In re Elena M.

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In re Elena M.

IN RE ELENA M.*
(AC 47618)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Cradle, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights as to his minor child. He claimed, inter alia, that the
court violated his constitutional right to procedural due process by denying
his oral motion for a continuance during the trial on the petition to terminate
his parental rights filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families. Held:

The respondent father’s claims on appeal were not moot, as the trial court
relied on the prior neglect adjudication to conclude that the petitioner had
established the adjudicatory grounds for termination set forth in the statute
(§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (E)), both subparagraphs of which required a
finding of neglect, and, if this court were to agree with the respondent, then
the trial court’s reliance on either adjudicatory ground at issue would be
undermined, thereby resulting in practical relief to the respondent.

The trial court did not violate the respondent father’s constitutional right
to procedural due process in denying his motion for a continuance, this court
having concluded, after balancing the three factors set forth in Mathews
v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319) to determine if the denial rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair, that the respondent’s claim failed under the third
prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233).

This court concluded that the respondent father’s claim, in the alternative,
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continu-
ance, was unavailing, as the trial court correctly concluded that a continu-
ance would have served no useful purpose and, even if this court were to
assume that the trial court abused its discretion, any error was harmless.

Argued October 15, 2024—officially released April 21, 2025***

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
*** April 21, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Elena M.

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New London, Juvenile
Matters at Waterford, where the petition was withdrawn
as to the respondent Joshua M.; thereafter Christopher
W. was cited in as a respondent; subsequently, the mat-
ter was tried to the court, Hoffman, J.; judgment termi-
nating the respondents’ parental rights; thereafter, the
court, Hoffman, J., granted a joint motion to open and
vacate the judgment of termination as to the respondent
father filed by the petitioner and the respondent father;
subsequently, the petitioner withdrew the petition to
terminate the respondent father’s parental rights; there-
after, the petitioner filed a new petition to terminate
the respondent father’s parental rights with respect to
his minor child; subsequently, the matter was tried to
the court, Hon. John C. Driscoll, judge trial referee;
judgment terminating the respondent father’s parental
rights, from which the respondent father appealed to
this court. Affirmed.

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The respondent father, Christopher W.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating his parental rights as to his
minor child, Elena M., on the ground that he failed to
achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation pursuant
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In re Elena M.

to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (E).1
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1)
violated his constitutional right to procedural due pro-
cess2 by denying his oral motion for a continuance dur-
ing the trial on the operative petition to terminate his
parental rights, or (2) in the alternative, the court
abused its discretion in denying the motion. We con-
clude that, in denying the motion for a continuance,
the court did not (1) violate the respondent’s right to
due process or (2) abuse its discretion. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court or as
were undisputed in the record, and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In Decem-
ber, 2020, Elena was born to Dianna L. At the time of
1
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-
717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families
has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b . . .
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent
of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return
of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . .
[or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected,
abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such
degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within
a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and
such parent’s parental rights of another child were previously terminated
pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies . . . .’’
2
The respondent does not specify whether his due process claim is raised
pursuant to the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution.
Therefore, we treat the respondent’s claim as limited to the United States
constitution. See State v. Alvarez, 257 Conn. 782, 796 n.10, 778 A.2d 938
(2001).
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In re Elena M.

Elena’s birth, Dianna L. also had two older children,
one of whom, Q, was the child of the respondent. Joshua
M., the father of Elena’s oldest half sibling, O, initially
was believed to be the father of Elena.
On December 30, 2020, the petitioner invoked a
ninety-six hour hold on Elena. On December 31, 2020,
the petitioner filed a neglect petition and obtained an
ex parte order of temporary custody of Elena, which
was sustained by the trial court, Hoffman, J., on Janu-
ary 8, 2021. On February 4, 2021, the court adjudicated
Elena neglected and committed her to the care and
custody of the petitioner.
On February 5, 2021, the petitioner filed a petition
to terminate the parental rights of Dianna L. and Joshua
M. as to Elena. In October, 2021, while this termination
petition was pending, Elena’s attorney moved for a
paternity test of the respondent, which the court
granted. On December 28, 2021, Joshua M. was removed
from the termination petition after the paternity test
results were put into the record. The issue of paternity
adjudication was continued, as Elena’s mother and the
respondent were not present in court when the pater-
nity results were entered into the record, and, on Janu-
ary 27, 2022, the court adjudicated the respondent to
be Elena’s biological father. On February 14, 2022, the
respondent was cited into the termination petition.
On May 13, 2022, following a trial in which the respon-
dent participated, the court terminated the respondent’s
parental rights as to Elena.3 On September 19, 2022, the
respondent and the petitioner filed a joint motion to
open and to vacate the judgment of termination as to
Elena on the basis that the respondent had not been
3
Dianna L. consented to the termination of her parental rights on January
24, 2022, and her parental rights were terminated on May 13, 2022.
In addition, the record reflects that the respondent’s parental rights as
to Q were terminated in May, 2022.
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provided with specific steps to facilitate the return of
Elena to the respondent pursuant to General Statutes
§ 46b-129 (b). See also General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) (ii). On October 5, 2022, the court granted the
joint motion and reappointed counsel for the respon-
dent. The same day, the petitioner withdrew the petition
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.4 There-
after, on October 20, 2022, court-ordered specific steps
were issued to the respondent.
On April 27, 2023, the petitioner filed a motion to
review and to approve a permanency plan of termina-
tion of the respondent’s parental rights and adoption.
On May 26, 2023, the respondent filed an objection to
the permanency plan and moved to revoke the order
of commitment issued by the court on February 4, 2021,
and to transfer legal guardianship of Elena to her pater-
nal aunt.
On June 16, 2023, the petitioner filed a new petition
to terminate the parental rights of the respondent on
the grounds set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (E)
(operative petition). A trial on the operative petition
occurred on October 19, 2023. The respondent appeared
and was represented by counsel. One witness, a Depart-
ment of Children and Families social worker, testified,
and several exhibits were admitted into the record.
During trial, the court, Hon. John C. Driscoll, judge
trial referee, raised, sua sponte, the question of whether
the respondent’s absence during the proceedings in
which Elena was adjudicated neglected had any bearing
on the trial on the operative petition. The court took a
brief recess to allow the respondent to speak with his
counsel. Following this recess, counsel for the respon-
dent argued that both grounds for termination of paren-
tal rights raised by the petitioner, found in § 17a-112 (j)
4
The respondent had appealed from the judgment of termination as to
Elena on the basis of the petitioner’s failure to provide him with specific
steps. The respondent withdrew the appeal on October 7, 2022.
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(3) (B) (i) and (E), required a determination of neglect,
and because the respondent was not a part of the
neglect adjudication proceedings, counsel objected to
continuing with the trial on that day. Elena’s counsel
orally moved to cite the respondent into the neglect
petition, and the petitioner requested additional time
to decide whether to join that motion. Additionally, the
petitioner’s counsel represented that the petitioner was
seeking to amend the operative petition. At approxi-
mately 12:51 p.m., the court took a lunch recess and
invited the parties to locate any case law pertinent to the
issue concerning the implications of the respondent’s
absence from the neglect proceedings.
The court resumed the proceeding at approximately
2:23 p.m. The petitioner’s counsel notified the court
that, rather than amending the operative petition, the
petitioner intended to proceed on the grounds for termi-
nation as pleaded in the operative petition, and Elena’s
counsel ‘‘yield[ed]’’ to the petitioner. Whereupon the
respondent’s counsel orally moved for a continuance
of unspecified duration, stating that, ‘‘because of the
stance of the case as it is right now, I need more time
to reevaluate [the respondent’s] position . . . .’’ The
respondent’s counsel later added: ‘‘I think [the issue
before the court is] a huge issue, and [the respondent]
deserves the ability to talk to me to discuss . . . what
we need to do at the . . . trial to address this particular
issue because it is an issue.’’ Elena’s counsel objected
to the motion for the continuance, arguing that the
petitioner had not amended the operative petition and
Elena was ‘‘deserving of permanency.’’ The petitioner’s
counsel did not object to the motion for the continuance
but argued that ‘‘there’s no need for [the petitioner] to
cite the [respondent] into a petition that was already
disposed of. If the [respondent] wanted to challenge the
neglect adjudication, he should have moved to open the
judgment within four months. If he didn’t, he could’ve
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In re Elena M.

moved to do a motion to revoke, which we have in this
case. We have a motion to revoke and transfer guardian-
ship to the aunt, which was not pursued for today’s
trial. . . . [T]he [neglect] adjudication goes to [Elena],
and all the [petitioner] has to prove with that is that
[Elena] was adjudicated neglected, which she was. . . .
[T]he [petitioner] doesn’t have to prove that the [neglect]
adjudication goes to the [respondent].’’
After hearing argument from counsel, the court
denied the respondent’s motion for a continuance. At
the outset, the court noted that, notwithstanding the
respondent’s involvement in the prior proceedings that
resulted in the May 13, 2022 judgment of termination
as to Elena, as well as in simultaneous termination
proceedings concerning Q, as to whom the respondent’s
parental rights were terminated, ‘‘[a]t no time . . . was
there [a] representation that [the respondent] had a
right to [a] neglect adjudication or adjudicatory hear-
ing’’ with regard to Elena. The court then relied on In
re Zoey H., 183 Conn. App. 327, 192 A.3d 522, cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 906, 192 A.3d 425 (2018), and In re
Ja’Maire M., 201 Conn. App. 498, 242 A.3d 747 (2020),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 911, 244 A.3d 563 (2021), in
concluding that the respondent’s ‘‘due process rights
have not been invalidated by the prior [neglect] adjudi-
cation. It was as to the status of [Elena], without regard
to his not being in the picture at the time, and so . . .
[that adjudication] stand[s]. We’re not going to permit
a collateral attack on it and say that [the respondent]
has a right to have an independent hearing now to
determine whether or not [Elena] should’ve been adju-
dicated as to him. Noting as well, that as I said, [the
respondent] was appointed counsel and his counsel
assumed that he was in the neglect case and made
filings, motions, and objections in the neglect case. . . .
[T]hrough counsel he was given his permanency plan.
He objected to it. He was given a hearing on it before
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Judge Hoffman and the matter was—at least the perma-
nency plan itself, the issue of the appropriate plan—
was consolidated with this trial. So, I see no need for
a continuance, and I see no need for an independent
adjudication.’’ The trial proceeded and concluded on
that same day.
On February 8, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision terminating the respondent’s parental rights
and appointing the petitioner as Elena’s statutory par-
ent. The court determined in relevant part that the peti-
tioner had demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence that (1) Elena had been adjudicated neglected
on February 4, 2021, (2) the Department of Children
and Families had made reasonable efforts to locate the
respondent and to reunify him with Elena, and (3) the
respondent had failed to rehabilitate sufficiently under
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (E). Further, the court con-
cluded that termination of the respondent’s parental
rights was in Elena’s best interest. This appeal fol-
lowed.5 Additional facts and procedural history will be
provided as necessary.
At the outset, we set forth the following relevant legal
principles. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights
are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision],
a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights
consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the
dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the
trial court must determine whether one or more of the
. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth
in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing
evidence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to termi-
nate those rights, must allege and prove one or more
of the statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-
112 (j) carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in
5
Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, Elena’s counsel filed a statement
adopting the petitioner’s appellate brief.
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In re Elena M.

the judgment of the legislature, constitute countervail-
ing interests sufficiently powerful to justify the termina-
tion of parental rights in the absence of consent. . . .
Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his
or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must
be strictly complied with before termination can be
accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. . . .
‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground
for termination exists, then it proceeds to the disposi-
tional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial
court must determine whether termination is in the best
interests of the child. . . . The best interest determina-
tion also must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. . . .
‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
the child. . . . In the dispositional phase . . . the trial
court must determine whether it is established by clear
and convincing evidence that the continuation of the
[respondent’s] parental rights is not in the best interest
of the child.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Gabriella M., 221 Conn. App. 827,
831–33, 303 A.3d 319, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 925, 304
A.3d 443 (2023).
I
Before turning to the merits of the respondent’s
claims on appeal, we preliminarily address the petition-
er’s argument that the respondent’s claims are moot.
The petitioner contends that, ‘‘[a]ssuming [the respon-
dent’s] claims relate to the trial court’s . . . finding
[pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)], there is no practi-
cal relief that this court can afford [the respondent]’’
because proof of the separate ground, § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(E), would be sufficient to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights. The respondent argues that his claims
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on appeal implicate both of these grounds for termina-
tion on which the court relied in terminating his parental
rights, such that this appeal is not moot. We agree with
the respondent.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . The
fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doc-
trine are well settled. We begin with the four part test
for justiciability . . . . Because courts are established
to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed con-
troversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must
be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be
an actual controversy between or among the parties to
the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be
adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be
capable of being adjudicated by the judicial power . . .
and (4) that the determination of the controversy will
result in practical relief to the complainant. . . .
‘‘[I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide
moot questions, disconnected from the granting of
actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow. . . . In determining moot-
ness, the dispositive question is whether a successful
appeal would benefit the [parties] in any way.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, 204 Conn.
App. 571, 575–76, 254 A.3d 358, cert. denied, 336 Conn.
951, 251 A.3d 617 (2021).
In its decision terminating the respondent’s parental
rights, the court relied on the prior neglect adjudication
of February 4, 2021, to conclude that the petitioner had
established the adjudicatory grounds set forth in § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (E),6 both of which required a
6
The petitioner maintains that the court’s decision is ambiguous as to
whether the court relied on the prior neglect adjudication in concluding that
the adjudicatory ground of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E) was satisfied. We disagree.
Although the court did not make a separate finding of neglect during the
trial on the operative petition, it acknowledged that Elena had been found
neglected in a prior proceeding.
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In re Elena M.

finding of neglect. The crux of the respondent’s claims
7

on appeal is that the court erred in denying him a contin-
uance of the termination trial to provide him with addi-
tional time to develop an argument concerning his
absence from the neglect proceedings that resulted in
the prior neglect adjudication upon which the court
relied in rendering the judgment of termination. If we
were to agree with the respondent, then the court’s
reliance on either adjudicatory ground at issue would
be undermined, thereby resulting in practical relief to
the respondent. The petitioner’s assertion—that, even
if we were to accept the respondent’s arguments on
appeal, the court’s finding with regard to the adjudica-
tory ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E) would still
stand—is unavailing. We therefore conclude that the
respondent’s claims on appeal are not moot.
II
We now turn to the respondent’s first claim on appeal.
The respondent claims that the trial court violated his
constitutional right to procedural due process in deny-
ing his motion for a continuance during the trial on the
operative petition. We disagree.
Before addressing the merits of the respondent’s first
claim, we set forth the following relevant legal princi-
ples. The respondent concedes that he did not raise his
constitutional claim before the trial court, and, there-
fore, he seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
Under Golding review, ‘‘a [respondent] can prevail on
a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
7
As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i),
the trial court may grant a petition for termination only if there was a finding
of neglect in a prior proceeding, whereas pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(E), the petitioner may seek a simultaneous adjudication of neglect and a
judgment terminating parental rights.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Jayce
O., 323 Conn. 690, 712, 150 A.3d 640 (2016).
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In re Elena M.

only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the [respondent] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to
harmless error analysis, the [petitioner] has failed to
demonstrate harmlessness [of the alleged constitutional
violation] beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]he
inability to meet any one prong requires a determination
that the [respondent’s] claim must fail. . . . The appel-
late tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the [respon-
dent’s] claim by focusing on whichever condition is
most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290, 306, 324 A.3d 211,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325 A.3d 217 (2024). ‘‘The
first two [prongs of Golding] involve a determination
of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two . . .
involve a determination of whether the [respondent]
may prevail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Skye B., 230 Conn. App. 725, 737, 331 A.3d 769 (2025).
The respondent argues that the court violated his
constitutional right to due process when his motion for
a continuance was denied because the court’s denial
‘‘prevented [him] from raising arguments relevant to an
accurate determination of the questions of law raised
by the trial court . . . .’’ The respondent contends that
his unpreserved claim satisfies all four prongs of Gold-
ing. The petitioner agrees that the first two Golding
prongs have been satisfied, but she argues that the
respondent’s unpreserved claim fails on the third and
fourth prongs of Golding because there was no constitu-
tional violation and any violation was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
We agree with the parties that the first two Golding
prongs have been satisfied, and, therefore, the respon-
dent’s unpreserved claim is reviewable. As to the first
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In re Elena M.

prong, the record demonstrates that the respondent
moved for a continuance during trial, the reasons for
such motion were stated by his counsel, and the court’s
denial of the continuance, as well as the reasons sup-
porting the denial, were stated on the record. As to the
second prong, the respondent’s constitutional right to
due process in the custody and care of his child was
implicated. See In re Lukas K., 120 Conn. App. 465,
473, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff’d, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d
990 (2011). The respondent’s claim, however, fails to
satisfy the third prong of Golding, as we conclude that
there was no violation of the respondent’s right to due
process.
Whether a due process violation occurred when the
motion for a continuance was denied requires this court
to apply the three-pronged test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed.
2d 18 (1976). See In re Matthew P., 153 Conn. App. 667,
675, 102 A.3d 1127, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104
A.3d 106 (2014); see also In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.
App. 592, 604–605, 767 A.2d 155 (2001) (‘‘[c]ourts ana-
lyze termination of parental rights cases involving pro-
cedural due process claims using the test articulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge, [supra, 335], rather than using
an abuse of discretion standard’’). ‘‘The three factors
[from Mathews] to be considered are (1) the private
interest that will be affected by the state action, (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest given
the existing procedures, and the value of any additional
or alternate procedural safeguards, and (3) the govern-
ment’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative
burdens attendant to increased or substitute procedural
requirements. . . . The bottom-line question is
whether the denial rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair in view of the Mathews factors.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) In re Shaquanna M., supra, 606. We review consti-
tutional claims de novo. Id., 600.
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As to the first factor, ‘‘the private interest that will
be affected by the state action’’; id., 606; we agree with
the respondent that his private interest in retaining his
parental rights as to Elena is substantial and weighs in
his favor. See, e.g., In re Zoey H., supra, 183 Conn. App.
341 (in analyzing first factor from Mathews, this court
held that respondent’s ‘‘private interest in directing the
care and custody of his biological child is substantial’’);
In re Matthew P., supra, 153 Conn. App. 676 (‘‘It is
axiomatic that the respondent has a constitutionally
protected interest in [his] parental rights. . . . Because
a petition to terminate parental rights threatens this
fundamental interest, the first Mathews factor weighs
in favor of the respondent.’’ (Citations omitted.)).
As to the second factor, we are not persuaded that
the court’s denial of the respondent’s motion for a con-
tinuance created a substantial ‘‘risk of an erroneous
deprivation’’ of the respondent’s private interest, nor
that granting the continuance would have been a valu-
able additional procedural safeguard for the respon-
dent. See In re Zoey H., supra, 183 Conn. App. 341.
This court’s decision in In re Ja’Maire M., supra, 201
Conn. App. 498, is controlling here. In that case, the
respondent father appealed from the judgment of the
trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to
his child. Id., 499. ‘‘On appeal, the respondent claim[ed]
that, in terminating his parental rights, the trial court
improperly relied on a finding that the child was
neglected, which was made at a previous proceeding
at which the respondent was not present’’ and at a time
when his paternity had not yet been established. Id.,
499–500. This court held that ‘‘a parent who is absent
from neglect proceedings is not denied due process
when his or her parentage of the child is not yet known.’’
Id., 508. The court explained that ‘‘[a] finding that a
child is neglected is not a finding of fault against the
parent but a fact relating to the status of the child. See
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In re T.K., 105 Conn. App. 502, 505–506, 939 A.2d 9,
cert. denied, 286 Conn. 914, 945 A.2d 976 (2008) ([A]n
adjudication of neglect relates to the status of the child
. . . . Although § 46b-129 requires both parents to be
named in the petition, the adjudication of neglect is not
a judgment that runs against a person or persons so
named in the petition; [i]t is not directed against them
as parents, but rather is a finding that the children are
neglected . . . .); see also In re Zamora S., 123 Conn.
App. 103, 110, 998 A.2d 1279 (2010) ([a] neglect petition
is sui generis and, unlike a complaint and answer in
the usual civil case, does not lead to a judgment for or
against the parties named . . .); In re David L., 54
Conn. App. 185, 193, 733 A.2d 897 (1999) ([t]he statutes
and rules of practice . . . do not afford a parent in a
neglect proceeding the right to require the trial court
to adjudge each parent’s blameworthiness for a child’s
neglect).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Ja’Maire M., supra, 508. Therefore, the respondent’s
due process claim on appeal was deemed ‘‘an impermis-
sible collateral attack on the validly rendered neglect
judgment . . . .’’ Id., 505. We reach the same conclu-
sion here.
As previously stated, the respondent’s private interest
at stake was retaining his parental rights as to Elena.
The denial of the motion for a continuance, however,
did not risk the erroneous deprivation of this right.
Neither in his appellate briefs nor during oral argument
before this court did the respondent identify a success-
ful argument that could have been made regarding his
absence from the proceedings leading to the neglect
adjudication had the motion for a continuance been
granted. Indeed, the respondent’s circumstances are
substantially similar to those of the respondent father
in In re Ja’Maire M., as his parentage was unknown at
the time of the neglect adjudication. See id., 505–508.
Additionally, as this court in In re Ja’Maire M. iterated,
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a neglect adjudication concerns the status of the child
and does not establish fault against a parent. Id., 508.
The respondent attempts to distinguish this case from
In re Ja’Maire M. by stating that, ‘‘under the circum-
stances present in In re Ja’Maire M., the [father’s]
absence from the neglect proceeding did not deprive
him of any due process, because the [petitioner] subse-
quently joined him to the proceedings and the court
advised him of the avenues available to him to challenge
the judgment,’’ whereas here, ‘‘[t]he respondent was
never advised by the trial court that he had the ability
to challenge these rulings.’’ The respondent’s argument,
however, is unavailing. Although the court in In re
Ja’Maire M. mentioned that the respondent father in
that case was advised of the dispositional avenues avail-
able to him; In re Ja’Maire M., supra, 201 Conn. App.
511; our reading of the case in the totality does not lead
us to the conclusion that an advisement of the ‘‘variety
of ways’’ the respondent could have challenged the
neglect adjudication was deemed necessary to protect
the respondent father’s due process rights.
The respondent also attempts to distinguish this case
from In re Ja’Maire M. by citing the fact that, in the
present case, he ‘‘was not joined [until] almost a year
after the neglect determination. The time for filing a
motion to open had passed. The time to appeal the
neglect determination had passed.’’ In contrast, the
respondent posits, the respondent father in In re
Ja’Maire M. was joined into the case before the statu-
tory four month period for opening the judgment had
expired. This argument, however, ignores the fact that
the respondent could have moved to open the neglect
judgment, despite the four month limitation set forth
in General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 52-212a,8 pursuant
8
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 52-212a provides in relevant part:
‘‘Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the
court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in
the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open
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to the common-law exception of mutual mistake, if he
had a good faith basis for doing so. See In re Jonathan
M., 255 Conn. 208, 238, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (recognizing
that, at common law, ‘‘even a judgment rendered by
the court . . . can subsequently be opened [after the
statutory four month limitation] . . . if it is shown that
. . . the judgment, was obtained . . . because of
mutual mistake’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also In re Santiago G., 318 Conn. 449, 475, 121 A.3d
708 (2015) (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to
open adjudication of neglect following trial on motion
to open because movant could not demonstrate that
adjudication of neglect was based on factual mistake);
In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 283, 618 A.2d 1
(1992) (holding that ‘‘[c]ourts have intrinsic powers,
independent of statutory provisions authorizing the
opening of judgments, to vacate any judgment obtained
by fraud, duress or mutual mistake’’).
Moreover, a respondent may also file a motion to
revoke commitment of his child, even when parentage
is established after a neglect adjudication is made and
the attendant appeal period has expired. See In re
Ja’Maire M., supra, 201 Conn. App. 511. Indeed, in the
present case, before the petitioner had filed the opera-
tive petition, the respondent moved to revoke the Feb-
ruary 4, 2021 commitment order, which motion the
respondent did not pursue at trial. In short, after being
cited into the present case in February, 2022, the respon-
dent had procedural mechanisms by which he could
have challenged the neglect adjudication, and he chose
not to pursue those options.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court
did not create a risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
respondent’s rights to the care and custody of Elena,
or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was
rendered or passed. . . .’’
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and granting the continuance would not have been a
valuable additional procedural safeguard. See In re
Zoey H., supra, 183 Conn. App. 341. Additional time to
formulate argument would not have yielded any basis
for the respondent to challenge the neglect adjudica-
tion. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of the
petitioner.

Lastly, as to the third factor of the Mathews test, ‘‘the
government’s interest, including the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens attendant to increased or substitute pro-
cedural requirements’’; (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) id., 336; we conclude that the government’s interest
in the court granting the respondent’s motion for a
continuance is low and a continuance would have
imposed greater fiscal and administrative burdens on
the court and the parties. ‘‘[T]he government’s interest
in [a] termination proceeding . . . is twofold. First, the
state has a fiscal and administrative interest in lessening
the cost involved in termination proceedings. . . . Sec-
ond, as parens patriae, the state is also interested in
the accurate and speedy resolution of termination litiga-
tion in order to promote the welfare of the affected
child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mat-
thew P., supra, 153 Conn. App. 679. A continuance in
the present case would have caused greater fiscal and
administrative burdens on both the court system and
the parties, as the trial on the operative petition would
have been extended, despite the fact that the parties
were present and ready to proceed with trial on the
day the respondent moved for the continuance. See id.,
680 (‘‘[T]he state has a fiscal and administrative interest
in lessening the cost involved in termination proceed-
ings. . . . In light of the fact that all party representa-
tives and the petitioner’s witnesses were present on
the first day of trial, we conclude that delaying the
proceeding by granting the continuance would have
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In re Elena M.

resulted in the very economic and administrative bur-
dens on resources considered by this prong.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Moreover, the government’s interest would have been
adversely impacted by a continuance due to the nature
of this proceeding, namely, the termination of parental
rights with respect to a child. As the respondent con-
cedes, it is in the government’s interest, as parens
patriae, to resolve this case as expeditiously as possible,
as the well-being of Elena is left in limbo by ongoing
proceedings. See In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557,
565, 613 A.2d 780 (1992) (recognizing that ‘‘state has a
vital interest in expediting the termination proceedings
and that that interest would be adversely affected by
any delay’’). Therefore, the third Mathews factor weighs
against the respondent and in favor of the petitioner.
In sum, in balancing the three Mathews factors, we
conclude that the respondent has failed to demonstrate
that an ‘‘alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and
. . . deprived the [respondent] of a fair trial . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alexis, 194
Conn. App. 162, 173, 220 A.3d 38, cert. denied, 334 Conn.
904, 219 A.3d 800 (2019). Therefore, the respondent’s
claim fails under Golding’s third prong.
III
The respondent next claims, in the alternative, that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
respondent’s motion for a continuance. In connection
with this claim, the respondent contends that ‘‘[t]he
failure to grant an extension under [the] circumstances
was unreasonable and arbitrary’’ because (1) he was
not seeking a lengthy continuance, (2) the impact of
the delay would have been negligible, (3) the motion
for a continuance was made for a legitimate reason,
and (4) the denial of the motion impacted his ability to
mount a defense. The respondent also claims that he
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In re Elena M.

was harmed by the denial of the motion. We conclude
that the respondent has demonstrated neither an abuse
of the court’s discretion nor harm.
‘‘A reviewing court ordinarily analyzes a denial of a
continuance in terms of whether the court has abused
its discretion. . . . This is so where the denial is not
directly linked to a specific constitutional right.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.) In re Shaquanna M., supra, 61 Conn.
App. 601. ‘‘Discretion involves a choice by a court to
do or not to do something that one cannot demand as
an absolute right. Courts exercise discretion in cases
where impartial minds could hesitate, which exercise
usually entails a balancing of the relative gravity of the
factors involved. . . . An abuse of discretion exists
when a court could have chosen different alternatives
but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate
logic, or has decided it based on improper or irrelevant
factors.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 603. Such a standard
‘‘affords the trial court broad discretion in matters of
continuances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua, 201 Conn. App. 261, 268, 242
A.3d 542 (2020).
Our Supreme Court has ‘‘articulated a number of
factors that appropriately may enter into an appellate
court’s review of a trial court’s exercise of its discretion
in denying a motion for a continuance. Although resis-
tant to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around
the circumstances before the trial court at the time it
rendered its decision, including: ‘the timeliness of the
request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;
the age and complexity of the case; the granting of
other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on
the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;
the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in
support of the request; [and] the [respondent’s] per-
sonal responsibility for the timing of the request . . . .’
State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 240, 636 A.2d 760
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In re Elena M.

(1994). ‘In the event that the trial court acted unreason-
ably in denying a continuance, the reviewing court must
also engage in harmless error analysis.’ Id., 242.’’ State
v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 801–802, 835 A.2d 977 (2003).
In State v. Hamilton, supra, 242, our Supreme Court
‘‘clarif[ied] that an appellate court should limit its
assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s
exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those
factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial
court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of
its ruling on the motion for a continuance.’’
Mindful of these principles, we turn to the respon-
dent’s contention that the court abused its discretion
in denying the motion for a continuance and harmed
the respondent by doing so. First, considering those
previously enumerated factors that were presented to
the court, or of which the court was aware, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion. Concerning
the timeliness of the request for a continuance, it is
significant that twenty months had passed from the time
the respondent was cited into the termination petition,
which gave him ample time to question, on his own,
the applicability of the court’s prior neglect finding.
During that period, he did not do so, while having partic-
ipated in the first termination trial in May, 2022.
With regard to the likely length of a delay, it is notable
that the respondent’s motion was for a continuance of
unspecified duration. ‘‘ ‘This court and our Supreme
Court have upheld denials of requests for continuances
when they are sought for indefinite durations. See, e.g.,
State v. Gordon, 197 Conn. 413, 424A–C, 504 A.2d 1020
(1985); State v. Mendez, [45 Conn. App. 282, 285–86,
696 A.2d 352 (1997)].’ State v. Wright, 70 Conn. App.
807, 821, 800 A.2d 1218, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 930,
806 A.2d 1070 (2002).’’ State v. Wilcox, 105 Conn. App.
24, 34, 936 A.2d 295 (2007), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 909,
944 A.2d 981 (2008); see also State v. Hamilton, supra,
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228 Conn. 247–48 (‘‘It is significant, however, that the
defendant asked for a continuance of unspecified dura-
tion, and, as the trial court found, made no showing of
his then present ability to retain new counsel. . . .
Having given the defendant the opportunity to buttress
his claim that retained counsel was available to under-
take his defense, the court did not abuse its discretion
in thereafter denying the defendant’s request for a con-
tinuance of indefinite duration for a further exploration
into the possibility of obtaining retained counsel.’’
(Emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted.)); State v. Wil-
cox, supra, 33–34 (‘‘Under the circumstances, and with
due regard for broad leeway possessed by trial courts
to grant or to deny continuances, it cannot be said that
the panel abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff
in error’s request for a continuance. . . . A continu-
ance likely was to be of indefinite duration because the
plaintiff in error sought a continuance until his federal
habeas petition was decided at some unspecified date
in the future and furthermore did not indicate whether
he would abide by the District Court’s ruling.’’ (Foot-
note omitted.)).
Perhaps most importantly, with regard to the legiti-
macy of the reasons proffered in support of the
motion—the factor on which the trial court placed the
greatest weight—the court correctly concluded that a
continuance would have served no useful purpose.
Even on appeal, the respondent has not identified how
additional time to research the applicability of the prior
neglect finding would have yielded a different outcome.
Second, even if we were to assume that the court abused
its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance,
any error was harmless. See Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi,
193 Conn. App. 137, 170, 219 A.3d 400 (2019) (‘‘even if
the court did abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
a continuance for the presentation of . . . testimony,
any error was harmless’’), aff’d, 337 Conn. 228, 253 A.3d
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1 (2020). In support of his contention that the court’s
ruling was harmful, the respondent argues that his ‘‘trial
counsel [could not] be expected to react in real time
to multiple and contradictory arguments from the trial
court itself, to multiple requests to amend the operative
petition . . . and to the emergence of a thorny legal
issue that required careful deliberation. The failure of
the trial court to grant the respondent’s request for a
continuance led to a fundamentally unfair trial.’’ The
respondent’s vague assertions that the denial led to a
fundamentally unfair trial, ‘‘prevented the trial court
from hearing complete, informed, and robust argument
on the issues raised,’’ and ‘‘impacted the respondent’s
ability to mount a defense’’ do not identify any actual
harm that occurred on the basis of the denial. In fact,
during oral argument before this court, the respondent’s
counsel again failed to identify a successful route the
respondent could have taken regarding the underlying
challenge to the neglect adjudication. Despite counsel’s
cursory statement during oral argument that the respon-
dent would have succeeded if he had time to make the
arguments proffered in his brief on appeal, such an
argument is unfounded on the basis of this court’s prec-
edent, including In re Ja’Maire M. See In re Ja’Maire
M., supra, 201 Conn. App. 508 (‘‘a parent who is absent
from neglect proceedings is not denied due process
when his or her parentage of the child is not yet
known’’).
In sum, we conclude that this claim fails on the inde-
pendent grounds that the respondent has demonstrated
neither an abuse of the court’s discretion nor harm.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.