Troy Laundry Building, LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC

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Troy Laundry Building, LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC

TROY LAUNDRY BUILDING, LLC v. BEAUTIFUL
LIFE ADULT DAYCARE, LLC
(AC 47173)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant tenant appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plain-
tiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action. The defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss,
in which it had argued that the notice to quit was defective. Held:

This court dismissed the appeal as moot because, during the pendency
of the appeal, the defendant vacated the property, and, having failed to
demonstrate that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness
doctrine applied, there was no practical relief this court could afford the
defendant and, thus, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
the defendant’s claims.
Argued January 14—officially released March 4, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing
Session at Meriden, where the court, Riley, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the court,
Jacobs, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
David J. Baker, with whom was Stuart A. Margolis,
for the appellant (defendant).
David A. Lavenburg, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this commercial summary process action,
the defendant, Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC,
appeals from the judgment of possession rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, Troy Laundry Building, LLC. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred
in denying its motion to dismiss, in which it argued that
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Troy Laundry Building, LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC

the notice to quit was defective. The defendant also
claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment because (1) there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defen-
dant had materially breached the lease agreement and/
or whether that breach was excused, and (2) the court
impermissibly found facts regarding whether an addi-
tional security deposit was owed. We do not reach the
merits of the defendant’s claims because, during the
pendency of this appeal, the defendant vacated the
premises, and, accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as
moot.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In September, 2022, the plain-
tiff commenced this summary process action. On
November 16, 2022, the plaintiff filed its second revised
amended complaint, which alleged three grounds for
eviction: (1) the defendant’s failure to pay common
area maintenance (CAM) charges for lease year 2021
pursuant to the lease agreement, (2) the defendant’s
failure to pay a security deposit pursuant to the lease
agreement, and (3) the termination of the defendant’s
right or privilege to occupy the premises. On December
15, 2022, the defendant moved to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
the plaintiff’s notice to quit was defective. On August
17, 2023, the trial court, Riley, J., denied the motion to
dismiss.
On August 22, 2023, the plaintiff filed its fourth
revised amended complaint (operative complaint),
essentially alleging the same grounds for eviction as
the second revised amended complaint but with greater
specificity. On September 28, 2023, the plaintiff filed
a one page motion for summary judgment, seemingly
directed to all three counts of the operative complaint,
and an accompanying affidavit from its manager,
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Michael Tevis, who averred, inter alia, that the defen-
dant had ‘‘fail[ed] to remit rent, i.e., CAM charges for
lease year 2021’’ and had ‘‘failed to pay an additional
security deposit in accordance with Article 13, Section
13.12, of the lease.’’ On October 16, 2023, the defendant
filed an objection, and, on November 13, 2023, the defen-
dant filed a memorandum of law and accompanying
affidavit and exhibits in opposition to the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment. The defendant argued,
inter alia, that there were genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the billed CAM charges were properly
calculated and/or were otherwise excessive and
whether the plaintiff had failed to provide requested
supporting documentation as required under the lease.
Furthermore, with respect to the additional security
deposit claim, the defendant argued that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to what amount of
additional security deposit was due, when it was due,
and whether the plaintiff ever sent a proper notice of
default under the lease. Additional briefing followed.
On December 4, 2023, the trial court, Jacobs, J.,
issued its memorandum of decision, stating in conclu-
sion that the plaintiff’s motion was ‘‘granted’’ and that
a judgment of possession shall be entered in its favor.
Although the court did not expressly state that the plain-
tiff’s motion was granted only as to count one, the
decision as a whole supports such a reading,1 and the
1
In reference to count one, the court stated: ‘‘With respect to the claim
that the defendant failed to pay CAM charges as they came due . . . there
are no genuine issues of material fact. It is undisputed that they were not
paid. . . . [T]he lease plainly and unambiguously calls for payment of the
billed estimated CAM charges in advance, subject to a refund or a ‘credit
for such excess against payments next thereafter to become due to [the
plaintiff] on account of [the defendant’s] Common Area Charge . . . .’ ’’
(Footnote omitted.) The court went on to reject the defendant’s claim that
its failure to pay the CAM charges should be excused (1) on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to provide supporting documentation for the CAM
charges as requested and/or (2) under the doctrine of equitable forfeiture.
In reference to count two, the court stated, inter alia, that, ‘‘[w]ith respect
to the alleged failure to pay the additional security deposit, there are genuine
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parties do not disagree. See CCI Computerworks, LLC
v. Evernet Consulting, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 491, 523,
302 A.3d 297 (2023) (‘‘[w]e are mindful that [a trial
court’s judgment] must be read as a whole, without
particular portions read in isolation, to discern the
parameters of its holding’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). This appeal followed.2

On January 7, 2025, the plaintiff filed a motion to
dismiss this appeal as moot, representing that ‘‘[s]ince
the filing of this appeal, the defendant has vacated the
property and the plaintiff is now in possession [of]
the property, which was vacated by the defendant on
December 31, 2024.’’ On January 10, 2025, the defendant
filed its memorandum of law in opposition to the
motion. Relying on the collateral consequences doc-
trine, the defendant maintains that this appeal should
not be dismissed as moot as a result of its vacating the
premises. In its opposition, the defendant draws our
attention to a pending collection action that the plaintiff
brought against it and two individual guarantors under
the lease during the pendency of this appeal. In that
case, the plaintiff seeks to recover, inter alia, unpaid
CAM charges for 2021. See Troy Laundry Building,
issues of material fact,’’ as further explained by the court, the resolution of
which required the denial of the plaintiff’s motion. Finally, with regard to
count three, the decision is silent.
2
On January 2, 2025, the parties were notified to be prepared to address
at oral argument before this court ‘‘whether the defendant has appealed
from a final judgment given that the trial court expressly found on page
eight of its December 4, 2023 memorandum of decision that ‘there are
genuine issues of material fact’ with respect to the second count of the
operative complaint alleging nonpayment of the additional security deposit.
See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 7[23]–24, [183
A.3d 1164] (2018) (‘[w]hen a legally consistent theory of recovery has been
litigated and has not been ruled on, there is no final judgment’).’’ Because
we dismiss this appeal as moot, we need not address the applicability of
Meribear Productions, Inc., to a summary process action in which a judg-
ment of possession is rendered on one count and another count remains
without adjudication.
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Troy Laundry Building, LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC

LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S. The defendant contends that there is a
reasonable possibility that the court’s judgment as to
count one in the present action may have a harmful,
preclusive effect in the collection action under the doc-
trines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this
appeal is moot and is not saved by the collateral conse-
quences doctrine. Accordingly, we lack subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s claims.
‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, 208
Conn. App. 789, 798–99, 266 A.3d 921 (2021). ‘‘We have
consistently held that an appeal from a summary pro-
cess judgment becomes moot [if], at the time of the
appeal, the defendant is no longer in possession of the
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premises.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Iacurci
v. Wells, 108 Conn. App. 274, 277, 947 A.2d 1034 (2008).
The collateral consequences doctrine provides an
exception to the mootness doctrine. ‘‘[F]or a litigant to
invoke successfully the collateral consequences doc-
trine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable
possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will
occur. Accordingly, the litigant must establish these
consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need
not demonstrate that these consequences are more
probable than not. This standard provides the necessary
limitations on justiciability underlying the mootness
doctrine itself. Where there is no direct practical relief
available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the
collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate,
calling for a determination whether a decision in the
case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the
future. The reviewing court therefore determines, based
upon the particular situation, whether the prejudicial
collateral consequences are reasonably possible.’’ State
v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 208, 802 A.2d 74 (2002).
Here, it is undisputed that the defendant has vacated
the subject property and that the plaintiff is now in
possession of the property, which renders moot the
appeal from the judgment of possession in the absence
of an applicable exception. See Iacurci v. Wells, supra,
108 Conn. App. 277. In determining whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the defendant will suffer
prejudicial collateral consequences in the collection
action if the underlying judgment is left undisturbed,
we construe the judgment to ascertain whether the
trial court made any findings regarding whether CAM
charges were properly calculated. Our review of the
judgment is plenary. See Anketell v. Kulldorff, 207 Conn.
App. 807, 821, 263 A.3d 972 (‘‘[b]ecause [t]he construc-
tion of a judgment is a question of law for the court . . .
our review . . . is plenary’’ (internal quotation marks
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omitted)), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821
(2021).
On the basis of our review of the court’s decision
on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, we
conclude that the court made no findings (and properly
so) as to whether the CAM charges at issue were prop-
erly calculated. Thus, we do not perceive any prejudicial
collateral consequences that the defendant may suffer
in the collection action as a result of the application of
collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.3 Accordingly,
because there is no practical relief that we could afford
the defendant, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the defendant’s claims on appeal. See Rocco v. Shaikh,
184 Conn. App. 786, 805–806, 196 A.3d 366 (2018);
Iacurci v. Wells, supra, 108 Conn. App. 283.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

3
We further note that, during oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
counsel expressly acknowledged that the trial court did not make any find-
ings as to whether the CAM charges at issue were properly calculated and
that the defendant would be free in the collection action to challenge the
plaintiff’s calculations.