Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi

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Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC v.
ALAN M. GIACOMI ET AL.
(AC 46212)
Clark, Seeley and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose on certain real property owned by the
defendants G and his wife. After several failed attempts to serve G with
process, the court granted the motion of the substitute plaintiff, U Co.,
to cite in G as a party defendant, and U Co. filed a revised complaint.
Thereafter, G failed to file a timely pleading in response to the operative
complaint by the deadline for doing so under the rule of practice (§ 10-
8), and the court granted U Co.’s motion to default G for failure to plead
and rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. G subsequently filed a
motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure, which the court
denied. On G’s appeal to this court, held:
1. G could not prevail on his claims challenging the trial court’s underlying
default judgment of foreclosure; neither G’s claim that he wrongfully
was denied participation in the foreclosure mediation program due to
procedural delays nor his claim that the court erroneously denied his
request to revise the complaint constituted a proper challenge to the
court’s judgment that G had been defaulted for failure to plead, as the
effect of the default was to preclude G from denying liability for the
claims asserted in the complaint and to permit the rendering of judgment
in favor of U Co.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying G’s motion to open
the default judgment; the court found, inter alia, that G’s proffered
justification for failing to file a timely pleading, namely, that he had an
erroneous understanding of the pleading deadline at issue, did not satisfy
the second prong of the applicable statute (§ 52-212 (a)) because it was
not the result of mistake, accident or excusable neglect but was rooted
in G’s own negligence.

Argued January 29—officially released July 2, 2024

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty owned by the named defendant et al., and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Waterbury, where the court, M. Taylor, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute U.S. Bank
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Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi

National Association, Trustee, as the plaintiff; there-
after, the court, Spader, J., granted the substitute plain-
tiff’s motion for default for failure to plead as to the
named defendant and rendered a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale; subsequently, the court, Spader, J., denied
the named defendant’s motion to open and vacate the
judgment of foreclosure, from which the named defen-
dant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Alan M. Giacomi, self-represented, the appellant
(named defendant).
Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The defendant Alan M. Giacomi1 appeals
from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion
to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale
rendered after he was defaulted for failure to plead. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly
(1) ‘‘den[ied] [his] requests to participate in foreclosure
mediation,’’ (2) ‘‘sustain[ed] the plaintiff’s objection to
[his] request to revise on or about February 5, 2020,’’
and (3) denied his motion to open the default judgment
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 (a). We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.2
1
The United States Department of Justice, Melissa R. Giacomi, and Mort-
gage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., also were named as defendants
in this action. None of those defendants is participating in this appeal.
As such, all references to the defendant in this opinion are to Alan M.
Giacomi only.
2
Although the defendant’s appeal form listed a number of other orders
that he intended to challenge on appeal, he failed to discuss any of those
orders in the briefs that he filed with this court. As a result, we deem those
claims abandoned. See Heyward v. Judicial Dept., 159 Conn. App. 794,
802–803, 124 A.3d 920 (2015) (‘‘[W]e are not required to review claims that
are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis,
rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning
an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judi-
ciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the
parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . .
[A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond
a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed
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The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On May 18, 2017,
the original plaintiff, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
(Nationstar), commenced this action against Melissa R.
Giacomi (Melissa Giacomi) to foreclose a mortgage on
property located at 70 Arvida Road in Wolcott owned
by Melissa Giacomi and the defendant, who formerly
were married but have since divorced. Although the
original summons and complaint named both Melissa
Giacomi and the defendant as defendants, Nationstar
failed to serve the original summons and complaint on
the defendant. On June 26, 2017, Melissa Giacomi filed
a foreclosure mediation request, which the clerk of
court granted on July 11, 2017. Melissa Giacomi and
Nationstar subsequently engaged in court-annexed
mediation between July, 2017, and January, 2018. On
January 10, 2018, the foreclosure mediator filed a final
report stating that the case had not been settled, and
the mediation period subsequently was terminated.
On January 16, 2018, Nationstar filed a motion to
cite in the defendant as a party defendant, which was
granted by the court, M. Taylor, J., on January 29, 2018.
On May 14, 2018, after the defendant was defaulted
for failure to appear, Nationstar filed a motion for a
judgment of strict foreclosure, which was granted by
the court on May 29, 2018, with the law days set to
commence on August 7, 2018.
On June 29, 2018, Nationstar filed a motion to open
the judgment nunc pro tunc and to substitute ‘‘U.S.
Bank National Association, not in its individual capacity
but solely as trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-
CCT’’ (U.S. Bank), as the plaintiff on the basis that
by this court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also Simms v.
Zucco, 214 Conn. App. 525, 546 n.14, 280 A.3d 1226 (‘‘to receive review, a
claim must be raised and briefed adequately in a party’s principal brief, and
. . . the failure to do so constitutes the abandonment of the claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 919, 284 A.3d 982 (2022).
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Nationstar had assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank by
an assignment dated May 17, 2018, and recorded on the
Wolcott land records on May 29, 2018. On July 16, 2018,
the court granted the motion.3
On August 3, 2018, Melissa Giacomi filed a notice of
bankruptcy stay. On December 14, 2018, after Melissa
Giacomi received a discharge from the bankruptcy
court and her bankruptcy case was closed, U.S. Bank
filed a motion to open and reset the law days. On Janu-
ary 28, 2019, the court granted the motion and rendered
a judgment of strict foreclosure with the law days to
commence on July 2, 2019.
On June 20, 2019, the defendant filed an appearance
in the case. The defendant filed a motion to open and
vacate the judgment on July 1, 2019, which the court
granted on the same day and reset the law days to
commence on July 23, 2019. Thereafter, on July 19,
2019, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30 (a) (2) and (4), and
Hyde v. Richard, 145 Conn. 24, 138 A.2d 527 (1958),
because the ‘‘defendant was never served with process
3
We note that U.S. Bank was not docketed as the substitute plaintiff in
the trial court file after the court granted the motion to open and substitute.
This appears to have been an administrative error. We also note that, after
the substitution in this case, various attorneys from Bendett & McHugh,
P.C., counsel for Nationstar, continued to file some pleadings in the trial
court on behalf of Nationstar despite the fact that Nationstar was no longer
a party to the action by virtue of the fact that U.S. Bank had been substituted
for Nationstar. In addition, counsel never filed an appearance on behalf of
U.S. Bank in the trial court or in this court. Instead, appellate counsel for
the plaintiff-appellee, Attorney Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker from Brock & Scott,
PLLC, filed an appearance in this court for Nationstar and filed an appellee
brief on behalf of Nationstar, not U.S. Bank. The record is clear, however,
that the operative complaint was filed by U.S. Bank, and judgment was
rendered by the trial court for U.S. Bank. Although counsel’s filing errors
appear to be mere oversights, counsel in such cases must pay careful atten-
tion to ensure that the pleadings and appearances they file comply with our
rules of practice and accurately reflect which parties they represent.
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. . . .’’ On August 1, 2019, the court granted the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss the case against him for lack
of personal jurisdiction, finding that, at the time of
service, the defendant did not live at the address where
Nationstar had attempted service of process.
On August 7, 2019, a motion to open and vacate the
judgment of foreclosure and a motion to cite in the
defendant as a party defendant was filed. On August
19, 2019, the court granted the motion to open and
vacate the judgment, and, on August 23, 2019, the court
granted the motion to cite in the defendant as a party
defendant. On November 12, 2019, due to an error in
service, an additional motion to cite in the defendant
as a party defendant was filed and was granted by the
court on November 25, 2019.4 On December 23, 2019,
the defendant was finally served with the amended com-
plaint.
On July 12, 2022, U.S. Bank filed a revised complaint,
which is the operative complaint in this appeal. On
August 10, 2022, U.S. Bank filed a motion for a judgment
of strict foreclosure. The defendant filed a request to
revise on August 11, 2022, which was denied by the
court on September 6, 2022. The defendant subse-
quently filed a motion to strike on September 20, 2022,
which was denied by the court on October 11, 2022.
Thereafter, the defendant failed to file a timely pleading
in response to the operative complaint by the October
26, 2022 deadline for doing so under Practice Book § 10-
8.5 As a result, on November 1, 2022, U.S. Bank moved
4
Although the text of the motions to cite in the defendant as a party
defendant filed on August 7, 2019, and November 12, 2019, refer to ‘‘[t]he
plaintiff, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC,’’ these motions were both filed after
the motion to substitute U.S. Bank as the plaintiff was granted on July 16,
2018, and, as stated in footnote 3 of this opinion, the operative complaint
was filed by U.S. Bank, and we therefore interpret all motions filed after
July 16, 2018, to have been filed by U.S. Bank.
5
Practice Book § 10-8 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Commencing on the
return day of the writ, summons and complaint in civil actions, pleadings,
including motions and requests addressed to the pleadings, shall advance
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to default the defendant for failure to plead. The court
granted that motion on November 8, 2022. On November
14, 2022, the court held a hearing on U.S. Bank’s August
10, 2022 motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, at
which it rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale
with a sale date of February 25, 2023.
On December 5, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure, arguing
that he had good defenses at the time the judgment was
rendered and that he was unable to raise his defenses
by filing a timely answer due to mistake, accident, or
other reasonable cause. Specifically, the defendant
stated, inter alia, that he ‘‘failed to plead due to his
belief that he had thirty days to plead after the court’s
action on the prior pleading. . . . The defendant was
unaware that foreclosure actions carried different time
constraints than regular civil actions.’’ U.S. Bank filed
an objection to the defendant’s motion on December
13, 2022. On December 21, 2022, the court denied the
defendant’s motion to open and vacate the judgment
of foreclosure and sustained U.S. Bank’s objection to
the motion.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘The
court has considered the arguments of the defendant
and the response of [U.S. Bank] and is not persuaded
to reopen the judgment of foreclosure pursuant to [§ 52-
212 (a)] or Practice Book § 17-43.
‘‘To open a judgment, the defendant must demon-
strate both that he has a good defense to the underlying
action and that he was prevented by mistake, accident,
or other excusable neglect from raising said defense.
within thirty days from the return day, and any subsequent pleadings,
motions and requests shall advance at least one step within each successive
period of thirty days from the preceding pleading or the filing of the decision
of the judicial authority thereon if one is required, except that in . . .
actions to foreclose a mortgage on real estate the time period shall be fifteen
days. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
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Even if the court is persuaded that the defendant has
good reason for not timely raising the defense, if the
defense is insufficient, the judgment should not be
opened. See generally Costello v. Hartford Institute of
Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160, 167, 475 A.2d 310
(1984). The defendant has not presented good cause for
the court to reopen the judgment. He has not credibly
demonstrated that a good defense existed at the time
of judgment.
‘‘As to the timing of the default, it was properly
entered. [U.S. Bank] moved for the default on November
1, 2022, and it was granted on November 8, 2022. The
defendant claims he only received the notice of the
granting of the default on November 10, 2022, the court-
house was closed on November 11, 2022, and the judg-
ment hearing was on November 14, 2022—so he did
not have time to go to the courthouse library to conduct
legal research. The default was moved for on November
1, 2022. Based on the defendant’s affidavit, he had not
even begun to research his defenses at the time he
received notice of the granting of the motion. While the
defendant is a self-represented party, it is also true that
he is a former attorney with more legal training than
others before the court and had, at least at some point
in the past, knowledge of the Connecticut Practice Book
and knowledge of pleading timelines. The court cannot
say that the defendant was prevented by mistake, acci-
dent, or excusable neglect from timely raising his poten-
tial defenses, as it appears that he neglected to raise
them by his own negligence. He notes that he has vigor-
ously defended the proceedings thus far, and the court
acknowledges that he has, but the default entered prop-
erly for his not timely filing a responsive pleading when
due nor after receiving [U.S. Bank’s] motion requesting
the default.
‘‘Although at this point the court, based on the above
finding, does not need to review the potential defenses,
for the sake of a clean record, the court will do so.
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‘‘The defenses being claimed by the defendant are
grounded in equity. Foreclosures are equitable proceed-
ings and equitable defenses are available thereto. The
defendant first claims that the original lender engaged
in fraud in approving him for a mortgage as he executed
a loan given to him based on inaccurate figures
amended by employees of GMAC [Mortgage Corpora-
tion] prior to the loan origination and that the terms
on the second mortgage signed contemporaneously
with the loan subject to his action were inaccurate.
The defendant then claims that the procedural delays
caused by [Nationstar’s] initial inability to serve him
because he was no longer at the premises, and then
through delays in causing the motions to cite to be
consummated with valid service, resulted in his not
being able to engage in mediation and caused excessive
interest accrual. Accordingly, the defendant contends
that the court should consider the procedural delays
of [Nationstar and U.S. Bank] as a defense pursuant to
U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers, 332 Conn. 656,
212 A.3d 226 (2019). Finally, the defendant claims a
priority issue, alleging that the federal lien on his prop-
erty has priority over the city’s accruing real estate
taxes and if the court, following a foreclosure sale,
disburses to the city rather than the [United States],
less of his equity in the premises will be used to pay
down his federal debt to his personal detriment.
***
‘‘As to the second proposed defense, the court cannot
fully credit the procedural delays against [Nationstar
and U.S. Bank]. The defendant was unable to be served
properly when he was no longer at the home. [Melissa
Giacomi] may not have advised him of the pendency
of this action, but he did know [that] he was in default
on the mortgage and did not take any steps to reach
out to [Nationstar] to attempt to resolve the situation.
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The matter was delayed for a time with [Melissa Gia-
comi’s] mediation attempts and her bankruptcy. The
court found that service was not proper and granted
the defendant’s previous motion to open. The court’s
decision revealed the difficulty of effectuating proper
service, but eventually, [U.S. Bank] obtained proper
service and the action proceeded.
‘‘These are not the types of delays that the Blowers
court indicated could provide a defense to a foreclo-
sure—the issue there was bad faith negotiations. If any-
thing at all, delays could provide an offset to the debt,
but the defendant would also have to demonstrate that
he had some ability to negotiate payments. The defen-
dant did not move to reconsider the denials of his media-
tion requests so there is no record of why they were
denied, but with [Melissa Giacomi] as a coborrower on
the note and her obtaining a Chapter 7 discharge of
personal liability, it is clear that no modification is pres-
ently possible. The delay in effectuating actual service
did not prejudice the defendant in his ability to redeem
the mortgage if he chose to do so since the 2016 default
in payments nor his ability to defend this matter.
***
‘‘The defendant also mentions his issues with [U.S.
Bank’s] pleadings, alleging that it has not followed the
cite in orders by properly stating his interest in the
premises and by including the original plaintiff of
Nationstar in its captioning of pleadings, despite an
order to amend the summons and complaint. The court
has reviewed the pleadings and finds no jurisdictional
error in them. The case caption required by the court
is the Nationstar name, as that is how the clerk has the
case captioned. The operative complaint does indicate
the substituted plaintiff in the signature block. The
interest of the defendant has consistently been
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plead[ed] as a party to the note and mortgage . . . and
owner and possessor of the premises . . . .
‘‘After careful consideration of all of the defendant’s
arguments and his affidavit and pleadings, the court
denies the motion to open and vacate the judgment of
foreclosure by sale.’’ (Emphasis in original.) This appeal
followed.
I
We first address the defendant’s claims challenging
the underlying default judgment of foreclosure.6 The
defendant challenges that default judgment on two
grounds. Specifically, he claims that the court improp-
erly (1) ‘‘den[ied] [his] requests to participate in foreclo-
sure mediation’’ and (2) ‘‘sustain[ed] the plaintiff’s
objection to [his] request to revise on or about February
5, 2020.’’ We reject both of these claims because neither
claim constitutes a proper challenge to the basis for the
court’s judgment in this case, namely that the defendant
had been defaulted for failure to plead.
‘‘The entry of a default constitutes an admission by
the [defaulted party] of the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint. . . . Practice Book § 17-33 (b) provides
in relevant part that the effect of a default is to preclude
the defendant from making any further defense in the
case so far as liability is concerned . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) TD Bank-
north, N.A. v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Con-
necticut, Inc., 133 Conn. App. 536, 545–46, 37 A.3d 766
(2012). ‘‘A default admits the material facts that consti-
tute a cause of action . . . and entry of default, when
appropriately made, conclusively determines the liabil-
ity of a defendant. . . . If the allegations of the plain-
tiff’s complaint are sufficient on their face to make out
6
The defendant’s challenges to the underlying default judgment are timely
because he filed his motion to open the judgment within the twenty day
period for appealing from the underlying judgment. See Practice Book § 63-1.
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a valid claim for the relief requested, the plaintiff, on
the entry of a default against the defendant, need not
offer evidence to support those allegations.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Carlevaro, 158 Conn.
App. 716, 725, 120 A.3d 1265 (2015).
The court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for default for
failure to plead on November 8, 2022. The effect of the
default was to preclude the defendant from denying
liability for the claims asserted in the complaint and to
permit the rendering of judgment in favor of U.S. Bank.
See TD Banknorth, N.A. v. White Water Mountain
Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 133 Conn. App.
545–46; Practice Book § 17-33 (b). Thereafter, the court
properly rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale on
November 14, 2022, on the basis of the order defaulting
the defendant for failure to plead. Neither the defen-
dant’s claim that he wrongfully was denied participation
in the foreclosure mediation program nor his claim that
the court erroneously denied his request to revise the
complaint relates to the basis of the court’s judgment
in this case.7 Having been defaulted for failure to plead,
7
In the section of his brief challenging the court’s denial of his request
to revise, the defendant also suggests that U.S. Bank lacks standing because
the operative complaint does not allege that Nationstar assigned the note
and mortgage to U.S. Bank even though the court had previously granted
Nationstar’s motion to substitute U.S. Bank as plaintiff. As the trial court
noted in its decision denying the defendant’s motion to open, however, the
operative complaint was signed by U.S. Bank and U.S. Bank is, in fact, the
plaintiff in this matter by virtue of the court’s order granting the motion to
substitute. See Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Creed, 145 Conn.
App. 38, 52, 75 A.3d 38 (‘‘The manner in which to bring a title taken by an
assignment pending suit to the attention of the court is by and in an applica-
tion for a change of parties. . . . No new cause of action, in such case, has
arisen; there has been simply a transfer of the right of action for the original
cause. . . . The substitution was effected when the order that it be made
was passed. Nothing further was required to put the new plaintiff in the
shoes of the former plaintiffs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 310 Conn. 936, 79 A.3d 889 (2013). As a result, and notwithstanding
the confusion caused by some of the filings made in the trial court and in
this court by counsel for Nationstar and U.S. Bank; see footnote 3 of this
opinion; U.S. Bank is the plaintiff in this case and has standing to prosecute
this action.
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the defendant was deemed to have admitted to liability.
See Perez v. Carlevaro, supra, 158 Conn. App. 725 (‘‘[a]
default admits the material facts that constitute a cause
of action . . . and entry of default, when appropriately
made, conclusively determines the liability of a defen-
dant’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,
the defendant’s first two claims fail.
II
Next, the defendant claims that the court erred in
denying his motion to open the default judgment.
Although the defendant admits in his brief that he failed
to timely plead, he nevertheless argues that, ‘‘because
foreclosure is an equitable proceeding, the trial court
must examine all relevant factors to ensure that com-
plete justice is done. . . . In this case, it is clear that
complete justice was not afforded.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Additionally, the
defendant argues that the failure of Nationstar and U.S.
Bank to timely serve him with process created proce-
dural delays, rendered him ineligible to participate in
the foreclosure mediation program, and caused him to
incur additional fees, charges, and interest on the
unpaid mortgage. We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
the relevant legal principles. ‘‘We review a trial court’s
ruling on motions to open under an abuse of discretion
standard. . . . Under this standard, we give every rea-
sonable presumption in favor of a decision’s correct-
ness and will disturb the decision only where the trial
court acted unreasonably or in a clear abuse of discre-
tion. . . . As with any discretionary action of the trial
court . . . the ultimate [question for appellate review]
is whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded as it did. . . . [I]n order to determine whether
the court abused its discretion [in ruling on a motion
to open], we must look to the conclusions of fact upon
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which the trial court predicated its ruling. . . . Those
factual findings are reviewed pursuant to the clearly
erroneous standard . . . .
‘‘A motion to set aside a default judgment is governed
by Practice Book § 17-43 and . . . § 52-212. . . . To
open a judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-43 (a)
and . . . § 52-212 (a), the movant must make a two
part showing that (1) a good defense existed at the time
an adverse judgment was rendered; and (2) the defense
was not at that time raised by reason of mistake, acci-
dent or other reasonable cause. . . . The party moving
to open a default judgment must not only allege, but
also make a showing sufficient to satisfy the two-
pronged test [governing the opening of default judg-
ments]. . . . The negligence of a party or his counsel
is insufficient for purposes of § 52-212 to set aside a
default judgment. . . . Finally, because the movant
must satisfy both prongs of this analysis, failure to meet
either prong is fatal to its motion.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Disturco v. Gates
in New Canaan, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 526, 532–33, 253
A.3d 1033 (2021).
Our appellate courts have long held that a party’s
own negligence does not qualify as a ‘‘mistake’’ for
purposes of § 52-212 (a). See, e.g., Pantlin & Chananie
Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building
Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240–41, 492 A.2d 159 (1985)
(‘‘it has been consistently held that the denial of a
motion to open a default judgment should not be held
an abuse of discretion where the failure to assert a
defense was the result of negligence’’); Disturco v.
Gates in New Canaan, LLC, supra, 204 Conn. App. 534
(‘‘While mistake, accident or other reasonable cause
may be a sufficient reason to open a default judgment,
negligence is not. Our Supreme Court has consistently
held that the denial of a motion to open a default judg-
ment should not be held an abuse of discretion where
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the failure to assert a defense was the result of negli-
gence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Dziedzic
v. Pine Island Marina, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 644, 653, 72
A.3d 406 (2013) (‘‘Negligence is no ground for vacating
a judgment, and it has been consistently held that the
denial of a motion to open a default judgment should
not be held an abuse of discretion where the failure
to assert a defense was the result of negligence. . . .
Negligence of a party or [its] counsel is insufficient for
purposes of § 52-212 to set aside a default judgment.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
In the present case, the court found, inter alia, that
the defendant’s proffered justification for failing to file
a timely pleading did not satisfy the second prong of
§ 52-212 (a) because it was rooted in the defendant’s
own negligence. In its order denying the defendant’s
motion to open, the court stated: ‘‘The court cannot
say that the defendant was prevented by mistake, acci-
dent, or excusable neglect from timely raising his poten-
tial defenses, as it appears that he neglected to raise
them by his own negligence.’’ On the basis of our review
of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion.
The only reason the defendant offered for his failure
to timely plead was that he ‘‘mistakenly believ[ed] that
he had additional time to plead . . . .’’ He admits that
he missed the requisite deadline because he had an
‘‘erroneous understanding of the time constraints at
issue . . . .’’8 Although the defendant labels his failure
8
‘‘We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut
courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not
interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice
liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless,
[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of
self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Anderson-Harris v. Harris, 221 Conn. App. 222, 240 n.15, 301 A.3d 1090
(2023). We note, however, as the trial court did, that, although the defendant
is a self-represented party, he is also a former attorney who has more legal
training than most self-represented litigants.
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to timely file his answer a ‘‘mistake,’’ we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the defendant’s proffered reason for failing to file
a timely pleading constituted inexcusable negligence
or ignorance of the law. See Purtill v. Cook, 197 Conn.
App. 22, 27, 231 A.3d 245 (2020) (court did not abuse
its discretion in denying motion to open where ‘‘the
defendant had appeared and actively participated in
pleadings, yet still failed to timely file his answer’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Berzins v. Berzins, 105
Conn. App. 648, 653, 938 A.2d 1281 (defendant’s failure
to appear was result of negligence where ‘‘[t]he defen-
dant was served with notice of [the] action and did
nothing’’), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156
(2008); Fontaine v. Thomas, 51 Conn. App. 77, 83, 720
A.2d 264 (1998) (‘‘[A]lthough the defendant had actual
notice of the pending case . . . he failed to take any
action . . . . [Although] his mistaken perception of
what steps he had to take [may have] prevented him
from defending, his error does not constitute a . . .
mistake . . . .’’); see also 47 Am. Jur. 2d 51–52, Judg-
ments § 659 (2017) (‘‘ ‘[M]istake,’ ‘inadvertence,’ and
‘excusable neglect’ warranting relief from judgment
require some justification for an error beyond mere
carelessness or ignorance of the law on the part of the
litigant or his or her attorney. Moreover, mistake of law
does not constitute grounds to set aside a judgment
due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.’’ (Footnote omitted.)).

Having determined that the defendant’s motion fails
under the second prong of § 52-212 (a), we need not
decide whether the trial court properly determined that
the defendant’s motion also failed to demonstrate that
a good defense existed at the time of judgment. See,
e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, 210 Conn. App. 703, 714, 270
A.3d 743 (2022) (‘‘because the movant must satisfy both
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prongs of this analysis, failure to meet either prong is
fatal to its motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to open
the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.