In re Mikhail M.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Mikhail M.

IN RE MIKHAIL M.*
(AC 47684)
Moll, Clark and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court for
the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his
parental rights as to his minor child. He claimed that the court improperly
determined that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation as required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)). Held:

There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the respondent father had failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) that would
encourage a belief that, in a reasonable time, he could assume a responsible
position in his child’s life.

Argued November 12, 2024—officially released January 3, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Knight, J.; judgment
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent father appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Seon A. Bagot, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** January 3, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
In re Mikhail M.

Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the appellee
(petitioner).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent father,1 Daniel R.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating his parental rights with
respect to his minor child, Mikhail M. On appeal, the
respondent claims that the court improperly deter-
mined that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of
personal rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). We find no merit to the respon-
dent’s claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the court.
‘‘Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal
rehabilitation is one of [the] statutory grounds on which
a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a-
112.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re G. Q.,
158 Conn. App. 24, 25, 118 A.3d 164, cert. denied, 317
Conn. 918, 118 A.3d 61 (2015). Concerning the failure
to achieve personal rehabilitation, § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
(i) provides for the termination of parental rights when
the minor child has been found to have been neglected,
abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding and the
parent of such child ‘‘has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsi-
ble position in the life of the child.’’
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to [his]
former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . .
[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not
1
The parental rights of Brittney M., the biological mother of Mikhail, also
were terminated. She has not appealed, and all references in this opinion
to the respondent are to Daniel R. only.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Mikhail M.

whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage
[his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the
ability to care for the particular needs of the child at
issue. . . . An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation
requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the
respondent’s child-caring and parenting abilities. . . .
Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the par-
ent must show more than any rehabilitation. . . . Suc-
cessful completion of the petitioner’s expressly articu-
lated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the
petitioner’s claim that the parent has not achieved suffi-
cient rehabilitation. . . . [E]ven if a parent has made
successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life
and may have achieved a level of stability within [his]
limitations, such improvements, although commend-
able, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within
a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a respon-
sible position in the life of [his child]. . . .
‘‘[T]he appropriate standard of review is one of evi-
dentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court
could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts estab-
lished and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient
to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying
this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner
most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial
court.’’2 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
The respondent also claims that the standard of review of evidentiary
2

sufficiency established by our Supreme Court in In re Shane M., 318 Conn.
569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015), is improper and therefore ‘‘should be
replaced by the former clear error standard.’’ He states that this claim was
made only for purposes of preservation and acknowledges that this court
does not have the authority to overturn the precedent of our Supreme Court.
We agree that we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Shane
M., and, therefore, reject the respondent’s standard of review claim. See
e.g., State v. Henry, 76 Conn. App. 515, 551, 820 A.2d 1076 (‘‘it is not the
province of an intermediate appellate court to overturn the precedent of
the jurisdiction’s highest court’’), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 908, 826 A.2d
178 (2003).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
In re Mikhail M.

omitted.) In re Fayth C., 220 Conn. App. 315, 319–20,
297 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 907, 298 A.3d
275 (2023).
Concerning the issue of personal rehabilitation, the
court found in its well reasoned decision that the
respondent ‘‘has a long history of substance abuse. He
started using and selling drugs in the eighth grade. He
has strained relations with his family because of his
past substance dependence, which includes the use of
cocaine, fentanyl and methamphetamines. He refused
the [Department of Children and Family’s (depart-
ment)] initial attempts to engage him in substance abuse
treatment, declining to participate in any services after
the child was placed in care, and he went missing from
December, 2021, until March, 2022.’’ The court ques-
tioned ‘‘whether the [respondent] will maintain his
sobriety given the chronicity of the issue and his history
of relapse even after substantial interventions’’ and
noted that ‘‘Mikhail has issues that need to be attended
to by a reliable and sober caregiver including medical
concerns, allergies and a speech delay.’’ The court fur-
ther found that, ‘‘[d]espite engaging in an intensive inter-
vention which included inpatient treatment, [the
respondent] relapsed almost immediately after dis-
charging from programming in December, 2022, and
again in July, 2023, after participating in outpatient care.
He is forty years old and has not demonstrated any
meaningfully significant period of sobriety. Moreover,
Dr. [Ines] Shroeder [a licensed psychologist, who con-
ducted an independent, court-ordered psychological
evaluation of the respondent], upon whose opinion this
court relies, also expressed concerns regarding the
[respondent’s] ability to manage his abstinence. She
stated that, during his evaluation, the [respondent] mini-
mized his substance abuse dependence and had little
insight into the impact his issues could have on Mikhail.
Further, he has not demonstrated that he has adequately
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Mikhail M.

addressed his mental health issues, which include
depression and [post-traumatic stress disorder]. More-
over, the [respondent] has yet to address an outstanding
arrest warrant pending out of California. This legal mat-
ter, though purportedly nonextraditable, is disquieting
given the [respondent’s] involvement in the criminal
justice system, which includes his history of felony con-
victions, probationary stints, and fleeing the state of
California without his probation officer’s knowledge.
During his time in Connecticut, he was arrested twice,
once for a number of felonies and another time for
getting into a domestic incident with his brother with
whom he lives.’’ The court additionally stated that the
respondent’s ‘‘parenting deficits are glaring,’’ that his
prior history of parenting includes the termination of
his parental rights as to another child, which ‘‘event
seemingly did not motivate the [respondent] to address
his substance abuse issues when the mother became
pregnant with Mikhail. He continued to misuse sub-
stances, left California while under court supervision,
and disappeared for substantial periods during the child
protection proceedings—failing to communicate and
cooperate with the department.’’ The court also found
that the respondent lacked stable housing and that he
‘‘did not visit with [Mikhail] consistently during the first
year of the child’s life, seeing him only four times from
December, 2021, to October, 2022. The [respondent]
completed a parenting course and has been visiting
with [Mikhail] more regularly since March of 2023.’’ The
court concluded that, under the totality of the circum-
stances, ‘‘the degree of rehabilitation achieved by the
[respondent] falls short of that which would reasonably
encourage a belief that in a reasonable time he can
assume a responsible position in Mikhail’s life.’’
We conclude that ample evidence exists in the record
to support the court’s determination in its well reasoned
decision that the respondent failed to achieve sufficient
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
In re Mikhail M.

rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that,
within a reasonable time, he could assume a responsible
position in Mikhail’s life. Accordingly, we disagree with
the respondent’s contention that the court’s decision
to terminate his parental rights as to Mikhail requires
reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.