Ramos v. State

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Ramos v. State

JOSE RAMOS v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(AC 47066)
Alvord, Seeley and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented plaintiff, who had previously been convicted of murder,
appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action against
the defendant, the state of Connecticut, in which he sought, inter alia,
declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages. The plaintiff claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly granted the state’s motion to dismiss
the action on the ground of sovereign immunity without permitting oral
argument on the motion pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 11-18). Held:

This court declined to review the plaintiff’s inadequately briefed claims that
the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to dismiss the action
and did so without permitting oral argument on the motion.
Argued December 10, 2024—officially released February 4, 2025

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive
relief with respect to the plaintiff’s conviction for the
crime of murder, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of New London,
where the court, Spallone, J., granted the state’s motion
to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jose Ramos, self-represented, the appellant (plain-
tiff).
Lisamaria Teresa Proscino, assistant attorney gen-
eral, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attor-
ney general, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Jose
Ramos, who previously had been convicted of murder
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and sentenced
to sixty years of imprisonment, appeals from the judg-
ment of the trial court dismissing his action against the
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Ramos v. State

defendant, the state of Connecticut (state), in which
he sought declaratory and injunctive relief, punitive
damages, and to have his conviction vacated and a
new criminal trial. On appeal, he claims that the court
improperly (1) granted the state’s motion to dismiss
the action and (2) did so without oral argument on
the motion. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claims are
inadequately briefed and, thus, decline to review them.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.
The following factual and procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff was
convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in connec-
tion with the shooting death of the victim, Tynel Hard-
wick, on October 10, 2008. On direct appeal from his
conviction, this court affirmed the judgment of convic-
tion. See State v. Ramos, 178 Conn. App. 400, 175 A.3d
1265 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 1003, 176 A.3d 1195,
cert. denied, 585 U.S. 1007, 138 S. Ct. 2656, 201 L. Ed.
2d 1056 (2018). In that appeal, this court set forth the
following facts, which the jury reasonably could have
found: ‘‘On the evening of October 10, 2008, [the victim]
and his fiancée, Lenore Robinson, were at Rumors Bar
on Boswell Avenue in Norwich (Rumors). At that time,
the [plaintiff] was also at Rumors with his friends Lat-
toya Small and Dishon Morgan. Small observed the
[plaintiff] and the victim engaged in a verbal dispute.
Thereafter, the [plaintiff] asked Small to drive him to
the apartment of his sister, Shavanha Kincade (Sha-
vanha), and her husband, James Kincade (James), a
few miles away, and Morgan joined them. The [plaintiff]
had left a rifle at the apartment in late summer, 2008,
while he was staying with them. When the [plaintiff]
arrived at the apartment, Shavanha and James were
away for the evening and James’ mother was caring for
their young child. The [plaintiff] went into the apart-
ment and retrieved the rifle. The [plaintiff], Small, and
Morgan returned to Boswell Avenue across from
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Ramos v. State

Rumors. The [plaintiff] got out of the car at a distance
away from Rumors and positioned himself in a grassy
area in sight of the bar. When the victim came out of
the bar, the [plaintiff] shot and killed him with a single
gunshot wound to the head. The [plaintiff] then returned
to Small’s car and Small, accompanied by Morgan, drove
the [plaintiff] to Hartford.
‘‘During their investigation in October, 2008, the
police discovered .22 caliber rounds, a burnt cigar, ear-
plugs, and footprints in the grass across the street from
Rumors, but they were unable to identify any suspects.
The [plaintiff] was implicated as the shooter in 2012 as
part of a cold case investigation led by Detective Corey
Poore of the Norwich Police Department. On Septem-
ber 25, 2012, while the [plaintiff] was living in New York
City, Norwich detectives located him in Brooklyn. The
Brooklyn detectives arrested him as a fugitive from
justice, and the Norwich detectives subsequently extra-
dited him to Connecticut. He then was charged with
murder in violation of § 53a-54a. Following the presen-
tation of evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Thereafter, the court sentenced the [plaintiff] to a total
effective sentence of sixty years [of] imprisonment.’’
Id., 402–403.
In 2016, while the plaintiff’s direct appeal was pend-
ing, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and a petition for a new trial, both of which
raised claims concerning alleged violations of the plain-
tiff’s constitutional rights, actual innocence, and inef-
fective assistance of counsel received by the plaintiff.
The matters were consolidated and tried to the court
over multiple days, commencing on December 1, 2022.
In a comprehensive written decision dated July 11, 2023,
the court, Newson, J., rendered judgments denying both
petitions. See Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction,
Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No.
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Ramos v. State

CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 11, 2023); Ramos v. State, Supe-
rior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 11, 2023). In its decision, the court
thoroughly addressed and rejected the seven claims
raised in the habeas petition. Those claims alleged the
following: (1) actual innocence; (2) a due process viola-
tion stemming from the state’s withholding of exculpa-
tory evidence; (3) a due process violation stemming
from the state’s knowing presentation of false testi-
mony; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel provided
by criminal trial counsel; (5) a due process violation
stemming from the state’s failure to preserve evidence;
(6) a due process violation resulting from the denial of
the plaintiff’s right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers, namely, the lead prosecutor and the state;
and (7) a violation of his rights to equal protection
and due process by the trial court and the prosecuting
authority for their failure to advise him of his constitu-
tional rights, to suppress statements, to canvass him,
and to allow him to represent himself. See id. There-
after, the court addressed the petition for a new trial,
noting that ‘‘[m]any of the [plaintiff’s] allegations in
support of his petition for a new trial are nothing more
than reformulations of factual allegations [that he]
made in support of the claims made in his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. He claims in his petition for
a new trial, however, that some of this information
constitutes ‘newly discovered evidence’ which calls his
original verdict into question and warrants a new trial.’’
Id. The court determined that each of the claims raised
in the petition for a new trial failed, primarily for lack
of evidence. Id. The plaintiff thereafter appealed from
the judgment denying his petition for a new trial. Subse-
quently, following the denial of his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, the plaintiff filed a separate appeal from
the judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Both of those appeals are currently pending
before this court.
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Ramos v. State

On January 10, 2023, during the pendency of the plain-
tiff’s habeas action and 2016 petition for a new trial,
the plaintiff commenced the present action, which he
characterizes as a ‘‘common-law cause of action
. . . .’’1 In this action, the plaintiff alleges violations of
his rights under the first, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments, as well as articles III
and VI, of the federal constitution. The plaintiff makes
a number of allegations in support of these claimed
violations, including, inter alia, that he was ‘‘hindered
from accessing and reviewing exculpatory material evi-
dence’’; his ‘‘trial counsel was prohibited from with-
drawing’’; he received exculpatory material regarding
his criminal case that constitutes ‘‘newly discovered
evidence’’; his trial counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance; and the state failed to preserve evidence and
presented false testimony, which resulted in, inter alia,
due process and equal protection violations. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff sought (1) a declaration from the
court that the acts and omissions described violated
his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, equal
protection, the effective assistance of counsel, and
access to the court; (2) an injunction prohibiting certain
witnesses ‘‘from testifying ever again in a court of law,’’
with the exception of this case; (3) to have the court
vacate his conviction and sentence and, if not release
the plaintiff, provide him with a new trial; and (4) puni-
tive damages in the amount of $250,000 for the denial
of his right to a fair trial.
On July 31, 2023, the state filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30 et seq., with a sup-
porting memorandum of law in which it alleged that,
pursuant to the eleventh amendment to the federal con-
stitution, the plaintiff was prohibited from pursuing
claims for money damages against the state, as well as
1
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff also referred to the
present action as his ‘‘petition for a new trial.’’
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Ramos v. State

declaratory and injunctive relief, because the state is
immune from suit and never waived its immunity from
suit. The state also argued, in the alternative, that the
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating
issues in this action that are the same as the ones raised
in his prior habeas petition and petition for a new trial,
which were fully litigated before and decided by Judge
Newson. In response to the state’s motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff filed an objection with a supporting memo-
randum of law, in which he countered the state’s argu-
ments about sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel
and which included the statement, ‘‘[o]ral arguments
required.’’
In an order dated September 18, 2023, the court
granted the state’s motion to dismiss, stating: ‘‘After
review of the pleadings and both parties’ memoranda
of law, the court hereby grants the [state’s] motion to
dismiss. The [state] is shielded by sovereign immunity
under the eleventh amendment [to] the constitution of
the United States and the federal and state case law
interpreting it. The plaintiff has failed to present any
evidence that the [state] has waived such immunity,
nor that Congress has abrogated it by its own action.
The court declines to reach the other issues raised by
the [state] since the lack of subject matter jurisdiction
by way of immunity disposes of all issues raised in the
motion to dismiss.’’ This appeal followed.
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff sets forth the facts
underlying this appeal and then asserts that the court
abused its discretion when it dismissed this action.
After again stating the grounds for this action and the
plain error standard of review, his analysis consists of
the following: he asserts that his undeniable rights to
access of the court, to petition for redress of grievances,
to due process and to equal protection, pursuant to
various amendments and articles of the federal constitu-
tion, ‘‘were clearly violated in this instant matter for
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Ramos v. State

the obvious reasons in addition to the trial court’s dis-
missal of the petition for a new trial without oral argu-
ment in direct conflict with [his] rights and Practice
Book § 11-18, which prohibits the trial court from dis-
missing said case without said oral argument.’’ He then
states that the court ‘‘acted as an administrative officer
rather than judicial’’ and that it ‘‘committed said acts,
to dismiss said case, in direct conflict with the United
States constitution and applied statutes and/or the likes
that are contrary to the United States constitution and
the supreme laws for which the said trial court is
bound by.’’
This court ‘‘repeatedly ha[s] stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is
asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter
receives only cursory attention in the brief without sub-
stantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . .
‘‘We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of
the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-repre-
sented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the
rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice
liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . .
Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] liti-
gants some latitude, the right of self-representation pro-
vides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App.
628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022). Courts adhere to the
rule affording latitude to self-represented litigants ‘‘to
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Ramos v. State

ensure that [self-represented] litigants receive a full and
fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of
legal education and experience . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789,
806, 213 A.3d 467 (2019).

Our Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that
‘‘[t]his rule of construction has limits . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. For example, our Supreme
Court has stated: ‘‘The solicitous treatment we afford
a self-represented party does not allow us to address
a claim on his behalf when he has failed to brief that
claim. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v.
Pollard, 182 Conn. App. 483, 487, 189 A.3d 1232 (2018)
(‘Other than a broad and conclusory claim that the
court too narrowly construed the transaction test, the
defendant has provided this court with no argument
specific to any count of his counterclaim; nor has he
set forth any reasoning in support of the notion that
his pleadings fall within the parameters of the transac-
tion test. Although we recognize and adhere to the well-
founded policy to accord leeway to self-represented
parties in the appeal process, our deference is not
unlimited; nor is a litigant on appeal relieved of the
obligation to sufficiently articulate a claim so that it is
recognizable to a reviewing court.’ . . .); Tonghini v.
Tonghini, 152 Conn. App. 231, 239–40, 98 A.3d 93 (2014)
(‘declin[ing] to enter into the statutory thicket of the
family support magistrate laws without any meaningful
assistance from the parties’ and observing that ‘the fact
that the defendant is self-represented cannot excuse or
cure . . . obvious inadequacies in the record’); In re
Nicholas B., 135 Conn. App. 381, 384, 41 A.3d 1054
(2012) (declining to review self-represented respon-
dent’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because his ‘argument is devoid of any legal
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Ramos v. State

analysis, let alone citation to any authority,’ and determin-
ing solicitude to self-represented parties was unwar-
ranted because ‘[t]he major deficiencies in the presenta-
tion of this claim, which undeniably interfere with the
petitioners’ right to respond adequately to the claim,
fall well outside of that degree of latitude afforded self-
represented parties’) . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
Traylor v. State, supra, 332 Conn. 807.
In the present case, other than referring to the various
articles of and amendments to the federal constitution,
the plaintiff cites no authority in support of his first
claim that his ‘‘undeniable rights’’ under the federal
constitution have been violated, nor does he provide
any analysis of applicable law or substantive argument
regarding why the court’s decision granting the state’s
motion to dismiss was improper. Significantly, he
makes no reference to sovereign immunity, which is the
sole basis for the court’s decision granting the motion
to dismiss. Rather, he asserts only that his rights ‘‘were
clearly violated in this instant matter for the obvious
reasons,’’ without providing any analysis of those rea-
sons. (Emphasis added.) The same is true with respect
to the plaintiff’s second claim. Aside from the one refer-
ence to Practice Book § 11-18,2 the plaintiff’s brief con-
tains no analysis whatsoever of his second claim. The
plaintiff’s briefing on both claims is scant, consisting
2
Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-18 (a), a motion to dismiss is a motion
for which oral argument is a matter of right, provided certain conditions
are met, including the conditions that ‘‘(1) the motion has been marked
ready in accordance with the procedure that appears on the short calendar
on which the motion appears, or (2) a nonmoving party files and serves on
all other parties . . . a written notice stating the party’s intention to argue
the motion or present testimony. Such a notice shall be filed on or before
the third day before the date of the short calendar date . . . .’’
We note that, ‘‘[e]ven though Practice Book § 11-18 grants . . . oral argu-
ment as a matter of right, it is not automatic but must be claimed for
argument as provided [by the rule].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Wasilewski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 152 Conn. App. 560, 569,
99 A.3d 1181 (2014).
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of one half of one page in total, and it is conclusory
and confusing. See State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 726,
138 A.3d 868 (2016) (‘‘[a]lthough the number of pages
devoted to an argument in a brief is not necessarily
determinative, relative sparsity weighs in favor of con-
cluding that the argument has been inadequately
briefed’’). His brief also fails to address the harmfulness
of the court’s alleged error in granting the motion to
dismiss without oral argument thereon. See Bradley v.
Yovino, 218 Conn. App. 1, 15, 24, 291 A.3d 133 (2023)
(to prevail on claim that court improperly adjudicated
motion for summary judgment, for which oral argument
is matter of right under § 11-18, plaintiff also had to
‘‘demonstrate that the court’s erroneous actions likely
affected the result’’); see also Wasilewski v. Commis-
sioner of Transportation, 152 Conn. App. 560, 570, 99
A.3d 1181 (2014).
Even though we afford the self-represented plaintiff
some latitude, that latitude cannot excuse his complete
failure to address the basis for the court’s decision
granting the motion to dismiss or to provide any analysis
of his claims on appeal. ‘‘The plaintiff’s status as a self-
represented party does not permit us to overlook that
complete omission.’’ Traylor v. State, supra, 332 Conn.
809. As a result, we are unable to conduct any meaning-
ful review of the plaintiff’s claims in this appeal due to
inadequate briefing. See C. B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn.
App. 630; see also State v. Godbout, 229 Conn. App. 231,
236–37, 326 A.3d 1142 (2024). Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court. See Traylor v. State,
supra, 809.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.