State v. Toste

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State v. Toste

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM TOSTE
(AC 47093)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Westbrook, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of twenty-five years to life with a mandatory minimum of
twenty-five years, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion for
sentence modification. The defendant claimed that the court abused its
discretion in finding that he had failed to establish good cause to modify
his sentence. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant
failed to establish good cause to warrant a sentence modification, as the
court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors and determined
that the seriousness of the offense, the impact on the victim’s family, and
the fact that the Board of Pardons and Paroles had denied the defendant’s
applications for parole outweighed the defendant’s age, his intellectual disa-
bilities and the length of time served.

Argued January 15—officially released April 8, 2025

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury
before Callahan, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty;
thereafter, the court, Hernandez, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motion for sentence modification, and the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s
attorney, and Michael DeJoseph, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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State v. Toste

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, William Toste, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court denying his applica-
tion for a sentence modification pursuant to General
Statutes § 53a-39. On appeal, the defendant claims that
the court abused its discretion in finding that he had
failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. In 1981, the defendant was convicted
of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a
for the December 20, 1974 killing of his close friend’s
mother.1 After he fled the scene of the murder in the
victim’s stolen car, the defendant was involved in two
accidents, one of which resulted in the death of a second
person. The defendant was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of twenty-five years to life, with a manda-
tory minimum of twenty-five years.2 The defendant’s
conviction was affirmed by our Supreme Court. See
State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986).
In 2013 and 2019, the Board of Pardons and Paroles
(board) denied the defendant’s applications for parole.3
1
The defendant, who was twenty-four years old at the time, ‘‘grabbed a
knife and stabbed [the victim] in the back approximately twenty times. He
also took a longer knife, a fork and a nail file and stabbed her again repeat-
edly.’’ State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 574, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986).
2
The defendant was originally tried, convicted of, and sentenced in 1976
for the murder of the first victim and for manslaughter in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-55 for the death of the second victim resulting from the car
accident. On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect
to the murder conviction and ordered a new trial because of an erroneous
charge to the jury on an insanity defense. See State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626,
424 A.2d 293 (1979). The defendant was retried solely on the murder charge.
It is unclear whether he did not appeal from the manslaughter conviction
or whether the judgment with respect to that conviction was also reversed,
and the state chose not to pursue that charge at the new trial. The resolution
of the manslaughter charge is immaterial to our analysis.
3
At both proceedings, the victim’s advocate, on behalf of the family of
the manslaughter victim, strongly opposed any parole application. Other-
wise, there is very little information available regarding the board’s denials
of the defendant’s applications for parole.
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State v. Toste

In 2021, the defendant filed an application for the com-
mutation of his sentence, which the board also denied.
In April, 2023, the defendant filed the underlying
application for a sentence modification, seeking a
reduction of his sentence, of which he had already
served more than forty-eight years. In his memorandum
in support of his application, the defendant contended
that ‘‘good cause exists to grant the application and to
reduce his sentence to time served.’’ The defendant
claimed that his intellectual disability,4 age and physical
condition,5 rehabilitation and remorse, and purported
plan for reentry outside prison all demonstrated an
adequate showing of ‘‘good cause’’ to warrant the modi-
fication of his sentence. In June, 2023, the trial court,
Hernandez, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s appli-
cation. The court heard from the defendant’s counsel,
the defendant, the state, and the victim’s advocate. The
defendant also submitted to the court a psychological
report by Andrew W. Meisler, who had evaluated the
defendant for his application for sentence modification,
and who opined that the defendant, although exhibiting
a lower risk of recidivism and having a ‘‘reasonably
good’’ ‘‘prognosis for safe and effective management in
an assisted living facility,’’ nevertheless exhibited ‘‘poor
social judgment and impulse control’’ with very poor
insight and judgment.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
the modification. In so ruling, the court stated: ‘‘I do
not believe that any of the circumstances that have
4
Around the time of his first criminal trial, psychological testing indicated
that the defendant had an IQ between sixty-eight and seventy-one. See State
v. Toste, supra, 198 Conn. 579. A psychological evaluation performed by
Andrew W. Meisler, who was retained by the defendant in connection with
his application, found that this IQ placed him at the ‘‘intellectual level of a
child aged seven to nine.’’
5
When the application for a sentence modification was filed, the defendant
was seventy-two years old, weighed less than 150 pounds, and walked with
a cane.
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State v. Toste

been presented to me at this time rise to the level of
good cause for granting [the defendant’s] application
for sentence modification. I’ve taken into consideration
the seriousness of the offenses, the impact on the vic-
tims and the victim’s family, and quite frankly on the fact
that the [board] denied [the defendant’s] application
for release on an indeterminant sentence . . . . I am
not bound by their findings, but I do rely in part on
their assessment of [the defendant’s] suitability for
release into the community.’’ This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his application for
a sentence modification. We are not persuaded.
We begin with the standard of review and legal princi-
ples relevant to this claim. General Statutes § 53a-39
(a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘the sentencing court
or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown,
reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged,
or order the defendant discharged on probation or con-
ditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to
which the defendant could have been originally sen-
tenced.’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘Although § 53a-39 [(a)]
provides that the trial court may reduce a defendant’s
sentence ‘for good cause shown,’ the statute does not
limit the information a court may consider in determin-
ing whether a defendant has shown good cause for the
requested modification, nor does it suggest that the
court’s discretion is somehow limited.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) State v. Dupas, 291 Conn. 778, 784, 970 A.2d
102 (2009).
‘‘[I]n arriving at its sentencing determination, the sen-
tencing court may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information [it] may consider or the source from
which it may come. . . . [T]his broad discretion
applies with equal force to a sentencing court’s decision
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State v. Toste

regarding a sentence modification . . . . Accordingly,
we review a court’s judgment granting or denying a[n]
[application for a] . . . sentence [modification] for
abuse of discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion exists
when a court could have chosen different alternatives
but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate
logic, or has decided it based on improper or irrelevant
factors. . . . As such, [i]n determining whether there
has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable pre-
sumption should be given in favor of the correctness of
the court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Brelsford, 227 Conn. App. 53, 61, 319 A.3d 763,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d 142 (2024).
In the present case, the defendant claims that the
trial court abused its discretion in two ways when it
determined that he had not established good cause to
modify his sentence.6 In particular, he argues that ‘‘[t]he
The defendant spent much of his appellate briefs arguing that, because
6

the societal and legal understandings of the effect of youth and mental
disabilities on culpability have changed since the defendant was sentenced
in 1981, the trial court was required to give significant, if not dispositive,
weight to the fact that the defendant had a mental disability that gave him
the functional level of a child aged seven to nine years old. The defendant
seems to suggest that, given the doctrinal shift toward sentencing adjust-
ments for juveniles and the mentally impaired, a proper exercise of discretion
virtually required some modification to the defendant’s sentence. We are
not persuaded.
First, the defendant’s intellectual impairments and functional youth do
not render him a juvenile for purposes of the law. See Haughey v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 173 Conn. App. 559, 571, 164 A.3d 849 (‘‘[s]imply put,
an offender who has reached the age of eighteen is not considered a juvenile
for sentencing procedures and eighth amendment protections’’), cert. denied,
327 Conn. 906, 170 A.3d 1 (2017). Second, there is no indication in the
record that the trial court did not consider these factors in reaching its
determination. Indeed, the defendant’s counsel brought these factors to the
court’s attention during the hearing, stating: ‘‘I think it’s imperative to shed
light on the critical distinctions that were tragically overlooked when [the
defendant] was sentenced: his intellectual and psychiatric disabilities. And
so, when we seek compassionate justice, we recognize the profound impact
that these disabilities have on his cognitive function and acknowledge how
we have advanced as a society in the meantime in addressing the needs of
individuals like him.’’ Although the court did not expressly address this
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State v. Toste

trial court’s reliance on the [board’s] denial [of his appli-
cations for parole was] completely improper’’ and that
the board’s actions could not ‘‘justify the denial of the
pending sentence modification . . . .’’ He further
argues that the overarching goals of sentencing—deter-
rence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
no longer apply to him, given his mental impairment,
health and age, and substantial improvements7 while
imprisoned. Both arguments are unavailing.
We first address the defendant’s contention that the
trial court improperly relied on the board’s decisions
denying the defendant parole because the court had ‘‘no
information’’ as to why the board denied the defendant’s
requests for parole and because he was without counsel
at the parole hearings.8 We are not persuaded.
First, it was not improper for the trial court to con-
sider the outcome of those hearings. As we previously
argument in denying the defendant’s application, it did say that the circum-
stances presented did not constitute good cause. Thus, we presume that
the court considered counsel’s argument and Meisler’s report as part of
the circumstances it considered when determining whether to modify the
defendant’s sentence. See Brett Stone Painting & Maintenance, LLC v.
New England Bank, 143 Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d 1121 (2013) (‘‘In
Connecticut, our appellate courts do not presume error on the part of the
trial court. . . . Rather, we presume that the trial court, in rendering its
judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Consequently, we
reject the defendant’s argument.
7
The defendant’s memorandum in support of his application provided the
following: ‘‘[The defendant] has maintained employment while incarcerated
over the span of the last forty-eight years and through different institutions.
[The defendant’s] work reports comment on his reliability and trustworthi-
ness. . . . The reports show his desire to be a part of a team, to better his
surroundings . . . . While in prison he has learned the sort of social interac-
tions and courtesies necessary to live and work in society.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.)
8
As the defendant notes in his appellate brief, ‘‘[t]he record is entirely
bereft of when [the defendant] appeared before the board, for what purpose,
what evidence, if any, was presented, and what the basis was for their
decision, whatever decision that may be—commutation and/or parole appli-
cation.’’
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State v. Toste

have noted, in reaching a determination regarding sen-
tence modification, ‘‘the sentencing court may appropri-
ately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlim-
ited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider
or the source from which it may come.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn.
App. 61. We see no reason why the trial court could
not consider, as one piece of relevant information, that
the board, which, according to the court, ‘‘seem[s] to
have a real grasp on where, when, and how people are
suitable for release into the community,’’ twice decided
that the defendant should not be released on parole.
The defendant does not dispute that the board did not
grant him parole or that the court’s description of the
board’s experience in making such decisions was inac-
curate. Furthermore, this court has held that it is appro-
priate when ruling on an application for modification for
the trial court to consider, as one factor, the statutory
factors considered by the board when deciding whether
to grant parole. See State v. Brelsford, supra, 62–63
(trial court did not abuse its discretion when it consid-
ered statutory parole framework in its denial of defen-
dant’s application for modification because, ‘‘in
reviewing applications for sentence modifications of
definite sentences, [the sentencing court] performs a
function similar to that of a parole board’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Second, the record is clear that the board’s denials
of parole were just one factor the trial court considered
in reaching its determination. Indeed, the court noted
that it is ‘‘not bound by [the board’s] findings because
[the board is] not a court.’’ Although the court acknowl-
edged that it did consider the board’s denials of the
defendant’s parole applications, the record reflects that
it also considered other relevant factors, including the
‘‘seriousness of the offenses, [and] the impact on the
victims and the victim’s family.’’ See State v. Brelsford,
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State v. Toste

supra, 227 Conn. App. 63 (‘‘[t]he court’s consideration
of all of these factors was consistent with the broad
discretion afforded to courts in ruling on [applications
for] . . . sentence modification’’). Consideration of
these factors is precisely ‘‘the type of broad inquiry that
[both this court and our Supreme Court] have deemed
appropriate in sentencing determinations.’’ State v.
Dupas, supra, 291 Conn. 784. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion
when it considered, among other factors, the board’s
denials of parole.
Finally, the defendant argues that his present circum-
stances required the trial court to grant his application
for modification. We are not persuaded.
As discussed, a trial court has broad discretion when
determining whether to modify a defendant’s sentence,
and the defendant’s individual characteristics, such as
his mental impairment, health and age, and personal
development, although relevant to the court’s sentenc-
ing decision, are not determinative. In the present case,
the court had before it information regarding the defen-
dant’s past,9 his intellectual disability, his current physi-
cal condition, his remorse following the crimes, and
his counsel’s argument that, given the defendant’s age,
denying the defendant’s modification would essentially
‘‘condemn him to a de facto death sentence.’’ The court
also was presented with information regarding the
nature and severity of both the murder and the second
death the defendant caused when he fled the crime
9
‘‘[The defendant] spent time living in an orphanage and then at the
Southbury Training School growing up. During [the defendant’s] school
years he was diagnosed with an intellectual disability and severely bullied
in school because of it. He did not learn how to read or write and was
ultimately expelled from school. After being diagnosed with [an intellectual
disability], [the defendant] was transferred to Willowbrook School until he
was approximately eleven years old . . . before [Willowbrook School] was
exposed for its inhuman conditions.’’
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State v. Toste

scene in a stolen vehicle, as well as the statement of
the victim’s advocate that a family member of one of
the defendant’s victims strongly opposed the modifica-
tion to the defendant’s sentence.
The court also had the opportunity to consider Meis-
ler’s psychological report. Although Meisler opined that,
given the defendant’s age, health, and a lack of violent
behavior and disciplinary infractions for many years,
the defendant’s ‘‘risk of recidivism [was] lower than it
was even ten years ago and dramatically lower than it
was at the time of the offense,’’ Meisler also noted
that a ‘‘full behavioral and psychiatric history’’ was not
available to him when he prepared his report. Meisler’s
report also noted that the defendant exhibited poor
social judgment and impulse control, at times became
irritated with Meisler during the evaluation, and that
his ‘‘insight and judgment remain very poor.’’ Meisler’s
conclusion was that, ‘‘[a]lthough [the defendant] is
unlikely to be a danger to others, his poor social judg-
ment and impulse control could make him vulnerable
to harm from others and, as such, he would best be
served by reasonably close supervision in a residential
setting.’’
It was within the court’s discretion to weigh all of
the information before it to determine whether the
defendant established good cause to justify a modifica-
tion of his sentence. The court concluded that the cir-
cumstances the defendant presented in support of his
application did not rise to the level of good cause in
light of ‘‘the seriousness of the offenses, the impact on
the victim’s family, and . . . the fact that the board10
10
The defendant additionally asserts that the court’s ‘‘reliance on the
[board’s] ‘denial’ being manifestly erroneous, the remaining grounds enumer-
ated by the court, the seriousness of the offense and the impact on the
victims and their families’’ were unaltered since the original sentencing, such
that the trial court failed to acknowledge any changes since the defendant’s
original sentencing. Because we conclude that it was not improper for the
court to consider the board’s denial of the defendant’s application for release,
this argument necessarily fails. In addition, it is within the court’s discretion
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State v. Toste

. . . denied [the defendant’s] application for release
on an indeterminate sentence, notwithstanding the fact
that he has [served] in excess of the twenty-five year
mandatory minimum.’’ In light of the information avail-
able to the trial court, we cannot conclude that the court
abused its broad discretion in weighing the relevant
sentencing factors. See State v. Reyes, 229 Conn. App.
121, 128, 326 A.3d 589 (‘‘[t]he court’s weighing of factors
is consistent with the broad discretion afforded to it in
ruling on a[n] [application] . . . for sentence modifica-
tion’’), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 934, 327 A.3d 385 (2024);
State v. Martin G., 222 Conn. App. 395, 406, 305 A.3d
324 (2023) (‘‘the court conducted an appropriate review
of the information before it and determined that the
gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and its continuing
effect on the victim and her family, outweighed the
rehabilitative efforts he has undertaken since his incar-
ceration’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 944, 308 A.3d 34
(2024).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

to determine the weight to attach to each sentencing factor. See State v.
Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63.