Nedder v. Nedder

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ERNEST J. NEDDER v. LAUREN E. NEDDER
(AC 45654)
Elgo, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and entering certain financial
orders. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court did not
have the authority to order the plaintiff to use specific assets to pay
certain expenses and debt; it was legally and logically correct for the
court to equitably divide the parties’ property and to order the three
financial accounts at issue to be used for their originally intended and
historical purposes, as the court derived its authority to enter those
orders from the statute (§ 46b-81 (a)) governing the assignment of prop-
erty and the responsibility for debts when entering an order dissolving
a marriage.
2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to assign a value to the plaintiff’s quasi-pension
account prior to dividing the parties’ property: this court presumed that
the parties’ property interest in the account was considered by the trial
court when it made its equitable division of property; moreover, although
the court did not state which valuation method it used, it was not
required to do so, and, because the defendant failed to file a motion for
articulation to clarify any potential ambiguity in how the court valued
the parties’ property, there was no evidence in the record supporting
the defendant’s claim.
3. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused
its discretion in fashioning its alimony orders:
a. The defendant’s claim that the trial court based its alimony orders on
the plaintiff’s gross income without considering his net income failed;
the plaintiff’s net income was easily ascertainable, the court had exhibits
in evidence showing the plaintiff’s net earnings for each of the four years
prior to the dissolution hearing, the court’s memorandum of decision
mentioned net income when determining the amount of child support,
and the court stated that it was adopting the plaintiff’s proposal as to
the amount of alimony to award, which was calculated as a percentage
of the plaintiff’s net income averaged over the last four years.
b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of alimony
it ordered; the record revealed that the court properly considered the
criteria in the statute (§ 46b-82 (a)) for determining what amount of
alimony to award, and, as it was within the court’s discretion to place
various degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual
circumstances of the case, this court could not conclude, on the basis
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Nedder v. Nedder
of the facts, evidence and findings in the record, that the trial court
ordered an insufficient alimony award.
Argued November 9, 2023—officially released July 23, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a
cross complaint; thereafter, the matter was tried to the
court, Moukawsher, J.; judgment dissolving the mar-
riage and granting certain other relief, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Tara C. Dugo, with whom was Melissa A. Bohl, for
the appellant (defendant).
Alexander Copp, with whom was Rachel Pencu, for
the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this appeal from a marital dissolution
judgment, the defendant, Lauren E. Nedder, claims that
the trial court erred in (1) ordering that the plaintiff,
Ernest J. Nedder, use specific assets to pay certain
expenses and debt, (2) failing to assign a value to a
quasi-pension account prior to dividing the parties’
property, and (3) fashioning its alimony orders. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The parties were married on June
18, 2005, and have five children together. On November
19, 2020, the plaintiff brought an action for dissolution
of marriage, stating that the marriage had broken down
irretrievably with no hope for reconciliation, to which
the defendant agreed. A trial was held over the course
of four days in June, 2022. The court heard testimony
from both parties and various other witnesses, includ-
ing, inter alia, financial experts for both parties. Both
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parties filed proposed orders that contained their
respective proposals for property division, child sup-
port, and alimony.
In his proposed orders, the plaintiff requested, inter
alia, that he be awarded three accounts—the ‘‘Fidelity
HSA #0811’’ (health savings account), the ‘‘Ameriprise
brokerage #1133’’ (brokerage account), and the ‘‘RSM
US LLP Draw account’’ (draw account)—with the
understanding that they would be used for the limited
purpose of funding the children’s medical expenses, the
children’s postmajority educational expenses, and tax
payments made in 2022, respectively. At trial, the court
questioned the plaintiff about these accounts. Follow-
ing a colloquy with the plaintiff’s counsel, the court
indicated that it understood the plaintiff’s intention to
‘‘distinguish [those accounts] as not being necessarily
entirely for his benefit’’; at the same time, the court
recognized that, to effectuate the proposed use of those
accounts, it ‘‘still [has] to allocate [them] to him.’’ The
defendant at that time did not object or raise any issue
with the plaintiff’s proposal. The court also heard exten-
sive testimony regarding the plaintiff’s quasi-pension
account (PVA account) from the plaintiff and from the
parties’ respective financial experts.
On June 28, 2022, the court rendered a judgment of
dissolution ending the parties’ seventeen year marriage.
The court agreed with the parties’ custody and parent-
ing agreement and incorporated it as a court order,
such that the parties would share joint legal custody
of their five minor children, who then ranged in age
from three years old to sixteen years old. The court
entered orders dividing the marital estate, which pro-
vided, inter alia, that the defendant would retain the
marital home and receive a total ‘‘property payment’’
of $75,000 payable in twelve monthly installments. The
plaintiff received the parties’ vacation property located
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in New Jersey. The court divided ownership of the par-
ties’ bank accounts, and ordered that the plaintiff was
to retain the following accounts with specific limita-
tions: (1) the health savings account was ‘‘to be used
solely for the children’s medical expenses,’’ (2) the bro-
kerage account was ‘‘to be used solely for the children’s
postsecondary educational expenses,’’ and (3) the draw
account was ‘‘to be used solely for tax payments in
2022.’’ The court ordered that a 401k account belonging
to the plaintiff was to be equally divided between the
parties, and permitted the plaintiff to retain the IRA
and retirement brokerage accounts he had owned prior
to the marriage. The court also awarded to the plaintiff
an ‘‘RSM Capital Account’’ and the PVA account. The
court ordered that the defendant was to receive $5034
in weekly child support, and a monthly alimony pay-
ment of $5000. The alimony was to be paid for eight
years. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court erred when
it ordered the plaintiff to use specific assets to pay a
specific debt or liability.1 The defendant does not dis-
1
In his brief, the plaintiff argues that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim due to the defendant’s lack of
aggrievement. Because aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing,
and standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we briefly address this
threshold issue.
It is axiomatic that ‘‘only an aggrieved party may appeal.’’ Newman v.
Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 94, 663 A.2d 980 (1995). ‘‘Standing is established
by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an
action, in other words, statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved. . . .
‘‘The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encom-
passes a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal
interest in [the challenged action] . . . . Second, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and
legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged
action]. . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distin-
guished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been
adversely affected.’’ (Emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation
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pute that the court had the authority to award the health
savings account, the brokerage account, or the draw
account to the plaintiff, nor that it had the authority to
require him to pay for the children’s medical expenses,
postsecondary educational expenses, or to make tax
payments. Rather, the defendant asserts that the court
did not have the authority to order the plaintiff to use
these specific accounts to pay for the named liabilities
and committed reversible error in doing so.2 We dis-
agree.
marks omitted.) Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 317
Conn. 515, 525–26, 119 A.3d 541 (2015).
The defendant meets the first prong of classical aggrievement because
she has a specific, personal, and legal interest in the equitable division of
the marital property. The three accounts at issue in the defendant’s first claim
constitute marital property. The second prong of classical aggrievement is
a relatively low threshold, as the defendant need only show a possibility
of being adversely affected by the court awarding these three accounts to
the plaintiff and directing that they be used for prescribed, limited purposes.
The defendant claims her legal interest in these accounts is adversely
affected because any ‘‘additional funds’’ that might remain in the accounts
upon satisfying the stated obligations or liabilities ‘‘cannot be utilized by
either party pursuant to the court’s limiting order. This harms both parties,
as it leaves assets undivided.’’ The defendant may still claim an interest in
any funds remaining in these accounts even though they were awarded to
the plaintiff. This is because, upon a careful review of the record, it is
evident that a possibility exists that the court did not take the funds into
account when equitably dividing the parties’ assets. On the first day of the
trial, the plaintiff’s counsel agreed that the funds in those three accounts
‘‘shouldn’t be considered part of the total balance between the parties in
terms of money,’’ ‘‘because it’s our claim that they’ll be set aside for’’ the
specific proposed purposes. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff was
asking the court ‘‘to think about these [accounts] differently,’’ and advised
counsel to ‘‘save it for closing argument or some other time, but . . . don’t
forget [to say that] if you’re just adding up who gets what number, you
shouldn’t be treating this as equal weight to that.’’ Although the record is
devoid of any indication of whether the court removed the value of these
accounts in the equitable division of assets, the possibility that any potential
remainder would be undivided between the parties is sufficient to meet the
minimal threshold requirement of standing. See Handsome, Inc. v. Plan-
ning & Zoning Commission, supra, 317 Conn. 525 (‘‘ ‘[s]tanding requires
no more than a colorable claim of injury’ ’’).
2
In the concluding paragraphs of the defendant’s discussion of her first
claim in her principal appellate brief, she raises two ancillary arguments—
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When a party ‘‘challenges the legal authority of the
court to issue [an] order, [the] claim raises a question
of law that is subject to . . . plenary review.’’ Rosato
v. Rosato, 77 Conn. App. 9, 17, 822 A.2d 974 (2003).
‘‘[T]he court’s authority to transfer property appurte-
nant to a dissolution proceeding requires an interpreta-
tion of the relevant statutes. Statutory construction, in
turn, presents a question of law over which our review
is plenary.’’ Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 272, 752
A.2d 1023 (1999).
The parties agree that the court derives its authority
to order that the plaintiff retain the disputed accounts
from General Statutes § 46b-81 (a), which provides in
relevant part: ‘‘At the time of entering a decree annulling
or dissolving a marriage . . . the Superior Court may
that ‘‘the practical effect of such orders makes them unworkable’’ and that
‘‘the trial court’s orders leave assets undivided and liabilities unpaid.’’ For
several reasons, we decline to review these ancillary contentions. First, those
contentions are inadequately briefed because they are ‘‘without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022). The
defendant also did not provide any analysis indicating how these contentions
related to the issue raised on appeal, which is whether the court lacked
the authority to enter the orders in question. Finally, although a potential
remainder in the three accounts constituted the possibility of an undivided
interest sufficient to establish standing; see footnote 1 of this opinion; it
was incumbent upon the defendant to file a motion for articulation in accor-
dance with Practice Book § 66-5 to clarify whether the court did, in fact,
value the accounts in its equitable division of the parties’ property. ‘‘It is a
well established principle of appellate procedure that the appellant has the
duty of providing this court with a record adequate to afford review. . . .
Where the factual or legal basis of the trial court’s ruling is unclear, the
appellant should seek articulation pursuant to Practice Book § [66-5]. . . .
Accordingly, [w]hen the decision of the trial court does not make the factual
predicates of its findings clear, we will, in the absence of a motion for
articulation, assume that the trial court acted properly.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Blum v. Blum, 109 Conn. App. 316, 331, 951 A.2d 587, cert.
denied, 289 Conn. 929, 958 A.2d 157 (2008). Here, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary and because the defendant failed to file a motion
for articulation to clarify the court’s order, we assume the court intended
that the plaintiff keep any funds remaining in these accounts after the named
liabilities have been satisfied.
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assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of
the other spouse. . . .’’ The defendant concedes that
§ 46b-81 authorizes the court to order that a party be
responsible for the payment of debts and liabilities. See
Carroll v. Carroll, 55 Conn. App. 18, 27, 737 A.2d 963
(1999) (‘‘[§] 46b-81 authorizes one party to assume the
joint liabilities of the parties’’).
The defendant nonetheless relies on Zilkha v. Zilkha,
159 Conn. App. 167, 123 A.3d 439 (2015), to support
her argument that the court acted ‘‘well beyond [its]
statutory authority’’ when ‘‘requiring the [plaintiff] to
utilize specific assets to pay said debts, liabilities and
expenses . . . .’’ The plaintiff counters by arguing that
Zilkha is inapposite to the present case. We agree with
the plaintiff.
In her brief, the defendant posits that, in Zilkha, this
court held that ‘‘the trial court lacks the authority to
order that fees be paid from a specific asset, regardless
if said asset is owned solely by the party that is directed
to make the payments.’’ However, the defendant fails
to consider that the reason ‘‘the court lacked authority
to distribute the escrow funds [was] because the judg-
ment of dissolution had not been opened.’’ Zilkha v.
Zilkha, supra, 159 Conn. App. 172.
In Zilkha, the trial court had rendered a judgment of
dissolution after dividing the property of the parties in
accordance with § 46b-81 (a). Id., 169. Three years later,
the plaintiff filed a motion to open and set aside the
dissolution judgment after the defendant received a
vast sum of money from a claim that allegedly was
fraudulently undisclosed during the pendency of the
dissolution action. Id. The court granted a motion to
order part of the defendant’s money from the claim to
be ‘‘held in escrow pending the outcome of the plaintiff’s
postjudgment motion to open,’’ but because the plaintiff
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took no action to conduct discovery or gather informa-
tion regarding the alleged fraud, no decision was made
regarding the postjudgment motion to open, and the
motion remained pending. Id., 170–71. Years later, when
a postjudgment motion for fees and retainers was filed
to compel payment, the trial court ordered that the
funds still held in escrow be used to pay for some of
those fees. Id., 171–72. On appeal, this court held that
‘‘the court could not make orders for funds to be distrib-
uted from the escrow account because those funds
belonged solely to the defendant, until and unless, the
court opened the judgment and distributed the escrow
funds, if at all. Accordingly, the court was without
authority to disburse funds from the escrow account.’’
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id., 175.
It is axiomatic that ‘‘[c]ourts have no inherent power
to transfer property from one spouse to another;
instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith,
supra, 249 Conn. 272. Once a dissolution of marriage
has been rendered, the judgment ‘‘may not be opened
or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is
filed’’ in accordance with our statutory rules. General
Statutes § 52-212a. In Zilkha, the court did not have the
authority under § 46b-81a to transfer the defendant’s
property—specifically, the funds in the escrow
account—to pay the fees because the judgment had
already been rendered. Zilkha v. Zilkha, supra, 159
Conn. App. 169. Section 46b-81 (a) may only be used
‘‘[a]t the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolv-
ing a marriage . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) This court
was clear in stating that, ‘‘although the court was free
to order that the defendant pay some or all of the fees
. . . it lacked the authority to direct that these pay-
ments be made from the escrowed funds.’’ Zilkha v.
Zilkha, supra, 174–75. This is because the escrowed
funds were specific property that ‘‘belonged solely to
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the defendant . . . .’’ Id., 175. Thus, ‘‘until . . . the
court opened the judgment . . . [it] was without
authority to disburse funds from the escrow account.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id. For these reasons, Zilkha is
inapposite to the present case.
Here, the parties each submitted proposed orders
prior to the commencement of trial. The defendant pro-
posed that the health savings, brokerage, and draw
accounts should be equally divided between the parties,
and that the plaintiff should pay 75 percent of the chil-
dren’s uninsured medical expenses going forward. The
defendant also asked that the court retain jurisdiction
to enter educational support orders for the children’s
college education. Conversely, the plaintiff’s proposed
orders requested that he retain the three accounts in
question, provided that they be used for the limited
purposes of ‘‘the children’s medical expenses . . . the
children’s postmajority educational expenses . . .
[and] to be used for tax payments in 2022.’’ At trial,
the plaintiff testified that the health savings and the
brokerage accounts were created with the intention of
using the funds for the children’s medical expenses and
the children’s college expenses, respectively, and that
the draw account was historically used to pay taxes.
During his testimony, he requested that these accounts
be designated for use only for those intended and histor-
ical purposes, and that they be distinguished as not
existing for his personal benefit. The defendant did not
raise an objection or express any concern regarding
the propriety of the plaintiff’s proposed use of those
accounts.
The defendant argues that, although § 46b-81 pro-
vides a court with the authority to assign assets or the
responsibility of debts to a spouse during dissolution,
it does not allow ‘‘the trial court to order debts, liabilities
and expenses [to] be serviced from specified assets.’’
The defendant’s only cited authority is Zilkha v. Zilkha,
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supra, 159 Conn. App. 167, which is inapposite to this
case. Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, we con-
clude that the court did have authority under § 46b-81
(a) because it was dividing the parties’ property and
rendering the judgment dissolving the marriage. ‘‘The
purpose of a property assignment is to divide the owner-
ship of the parties’ property equitably. . . . [E]quitable
remedies are not bound by formula but are molded to
the needs of justice. . . . Further, we presume that
the trial court properly considered all of the evidence
submitted by the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Szegda v. Szegda, 97 Conn. App. 426, 436, 904
A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 959
(2006). As our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated,
‘‘trial courts are empowered to deal broadly with prop-
erty and its equitable division incident to dissolution
proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 743, 785 A.2d 197
(2001).
On the basis of our plenary review of the record, we
conclude that it was legally and logically correct for
the court to equitably divide the parties’ property and
order the accounts at issue to be used for their originally
intended and historical purposes. Because § 46b-81
empowered the court to enter these orders, the defen-
dant’s argument fails.
II
The defendant’s second claim is that the court abused
its discretion by failing to assign a value to the PVA
account prior to dividing the parties’ property. She
argues that awarding an asset entirely to one party
necessitates using a present value method so that the
value of the asset can be properly offset with other
marital assets. Because the PVA account was awarded
solely to the plaintiff, the defendant claims that the
court necessarily used a present value methodology of
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valuation, and its failure to assign a value to the account
constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. The plaintiff ‘‘is a partner and national tax leader
in a large public accounting firm.’’ The PVA account is
a quasi-pension program available only to the partners
of his firm that provides for an allocation of a future
payout to those reaching retirement status, if multiple
contingent factors are met. At trial, both parties pre-
sented expert witnesses to testify regarding the PVA
account. The plaintiff’s witness testified that, taking
into account multiple risk factors, and assuming the
plaintiff works until the retirement age of sixty-three
years old,3 the after tax, present value of the PVA
account was $520,000. The defendant’s witness testified
that he was only retained to issue a rebuttal, and that
it was his opinion that ‘‘it’s impossible to value’’ the
PVA account because there ‘‘were too many variables’’
and it was ‘‘overly speculative.’’ Each party submitted
proposed orders regarding how to divide the marital
estate. With respect to the PVA account, the defendant
proposed a formula to be used in entering a domestic
relations order ultimately allowing 50 percent of the
benefit to be paid to her. The plaintiff’s proposed orders
suggested a 60/40 division of assets in his favor, with
the PVA account being retained by him as part of this
division. Alternatively, the plaintiff supplied an
amended proposed order ‘‘[i]n accordance with the
court’s . . . request . . . which represents an alterna-
tive asset division in the event the court elects not to
present value the plaintiff’s PVA [account] and offset
it with other assets,’’ which also proposed that the
account be awarded exclusively to him.
During the trial, the plaintiff offered extensive testi-
mony regarding the PVA account. The plaintiff testified
3
During the trial, the plaintiff testified that he was fifty-two years old.
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that, contrary to the defendant’s proposal, ‘‘the firm
could not do a domestic relations order’’ by making
payments to her from the PVA account because pay-
ments may only be made to those ‘‘in the capacity as
owners or partners in the firm,’’ and could not be made
to the defendant because doing so ‘‘would bring along
. . . regulatory issues around [Securities and Exchange
Commission] independence, around conflicts, around
. . . anything and all that we’re required to comply with
as partners in our firm would then be applied to her.’’
During the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the PVA
account, the court interjected many times to ask clarify-
ing questions and engaged in a prolonged colloquy with
the plaintiff that spanned nine pages of the transcript.
At one point, the following exchange took place:
‘‘The Court: But the more important point is . . .
there’s no account with this money in it. You can’t hand
it over. It’s subject to contingencies. You can’t even
define exactly what the dollar amount would [be] ulti-
mately . . . [going into] your hands. That’s your testi-
mony.’’
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes, Your Honor.’’
The court ultimately awarded the PVA account to
the plaintiff without fixing it with a monetary value or
stating which methodology of valuation it used.
It is well established that ‘‘[a]n appellate court will
not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations
cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it
is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did,
based on the facts presented. . . . In determining
whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in
domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender,
supra, 258 Conn. 739–40.
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The parties do not dispute that, when a court uses
the present value method, the court is required to
‘‘determine the present value of the pension benefits,
decide the portion to which the nonemployee spouse is
entitled, and award other property to the nonemployee
spouse as an offset to the pension benefits to which
he or she is otherwise entitled.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kent v. DiPaola, 178 Conn. App. 424,
435, 175 A.3d 601 (2017). The parties additionally agree
that ‘‘a trial court, in valuing the parties’ assets upon
dissolution, has considerable discretion in selecting and
applying an appropriate valuation method.’’ Krafick v.
Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 799, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). The
contention lies between the defendant’s assertion that,
because the court awarded the PVA account solely to
the plaintiff, it necessarily used the present value
method, and the plaintiff’s argument that the court
never indicated it was using the present value method,
therefore, as long as the court acted equitably by taking
the value of the account into consideration when calcu-
lating its financial orders, there is no requirement to
assign a numerical value to the account.
‘‘[W]e note that, as a general proposition, the trial
court need not necessarily specify a valuation method
used.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v.
Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341, 352, 125 A.3d 606 (2015).
In Krafick, our Supreme Court highlighted ‘‘three
widely approved methods of valuing and distributing
pension benefits’’; Krafick v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn.
800; but acknowledged that ‘‘[t]hese methods are not
exclusive. A trial court retains discretion to select any
other method to take account of the value of a pension
asset ‘that might better address the needs and interests
of the parties’ ’’; id., 804; so long as the court does
not ‘‘[remove the] property interest from the scales in
determining an equitable division of all of the property
before the court.’’ Id., 806. The court does ‘‘need to
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consider the economic value of the parties’ estates. The
court need not, however, assign specific values to the
parties’ assets.’’ Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn.
508, 531, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).
Here, the court did not explicitly state which valua-
tion method was used when dividing the parties’ assets,
nor did it assign a specific value to the PVA account.
The defendant asserts that, because the court awarded
the account entirely to the plaintiff, it necessarily used a
present value method. However, the defendant provides
no authority, and we can find none, indicating that
awarding an asset entirely to one party is proof that a
valuation was conducted using the present value
method.
In this case, the record clearly reveals that significant
time and effort were spent considering how to value
and equitably divide the parties’ property given the com-
plexity of the PVA account. As previously stated, in
relation to the PVA account, the evidence before the
court included testimony from two experts, as well as
proposed orders, an amended proposed order at the
court’s request showing an alternative division of the
PVA account, and the court’s own detailed examination
of the plaintiff during the trial. Unlike in Krafick where,
‘‘[d]espite . . . repeated attempts, the trial court
refused to state the basis of its property distribution
or to articulate the value’’ during a hearing on ‘‘a motion
to open and clarify the trial court’s judgment’’; Krafick
v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. 790–91; here the defendant
did not attempt to clarify any ambiguity in the court’s
order by filing a motion for articulation in accordance
with our rules of practice. See Practice Book § 66-5;
see also Mitchell v. Bogonos, 218 Conn. App. 59, 67, 290
A.3d 825 (2023) (‘‘Until the contrary is shown, the law
presumes that judges have acted in accordance with
the law. We do not presume error.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). Further, the defendant’s own expert
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witness declined to place a value on the account, testi-
fying that it was ‘‘impossible’’ to do as a result of the
‘‘overly speculative’’ and variable nature of the account.
‘‘[W]hen a party neglects to provide the court informa-
tion regarding the value of his or her assets, that person
cannot later complain about the court’s valuation.’’
Brooks v. Brooks, 121 Conn. App. 659, 670, 997 A.2d
504 (2010). Neither may a party argue the impossibility
of assigning a value to an asset, then later cry foul when
the court declines to assign a value to the same asset.
On the basis of our careful review of the record,
we may reasonably presume that the parties’ property
interest in the PVA account was firmly on the scales
as the court made its equitable division of the property.
Although the court did not state which valuation
method it used, it was not required to do so. Because
the defendant failed to file a motion for articulation to
clarify any potential ambiguity in how the court valued
the parties’ property, there is no evidence in the record
supporting her claim that the court abused its discretion
by failing to assign a value to the plaintiff’s PVA
account.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused
its discretion regarding the alimony order by (1) improp-
erly basing it on the plaintiff’s gross income as opposed
to net income, and (2) awarding an improper alimony
amount because the court improperly factored in the
child support orders when calculating alimony, and
because the amount ordered, ‘‘when viewed through
the lens of the [plaintiff’s] net annual income . . . as
well as the family’s station and standard of living,’’ was
inadequate. We disagree.
When a party calls into question a court’s dissolution
orders, the standard of review is an abuse of discretion.
We reiterate that, ‘‘[i]n determining whether a trial court
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has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations
matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in
favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn.
665, 671, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).
A
The parties do not dispute that ‘‘[a] trial court must
base periodic alimony and child support orders on the
available net income of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ludgin v. McGowan, 64 Conn. App.
355, 358, 780 A.2d 198 (2001). The defendant argues
that this case is similar to Ludgin because, as in Ludgin,
the court did not make an explicit finding in its memo-
randum of decision as to the parties’ respective
incomes, and because the court only mentions gross
income, and not net income, in the memorandum of
decision. The defendant thus asserts that it must be
inferred that the court abused its discretion by improp-
erly relying on gross income in fashioning the sup-
port orders.
Our review of the record reveals that this case is not
comparable to Ludgin. In Ludgin, the plaintiff’s income
was ‘‘difficult to determine because he [was] a sole
practitioner and had not yet filed his federal tax return
at the time of the hearing.’’ Id., 357. Additionally, ‘‘[t]he
court’s memorandum of decision [was] devoid of any
mention of the parties’ net incomes,’’ and the court
‘‘repeatedly referred to and compared the parties’ gross
incomes’’ in its decision. Id., 358–59. Here, the plaintiff
is not a sole practitioner, and his net income was easily
ascertainable. The trial court had exhibits in evidence
showing the plaintiff’s net earnings for each of the four
years prior to the dissolution hearing. Further, while the
decision in Ludgin repeatedly references and compares
the gross incomes of the parties, here, the court’s memo-
randum of decision only alludes to the plaintiff’s gross
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income one time, and that was in the context of stating
that the plaintiff is a high income earner and not in the
context of entering support orders. This case is further
distinguishable from Ludgin because here, the court
does mention net income in its decision when determin-
ing the amount of child support. Although it does not
repeat the mention of net income when awarding ali-
mony, the court states that it ‘‘adopts [the plaintiff’s]
proposal that he pays [the defendant] $5000 a month in
alimony.’’ The plaintiff’s proposed alimony order clearly
states that it is calculated as a percentage ‘‘of his net
income averaged over the last four years.’’ (Emphasis
added.) For these reasons, the defendant’s claim that
the court based its alimony orders on the plaintiff’s
gross income without considering his net income fails.
B
The defendant’s final argument is that the court erred
in the amount of alimony it ordered. The defendant first
states that the court erroneously factored in the child
support orders when calculating alimony and thus
improperly conflated the orders. The defendant also
contends that the amount of alimony ordered was insuf-
ficient. We disagree.
‘‘In determining whether alimony shall be awarded,
and the duration and amount of the award, the court
shall consider the evidence presented by each party
and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes
for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal
separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount
and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational
skills, education, employability, estate and needs of
each of the parties and the award, if any, which the
court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the
case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children
has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of
such parent’s securing employment.’’ General Statutes
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§ 46b-82 (a). ‘‘[T]he trial court may place varying
degrees of importance on each criterion according to
the factual circumstances of each case. . . . There is
no additional requirement that the court specifically
state how it weighed the statutory criteria or explain in
detail the importance assigned to each statutory factor.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ingles v. Ingles, 216
Conn. App. 782, 795, 286 A.3d 908 (2022).
In its memorandum of decision, the court provided
insight into its reasoning for awarding alimony. Specifi-
cally, the court stated: ‘‘There is no question that [the
defendant] has given up any career options she may
have had to raise a family, and it is desirable that she
continue for a time to do so. She has very limited future
job prospects, and she has been married to [the plaintiff]
for over seventeen years. These factors favor alimony.
But considering her repeated misbehavior and lies
about it, the court finds the fault factor tips solidly
against granting her request for significant percentages
of [the plaintiff’s] income. . . .
‘‘Instead, mindful that it has granted more child sup-
port than he proposed, the court adopts [the plaintiff’s]
proposal that he pay [the defendant] $5000 a month in
alimony. For many years, she will have over $260,000
in annual child support and $60,000 of annual alimony.
She will have a house with a reasonable mortgage on
it and the benefit of additional property orders [equaling
a total of $75,000]. This is a reasonable sum when the
court considers all the statutory factors against the facts
of the case. . . . [The defendant] will be amply pro-
vided for given that her household will be supported
for many years by substantial child support and ali-
mony, and she will have all the equity in the marital
home—an amount both parties agree is around
$560,000.’’
The defendant argues that the court improperly com-
bined the child support and alimony orders, ‘‘assum[ing]
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that the child support will be utilized by [the defendant]
to cover her personal expenses and support her needs.’’
However, the court’s mention of the ample child sup-
port when crafting the alimony orders may be reason-
ably understood as evidence that the court was consid-
ering the required factors in § 46b-82 (a), including the
‘‘amount and sources of income’’ and the ‘‘needs of
each of the parties . . . .’’ The plaintiff’s net income
will be significantly reduced by the high amount of child
support awarded in this case. Additionally, the marital
home and its equity is awarded to the defendant. The
court’s mentioning of these factors is relevant as they
affect its determination of how much to award in ali-
mony, and not necessarily because the court combined
the child support and alimony orders. In light of the
foregoing, we conclude the defendant’s argument that
the court conflated the child support and alimony
orders is without merit.
We also reject the defendant’s argument that the ali-
mony orders were erroneous as to the amount, repre-
senting an inadequate amount ‘‘when viewed through
the lens of [the plaintiff’s] net annual income . . . .’’
The defendant states that the $60,000 per year alimony
award would not allow her ‘‘to live and have an opportu-
nity to become self-sufficient after years of raising chil-
dren.’’
‘‘In determining whether alimony shall be awarded,
and the . . . amount of the award, the court shall con-
sider the evidence presented by each party . . . and
needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which
the court may make pursuant to [§] 46b-81 . . . .’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-82 (a). A court is ‘‘free to credit or
reject all or part of the testimony given by the [parties].
On review, we do not reexamine the court’s credibility
assessments.’’ Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167 Conn. App. 480,
489, 144 A.3d 447 (2016).
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Here, the court did not credit the defendant’s testi-
mony. In assessing the defendant’s credibility, the court
stated: ‘‘[W]hen it was time to preserve evidence in the
wake of the divorce filing, [the defendant] disposed of
her mobile phone with whatever pictures and messages
might have been on it. She claims she lost it and couldn’t
recover anything from it. Considering her other lies and
the obvious advantage to her of this all too typical loss,
the court doesn’t believe her. It also doesn’t believe her
because of her tone and demeanor as a witness. She had
canned explanations for her conduct. Her testimony
seemed more practiced than sincere, and the court rec-
ognized no convincing remorse over her betrayals or her
lying. [The plaintiff] made the opposite impression—
wounded, candid, and regretful. [The defendant’s] per-
jury, her affairs, and her destruction of evidence have
statutory weight under §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 . . . .
They make [her] claims in the lawsuit starkly unappeal-
ing.’’ The court also did not credit her testimony regard-
ing her need for a larger alimony award. Specifically,
the court stated that the defendant’s claim for support
‘‘is disproportionate to her needs, it disregards her fault,
and it gives no fair recognition to [the plaintiff’s] consid-
erable financial achievements.’’ Finally, the court stated
that the defendant ‘‘will be supported for many years’’
when taking into account the support orders and that
she was awarded the marital home, including its equity
of approximately $560,000. In its discretion, the court
stated that the alimony orders represented ‘‘a reason-
able sum when the court considers all the statutory
factors against the facts of the case.’’
The record reveals that the court properly considered
the criteria for determining what amount of alimony to
award in accordance with § 46b-82 (a). It is within a
court’s discretion to place ‘‘varying degrees of impor-
tance on each criterion according to the factual circum-
stances of each case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Ingles v. Ingles, supra, 216 Conn. App. 795. On
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the basis of the facts, evidence, and findings in the
record, we cannot agree that the court abused its discre-
tion by ordering an insufficient alimony award.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.