In re Zakari W.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

IN RE ZAKARI W.*
(AC 48030)
Moll, Clark and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court termi-
nating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother
claimed that the court erred in concluding that she failed to achieve a
sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of the statute
(§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)). Held:

The trial court properly concluded that the respondent mother failed to
achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation such that, within a reasonable
time and considering the age and needs of the minor child, she could assume
a responsible position in his life, as the evidence adduced at trial, including
evidence of the mother’s repeated, ongoing failure to comply with her spe-
cific steps and her refusal to cooperate with the Department of Children
and Families, was sufficient to support the court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence as required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).
Argued March 19—officially released June 6, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Conway,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** June 6, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
In re Zakari W.

rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
Emily Barigye, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The respondent mother, Tali B., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating her parental rights as to her minor
child, Zakari W. (Zakari).1 The respondent claims that
the court erred in concluding that she failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the
meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court or as
are undisputed in the record, and procedural history,
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Zakari was
born in December, 2022, to the respondent and Zion
W. (Zion). Zakari was born premature at thirty-three
weeks and, as a result, needed assistance with breathing
and feeding. Zakari spent twenty-four days hospitalized
following his birth before being discharged.
The Department of Children and Families (depart-
ment) first became involved with the family on the day
of Zakari’s birth after receiving a referral from staff at
the hospital where he was born, which reported that
1
The parental rights of Zakari’s father, Zion W., were also terminated in
the proceeding underlying this appeal, but he is not a party to this appeal.
Accordingly, we refer to Zakari’s mother as the respondent and to Zakari’s
father by his first name.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

the respondent and Zion lacked stable and appropriate
housing. Within one day of Zakari’s birth, Kristine Flo-
rio, an investigative social worker for the department,
attempted to meet with the respondent and Zion at the
hospital. The respondent told Florio that she was not
in a position to speak with her because she first needed
to speak with Zion, who was asleep in the hospital
room. Over the next few weeks, Florio had difficulty
maintaining communication with the respondent; she
had one brief telephone conversation with the respon-
dent and communicated with her via text message
approximately two or three times per week, but was
unable to arrange an in-person meeting despite repeated
attempts. In the telephone and text message communi-
cations, the respondent acknowledged that she lacked
appropriate housing and indicated that she would like
Zakari placed with a friend of her family upon discharge
from the hospital. On or about December 27, 2022, Flo-
rio attempted to contact the respondent to discuss a
plan for Zakari’s discharge from the hospital but received
no response.
Upon Zakari’s discharge from the hospital, the peti-
tioner filed a neglect petition and obtained an ex parte
order of temporary custody that same day, and Zakari
was placed in fictive kin2 foster care with a friend of
the respondent’s godmother. On January 6, 2023, the
respondent and Zion failed to appear at the hearing on
the preliminary order of temporary custody, and the
court, Conway, J., sustained the order of temporary
custody. The respondent and Zion also failed to appear
at the plea hearing on the neglect petition on February
14, 2023, and the court, Conway, J., entered a default
2
General Statutes § 17a-114 (a) (3) provides that ‘‘ ‘fictive kin caregiver’
means a person who is twenty-one years of age or older and who is unrelated
to a child by birth, adoption or marriage but who has an emotionally signifi-
cant relationship with such child or such child’s family amounting to a
familial relationship.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
In re Zakari W.

judgment and committed Zakari to the custody of the
petitioner. On the same day, the court ordered specific
steps to facilitate reunification, which required the
respondent, inter alia, to keep all appointments set by
the department and cooperate with all home visits, to
let the department know where she resided and inform
the department of any changes to her contact informa-
tion, to participate in counseling, to submit to a sub-
stance abuse evaluation and follow any recommended
treatment, to obtain and maintain adequate housing and
a legal income, to visit Zakari as often as permitted,
and to cooperate with service providers recommended
by the department.
Kelly Thibault, a social worker for the department,
took over the respondent’s case on or about January
27, 2023. The trial court found that ‘‘Thibault attempted
to meet with [the respondent] to assess [her] needs and
to offer reunification services. Although . . . Thibault
had text communications with [the respondent], [the
respondent] did not make [herself] available for an in-
person meeting with . . . Thibault until the end of
March, 2023. Throughout all of 2023, and possibly into
January, 2024, [the respondent] lived a transient life
and . . . would not or could not keep the department
up to date about where and with whom [she was] living.
. . . Thibault’s request to visit [the respondent] at [her]
various temporary residences were denied; at times [the
respondent] . . . reported [that her] hosts objected to
department contact or involvement. . . . Thibault, not
wanting to potentially jeopardize [the respondent’s]
fleeting housing by alienating [her] host, respected the
[respondent’s] wishes and representations and did not
pursue gaining access to [her] residences, given that
none of the homes were being proffered as potential
homes for reunification purposes. Throughout 2023 and
into January, 2024, [the respondent], often belatedly,
provided the department with [her] city [or] town of
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

residence but [was] not forthcoming with a specific
address.
‘‘Retrospectively, at the termination trial, the [respon-
dent and Zion] chronicled their 2022 through 2023 living
situation in their trial testimony. While pregnant [with
Zakari] in 2022, the respondent . . . and [Zion] resided
with [Zion’s father and his family] . . . in Waterbury.
At some point, in late 2022 but before Zakari’s . . .
birth, [the respondent and Zion] left [that] residence
and moved in with [Zion’s mother] in New Haven. [The
respondent and Zion] left that home in February, 2023,
because of [their] ongoing arguments with [Zion’s]
mother. The [respondent and Zion] next resided for
two weeks with [Zion’s grandmother] in Ansonia before
moving in March, 2023, to [the home of the respondent’s
mother] in Bridgeport. The [respondent and Zion] left
that home in May, 2023, due to arguments . . . with
[the respondent’s mother]. In May, 2023, [the respon-
dent and Zion] lived with [the respondent’s] grand-
mother in Bridgeport for two weeks [until June, 2023,
when they moved back in with Zion’s mother] in New
Haven. [The respondent and Zion] moved out of [that]
home in New Haven in September, 2023, due to ongoing
arguments with [Zion’s mother]. In October, 2023, [the
respondent and Zion] went to stay with [Zion’s] cousin
in Ansonia. From October to December, 2023, [or] Janu-
ary, 2024 . . . Thibault credibly testified [that] she
believed the [respondent and Zion] were living back and
forth between Ansonia and Waterbury. [The respondent
and Zion] testified that, in very early December, 2023,
they moved [back in with Zion’s father and his family
in Waterbury] . . . .
‘‘[T]he predominant means of communication
between . . . Thibault and [the respondent] through-
out 2023 was via text messaging. . . . Thibault credibly
testified that there were periods of time when [the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
In re Zakari W.

respondent] did not maintain even texting communica-
tion. [The respondent] credibly testified that in 2023
there were ‘gaps’ of time when [she and Zion] did not
have operable cell phones and/or cell phone service.
Reliable cell phone operability was most recently an
issue for [the respondent] in April, 2024. At the time of
the termination [of parental rights] trial, [the respon-
dent] testified that she [had] just obtained a new cell
phone and [that it was operable], and [that] she [was]
in frequent contact with . . . Thibault. . . .
‘‘In early 2023 . . . Thibault sought to refer [the
respondent] for a substance abuse evaluation/assess-
ment and . . . to submit to a mental health assessment.
At the time, [the respondent was] residing in Bridgeport
and therefore a referral was made for [her] to attend
South West Behavioral Health Systems. The respondent
. . . scheduled an intake . . . but [did not follow]
through. . . .
‘‘Thibault learned in May, 2023, [that] the [respondent
was] residing in New Haven and she therefore referred
[the respondent] to New Haven based State Street Coun-
seling [(State Street)] and [Midwestern Connecticut
Council of Alcoholism, Inc. (MCCA)]. State Street . . .
offers treatment for dually diagnosed clients and there-
fore if [the respondent] had attended she could have
been assessed for substance use/abuse and undergone
a mental health assessment. [The respondent] did not
engage with either State Street . . . or MCCA. . . .
Thibault persevered in attempting to engage the [respon-
dent] and she attempted to connect [the respondent]
with Prosperity Counseling, an entity that offers mental
health evaluation/assessment and treatment but also
case management services, to assist in getting [the
respondent] to engage with services and providers. [The
respondent] failed to follow through with Prosperity
Counseling.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

‘‘When . . . Thibault learned of [the respondent’s]
relocation to Ansonia, she discussed with [her] engag-
ing with Behavioral Health Care. Once again, [the
respondent] did not appear for the intake appointment.
In January, 2024, the [respondent] informed . . . Thi-
bault of [her] relocation [back] to the . . . Waterbury
residence [of Zion’s father]. . . . Thibault identified
Waterbury based Wellmore Counseling Services [(Wel-
lmore)] as an appropriate referral for [the respondent]
and . . . informed [the respondent] about Wellmore’s
walk-in hours. It [was not] until mid-April, 2024, two
days prior to the start of the . . . trial, that [the respon-
dent] went to Wellmore . . . . Wellmore recom-
mended [that the respondent] be assessed by Wheeler
Clinic, [which] also offers walk-in hours. By the conclu-
sion of the . . . trial on May 1, 2024, [the respondent]
had yet to engage with Wheeler Clinic.
‘‘The department attempted to assist [the respondent]
with housing. [The respondent was] encouraged to call
211 and, as far back as March, 2023 . . . Thibault
assisted [the respondent] in completing a referral for
supportive housing services. . . . Thibault repeatedly
tried to explain to and discuss with [the respondent]
what [she] needed to do for supportive housing eligibil-
ity purposes and for reunification purposes. [The
respondent] would respond that [she] would do what
[she] needed to do but then not do it or become angry
and abruptly end the discussion.
‘‘[The respondent was] offered weekly supervised vis-
itation with Zakari. Throughout 2023, [the respondent]
reported a lack of reliable transportation. In March,
2023, [the respondent and Zion] resided in Bridgeport.
. . . Thibault transported . . . Zakari to the [respon-
dent’s] Bridgeport residence [which was in the apart-
ment building of the respondent’s grandmother]. At the
[respondent’s] direction, apparently because the depart-
ment was not welcome to come inside the apartment,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
In re Zakari W.

the supervised visit took place in the building’s lobby.
Subsequently, the department was successful in having
Quality Parenting Center (QPC), a supervised visitation
and parenting coaching/education provider . . . trans-
port Zakari to visits in Bridgeport. However, once [the
respondent] relocated to an undisclosed New Haven
address . . . QPC deemed [the respondent] no longer
eligible for QPC transport [due to the proximity of New
Haven to QPC’s location in Hamden and the availability
of public transportation between the respondent’s
home and QPC’s Hamden location]. From June
[through] August, 2023, the respondent . . . attended
five out of twelve scheduled visits . . . . [She was]
unsuccessfully discharged from QPC on August 18,
2023, [due to inconsistency in attending visitation
appointments]. . . . Supervised parent-child visits
were then moved to the [department’s] New Haven . . .
office; [the respondent] attended approximately half of
the scheduled visits [at that office].
‘‘In the latter part of 2023 . . . Thibault understood
the [respondent] to be living back and forth between
Ansonia and Waterbury. In January, 2024 . . . Thibault
referred [the respondent] to ’r Kids, an agency that
provides professional supervised visitation services and
parenting coaching/education services. [The respon-
dent] failed to attend the January 22, 2024 ’r Kids intake
appointment. Nonetheless, from February 2, 2024, to
April 16, 2024, (the first day of the termination [of paren-
tal rights] trial), there had been ten scheduled ’r Kids
supervised visits. [The respondent] attended seven
supervised ’r Kids visits . . . missed one visit due to
[the respondent] oversleeping . . . missed [another
visit] because [the respondent] did not confirm ahead
of time [her] intent to attend, and . . . missed [a third
visit due to a miscommunication between the respon-
dent and the department’s central transportation unit
. . . driver].
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

‘‘The department attempted to assist the respondent
with transportation [for the supervised visits]. Through-
out the case the [respondent was] offered bus passes.
When public bus transportation was not feasible, the
department was amenable to purchasing train tickets
for [the respondent but was unable to do so because
the respondent was] not forthcoming about [her] loca-
tion and/or [was] too transient to know from what train
station [she was] traveling to and from. . . . [From]
early 2024 [through the time of trial] . . . the [respon-
dent was] provided with department based . . . trans-
portation to and from ’r Kids.’’ (Citation omitted; foot-
notes omitted.)

On January 3, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition to
terminate the respondent’s parental rights, alleging that
the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify
the respondent with Zakari and that the respondent
had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j).3 The court, Con-
way, J., held a trial on April 16 and May 1, 2024. On
the first day of trial, the respondent testified that she
expected to reside at the home of Zion’s father in Water-
bury (Waterbury residence) long-term and that she had
3
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-
717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families
has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b . . .
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent
of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return
of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child
. . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
In re Zakari W.

a bed, clothes, and toys ready for Zakari at that home.
On April 23, 2024, however, when Thibault attempted
to meet with the respondent at the Waterbury residence,
the respondent refused to let her inside the house.

On May 17, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision granting the petition. The court found by clear
and convincing evidence that the department had made
reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with
Zakari, that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation to encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time she could assume a
responsible position in Zakari’s life, and that terminat-
ing the respondent’s parental rights was in Zakari’s best
interest.

On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred
in concluding that she failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation.4 The respondent
argues that because her ‘‘rehabilitation was dependent
on housing, and because whether the respondent’s
housing was suitable for [Zakari] was easily determined
within a short period of time, the trial court erred in
determining [that] the evidence was sufficient to termi-
nate [her] parental rights . . . .’’ The petitioner argues
to the contrary that the respondent faced ‘‘many obsta-
cles to reunification with Zakari [that] spanned beyond
housing and remained unaddressed at the time of trial,’’
and that the court properly considered all of the relevant
factors in determining that the respondent had failed
to rehabilitate. We agree with the petitioner.

The following legal principles and standard of review
govern the respondent’s claim. ‘‘In the adjudicatory
4
Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c), the attorney for the
minor child filed a statement adopting the brief of the petitioner and support-
ing the affirmance of the judgment terminating the respondent’s parental
rights.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding,5
the court must determine whether one of the . . . stat-
utory grounds that may serve as a basis for termination
of parental rights exists. . . . Failure of a parent to
achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of [the]
statutory grounds on which a court may terminate
parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112. . . . That ground
exists when a parent of a child whom the court has
found to be neglected fails to achieve such a degree of
rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within
a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the
child, the parent could assume a responsible position
in the life of that child.’’ (Footnote added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Aurora H., 222 Conn. App.
307, 317–18, 304 A.3d 875, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 931,
306 A.3d 1 (2023).

‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112] refers
to the restoration of a parent to [her] former construc-
tive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing
rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the par-
ent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life,
but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care
for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . An
inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires us to
obtain a historical perspective of the respondent’s child-
caring and parenting abilities. . . . Although the stan-
dard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show
more than any rehabilitation. . . . Successful comple-
tion of the petitioner’s expressly articulated expecta-
tions is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner’s claim
5
‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . If the trial court determines that
a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional
phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termina-
tion is in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 835, 296 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
In re Zakari W.

that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilita-
tion. . . . [E]ven if a parent has made successful
strides in her ability to manage her life and may have
achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such
improvements, although commendable, are not disposi-
tive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period
of time, she could assume a responsible position in
the life of her children.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Zarirai S., 229 Conn.
App. 239, 254–55, 326 A.3d 1148 (2024).
‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its
weighing of the facts in assessing whether those find-
ings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate
standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,
that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, upon the facts established and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative
effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ulti-
mate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015).6
In the present case, our careful review of the record
leads us to conclude that the court’s determination that
6
‘‘Prior to In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 569, courts had applied the
clear error standard of review both to a trial court’s determination that a
parent failed to rehabilitate and to that court’s subordinate factual findings.’’
In re Kyreese L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 720 n.8, 299 A.3d 296, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). In her principal appellate brief, the
respondent argues that ‘‘the standard of review as established by our
Supreme Court in In re Shane M., should be replaced by the former clear
error standard.’’ As the respondent acknowledges, however, this court ‘‘is
bound by the precedent from our Supreme Court and is unable to modify
it.’’ In re Denzel W., 225 Conn. App. 354, 380 n.14, 315 A.3d 346, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 1 (2024).
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of
rehabilitation is well supported by the evidence. The
respondent’s specific steps required her to obtain ade-
quate housing, to keep the department informed about
where and with whom she resided, and to ‘‘cooperate
with home visits, announced or unannounced . . . .’’
As the court found, the respondent was transient from
the time of Zakari’s birth in December, 2022, until
December, 2023, or January, 2024, around the time of
the filing of the petition. Thibault testified that for most
of that time the respondent refused to provide her with
the address of her residence or the names of people
with whom she resided but, instead, would only tell
her in which town she was living and that she was
staying with ‘‘family or friends.’’ Although the respon-
dent testified that she moved to the Waterbury resi-
dence in early December, 2023, Thibault testified that
the respondent did not inform the department of the
move or provide the address until the end of Janu-
ary, 2024.
In addition, despite the respondent offering the
Waterbury residence as a permanent home for Zakari,
there was evidence in the record that called into ques-
tion the permanency of that arrangement. As the court
noted in its memorandum of decision, the respondent
and Zion previously moved out of the Waterbury resi-
dence shortly before Zakari’s birth, and the respondent
did not provide a plausible explanation why they were
welcome to reside there permanently at the time of trial
but not at the time of Zakari’s birth. Moreover, Thibault
testified that, as of the first day of trial, the respondent
still had not allowed her inside the residence to assess
whether it was a suitable home. As the court found,
although ‘‘the [respondent] testified that [she] under-
stood the need to permit the department access to any
residence proffered as a suitable home for Zakari,’’ Thi-
bault was ‘‘denied access to the [Waterbury residence]
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
In re Zakari W.

by the respondent . . . allegedly because [Zion’s
father] was not comfortable with the department com-
ing into his home. On April 23, [2024, approximately
one week after the first day of trial] . . . Thibault went
back to [the Waterbury residence] with releases to be
signed by the [respondent],’’ but ‘‘[the respondent]
refused . . . Thibault access to the home, notwith-
standing that the termination trial was scheduled to
resume to conclusion on May 1.’’
The respondent’s specific steps also required her to
‘‘visit [Zakari] as often as permitted,’’ but the evidence
indicates that the respondent repeatedly missed sched-
uled visits. A social study submitted by Thibault in sup-
port of the termination petition, which was admitted
into evidence, indicates that the respondent attended
only six of seventeen weekly visits that were scheduled
at the department’s New Haven office. Thibault testified
that, when the department referred the respondent to
QPC for visitation and parent coaching, she was unsuc-
cessfully discharged after attending only five of twelve
scheduled visits. Thibault further testified that, when
the department referred the respondent to ’r Kids for
visitation services after she moved to the Waterbury
residence, she failed to attend the intake appointment
and then missed three of ten scheduled visits. As Thi-
bault testified, the department took various steps to
address the respondent’s transportation issues, includ-
ing transporting Zakari to Bridgeport so that the respon-
dent could visit with him close to home, arranging to
provide the respondent with bus passes and train tick-
ets, and providing transportation to and from visits via
the department’s centralized transportation unit.
Despite these efforts, the respondent continued to miss
scheduled visits with Zakari throughout the pendency
of the case.
Thibault further testified that the respondent’s lack
of cooperation with the department and failure to
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

engage in recommended services prevented the depart-
ment from fully assessing the respondent’s needs. Thi-
bault testified that the respondent had reported feeling
depressed and was concerned about possible postpar-
tum depression. The respondent’s specific steps required
her to ‘‘[t]ake part in counseling and make progress
toward the identified treatment goals’’ and indicated
that those goals were ‘‘[to be determined] upon further
assessment.’’ In addition, the specific steps required the
respondent to ‘‘[s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation
and follow the recommendations about treatment
. . . .’’ Thibault testified that between March, 2023, and
January, 2024, she referred the respondent to several
different service providers depending on where the
respondent was living at the time, but the respondent
repeatedly failed to attend her intake appointments.
During her testimony, the respondent acknowledged
that she did not engage with any of the recommended
service providers until four days before the first day of
trial when she went for an initial assessment at Wellm-
ore, which referred her to Wheeler Clinic. Although
Wheeler Clinic offers walk-in hours, the respondent
acknowledged that she had not followed up on that
referral as of the conclusion of the trial.

The respondent’s specific steps also required her to
‘‘[k]eep all appointments set by [the department]
. . . .’’ Thibault testified, however, that the respondent
attended only one of three scheduled administrative
case reviews, which are held to discuss the progress
of the case and explain the department’s expectations
with respect to the reunification plan. Thibault further
testified that when she attempted to discuss with the
respondent the importance of engaging with recom-
mended services, the respondent would resist those
efforts by either stating that she did not need the ser-
vices or abruptly ending the conversation. The social
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
In re Zakari W.

study submitted by Thibault in support of the termina-
tion petition indicates that, as of December 18, 2023,
the respondent ‘‘ha[d] not met with [Thibault] since
[May 5, 2023] to discuss the case despite numerous
requests made by the [d]epartment.’’
We disagree with the respondent’s contention that the
court could not conclude that she failed to rehabilitate
merely because she claimed to have obtained perma-
nent housing by the time of trial. First, the court was
not required to credit the respondent’s testimony con-
cerning the suitability or permanency of her residence
at the time of trial. On the contrary, given the respon-
dent’s long history and pattern of transience throughout
the period of the department’s involvement in the case
and the respondent’s continuing refusal to grant the
department access to her residence at the time of the
trial, there was more than sufficient evidence for the
court to conclude that the respondent had not obtained
and likely would not remain in a permanent and suitable
housing environment.7
Second, the respondent’s argument also ignores the
fact that the court’s determination that she failed to
7
In her principal appellate brief, the respondent appears to argue that
the court erred in failing to grant a continuance so that the department
could conduct an inspection of the Waterbury residence. Specifically, the
respondent argues in her brief that the court was ‘‘required [to grant] addi-
tional time to determine whether the respondent’s residence was appropriate
for reunification,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he failure to allow for such minimal delay
acted against the statutory language [of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)] and resulted
in an improper termination of the respondent’s parental rights.’’ During oral
argument before this court, however, the respondent’s counsel clarified that
the respondent was not claiming that the court erred in failing to grant a
continuance but, instead, was arguing that the court was required to consider
whether the respondent would have been able to demonstrate sufficient
rehabilitation if given additional time for the department to inspect her
residence. The record reflects that the court expressly considered—and
rejected—the respondent’s argument that the circumstances justified giving
her additional time to rehabilitate, however, and we conclude that the court’s
determination that the respondent failed to rehabilitate was reasonably
supported by the evidence.
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Zakari W.

rehabilitate relied on more than just her lack of perma-
nent housing. Rather, the memorandum of decision indi-
cates that the court relied on the totality of the evidence
regarding the respondent’s overall failure to address
the issues that led to Zakari’s commitment to the peti-
tioner’s custody, finding that ‘‘[the respondent] repeat-
edly eschewed the department’s attempts to connect
[her] with services and providers that were essential
for reunification.’’ The court further found that ‘‘[t]he
evidence and testimony does not support giving [the
respondent] additional time to become compliant with
the court-ordered specific steps and/or to afford [the
respondent] further time to decide whether to more
fully collaborate with the department.’’ In light of the
aforementioned evidence of the respondent’s repeated,
ongoing failure to comply with her specific steps and
refusal to cooperate with the department, the court’s
determination in that regard was well supported by the
record. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support the conclusion that the respondent
failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation
such that, within a reasonable time and considering the
age and needs of Zakari, she could assume a responsible
position in his life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.