, Colo. Const. art. XXVIII,
§ 2(10)(a)(I), which qualifies an organization as an "issue committee"
subject to registration, reporting, and disclosures, by adopting a
multifactor test that permits a major purpose finding when an
organization spends 10% or less of its total outlays supporting or
opposing a particular ballot measure.

2 Respondents in this case are the Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in
her official capacity as the Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew Kline, in his
official capacity as the Colorado Deputy Secretary of State. For the sake of brevity,
we refer to them as "the Secretary of State" throughout.

organization's activities on a proposition-by-proposition basis. Colo. Const. art.
XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).

13 First, we interpret the phrase "a major purpose" to require a fact-specific
analysis of an organization's creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related
activities, as guided by a nonexhaustive list of factors established in case law and
statute at the time of this dispute. In conducting this fact-specific analysis, we
interpret the phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question" to allow consideration of
an organization's aggregate activity and spending across multiple ballot issues.

14 Next, we apply the fact-specific analysis to Unite to determine whether it
meets article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I)'s definition of issue committee. We
conclude that Unite's decision to engage in statewide ballot issue advocacy soon
after its creation and its in-kind contributions to gather signatures in support of
propositions both weigh in favor of a major purpose. On the other hand, the fact
that Unite spent less than a quarter of its overall spending during the 2020 election
cycle on issue advocacy weighs strongly against a major purpose. Under the
totality of the circumstances, we hold that Unite did not have a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy in 2020.

15
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

## I. Legal Background

16
Because this dispute concerns Unite's activities in 2020, we first summarize
the relevant campaign finance laws applicable at that time.

17
Colorado's campaign finance laws can be traced back to the Campaign
Reform Act of 1974, which focused on the regulation of political committees that
support or oppose the nomination or election of candidates for public office.
Ch. 57, sec. 1, §§ 49-27-101 to -121, 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 261, 261-70. In 1996,
voters updated and reenacted the law via a ballot measure (Amendment 15) as the
Fair Campaign Practices Act ("FCPA"). Legis. Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb.,
An Analysis of 1996 Ballot Proposals, at 27-32, 56-67 (1996), https://
historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/191?page=26
[https://
perma.cc/P7K4-4YM9]; Colo. Sec'y of State, State of Colorado: Abstract of Votes Cast
1995-1996, at 159, https://historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/
232?page=168 [https://perma.cc/8SGT-F9A8] (showing the abstract of votes cast
for Amendment 15 in the November 5, 1996 general election). The FCPA included
the regulation of issue committees that support or oppose ballot issues,
§ 1-45-108(1), (3), C.R.S. (1997), and required the disclosure of information about
"contributions received ... expenditures made; and obligations entered into,"
§ 1-45-108(1), C.R.S. (1997).

18
In 2002, voters adopted Amendment 27, which enshrined comprehensive
campaign finance regulations, including the regulation of issue committees, in the
Colorado Constitution. See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII. Article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a) defines an issue committee as:

any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more
persons, including natural persons:

(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot
issue or ballot question; or

(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess
of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot
question.

Only the first prong of this definition is at issue in the majority of cases, including
this one, because the Secretary of State has interpreted this provision to require an
organization to meet both the major purpose element and spend in excess of two
hundred dollars to qualify as an issue committee. Dep't of State, 8 Colo. Code
Regs. 1505-6:1.9 (2022).3 Because no party disputes the Secretary of State's
interpretation, we proceed under this interpretation.

19 Article XXVIII requires organizations that qualify as issue committees to
meet the disclosure requirements set out in section 1-45-108, C.R.S. (2025). Colo.

3 We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held,
when interpreting the definition of "political committee" in Amendment 27, that
a two-hundred-dollar spending threshold, standing alone, is unconstitutional.
Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007).

Const. art. XXVIII, § 7. Section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025), requires issue
committees to "report ... their contributions received, including the name and
address of each person who has contributed twenty dollars or more; expenditures
made, and obligations entered into by the committee or party." And the issue
committee must also disclose "the occupation and employer of each person who
has made a contribution of one hundred dollars or more." § 1-45-108(1)(a)(II),
C.R.S. (2025). Such disclosures must be made every year, even when the issue
committee is inactive. Dep't of State, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:17.2.3 (2022).

110 In 2008, a division of the court of appeals first analyzed article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a)(I) in Independence Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130, 1136-39 (Colo.
App. 2008). There, the Independence Institute argued that the phrase "a major
purpose" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 1136. The division
rejected the vagueness challenge, reasoning that "[c]onstitutional provisions need
not be so exact as to eliminate any need for [a] fact-specific analysis," and that an
organization's "major purpose" could be assessed by "compar[ing] the purposes
stated in its charter, articles of incorporation, and by-laws; the purposes of its
activities and annual expenditures; and the scope of issues addressed in its print
and electronic publications." Id. at 1139. The division also rejected the
Independence Institute's First Amendment overbreadth challenge because article

XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) did "not burden a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech." Id. at 1140.

111 Two years later, a different division of the court of appeals expounded on
the definition of the phrase "a major purpose" in Cerbo v. Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc.,
240 P.3d 495, 501 (Colo. App. 2010). There, the division examined the plain
language definition of the term "major" at the time Amendment 27 passed in 2002.
Id. It concluded that an organization has "a major purpose" of ballot issue
advocacy if it expends "a considerable or principal portion of the organization's
total activities" on ballot issue advocacy. Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
525 F.3d 274, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting)). The division also
applied the phrase to Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc., and relied on several factors to
assess whether the organization's ballot issue advocacy amounted to a
considerable or principal portion of its activities. Id. at 501-04.

112 That same year, the General Assembly passed a new statutory definition of
"a major purpose" that essentially codified the factors identified in Independence
Institute. Ch. 270, sec. 4, § 1-45-103(12), 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1239, 1241. This new
legislation stated that an organization's "major purpose" could be reflected by:
(1) "[a]n organization's specifically identified objectives in its organizational
documents"; or (2) "an organization's demonstrated pattern of conduct based
upon its .. . [a]nnual expenditures in support of or opposition to a ballot issue or

ballot question" or "[p]roduction or funding . . . of written or broadcast
communications ... in support of or opposition to a ballot issue or ballot question."
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2011).

113 Finally, in Colorado Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, 11 32-35,
363 P.3d 727, 731-32, a division of the court of appeals rejected a rule promulgated
by the Secretary of State. The rule sought to clarify that an organization has a
major purpose of ballot issue advocacy if more than 30% of its annual expenditures
are directed to such activity. Id. at 1 31, 363 P.3d at 731. The division concluded
that the 30% threshold was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported
by competent evidence and was untethered to the language in section
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2013), that required a broader analysis of an organization's
"pattern of conduct." Colo. Ethics Watch, TT 32-35, 363 P.3d at 731-32 (citing
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2013)).4

4 In addition to these developments, in 2016, the legislature amended section
1-45-108 to exclude "small-scale issue committee[s]" from the general issue
committee disclosure requirements. Ch. 269, sec. 2, § 1-45-108(1.5), 2016 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1113, 1114. Section 1-45-103(16.3)(a), C.R.S. (2025), defines small-scale issue
committees as those that have "accepted or made contributions or expenditures in
an amount that does not exceed five thousand dollars during an applicable
election cycle."

Finally, in 2022, the legislature again amended the definition of "a major purpose"
in section 1-45-103(12)(b). Ch. 400, sec. 1, § 1-45-103(12)(b), 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws
2851, 2852. However, because the 2022 legislation does not appear to apply
retroactively to Unite's activities in 2020, we decline to apply those factors to Unite
or otherwise comment on the factors the legislature provided in that legislation.

## II. Facts and Procedural History

114 Unite began operations in January 2020 and described itself on its website
as "an issue advocacy organization" with the mission of "support[ing] policies
that increase economic opportunity and greater government transparency" and
"oppos[ing] policies that would be harmful to Colorado's economic wellbeing,
and efforts to unnecessarily grow the size and reach of government." Katie
Kennedy, Unite's registered agent and only board member, and Dustin Zvonek, a
contractor, directed all of Unite's activities.

115 In 2020, Unite spent a total of $17,174,246.70. Of that amount, $4,026,017.26,
approximately 23.4%, was directed to ballot issue advocacy:

· Unite spent $1,500,808.85 opposing Proposition 113, a ballot initiative to
join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, including spending
on advertising, text messages, and direct contributions to Protect
Colorado's Vote, an issue committee opposing Proposition 113.

· Unite spent $964,998.25 supporting Proposition 116, a ballot initiative to
reduce the state income tax rate. Spending on Proposition 116 included
in-kind contributions for signature gathering to support Energize our
Economy, an issue committee supporting Proposition 116.

· Unite spent $1,560,210.16 supporting Proposition 117, a ballot initiative
to require voter approval of certain new state-owned businesses. This
spending also included advertising to support the initiative and in-kind
contributions for signature gathering to Voter Approval of Fees, an issue
committee supporting Proposition 117.

116 In August 2020, members of the public filed a campaign finance complaint
against Unite with the Elections Division of the Department of State ("the Elections

Division"), alleging that Unite was an issue committee under the definition in
article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of the Colorado Constitution and had failed to
register and make the required disclosures.

117 After investigating the complaint, the Elections Division ultimately moved
to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that Unite did not meet article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)'s definition of an issue committee. The Elections Division reached this
conclusion in part because it construed article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) to require a
major purpose of supporting a specific ballot initiative, not a major purpose of
supporting ballot initiatives generally.

118 However, then-Deputy Secretary of State, Ian Rayder, disagreed with this
interpretation, denied the motion, and remanded the case back to the Elections
Division with instructions to commence administrative proceedings against Unite
for failing to register as an issue committee and make the required disclosures.
The Elections Division did so, and after proceedings before the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ"), the ALJ found that Unite had a major purpose of ballot issue
advocacy because of its activities in connection with Propositions 113, 116, and
117. On review, the new Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher P. Beall, adopted
the ALJ's findings and conclusions in part.5 The Final Agency Order adopted by

5 The ALJ also held that under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II), spending more
than two hundred dollars on ballot issues or ballot questions qualifies an
organization as an issue committee. But the Deputy Secretary of State ultimately

the Deputy Secretary of State imposed a $40,000 fine on Unite and required Unite
to register and make the required disclosures.

119 Pursuant to section 24-4-106, C.R.S. (2025), Unite sought review of the Final
Agency Order in district court. Unite challenged the Deputy Secretary of State's
interpretation and application of the major purpose standard and argued that the
requirement to register and make disclosures violated Unite's First Amendment
rights. The district court reversed the Final Agency Order, concluding that Unite
was not an issue committee. The district court reasoned that the statutory
definition of an issue committee, section 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020), did not
support aggregating Unite's activity across all three ballot initiatives. The district
court did not rule on Unite's First Amendment claims. The Secretary of State
appealed the district court's order.

120 A division of the court of appeals unanimously reversed the district court.
Colo. Dep't of State v. Unite for Colo., 2024 COA 31, 1 1, 551 P.3d 687, 693. The
division conducted its own major purpose analysis. Starting with the
constitutional language in article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a), the division held that the
language contemplates an organization's aggregate conduct across multiple ballot
issues or ballot questions. Id. at 11 41-43, 551 P.3d at 699. The division also

rejected this interpretation in the Final Agency Order because the ALJ raised the
issue sua sponte without any argument on that point from the Elections Division.

identified seven factors to guide its analysis of whether Unite had a major purpose
of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Id. at 1 38, 551 P.3d at 698.
The division applied these factors and held that Unite had a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Id. at | 58, 551 P.3d at 702.
The division also considered and rejected Unite's First Amendment claims. Id. at
TT 59-70, 551 P.3d at 702-04.

121 Unite petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari. We granted review to
consider the interpretation of the "major purpose" standard.6

## III. Standard of Review

122 Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo
review. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, 1 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235. We
accord administrative proceedings a "presumption of validity" and resolve "all
reasonable doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings .. . in favor of the
agency." Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 1990). That said, such
deference is unwarranted where "the agency's interpretation is contrary to
constitutional and statutory law." Gessler, 1 7, 327 P.3d at 235.

6 Unite also raises various free speech and freedom of association arguments under
the First Amendment throughout its briefing. Opening Brief for Petitioner at
36-40. We do not address these arguments because we denied certiorari review
of Unite's First Amendment claims.

## IV. Analysis

123 We begin with our guiding principles of constitutional interpretation. We
then analyze the phrase "a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot
issue or ballot question." Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I). First, we analyze
the meaning of the phrase "a major purpose" and conclude that it requires a fact-
specific analysis of an organization's creation, spending, and ballot campaign-
related activities. Second, we examine the phrase "any ballot issue or ballot
question" to determine whether the major purpose analysis allows consideration
of an organization's aggregate spending across multiple ballot issues. We
conclude that it does. We end our analysis by applying article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)(I) to Unite and hold that Unite is not an issue committee because it did not
have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle.

## A. Principles of Constitutional Interpretation

124 Our goal when interpreting amendments to the Colorado Constitution is
twofold: effectuate the intent of the framers of our constitution and the people of
the State of Colorado and prevent evasion of the constitution's legitimate
operation. Markwell v. Cooke, 2021 CO 17, 1 33, 482 P.3d 422, 429. To do so, we
start with the plain language of a constitutional provision, giving its terms their
ordinary and popular meanings. People v. Smith, 2023 CO 40, 1 20, 531 P.3d 1051,
1055. That said, we may look beyond the plain and ordinary definitions of phrases

if "they have acquired a technical meaning through . . . judicial construction."
Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1368 (Colo. 1988); see also Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate
Maj. Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, 1 26, 269 P.3d 1248, 1255-56 (applying the legal
meaning of the phrase "express advocacy" in interpreting a different provision of
article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution). We may also consider the objective
the provision sought to achieve and the mischief it sought to avoid. Senate Maj.
Fund, LLC, 1 20, 269 P.3d at 1254. In discerning voter intent, we consider the ballot
title and submission clause, as well as the voter Blue Book, "which is the analysis
of ballot proposals prepared by the legislature." In re Submission of Interrogatories
on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999).

125 We favor constructions that harmonize different constitutional provisions
over those that create conflict, and where possible, we adopt a construction
consistent with those given by coordinate branches of government. In re
Interrogatory on House Joint Resol. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23, T1 32-33, 500 P.3d 1053,
1062-63. We also presume that voters know the existing law when they vote to
amend the constitution. Dwyer v. State, 2015 CO 58, 1 19, 357 P.3d 185, 191.

## B. The Phrase "a Major Purpose" Demonstrates the Voters' Intent to Adopt a Fact-Specific Analysis

126 Here, we begin with the plain language of the phrase "a major purpose."
We conclude that the plain language sets an overarching standard for whether an
organization qualifies as an issue committee but sheds little light on how to

analyze whether an organization meets this standard. So, to better understand
how the voters would have understood the phrase in 2002 when they approved
Amendment 27, we review the origins of the phrase in United States Supreme
Court case law and trace its development in Colorado. We examine the policy
declaration voters approved alongside Amendment 27, the Blue Book that
accompanied Amendment 27 on the ballot, and the voter informational interest
undergirding the disclosure requirements in Amendment 27.

[27 All these sources of the voters' intent clarify that the major purpose test is a
holistic, case-by-case assessment of an organization's creation, spending, and
ballot campaign-related activities to determine whether it spent a considerable or
principal amount of its time and resources engaging in ballot issue advocacy.

128 We conclude by highlighting some guiding factors from the legislature and
case law that courts should consider when conducting this analysis.

## 1. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of "a Major Purpose"

129 Common definitions of "major" and "purpose" at the time voters passed
Amendment 27 offer some insight. In 2002, the Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defined "major" as "notable or conspicuous in effect or scope:
considerable, principal." Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501 (quoting Major, Webster's Third
New International Dictionary (2002)). "Considerable" was defined further as
"rather large in extent or degree." Id. (quoting Considerable, Webster's Third New

International Dictionary (2002)). And as of 2002, Black's Law Dictionary defined
"purpose" as "[a]n objective, goal, or end." Purpose, Black's Law Dictionary (7th
ed. 1999). These definitions indicate the voters' intent to categorize as issue
committees those organizations that spend a considerable or principal amount of
their time and resources on ballot issue advocacy. Finally, we note that by using
the phrase "a major purpose," voters recognized that organizations could have
more than one major purpose. Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501 ("[B]y using the indefinite
article 'a,' the phrase 'a major purpose' brings within its ambit organizations for
which promoting a ballot issue is but one major purpose.").

130 Because the phrase "major purpose" has its origins in United States
Supreme Court case law, we turn next to that history.

## 2. The Origins of the Major Purpose Test and Its Understanding in 2002

131 The Supreme Court first invoked what has come to be called the major
purpose test in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley concerned various
challenges to the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
("FECA"), one of which claimed that FECA's definition of "political committee"
was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 7-8, 76-80. FECA defined "political
committee" as a group of people that spent over one thousand dollars in a calendar
year for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate. Id.
at 62-63. The Court held that this definition of "political committee" was not

unconstitutionally vague in part because it "only encompass[ed] organizations
that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate." Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Because the
Court tied the definition of "political committee" to the organization's "major
purpose," federal courts started using the major purpose definition as a test for
whether an organization qualified as a political committee. See, e.g., Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 1982).
132 The Supreme Court applied the major purpose requirement ten years later
in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986) ("MCFL"). MCFL concerned a constitutional challenge to a different
provision of FECA that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to make
expenditures "in connection with" a federal election and required that any such
expenditures be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated
fund. Id. at 241. FECA then regulated these separate segregated funds as political
committees. Id. at 253. For a nonprofit corporation like MCFL that engaged in
issue advocacy, this meant that its independent expenditure activity could be
regulated as though MCFL's major purpose was to further the election of
candidates.

T33
The Court ultimately held the provision at issue unconstitutional as applied
to MCFL. Id. at 254-64. It began by summarizing the circumstances of MCFL's
creation and its activities as an organization-noting when the organization was
created, quoting the organization's purpose statement in its articles of
incorporation, describing from whom the organization did and did not accept
funding, listing the various types of activities the group pursued in the
community, and detailing its campaign-related spending. Id. at 241-44.

134 From all this information, the Court concluded that MCFL was not a
political committee (and therefore could not be subjected to the full panoply of
regulations that accompany political committee status) because it did not have the
major purpose of nominating or supporting a candidate. Id. at 241-42, 252 n.6, 262.
The Court cautioned, however, that "should MCFL's independent spending
become so extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as
campaign activity," then it would be "classified as a political committee" and
subject to FECA's requirements. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).

135 In sum, the Court examined the specific facts of MCFL's creation, spending,
and campaign-related activities to reach its conclusion that campaign activity was
not MCFL's major purpose. Id. at 241-44, 252 n.6, 262. 7

7 The Federal Election Commission has also interpreted the Court's case law
regarding the major purpose test as requiring a broad, fact-specific analysis. See
The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 681 F.3d 544, 556 (4th

136 We too encountered the major purpose test in the lead up to the passage of
Amendment 27 in 2002. In Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 753-57
(Colo. 2000), we interpreted the earlier statutory definition of issue committee in
the FCPA (Colorado's Fair Campaign Practices Act). At that time, the FCPA did
not include "a major purpose" in its definition of issue committee but instead
defined an issue committee as "[t]wo or more persons who are elected, appointed,
or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting contributions
and making expenditures to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question."
§ 1-45-103(8)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2000) (emphasis added). Though an ALJ in Common
Sense Alliance read the major purpose test from Buckley and MCFL into the FCPA's
definition, we refused to do so because the plain language of the definition omitted
it. Common Sense All., 995 P.2d at 751, 753. We noted that the FCPA's definition
created a "loophole" that "may be troubling" but refused to read the major
purpose test into the definition because we were "bound by the [FCPA's] plain
language." Id. at 755.

Cir. 2012) (highlighting that the Federal Election Commission interprets the major
purpose test as requiring "the flexibility of a case-by-case analysis of an
organization's conduct that is incompatible with a one-size-fits-all rule" (quoting
Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5601 (Feb. 7, 2007))). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has similarly interpreted article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a) as adopting a version of Buckley's major purpose test. Colo. Right
to Life Comm., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1155.

## 3. Amendment 27's Passage, the Voters' Policy Declaration, the 2002 Blue Book, and the Informational Interest

137 It was against this legal backdrop that the voters in 2002 adopted
Amendment 27's new definition of issue committee:

"Issue committee" means any person, other than a natural person, or
any group of two or more persons, including natural persons:

(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or
ballot question; [and]

(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess
of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot
question.

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a) (emphasis added).

138 This definition expressly incorporated the same major purpose language
from Buckley and MCFL that we had declined to read into the earlier FCPA
definition in Common Sense Alliance. And because we assume that voters knew the
law at the time, we interpret the definition in section 2(10)(a) as adopting the major
purpose test as articulated in Buckley and MCFL-i.e., as a fact-specific analysis of
an organization's spending, creation, and ballot campaign-related activities.
Additional evidence of the voters' intent supports this interpretation.

139 The declaration that appears at the beginning of Amendment 27 serves as a
guide to the voters' intent. See Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550,
555 (Colo. 1998). Specifically, the voters of Colorado declared that

the interests of the public are best served by . .. full and timely
disclosure of campaign contributions, independent expenditures, and
funding of electioneering communications, and strong enforcement
of campaign finance requirements.

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1. This language reveals that the voters' intent in
adopting Amendment 27 was to ensure robust compliance with and enforcement
of Colorado's campaign finance law requirements.

140 The Blue Book voter guide offers additional insight into the voters' intent.
In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d at 554. Specifically,
the 2002 Blue Book clarifies that the disclosure provisions focused on the
importance of providing the electorate with sufficient information about who is
spending money to influence elections:

Requiring greater disclosure of who pays for political advertising
provides more information about who is spending money to
influence elections.

Legis. Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2002 Ballot Information Booklet: Analysis
of Statewide Ballot Issues and Recommendations on Retention of Judges, at 6 (2002),
https://hermes.cde.state.co.us/islandora/object/co%3A27117
[https://
perma.cc/7W4L-BFY7].

141 This voter "informational interest," like the major purpose test itself, traces
its origins back to Buckley, where the Court identified it as the first of three
"substantial governmental interests" that can support campaign disclosure
requirements. 424 U.S. at 67-68, 81.

142 The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this informational interest as a
justification for disclosure requirements in both ballot issue and candidate
elections. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792, n.32 (1978),
for example, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
corporate expenditures to influence certain types of ballot issues, but noted the
importance of disclosure requirements, observing that "identif[ying] . . . the source
of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected." And in Buckley
v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 203 (1999), the Court
observed that such disclosures ensure "voters are informed of the source and
amount of money spent by proponents to get a measure on the ballot." Id. at 202-
03 (upholding Colorado's law requiring a ballot issue's proponents to disclose the
amount spent on collecting signatures). The electorate's informational interest
appeared again in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 369
(2010), where the Court upheld disclosure requirements in political
advertisements and explained that such disclosures were justified because "the
public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before
an election."

143 The information provided through disclosure requirements can be
particularly valuable for voters assessing ballot propositions because they often

concern "divisive and controversial public issues" such as taxation, business
regulation, and hot-button political and social issues. Common Sense All., 995 P.2d
at 756. Given the stakes, voters often face a deluge of sophisticated special interest
groups trying to influence their vote on proposed legislation. It is important to
remember that when Colorado voters exercise the power of initiative, they are
quite literally acting as legislators because the power of the initiative derives from
the legislative power the people have reserved to themselves under the
constitution. Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1) ("The legislative power of the state shall be
vested in the general assembly ... but the people reserve to themselves the power
to propose laws and amendments to the constitution .... "); see also Vagneur v. City
of Aspen, 2013 CO 13, 11 36-37, 295 P.3d 493, 504 (explaining that voters are
exercising a part of the same legislative power as the General Assembly when they
exercise the initiative power).

144 Given this dynamic, the disclosure of information regarding who is
spending money to influence the decisions of Colorado's electorate is directly
analogous to legislators understanding who is funding the lobbyists trying to
influence their vote. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (noting that the Court has
upheld disclosure requirements for lobbyists because "Congress 'has merely
provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to
influence legislation'" (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)));

Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("More than fifty years
ago, the Supreme Court held that the public disclosure of 'who is being hired, who
is putting up the money, and how much' they are spending to influence legislation
is 'a vital national interest."" (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-26)). Without this
information, "the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the
voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal." Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625. The purpose of disclosure
requirements is to bring this essential information to light. Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 371 ("[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.").

## 4. The Major Purpose Test Requires Analyzing an Organization's Creation, Spending, and Ballot Campaign-Related Activities

145
Colorado voters adopted a definition of "issue committee" against a
backdrop of case law that applied a fact-specific analysis. They prefaced it with a
declaration insisting on full and timely disclosures and strong enforcement of
campaign finance laws. And the Blue Book indicates that voters wanted to ensure
access to full and accurate information about who is trying to influence their vote.
For these reasons, we conclude that analyzing whether an organization has a
"major purpose" of ballot issue advocacy requires a holistic, case-by-case
assessment of an organization's creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related

activities to determine whether it spent a considerable or principal amount of its
time and resources engaging in ballot issue advocacy.

146 We adopt a case-by-case analysis also to avoid interpretations that allow for
easy evasion of the constitution's requirements. We have long considered it an
obligation to "construe the constitution in such a manner as will prevent . . .
evasion of its legitimate operation." Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201,
207 (Colo. 1991) (citing Inst. for the Edu. of the Mute & Blind v. Henderson, 31 P. 714,
716 (Colo. 1892)). And campaign finance regulation is an area rife with
sophisticated evasion. See Chisun Lee, et al., Secret Spending in the States, Brennan
Ctr. for Just., at 6-9, 14-18 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/media/210/
download/Report_Secret_Spending_in_the_States.pdf?inline=1
[https://
perma.cc/DC3H-MYC8] (explaining the precipitous rise of undisclosed campaign
finance spending on ballot measure elections, even in states-such as
Colorado-with laws intended to require disclosure); see also McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 176 (2003) ("Experience under the current law
demonstrates that Congress' concerns about circumvention are not merely
hypothetical.").

147 Accordingly, we agree with and adopt the factors identified by the division
below as guidelines in determining whether an organization has a major purpose

of ballot issue advocacy, while cautioning that no single factor is necessarily
dispositive, nor is the list exclusive:

(1) the organization's specifically identified objectives, as expressed
in its organizational documents or in its public statements (such as on
its website or in correspondence with potential donors);

(2) its activities and annual expenditures relative to its ballot-
measure-related activities and expenditures;

(3) the scope of issues addressed in its print and electronic
publications relative to its ballot-measure-related communications;

(4) the length of time of the organization's existence relative to its
ballot measure advocacy;

(5) the organization's structure;

(6) the interrelatedness of the organization and the ballot measure's
proponents or opponents; and

(7) the various issues with which the organization has been involved.
☒

See Unite, 1 38, 551 P.3d at 698.

148 Some of these factors can be traced directly to the 2010 legislation. Id. (citing
§ 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020)). And "[w]here possible, courts should adopt a
construction of a constitutional provision in keeping with that given by coordinate
branches of government." In re Great Outdoors Colo. Tr. Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 538
(Colo. 1996).

149 Importantly, all of these factors can also be traced back to the circumstances
the Supreme Court considered in MCFL. Most are drawn from Independence
Institute, 209 P.3d at 1139, and Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501-04. Both of those cases, in

turn, relied on Judge Michael's dissent in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d
at 328-29 (Michael, J., dissenting). And Judge Michael cited the Court's analysis
in MCFL as support for those elements. Id.

150 Although the Court in MCFL did not list these factors explicitly, each factor
captures circumstances the Court deemed relevant in that case. The Court
discussed (1) the organization's stated purpose, MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-42; (2) the
purposes of MCFL's activities and its annual expenditures, id. at 242-43; (3) the
scope of issues MCFL addressed in its various publications, id. at 242-44; (4) the
timing of MCFL's election-related advocacy relative to its creation as an
organization, id. at 241-44; (5) MCFL's organizational structure, id. at 241-42,
252-54, 259, 263-64; (6) MCFL's inability to serve as a "conduit[]" for the direct
spending of other organizations-i.e., its (lack of) interrelatedness with other
organizations, id. at 264; and (7) the various issues in which MCFL had been
involved, id. at 241-44.

151 In short, the major purpose test is a flexible, fact-specific analysis of an
organization's creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities. Because
these factors carry the authority of both our legislature and Supreme Court case
law, we adopt them as a nonexhaustive list of guidelines for courts to rely on when
assessing whether an organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy.

## C. The Phrase "Any Ballot Issue or Ballot Question" Permits Aggregation

152 The parties also dispute the scope of the phrase "any ballot issue or ballot
question" in article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado Constitution. Unite
insists that "any ballot issue or ballot question" means courts must assess an
organization's major purpose on a proposition-by-proposition basis.

153 As relevant here, Unite supported or opposed three ballot issues during the
2020 election cycle: Propositions 113, 116, and 117. Unite contends that, to qualify
as an issue committee, the court must determine whether it had a major purpose
of supporting or opposing each specific proposition. The Secretary of State argues
the opposite - that a court may assess whether Unite had a major purpose of ballot
issue advocacy by examining the organization's activities in the aggregate.

154 "Any" has an expansive meaning that includes "one or more." Any,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
any [https://perma.cc/37HA-PXMT]. Colorado courts have consistently
interpreted "any" to mean "all." See, e.g., Winslow v. Morgan Cnty. Comm'rs,
697 P.2d 1141, 1141 (Colo. App. 1985) (relying on Filmore v. Wells, 15 P. 343, 345
(Colo. 1887)) (interpreting the word "any" to mean "all" when interpreting zoning
requirements in the Colorado code); see also BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep't of
Revenue, 2016 CO 23, 1 18, 369 P.3d 281, 286 ("When used as an adjective in a
statute, the word 'any' means 'all."" (quoting Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 447

(Colo. 2007))); Stamp, 172 P.3d at 447 (construing the phrase "any derivative claim"
to mean "all derivative claims"); Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 405 n.2 (2020)
(explaining that the word "any" has an expansive meaning). Given our
presumption that the voters understood the expansive meaning applied to "any,"
we interpret the plain language of the phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question"
to permit consideration of an organization's activities across all ballot issues or
ballot questions it supports or opposes.8 Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).

155 This plain language interpretation of section 2(10)(a)(I) is bolstered by the
voter informational interest that underlies the regulation of issue committees. This

8 Unite points out that the statutory definition of "issue committee" refers to "a
ballot issue or ballot question." § 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020). It contends that
the statute's use of the indefinite article "a" and the singular terms "issue" and
"question" indicate that a major purpose must be assessed with respect to an
individual ballot measure. See Opening Brief for Petitioner at 44. We disagree.
First, the legislature's use of the article "a" is not necessarily more restrictive than
"any." And in any event, we are bound, first and foremost, by the constitutional
language. Here, the voters chose to use the term "any" and thereby implicate our
case law interpreting "any" to mean "all." Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
Unite further contends that if the voters had intended to allow for aggregation of
an organization's conduct across multiple ballot issues, they would have used
"one or more" for the definition of "issue committee" as they did in the definition
of "political committee." See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(12)(a) (defining "political
committee" as supporting or opposing the nomination or election of "one or more
candidates" (emphasis added)). Again, we disagree. The voters chose to use the
expansive term "any." The fact that they used another expansive phrase ("one or
more") for political committees does not undermine the established, expansive
meaning of "any."

informational interest is only amplified, not diminished, where a group is seeking
to influence the electorate's vote on more than one measure in an election cycle.

156 Finally, we note that Unite's interpretation that an organization's activities
must be evaluated on a proposition-by-proposition basis would lead to absurd
results. Under Unite's view, if an organization devotes literally 100% of its
resources and activity to ballot issue advocacy but spreads those resources equally
across ten separate ballot issues, that organization does not have "a major purpose
of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question" because it has spent
only 10% of its resources on each individual proposition. Such a result cannot be
squared with the voters' intent in passing Amendment 27.

## D. Applying Article XXVIII, Section 2(10)(a) to Unite

157 After weighing all of the facts available in the record before us, we conclude
that, while it is a close call, Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot issue
advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Of the seven factors listed above, we find
four relevant to our analysis here.

158 First, we assess Unite's organizational objectives. And although Unite's
articles of incorporation do not include a purpose statement, Unite described itself
on its website as an "issue advocacy organization" with the goals of "support[ing]
policies that increase economic opportunity and greater government
transparency" and "oppos[ing] policies that would be harmful to Colorado's

economic wellbeing, and efforts to unnecessarily grow the size and reach of
government." But while Unite calls itself an "issue advocacy organization," it has
also repeatedly disclaimed in its formal correspondence any status as, or intention
to be, an issue committee. So, this factor does not weigh strongly in either
direction.

159 Second, we consider the length of time from Unite's creation to its ballot
issue advocacy. The record indicates that Unite began actively supporting
Proposition 116 as early as April 2020, only three months after its creation in
January 2020. Given this relatively short period of time between creation and
supporting a ballot issue, this factor weighs in favor of a major purpose finding.

160 Third, we compare Unite's overall activities and expenditures to its ballot-
initiative-related activities and expenditures. Unite spent approximately $1.5
million opposing Proposition 113 (8.7% of its total spending); approximately $965
thousand supporting Proposition 116 (5.6% of its total spending); and
approximately $1.5 million supporting Proposition 117 (9.1% of its total spending).
In sum, Unite spent just over $4 million across three statewide initiatives, and such
a high dollar amount demonstrates a significant commitment to ballot issue
advocacy. But assessing an organization's major purpose requires comparing its
ballot campaign-related spending with its overall spending. This is essential to
determine whether the ballot campaign-related spending constituted a

considerable or principal amount of the organization's overall spending. Here,
even considering its spending in the aggregate, Unite devoted only 23.4% of its
expenditures during the 2020 election cycle to ballot issue advocacy.

161 While we largely align with the division's analysis elsewhere, we disagree
with the division's holding that directing less than a quarter of all expenditures to
ballot issue advocacy supports a conclusion that an organization has a major
purpose of ballot issue advocacy. Unite, 1 51, 551 P.3d at 701. Spending less than
a quarter of all expenditures on ballot issue advocacy does not reflect a major
purpose because it does not reflect a considerable or principal amount of an
organization's overall spending. For this reason, we hold that Unite's ballot-
initiative-related spending, relative to its total annual expenditures, weighs
strongly against a major purpose finding.

162 Finally, we examine the interrelatedness between Unite and the
propositions' other opponents or supporters. The record indicates that Zvonek,
Unite's contractor, met with Independence Institute, a policy think tank, in April
2020, where he discussed Unite gathering signatures to qualify Proposition 116 for
the ballot. Soon after this meeting, Independence Institute created an issue
committee to support Proposition 116.

163 Unite also made approximately $1.5 million worth of in-kind contributions
to issue committees in the form of services, specifically, work to print petitions and

gather signatures to get the propositions on the ballot. Because such in-kind
contributions in the form of services require a higher degree of coordination than
purely monetary contributions, they also demonstrate interrelatedness and weigh
in favor of a major purpose finding.

164 We emphasize this evidence of interrelatedness because-given the fact-
specific nature of the major purpose analysis-slightly different facts with a
similar amount of spending could support a major purpose finding. Nevertheless,
Unite's low percentage of overall spending on ballot issue advocacy weighs
strongly enough against a major purpose finding that it counterbalances the
evidence of interrelatedness.

165 We do not apply to Unite the remaining factors (three, five, and seven)
because there is insufficient evidence in the record on the facts necessary to assess
those factors, namely the scope of Unite's activities outside of its ballot issue
advocacy and whether its organizational structure indicates a major purpose of
ballot issue advocacy. Again, the seven factors are a nonexhaustive list of
guidelines, and they all may or may not be appropriate in any given case.

166 Overall, the totality of the circumstances here leads us to conclude that Unite
did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020 election
cycle.

## V. Conclusion

167 The voters adopted a major purpose test with broad language and a legal
history of fact-specific analysis. They did so to protect their informational interest
in knowing who is trying to influence their vote and accompanied the test with a
declaration insisting on full and timely disclosures achieved through strong
enforcement. For these reasons, we interpret article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of the
Colorado Constitution to require a fact-specific assessment of an organization's
creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities. Here, countervailing
facts make Unite's status a close call. But ultimately, the facts demonstrate that
Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020
election cycle. Therefore, it was not an issue committee pursuant to article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a).

168 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

26 CO 56, 24SC281 Unite for Colorado v. Department of State

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