State v. Nichols

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State v. Nichols

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT LEE NICHOLS
(AC 46102)
Elgo, Moll and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth
degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court,
claiming, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
that he intentionally touched the minor victim for the purpose of the
defendant’s sexual gratification. After the minor victim began exhibiting
behavioral problems, his mother accepted an offer from the defendant
and his wife to have the victim live with them for two weeks to help
address those problems. During that time, the defendant entered the
bathroom where the victim had showered and beat his buttocks, after
which he led the victim to the defendant’s bedroom and made him sleep
in bed with the defendant and his wife. While in bed, the defendant
unbuttoned the victim’s pants, rubbed the victim’s legs and the side of
his buttocks, and repeatedly touched the victim’s penis, events that
reoccurred almost every night during the victim’s stay at the defendant’s
home. At trial, the victim yelled an expletive during the defendant’s
testimony, after which the victim left the courtroom demonstrably upset.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the victim’s
outburst had irreparably harmed the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The
court denied the motion for a mistrial and gave the jury a curative
instruction directing it to disregard the outburst. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial; the victim’s
outburst during the defendant’s testimony, although inappropriate, was
brief and isolated, the court did not observe any improper interaction
between the jury and the victim or his mother, and the defendant did
not demonstrate any indication that the jury failed to abide by the court’s
curative instruction, which obviated any possible harm to the defendant.
2. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of
sexual assault in the fourth degree: the victim testified that the defendant
forced him into the defendant’s bed and sexually assaulted him there
nearly every night during his stay at the defendant’s home, conduct that
easily justified a reasonable inference that the defendant did not touch
the victim’s penis for some reason other than to obtain sexual gratifica-
tion; moreover, when the victim informed the defendant that he intended
to report his conduct, the defendant made statements that caused the
victim to fear that the defendant would harm the victim’s mother, and
the defendant’s rebuke of his wife when she expressed discomfort with
his conduct, as well as the recurrent nature of that conduct, further
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State v. Nichols
supported a reasonable inference that the defendant’s intentional touch-
ing of the victim was for the defendant’s sexual gratification.

Argued May 15—officially released June 18, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of sexual assault in the fourth
degree and one count of the crime of risk of injury to
a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, geographical area number twelve,
and transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen;
thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Gustaf-
son, J.; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s
motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a mistrial;
verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new
trial; subsequently, the court, Gustafson, J., vacated the
conviction as to one count of sexual assault in the fourth
degree and rendered judgment of guilty of one count
each of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of
injury to a child, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Michael S. Taylor, with whom was Brendon P.
Levesque, for the appellant (defendant).
Bharbara Viegas Rocha and Connor R. Reed, certi-
fied legal interns, with whom were Ronald G. Weller,
senior assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief,
Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Michael W.
Riley, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appel-
lee (state).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, Robert Lee Nichols, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation
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State v. Nichols

of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A)1
and risk of injury to a child in violation of General
Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2).2 The defendant claims that (1)
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a mistrial predicated on an outburst by the
victim3 while the defendant was testifying at trial and
(2) there was insufficient evidence to support the con-
viction of sexual assault in the fourth degree. We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of convic-
tion.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of the defendant’s claims. The victim and his
mother became acquainted with the defendant in 2007
while the victim attended an after-school program oper-
ated by the defendant. Additionally, the victim partici-
pated in a summer program also operated by the defen-
dant. In the summer of 2010, the victim was exhibiting
1
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-73a (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such
person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A)
under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than
such other person . . . .’’
Hereinafter, all references to § 53a-73a are to the 2009 revision of the stat-
ute.
2
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
. . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts . . . of a child under the age
of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact
with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner
likely to impair the health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of
. . . a class B felony . . . except that, if . . . the victim of the offense is
under thirteen years of age, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court.’’
Section 53-21 was amended since the events underlying this appeal by
No. 13-297, § 1, of the 2013 Public Acts and by No. 15-205, § 11, of the 2015
Public Acts, which made changes to the statute that are not relevant to this
appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
3
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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State v. Nichols

behavioral problems, including struggling to control his
temper, getting into fights, and having arguments with
his mother, who was raising the victim as a single
mother. The victim’s mother discussed the victim’s
issues with the defendant and his wife, Tamara Nichols
(Tamara), both of whom offered to have the victim live
with them for two weeks to help address his ongoing
problems. The victim’s mother agreed to the arrange-
ment, and the victim proceeded to live with the defen-
dant and Tamara in their home in Manchester for
approximately ten days during the summer in 2010.
At that time, the victim was eleven years old and the
defendant was thirty-one years old.
When the victim first arrived at the defendant’s home,
the defendant permitted the victim to call his mother
only three times per day. Nevertheless, during the first
night, the victim, feeling scared and homesick, called
his mother in violation of the defendant’s rule. The
following day, the victim’s mother mentioned to the
defendant that the victim had called her the previous
night. Thereafter, the defendant prohibited the victim
from calling home at all.
The victim engaged in various activities during the
daytime while staying at the defendant’s home. On his
second day at the defendant’s home, the victim per-
formed landscaping work outside. Afterward, the victim
went inside and showered. When the victim exited the
shower, he discovered that the defendant was in the
bathroom with him. The defendant then repeatedly beat
the victim’s buttocks with his hands. After the victim
had dressed himself, the defendant led the victim to
the defendant’s bedroom and made the victim sleep in
bed with both the defendant and Tamara. The victim
had slept in a guest room the previous night.4
4
The guest room was occupied by another young male when the victim
arrived at the defendant’s home. The victim had not been the first child,
unrelated to the defendant, to stay over at the defendant’s home.
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State v. Nichols

On the victim’s third day at the defendant’s home,
the victim again (1) was beaten by the defendant in the
bathroom following a shower and (2) slept in bed with
the defendant and Tamara in the defendant’s bedroom.
During the third evening, while in bed with the victim
and Tamara, the defendant unbuttoned the victim’s
pants and rubbed the victim’s legs, rubbed the side
of the victim’s buttocks, and repeatedly touched the
victim’s penis. These events reoccurred every night
thereafter during the victim’s stay at the defendant’s
home, except for Sundays. At one point, Tamara
expressed her discomfort with the defendant’s conduct;
however, the defendant told her to ‘‘shut up,’’ that ‘‘this
is his house,’’ and that ‘‘[h]e does what he wants.’’
Prior to the end of his stay at the defendant’s home,
the victim conveyed to the defendant that he intended
to report the defendant’s actions. The defendant
responded by indicating that he knew the victim’s
mother and would find her if anything happened. This
statement made the victim feel threatened and con-
cerned that the defendant was going to harm his mother.
After the victim had returned to his home following
his stay with the defendant, the victim’s grandmother
noticed injuries on his body. When the victim’s grand-
mother inquired about the injuries, the victim, feeling
worried about his mother, told his grandmother that
he had injured himself by falling.
In 2019, Detective Claire Hearn received a complaint
from the victim, which prompted her to commence an
investigation with regard to the events that had
occurred in the summer of 2010. After taking a state-
ment from the victim, Hearn prepared an arrest warrant
for the defendant. The defendant subsequently was
arrested, and in its operative amended long form infor-
mation (operative information), the state charged the
defendant with two counts of sexual assault in the
fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and
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State v. Nichols

one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of
§ 53-21 (a) (2).
The matter was tried to a jury on September 26, 2022.
During its case-in-chief, the state called as witnesses
(1) the victim, (2) the victim’s mother,5 and (3) Hearn.6
During the defendant’s case-in-chief, the defense called
as witnesses (1) the defendant and (2) Tamara. The
trial court, Gustafson, J., admitted two exhibits in full,
namely, a photograph submitted by the state and a video
recording submitted by the defendant. During trial,
defense counsel orally moved for a mistrial on the basis
of an outburst by the victim that had occurred during
the defendant’s direct examination. Following argu-
ment, the court denied that motion. The next day, the
jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. On Octo-
ber 17, 2022, the defendant filed a postverdict motion
seeking (1) a judgment of acquittal on the two sexual
assault counts for lack of sufficient evidence or, in the
alternative, (2) a new trial on the ground that the court
had deprived him of a fair trial in denying his motion
for a mistrial. On November 22, 2022, the court denied
that motion.7
On November 29, 2022, after vacating the conviction
of sexual assault in the fourth degree as alleged in count
two of the operative information,8 the court sentenced
5
The state briefly recalled the victim’s mother on rebuttal.
6
After the state rested its case-in-chief, defense counsel orally moved for
a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the state had failed to prove
intent as to any of the crimes charged. The court denied that motion.
7
In the postverdict motion, the defendant also requested a new trial on
the basis of the court’s alleged improper denial of a motion in limine that
he had filed seeking to preclude certain evidence. The court denied the
postverdict motion as to that ground as well. The defendant does not raise
that issue on appeal, and, therefore, we need not discuss it further.
8
Count one of the operative information alleged that the defendant com-
mitted sexual assault in the fourth degree by intentionally subjecting the
victim to sexual contact, by touching the victim’s genitalia for the sexual
gratification of the defendant, when the victim was eleven years old and
the defendant was more than two years older than the victim. Count two
of the operative information alleged that the defendant committed sexual
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State v. Nichols

the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty
years of incarceration, execution suspended after eight
years, five years of which was a mandatory minimum,
followed by ten years of probation. This appeal fol-
lowed. Additional procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial stem-
ming from an outburst by the victim while the defendant
was testifying at trial. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On direct examina-
tion, the defendant testified that, while the victim was
at his home during the period in question, the victim
experienced an issue with showering. In particular, the
defendant testified: ‘‘The issue with showering was, ah,
prior to [the victim] coming to arrive at my home that
weekend, I was asked by [his] mom if it was possible
for me to help show [the victim] how to take a shower
because, up to that point, [the victim] had refused and
had never done it. And [the victim’s mother] just wanted
assault in the fourth degree by intentionally subjecting the victim to sexual
contact, by touching the victim’s genitalia to humiliate and to degrade the
victim, when the victim was eleven years old and the defendant was more
than two years older than the victim. Prior to the defendant’s sentencing,
the court stated that it would vacate the conviction on one of those counts
because ‘‘the conduct involved one victim and one course of conduct . . . .’’
See State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 245, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013) (proper remedy
for violation of double jeopardy arising from convictions of greater and
lesser included offenses is vacatur of conviction of lesser included offense);
State v. Miranda, 317 Conn. 741, 749, 120 A.3d 490 (2015) (‘‘in Polanco, [our
Supreme Court] invoked [its] supervisory powers to readopt vacatur as a
remedy for a cumulative conviction that violated double jeopardy protec-
tions’’); see also State v. Wright, 320 Conn. 781, 829–30, 135 A.3d 1 (2016)
(proper remedy for violation of double jeopardy arising from convictions
of three conspiracy counts based upon single conspiratorial agreement was
vacatur of two of conspiracy convictions).
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State v. Nichols

to know if it was possible, could I help him. So, I told
her okay. Ah, you know, I’ll try and we’ll see.’’9
Immediately following that testimony, the trial tran-
script reflects that (1) there was ‘‘some banging in the
courtroom,’’ (2) the victim stated, ‘‘[t]his is bullshit,’’10
(3) the marshal in the courtroom conferred with the
victim, and (4) counsel approached the bench for an off-
the-record conversation. Following the off-the-record
conversation, the court issued the following instruction
to the jury: ‘‘So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, out-
bursts in court are not to be considered as evidence
and be disregarded by you. Thank you.’’ Defense coun-
sel then continued with the defendant’s examination.
Later in the afternoon, following a lunch recess,
defense counsel orally moved for a mistrial on the basis
of the victim’s outburst during the defendant’s testi-
mony.11 Defense counsel argued that (1) the victim and
his mother were observed loudly speaking within the
hearing of the jury, (2) at least two jurors were watching
and listening to the victim and his mother, rather than
watching the defendant testify, and (3) the victim left
the courtroom while yelling an expletive. Defense coun-
sel maintained that, as a result of the victim’s conduct,
the defendant’s right to a fair trial had been irreparably
harmed. The state responded that the court’s curative
instruction to the jury immediately after the victim’s
outburst had cured any harm suffered by the defendant.
Following argument, the court orally denied the motion
for a mistrial. The court stated that, (1) during the
9
The victim’s mother later testified that she did not request that the
defendant teach the victim how to shower.
10
The victim was not under a sequestration order.
11
In denying the defendant’s postverdict motion seeking, inter alia, a new
trial, the court stated that, during the off-the-record conversation, defense
counsel had requested that the jury be excused in order to allow counsel
to move for a mistrial, and the court explained that it would permit counsel
to move for a mistrial outside of the jury’s presence at the next recess.
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State v. Nichols

defendant’s testimony, the court observed the victim
abruptly leave the courtroom while looking ‘‘demon-
strably upset,’’ although the court could not hear what
the victim had said and did not hear anything else, (2)
the court, while paying ‘‘pretty careful attention,’’ did
not observe the jury exchange looks with either the
victim or his mother during any testimony, and (3) the
court ‘‘anticipate[d] [that] it won’t happen again,’’ as
the state had spoken to the victim and his mother12 and,
as the court iterated, ‘‘the decorum that we need in the
courtroom is nothing but professionalism.’’ The court
further stated that it had instructed the jury to disregard
the victim’s outburst. In sum, the court determined that
it ‘‘[did not] think [the defendant’s right to] a fair trial
[had been] irreparably harmed by the very limited, two
second outburst that [the court] did provide a curative
instruction on.’’

In his postverdict motion seeking, inter alia, a new
trial, the defendant contended that the court improperly
had denied his motion for a mistrial because the victim’s
outburst had ‘‘resulted in substantial and irreparable
prejudice to the defendant’s case. Despite the court’s
curative instruction, in the context of the proceedings
as a whole, including the very short length of the trial
and the contest of veracity between the defendant’s
testimony and the [victim’s] testimony, the conduct was
such that the jury reasonably could not be presumed
to have disregarded it.’’ In denying the postverdict
motion as to that ground, the court stated that, (1)
during the defendant’s testimony at issue, the victim
became ‘‘demonstrably upset,’’ ‘‘exclaimed ‘bullshit’ as
he walked approximately thirty feet to the exit [of the
12
While setting forth its reasoning for denying the defendant’s motion for
a mistrial, the court noted for the record that the victim and his mother
had returned to the courtroom.
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State v. Nichols

courtroom],’’ and ‘‘angrily left the courtroom,’’ (2) not-
withstanding the defendant’s contention ‘‘that [the vic-
tim] and his mother were near the jury and were animat-
edly reacting to the defendant’s testimony, the court
did not observe any other distracting or inappropriate
conduct prior to or after the subject outburst,’’ (3) fol-
lowing a sidebar with counsel, the court issued a cura-
tive instruction to the jury, (4) there were no additional
disturbances, and (5) neither party requested any addi-
tional instructions to the jury, and no additional instruc-
tions were given. The court further stated that, notwith-
standing the victim’s ‘‘patently improper’’ outburst, the
court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the
outburst, which instruction the jury was presumed to
follow. Accordingly, the court rejected the defendant’s
claim.
The defendant claims on appeal that the court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial, main-
taining that (1) the victim’s outburst during the defen-
dant’s testimony ‘‘resulted in substantial and irreparable
prejudice’’ and (2) notwithstanding the court’s issuance
of a curative instruction to the jury following the out-
burst, in light of the circumstances, including the short
length of the trial and the credibility contest between
the victim and the defendant at trial, the jury reasonably
could not be presumed to have disregarded the out-
burst. We are not persuaded.
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern our review of the defendant’s claim. Practice
Book § 42-43 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon motion
of a defendant, the judicial authority may declare a
mistrial at any time during the trial if there occurs during
the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
any conduct inside or outside the courtroom which
results in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the
defendant’s case. . . .’’ The defendant bears the burden
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State v. Nichols

to establish prejudice.13 See State v. Gore, 342 Conn.
129, 168–69, 269 A.3d 1 (2022). ‘‘We review a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for a mistrial under the abuse of
discretion standard. . . . When reviewing a ruling on
a mistrial motion, we must ask whether the trial court
considered the totality of the circumstances in arriving
at its decision. . . . Further, our review must take into
account the trial judge’s superior opportunity to assess
the proceedings over which he or she has personally
presided.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Henderson, 348 Conn. 648, 666–67,
309 A.3d 1208 (2024). ‘‘Every reasonable presumption
will be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson,
163 Conn. App. 783, 791, 134 A.3d 741, cert. denied, 321
Conn. 909, 138 A.3d 931 (2016).
‘‘Furthermore, [w]hile the remedy of a mistrial is per-
mitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored. [A]
mistrial should be granted only as a result of some
occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is
apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot
13
In his principal appellate brief, citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.
227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954), the defendant asserted that a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice (Remmer presumption) arose from the
victim’s outburst during the defendant’s testimony. See id., 229 (‘‘In a criminal
case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indi-
rectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury
is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in
pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions
of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the [g]ov-
ernment to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such
contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.’’). The defendant
further maintained that the trial court improperly failed to analyze his claim
under Remmer. In response, the state argued that the Remmer presumption
was inapplicable to this action because the victim’s outburst was not a
‘‘private’’ communication with a juror. During oral argument before this
court, the defendant’s appellate counsel expressly withdrew the contention
that the Remmer presumption applied in the present action. Accordingly,
we need not address the applicability of the Remmer presumption further.
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State v. Nichols

have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are
vitiated. . . . If curative action can obviate the preju-
dice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided.
. . . On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not
to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of
the many circumstances [that] may arise during the trial
in which his [or her] function is to assure a fair and
just outcome. . . . The trial court is better positioned
than we are to evaluate in the first instance whether a
certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and,
if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that prejudice.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Collins, 206
Conn. App. 438, 441–42, 260 A.3d 507, cert. denied, 339
Conn. 914, 262 A.3d 135 (2021).
In resolving the defendant’s claim, we are guided by
our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Savage, 161
Conn. 445, 290 A.2d 221 (1971). In Savage, the defen-
dant, who was charged with incest, testified at trial.
Id., 446, 447–48. As the defendant was leaving the wit-
ness stand following his testimony, the complainant,
who was the defendant’s daughter, ‘‘screamed that he
was a liar and had not told the truth.’’ Id., 448–49. The
trial court excused the jury, which had been present
for the complainant’s outburst, and the defendant
moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Id., 449.
After recalling the jury, the court ‘‘instructed [the jury]
at length to disregard the complainant’s outburst. The
court again so instructed the jury during its final
charge.’’ Id. On appeal, our Supreme Court upheld the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a mis-
trial, concluding that ‘‘[t]he [trial] court’s careful and
correct instructions to the jury to disregard the com-
plainant’s outburst obviated any possible harm to the
defendant from this outburst . . . .’’ Id.
In light of Savage, as well as the totality of the circum-
stances in the present case, we conclude that the court
properly denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
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State v. Nichols

As the court found, although the victim’s outburst in
the courtroom was inappropriate, the outburst was
brief and isolated, and the court did not observe any
improper interaction between the jury and the victim
or his mother.14 Moreover, immediately following the
sidebar with counsel that had occurred after the victim’s
outburst, the court issued a curative instruction to the
jury directing it to disregard the outburst, as it did not
constitute evidence.15 ‘‘[A]s a general matter, the jury
is presumed to follow the court’s curative instructions
in the absence of some indication to the contrary.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roberto Q.,
170 Conn. App. 733, 746, 155 A.3d 756, cert. denied, 325
Conn. 910, 158 A.3d 320 (2017). The defendant has not
demonstrated any indication that the jury failed to abide
by the court’s curative instruction, which ‘‘obviated any
possible harm’’ to the defendant from the victim’s out-
burst. State v. Savage, supra, 161 Conn. 449.
In sum, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a
mistrial.
II
The defendant next claims that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction of sexual assault in
14
The defendant maintains that, contrary to the court’s findings, (1) the
victim exclaimed, ‘‘[t]his is fucking bullshit’’; (emphasis added); rather than
‘‘[t]his is bullshit,’’ and (2) at least two jurors were paying attention to the
victim and his mother, rather than to the defendant, during the defendant’s
testimony. The defendant offers no support for these contentions other than
counsel’s representations, which are inadequate. See Magana v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 164 Conn. App. 729, 734, 138 A.3d 966 (2016) (‘‘representations
of counsel are not evidence and are certainly not proof’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
15
The court did not repeat its curative instruction in its final charge to
the jury the next day. With respect to the evidence in the case, however,
the court instructed the jury that ‘‘[t]he evidence from which you are to
decide the facts consist[s] of one, the sworn testimony of witnesses, both
on direct and cross-examination, regardless of who called the witness; and
two, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence.’’ The court further
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State v. Nichols

the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A)
as alleged in count one of the operative information
(count one).16 We do not agree.
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-73a (a) provides
in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of sexual assault
in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person intentionally
subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A)
under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than
two years older than such other person . . . .’’ ‘‘ ‘Sex-
ual contact’ ’’ is statutorily defined as ‘‘any contact with
the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor
for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or
for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person
or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with
a person not married to the actor for the purpose of
sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of
degrading or humiliating such person.’’ General Statutes
(Rev. to 2009) § 53a-65 (3). ‘‘ ‘Intimate parts’ ’’ is statu-
tory defined as ‘‘the genital area or any substance emit-
ted therefrom, groin, anus or any substance emitted
therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks or breasts.’’ General
Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-65 (8).
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. In support of count
instructed the jury that ‘‘[y]ou may not go outside the evidence introduced
in court to find the facts.’’
16
Notwithstanding the court’s vacatur of the defendant’s conviction of
sexual assault in the fourth degree as alleged in count two of the operative
information; see footnote 8 of this opinion; the parties have addressed the
sufficiency of the evidence as to both counts one and two, which is appro-
priate given the possibility that we may reverse the defendant’s conviction
with respect to count one and order the reinstatement of his conviction as
to count two. See State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 262–63, 61 A.3d 1084
(2013) (reinstatement of conviction vacated as violative of double jeopardy
is proper remedy when cumulative conviction is reversed on appeal for
reasons unrelated to viability of vacated conviction). Because we affirm the
defendant’s conviction with regard to count one, we need not address the
merits of the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction as to count two.
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one, the state alleged that ‘‘during the summer of 2010
in Manchester . . . the defendant intentionally sub-
jected [the victim] to sexual contact, who was eleven
years of age and the defendant is more than two years
older than [the victim]. This sexual contact was the
touching of [the victim’s] genitalia by the defendant for
the sexual gratification of the defendant.’’
In his postverdict motion seeking, inter alia, a judg-
ment of acquittal as to his conviction on count one,
the defendant asserted that ‘‘the evidence [was] not
sufficient to demonstrate . . . that [he] had the spe-
cific intent to obtain sexual gratification from the sexual
contact . . . at the time of the alleged offense . . . .’’
(Emphasis omitted.) In denying the motion as to that
ground, the court determined that the trial evidence,
along with all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,
when viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict, established that the defendant had touched
the victim’s genital area for the purpose of his sexual
gratification, as the defendant’s conduct (1) occurred
at night in the defendant’s bed and (2) included rubbing
the victim’s penis and buttocks.
On appeal, the defendant concedes that, on the basis
of the evidence, the jury reasonably could have found,
inter alia, that, (1) at the time of the events in question,
the victim was under the age of thirteen years old and
the defendant was more than two years older than the
victim, and (2) the defendant intentionally touched the
victim in a sexual manner in that the defendant, while
in bed in the defendant’s bedroom with the victim and
Tamara, at night, repeatedly touched the victim’s penis,
which conduct was also accompanied by the defendant
rubbing the victim’s legs and the side of the victim’s
buttocks. The defendant asserts, however, that there
was insufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted
with the specific intent required pursuant to § 53a-73a
(a) (1) (A) because the evidence was not adequate to
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establish that he intentionally touched the victim for
the purpose of his sexual gratification. We disagree.
‘‘We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
legal principles and standard of review. The standard
of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence
is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a
[two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,
we determine whether upon the facts so construed and
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder
of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumu-
lative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘We also note that the jury must find every element
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the
defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of
the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclu-
sions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to con-
clude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the
jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may
consider it in combination with other proven facts in
determining whether the cumulative effect of all the
evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all
possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reason-
able doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of
innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [finder of fact], would have
resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of
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the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict
of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thomas S., 222 Conn. App. 201, 211–12, 304 A.3d 513
(2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 943, 307 A.3d 909 (2024).
‘‘The specific intent to subject a person under thirteen
years of age to sexual contact, when the actor is more
than two years older than the victim, is an essential
element of the crime of sexual assault in the fourth
degree [in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A)].’’ State v.
Andersen, 132 Conn. App. 125, 143–44, 31 A.3d 385
(2011), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 906, 44 A.3d 182 (2012).
‘‘It is well established that the question of intent is
purely a question of fact. . . . The state of mind of one
accused of a crime is often the most significant and, at
the same time, the most elusive element of the crime
charged. . . . Because it is practically impossible to
know what someone is thinking or intending at any
given moment, absent an outright declaration of intent,
a person’s state of mind is usually proven by circumstan-
tial evidence . . . . Intent may be and usually is
inferred from [conduct. . . . Whether] such an infer-
ence should be drawn is properly a question for the
jury to decide. . . . [I]ntent may be inferred from the
events leading up to, and immediately following, the
conduct in question . . . the accused’s physical acts
and the general surrounding circumstances.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thompson, 146 Conn. App. 249, 277–78, 76 A.3d 273,
cert. denied, 310 Conn. 956, 81 A.3d 1182 (2013); see
also State v. Roy D. L., 339 Conn. 820, 852, 262 A.3d
712 (2021) (‘‘It is well established that [i]ntent may be,
and usually is, inferred from the defendant’s verbal or
physical conduct. . . . Intent may also be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances. . . . The use of
inferences based on circumstantial evidence is neces-
sary because direct evidence of the accused’s state of
mind is rarely available. . . . Intent may be gleaned
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State v. Nichols

from circumstantial evidence such as . . . the events
leading up to and immediately following the incident.
. . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a neces-
sary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended
the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support a reasonable inference that
the defendant intentionally touched the victim’s genita-
lia for the purpose of his sexual gratification. The vic-
tim’s testimony17 established that, starting on the third
evening of the victim’s approximate ten day stay at the
defendant’s home and reoccurring every night there-
after, except for Sundays, the defendant (1) forced the
victim into an intimate location, that is, the defendant’s
bed in his bedroom, at nighttime, accompanied by
Tamara, and (2) unbuttoned the victim’s pants and
repeatedly touched the victim’s penis and rubbed the
victim’s legs and the side of the victim’s buttocks. These
circumstances easily justify a reasonable inference that
the defendant did not touch the victim’s penis for some
reason other than to obtain sexual gratification.
In addition, the victim testified that when (1) he
informed the defendant that he intended to report the
defendant’s conduct, the defendant made statements
regarding his mother that caused him to fear that the
defendant would harm his mother, and (2) Tamara
expressed discomfort with the defendant’s actions, the
defendant told her to ‘‘shut up,’’ that ‘‘this is his house,’’
17
Other than the victim’s testimony, there was no evidence describing the
contours of the defendant’s abuse. The testimony of the defendant, as well
as Tamara, contradicted the victim’s account and denied any abuse of the
victim by the defendant. As this court has explained, however, ‘‘a jury
reasonably can find a defendant guilty of sexual assault on the basis of the
victim’s testimony alone.’’ State v. Gene C., 140 Conn. App. 241, 247, 57 A.3d
885, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 928, 64 A.3d 120 (2013).
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and that ‘‘[h]e does what he wants.’’ This evidence fur-
ther supports a reasonable inference that the defen-
dant’s intentional touching of the victim was for the
purpose of the defendant’s sexual gratification.18 Other-
wise, if the conduct had been for some nonsexual pur-
pose, there would have been little need for (1) the
defendant to threaten the victim with harm toward his
mother, (2) Tamara to express discomfort with the
defendant’s conduct, and (3) the defendant to rebuke
Tamara for sharing her concerns.
Finally, the reasonableness of these inferences is fur-
ther bolstered by the recurrent nature of the defendant’s
conduct. See State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 854
(agreeing with trial court’s statement that ‘‘ ‘repeated
and almost ritualistic nature’ ’’ of defendant’s conduct
made inference of sexual gratification ‘‘ ‘particularly
reasonable’ ’’).
In sum, we reject the defendant’s claim that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of
sexual assault in the fourth degree as alleged in
count one.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
18
The defendant posits that ‘‘there must be some circumstances beyond
the doing of the act itself that would warrant [intent being inferred from
behavior] by the jury’’ and that, although ‘‘the jury reasonably could have
found intentional sexual touching . . . the jury should not be allowed to
infer, from that conduct alone, that the touching in question was for any
particular purpose.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) As we explain in this opinion, it
is not the defendant’s singular act of intentionally touching the victim’s
genitalia from which the jury reasonably could infer that the defendant
acted for the purpose of his sexual gratification; instead, this inference
stems from the defendant’s conduct examined in conjunction with the cir-
cumstances surrounding the conduct. Indeed, there are conceivable scenar-
ios involving the intentional touching of a child’s intimate areas, such as a
parent washing their child for hygienic purposes or a doctor performing a
medical examination of a child, where a reasonable inference of sexual
gratification would not arise.