Waterbury v. Watertown

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

CITY OF WATERBURY v. TOWN OF WATERTOWN
(AC 46784)
Elgo, Moll and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant town appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff
city with respect to the plaintiff’s action to collect certain unpaid fees for
the use of its water and sewer services. The defendant claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly concluded that, in the absence of a contractual
agreement, the plaintiff was authorized by statute (§§ 7-239 and 7-255) to
set the rates it charged properties located in the defendant municipality for
the continued use of its water and sewer services. Held:

The trial court properly construed §§ 7-239 and 7-255 as authorizing the
plaintiff to set just and equitable rates for the continued use of its water
and sewer systems by properties located in the defendant municipality
following the expiration of contracts between the parties relating to such use.

The trial court properly concluded that, pursuant to statute (§§ 7-239, 7-255
and 7-258), the plaintiff was permitted to bring an action against the defen-
dant to recover unpaid water and sewer service charges incurred by proper-
ties within the defendant municipality because the defendant had elected
to collect payment for such charges.

The trial court’s finding that the rates set by the plaintiff for water and
sewer services were reasonable and equitable was not clearly erroneous.
Argued January 8—officially released June 10, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the collection of certain unpaid fees for
water and sewer services provided by the plaintiff, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court,
Cordani, J.; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Daniel J. Krisch, with whom, on the brief, were
David P. Friedman and Lorey C. Leddy, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Joseph A. Mengacci, corporation counsel, with whom
was Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel-
lee (plaintiff).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Waterbury v. Watertown

Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, the town of Watertown,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
after a bench trial, in favor of the plaintiff, the city of
Waterbury. On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court improperly (1) concluded that, in the absence of
a contractual agreement, General Statutes §§ 7-2391 and
7-2552 authorize the plaintiff to set the rates it charges
properties located in the defendant municipality for
the continued use of its water and sewer services, (2)
concluded that those statutes impliedly authorize the
plaintiff to sue the defendant to collect unpaid water
and sewer service charges incurred by those properties,
and (3) found the plaintiff’s water and sewer service
rates to be reasonable and equitable. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff is authorized, by special act of the Gen-
eral Assembly, to obtain water from outside its borders;
see 11 Spec. Acts 322, No. 252, § 1 (1893); and to con-
tract to supply water to any municipality through which
its water supply mains run. See 18 Spec. Acts 904, No.
391 (1921).3 The plaintiff also is statutorily authorized
to contract to provide sewer services to adjoining
municipalities. See General Statutes § 7-273.4 Pursuant
1
Although § 7-239 has been amended by the legislature since the events
underlying this case; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-143, § 4; those amendments
have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity,
we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
Although § 7-255 has been amended by the legislature since the events
underlying this case; see, e.g., Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-
2, § 164; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal.
In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
3
That special act provides in relevant part that the plaintiff ‘‘is authorized
and empowered . . . to contract to supply water for domestic purposes
and fire protection to any municipality, borough or fire district, through
which, or contiguous to which the water supply mains of said city are or
shall be laid . . . .’’ 18 Spec. Acts 904, No. 391 (1921).
4
General Statutes § 7-273 provides: ‘‘Any town, city, borough or fire or
sewer district, maintaining a sewerage system, may contract with any adjoin-
ing town or property owner therein for connection with and the use of such
sewerage system.’’
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

to that authority, the plaintiff contracted to supply
water and sewer services to the defendant for more
than sixty years. This case involves an action to collect
unpaid charges for water and sewer services.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found the
following relevant facts. The plaintiff first supplied
water services to the defendant in 1939 and sewer ser-
vices to the defendant in 1951. ‘‘Starting on or about
June 29, 1988, [the plaintiff] provided water and sewer
services to [the defendant] pursuant to written agree-
ments between the parties with terms of twenty-five
years. During [those contractual periods], [the plaintiff]
charged, and [the defendant] paid . . . rates [that]
were less than the rates that [the plaintiff] charged to
its own residents. . . .
‘‘In conjunction with the expiration of the foregoing
agreements, the parties negotiated and abided by new
subsequent agreements, which started in 2013 and ter-
minated five years later, on June 30, 2018. These 2013
water and sewer agreements applied flat rates for water
and sewer service[s] and applied an escalator to those
rates at 2 percent per year.’’5 (Footnotes omitted.)
The court further found that, ‘‘[i]n advance of the
termination of their 2013–2018 agreements, the parties
attempted to negotiate a further agreement but failed
to reach an agreement. Accordingly, as of June 30, 2018,
no agreement existed between the parties concerning
the provision of water and sewer services, and there
The court also found that ‘‘[t]he negotiations for the 2013–2018 agree-
5

ments [between the parties] began in 2012. During these negotiations, the
[plaintiff’s mayor] informed [the defendant] that [the plaintiff] would seek
to impose the [plaintiff’s] resident standard rates on [the defendant] after
these 2013 contracts expired in five years, and that the 2 percent per year
escalator, as applied to the flat rates in the agreements, was a start in
that direction. Accordingly, [the defendant] had substantial notice of [the
plaintiff’s] intent concerning pricing, which notice preceded the 2015 public
meetings which set the prices at issue.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Waterbury v. Watertown

was no agreement concerning the rates to be charged.
Despite there being no agreement between the parties,
[the plaintiff] continued to provide, and [the defendant]
continued to consume, water and sewer services. . . .
[The plaintiff] deployed good faith efforts to achieve
new agreements, or amended 2013 agreements, but,
despite those good faith efforts, no agreement arose
after the expiration of the 2013 agreements on June 30,
2018. . . .
‘‘In December of 2017, [the plaintiff] again firmly
advised [the defendant] that, in the absence of a negoti-
ated agreement, [the plaintiff] would charge [the defen-
dant] the same rates for water and sewer service that it
charged [its own] residents, plus a 10 percent municipal
system benefit charge on the water rates. Ultimately,
[the plaintiff] further informed [the defendant] of its
position in a letter dated June 8, 2018. . . .
‘‘[The plaintiff’s] independent water and sewer con-
sultants conducted studies in 2014 to make recommen-
dations to [the plaintiff] for water and sewer rates for
the period from 2015 through 2019, and made the follow-
ing findings and recommendations: (a) [the plaintiff’s]
water and sewer rates had been insufficient to support
the short and long-term financial needs of [the plain-
tiff’s] systems, and [the plaintiff] had been funding defi-
cits through other means, including the use of reserves;
(b) there had been underinvestment by [the plaintiff]
in its aging water and sewer systems over the years and
that underinvestment [necessitated] substantial capital
expenditures in the near-term coming years; (c) [the
plaintiff] needed to build a capital reserve to plan for
required capital investments; (d) the annual cost of
operating [the plaintiff’s] water system [was] expected
to increase from under $12 million in 2015 to $13.7
million in 2019, a 3.4 percent per year increase, and $35
million in capital improvements to the water system
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

were required over the coming five years; (e) [the plain-
tiff’s] water and sewer charges to its customers were
substantially lower than other comparable Connecticut
suppliers; [and] (f) the rate recommendations made by
[the consultants] were designed on a break-even basis
for [the plaintiff’s] operations, but [the plaintiff] chose
lower rates and increases than those recommended by
[the consultants]. Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] rates for
2015 through 2019 still did not produce break-even oper-
ations. . . .
‘‘[S]tarting in 2015, pursuant to [§] 7-239, [the plaintiff]
established rates to be charged for persons or entities
being supplied water by the [plaintiff’s] waterworks.
The rate set was $2.31 per hundred cubic feet of water
for 2015, $2.43 for 2016, $2.47 for 2017, and $2.52 for
2018 through 2021. . . . In 2022, the rate was increased
to $2.65 per hundred cubic feet of water. The foregoing
rates were set after publication and public hearings as
required in the statute. These rates were adopted by [the
plaintiff’s] Board of Aldermen. . . . The court found no
credible evidence of any irregularity in the procedures
used by [the plaintiff] to set its rates. . . .
‘‘[S]tarting in 2015, pursuant to [§] 7-255, [the plaintiff]
established rates to be charged for persons or entities
using the [plaintiff’s] sewer system. The rate was set
at $2.472 per hundred cubic feet for 2019 through 2022.
. . . The foregoing rate remains in effect today. [That]
rate was set after publication and public hearings as
required in the statute . . . [and was] adopted by [the
plaintiff’s] Board of Public Works. . . . The court
found no credible evidence of any irregularity in the
procedures used by [the plaintiff] to set its rates. . . .
‘‘The rates adopted by [the plaintiff] in 2015 for water
and sewer [services] were less than the rates recom-
mended by [the plaintiff’s] independent water and
sewer consultant. Further, the rates adopted in 2015
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Waterbury v. Watertown

by [the plaintiff] . . . were not sufficient to make the
[plaintiff’s] water and sewer enterprises self-sufficient.
[The plaintiff] adopted these low 2015 rates in an effort
to slowly bring its water and sewer enterprises up to
self-sufficiency without overwhelming its citizens. . . .
‘‘The rates for water and sewer [services] adopted
by [the plaintiff] in 2015 were charged to [all of the
plaintiff’s] residents and businesses regardless of size,
location . . . and usage. [The plaintiff] also applied
these rates to the towns of Naugatuck, Cheshire, Mid-
dlebury and Prospect. All municipalities currently acquir-
ing water from [the plaintiff] pay 110 percent of [the
plaintiff’s] standard rate for water, and all municipali-
ties, other than Wolcott, which use [the plaintiff’s]
sewer services pay 100 percent of [the plaintiff’s] stan-
dard rate. It was reasonable for [the plaintiff] to adopt
a uniform system of pricing, particularly since [the
plaintiff’s] accounting system did not support accurate
costing of distinctions or classes. . . .
‘‘Prior to the expiration of the 2013 agreements with
[the defendant], [the plaintiff] notified [the defendant]
that, starting July 1, 2018, [the plaintiff] would begin
charging [the defendant] at [the plaintiff’s] standard
resident rate plus 10 percent for water [services] and
at [the plaintiff’s] standard resident rate for sewer ser-
vice. . . . [On] July 1, 2018, [the plaintiff] began charg-
ing [the defendant] $2.52 per hundred cubic feet of
water plus an additional 10 percent municipal system
benefit charge and $2.472 per hundred cubic feet of
sewage plus a capital recovery charge of $1.481 per
hundred cubic feet of sewage. These rates were the
rates charged by [the plaintiff] to its residents and other
surrounding [municipalities], but were higher than the
contractual rates previously charged to [the defendant]
pursuant to the previously expired contracts. . . . [The
defendant] has not paid the foregoing rates and has
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

short paid the invoices issued by [the plaintiff] for the
period beginning on July 1, 2018.6 . . .
‘‘During the foregoing time periods, [the plaintiff] has
charged municipalities other than [the defendant] the
rates that [the plaintiff] established pursuant to §§ 7-
239 and 7-255 . . . . Commencing on July 1, 2018, [the
plaintiff] began charging [the defendant] interest at the
rate of 18 percent per year on the amounts [the plaintiff]
claimed were due because of [the defendant’s] practice
of short paying [the plaintiff’s] invoices. . . .
‘‘[The defendant] directly charges its residents for
water and sewer services and, thus, bears the cost and
burden of collection. [The defendant] also owns the
pipes and other equipment located within [its] borders
(except for certain supply and collection stations and
the primary supply pipes), which are used to distribute
water and sewer services within [the defendant munici-
pality] to [its] residents.
***
‘‘In 2013, while negotiating the 2013 agreements, [the
plaintiff’s mayor, Neil O’Leary] informed [the defen-
dant’s counsel] that the rates and [the 2 percent per
year] escalator in the 2013 agreements were meant to
transition [the defendant] to [the plaintiff’s normal] resi-
dent rates for water and sewer service and that, after the
2013 agreements expired in 2018, [the plaintiff] would
charge [the defendant] 110 percent of [the plaintiff’s
normal] resident rate for water and 100 percent of [its
normal] resident rate for sewer services.7 . . .
6
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the rates for water
and sewer service proposed by the defendant ‘‘were unreasonable in the
extreme and should have been known as such by [the defendant] and its
experts.’’ The court further noted that ‘‘[t]hese extremely unreasonable rate
proposals [by the defendant] cause the court to question whether they were
arrived at and suggested in good faith.’’
7
In its memorandum of decision, the court found Mayor O’Leary’s testi-
mony ‘‘to be reliable and credible.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Waterbury v. Watertown

‘‘Over the years, federal regulatory mandates have
made it substantially more costly for [the plaintiff] to
operate its water and sewer systems. When the . . .
water and sewer contracts [between the parties] expired
in 2018, Mayor O’Leary, on behalf of [the plaintiff], did
not cut off water and sewer service to [the defendant]
because he understood that doing so would give rise
to catastrophic problems for [the defendant’s] residents
and he did not think that to be an appropriate manner
in which to treat neighbors. . . . Other sources for the
supply of water to [the defendant] would be substan-
tially more expensive than the rates charged by [the
plaintiff] to its residents and now to [the defendant].’’
(Citations omitted; footnotes added; footnotes omit-
ted.)
The court also found that the defendant was ‘‘a direct
and indirect user’’ of the plaintiff’s water and sewer
services. As the court stated: ‘‘[The defendant] acts on
behalf of and stands in the shoes of the residents and
property owners of [the defendant municipality] whose
property is connected to and who use [the plaintiff’s]
waterworks. . . . The [properties in the defendant
municipality] are connected to [the plaintiff’s] water
delivery and sewer systems, albeit initially through
pipes owned by [the defendant]. Further, [the defen-
dant] itself is a property owner whose properties are
connected to and serviced by [the plaintiff’s] water and
sewer systems, making [the defendant] itself a direct
user and property owner connected to [the plaintiff’s]
systems.’’
When the defendant refused to pay for water and
sewer services provided to properties in the defendant
municipality at the rates that became effective on July
1, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the present action.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January
27, 2020, in which it sought to collect unpaid water fees
pursuant to § 7-239 and unpaid sewer fees pursuant
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

to General Statutes §§ 7-255 and 7-258. The defendant
thereafter filed an answer and eight special defenses,
which the plaintiff denied in their entirety.8
A four day bench trial was held in May, 2023, at which
both parties presented documentary and testimonial
evidence. On July 28, 2023, the court issued its memo-
randum of decision. The court found that ‘‘[the defen-
dant] has short paid [the plaintiff’s] invoices for water
and sewer service since July 1, 2018. [The plaintiff]
billed $23,455,544.42 in aggregate principal for water
and sewer service from July 1, 2018, through April 25,
2023. . . . Because of [the defendant’s] practice of
short paying invoices, [the plaintiff] has applied interest
at 18 percent per year on unpaid amounts, which results
in an aggregate interest charge of $4,637,784.58 over
the period from July 1, 2018, through April 25, 2023.’’9
(Footnote omitted.) In addition, the court found that
8
In its special defenses, the defendant alleged in relevant part that (1)
the ‘‘statutory rate scheme [invoked by the plaintiff] is inapplicable’’; (2)
the doctrine of municipal estoppel applied; (3) the plaintiff failed to comply
with ‘‘a mandatory presuit mediation provision’’ contained in the parties’
most recent contract; (4) the defendant maintained its own water and sewer
infrastructure and, therefore, ‘‘should not pay water or sewer rates that
include [the plaintiff’s] full infrastructure costs’’; (5) the water and sewer
rates charged by the plaintiff ‘‘are not fair and reasonable or just and equita-
ble under Connecticut law’’; (6) the water and sewer rates charged by the
plaintiff ‘‘were set in an arbitrary and capricious manner’’; (7) the water
and sewer rates charged by the plaintiff ‘‘were not the subject of a mandatory
published legal notice and public hearing’’; and (8) the water and sewer
rates charged by the plaintiff ‘‘include capital expenses for which [the defen-
dant] has been paying its fair share . . . .’’
After the close of pleadings, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court denied that motion, concluding that genuine issues
of material fact existed as to whether the rates set by the plaintiff for water
and sewer services were reasonable and whether the doctrine of municipal
estoppel applied.
9
Pursuant to §§ 7-239 (b) and 7-258 (a), unpaid water and sewer service
charges bear interest at the same statutory rate as unpaid taxes. See General
Statutes § 12-146 (‘‘the delinquent portion of the principal of any tax shall
be subject to interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum from the
time when it became due and payable until the same is paid’’).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Waterbury v. Watertown

the defendant had not proven any of its special
defenses. The court thus rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in the amount of $18,800,445.37 for ‘‘unpaid
principal and interest for water and sewer services’’ for
the period from July 1, 2018, to April 25, 2023. From
that judgment, the defendant now appeals.
I
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly concluded that, in the absence of a contrac-
tual agreement, §§ 7-239 and 7-255 authorize the plain-
tiff to set the rates it charges properties located in
the defendant municipality for the continued use of its
water and sewer services. We disagree.
As the defendant notes in its principal appellate brief,
its claim requires this court to consider ‘‘the meaning
of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the]
case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept.
of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 332 Conn. 776,
782, 213 A.3d 459 (2019). For that reason, we begin by
noting what is not at issue in this appeal. This case is
not about whether the plaintiff may enter into a contract
with other municipalities to provide water and sewer
services; it is statutorily authorized to do so. See 18
Spec. Acts 904, No. 391; see also General Statutes § 7-
273. This case also is not about whether the plaintiff is
authorized to set unilaterally the rates it charges for
water and sewer services provided to properties in a
municipality with which it had no prior contractual
relationship. It is undisputed that the parties in the
present case contracted for such services for more than
sixty years.
Rather, the question presented in this appeal con-
cerns the scenario in which (1) a contractual relation-
ship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant
and (2) during that contractual time period, the plaintiff
set new rates for the continued use of its water and
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

sewer services by properties located in the defendant
municipality following the expiration of that contrac-
tual period. On appeal, the defendant contends that the
plaintiff lacked authority to do so.
The defendant’s claim involves an issue of statutory
interpretation, over which our review is plenary. See,
e.g., 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District
Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 827, 251 A.3d 56 (2020).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Sena v. American Medical Response
of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45–46, 213 A.3d
1110 (2019).
In addition, we note that, ‘‘as a creation of the state,
a municipality has no inherent powers of its own. . . .
A municipality has only those powers that have been
expressly granted to it by the state or that are necessary
for it to discharge its duties and to carry out its objects
and purposes.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Wright v. Woodridge Lake Sewer Dis-
trict, 218 Conn. 144, 148, 588 A.2d 176 (1991).
A
We first consider the applicability of § 7-239, which
concerns rates for water services provided by munici-
palities. Section 7-239 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Waterbury v. Watertown

legislative body [of the municipality] shall establish just
and equitable rates or charges for the use of the water-
works system authorized in this subsection, to be paid
by the owner of each lot or building which is connected
with and uses such system, and may change such rates
or charges from time to time. . . . No such rate or
charge shall be established until after a public hearing
at which all the users of the waterworks system and
the owners of property served or to be served and
others interested shall have an opportunity to be heard
concerning such proposed rate or charge. . . . The
rates or charges so established for any class of users
or property served shall be extended to cover any addi-
tional premises thereafter served which are within the
same class, without the necessity of a hearing
thereon. . . .’’
By its plain language, the first sentence of § 7-239 (a)
authorizes the plaintiff to set ‘‘just and equitable rates
or charges for the use of [its] waterworks system’’ and
to ‘‘change such rates or charges from time to time.’’
That provision broadly and unambiguously applies to
‘‘each lot or building which is connected with and uses
such system . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Stat-
utes § 7-239 (a). Had the legislature intended to limit the
applicability of that grant of authority only to properties
located within the municipality that owned the water-
works system, it certainly knew how to do so. See
Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Reve-
nue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 219, 38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it is
a well settled principle of statutory construction that
the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly
. . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses
to do so’’ (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 940,
133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). The plaintiff’s
statutory authority to set rates for the use of its water-
works system pursuant to § 7-239 plainly is not confined
to properties located within its geographical boundaries
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

but, rather, extends to any property that is connected
with and uses the waterworks system.10 See General
Statutes § 7-239 (a).
In its principal appellate brief, the defendant appears
to concede as much. Because § 7-239 (a) provides that
such rates shall be ‘‘paid by the owner of each lot or
building which is connected with and uses [the water-
works] system,’’ the defendant submits that ‘‘[p]roperty
owners that use a municipal waterworks system must
pay ‘just and equitable rates’ to the municipality that
owns it . . . .’’ (Emphasis altered.) That averment pro-
vides further support for a construction of § 7-239 (a)
that authorizes the plaintiff to set rates for all properties
that use its waterworks system, including those in the
defendant municipality that are owned by the defen-
dant.11
The aforementioned provisions of subsection (a) also
must be read in context of the entire statute. See
Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn.
391, 408, 999 A.2d 682 (2010) (statutory provision can-
not be ‘‘interpreted in a vacuum, without reference to
the statute’s other provisions’’); Board of Education v.
State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 116, 584
A.2d 1172 (1991) (‘‘[w]e construe a statute as a whole
and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach
10
Although 18 Spec. Acts 904, No. 391, permits the plaintiff to enter into
contractual agreements with other municipalities regarding the procurement
of water services; see footnote 3 of this opinion; it neither obligates the
plaintiff to do so nor precludes the plaintiff from providing such services
to properties in other municipalities at rates established pursuant to § 7-
239 in the absence of a contractual agreement. See Fredette v. Connecticut
Air National Guard, 283 Conn. 813, 836, 930 A.2d 666 (2007) (courts ‘‘read
statutes to be consistent, rather than to conflict, with each other’’); see also
General Statutes § 7-148 (c) (4) (granting municipalities ‘‘the power’’ to ‘‘(G)
[p]rovide for the furnishing of water, by contract or otherwise’’ (empha-
sis added)).
11
The court found, and the defendant does not dispute, that the defendant
‘‘itself is a property owner whose properties are connected to and serviced
by the [plaintiff’s] water and sewer systems . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Waterbury v. Watertown

a reasonable overall interpretation’’). Section 7-239 (a)
also mandates that ‘‘[n]o such rate or charge shall be
established until after a public hearing at which all the
users of the waterworks system and the owners of
property served or to be served and others interested
shall have an opportunity to be heard concerning such
proposed rate or charge. . . .’’ It further provides in
relevant part that ‘‘[t]he rates or charges so established
for any class of users or property served shall be
extended to cover any additional premises thereafter
served which are within the same class, without the
necessity of a hearing thereon. . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) General Statutes § 7-239 (a). Those provisions
expressly and unambiguously require notice of rate
changes to ‘‘all the users of the waterworks system and
the owners of property served’’ and indicate that such
rates may be established ‘‘for any class of users or
property served . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-239 (a).
Moreover, § 7-239 (j) provides in relevant part that, in
a civil action to collect unpaid charges, ‘‘[t]he municipal-
ity shall be subject to the same rates or charges under
the same conditions as other users of such waterworks
system.’’ (Emphasis added.) Read together, those vari-
ous provisions compel the conclusion that § 7-239
authorizes the plaintiff to set rates for all properties
that use its waterworks system.
In construing § 7-239, we also are mindful that ‘‘com-
mon sense must be used in statutory interpretation,
and courts will assume that the legislature intended to
accomplish a reasonable and rational result.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cannata v. Dept. of Environ-
mental Protection, 239 Conn. 124, 141, 680 A.2d 1329
(1996). Furthermore, it is a ‘‘well established canon
of statutory construction that those who promulgate
statutes . . . do not intend to promulgate [ones] . . .
that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Modzelewski’s
Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

Vehicles, 322 Conn. 20, 36, 139 A.3d 594 (2016), cert.
denied, 580 U.S. 1216, 137 S. Ct. 1396, 197 L. Ed. 2d 554
(2017). The defendant contends that construing § 7-239
as authorizing the plaintiff, in the absence of a contract,
to set rates for users of its waterworks system in other
municipalities creates an absurd result by ‘‘giving the
plaintiff nearly unfettered power to charge [those users]
whatever it wants for water.’’ For two reasons, we dis-
agree.
First, § 7-239 contains a critical limitation on a munic-
ipality’s ability to set rates for water services. Pursuant
to § 7-239 (a), any rates or charges established for the
use of a municipal waterworks system must be ‘‘just
and equitable . . . .’’ That statutory requirement serves
as a formidable check on municipal authority to set
rates and belies the defendant’s claim of the plaintiff’s
‘‘unfettered power’’ to impose rates that are unjust or
inequitable. The statute also provides a barometer by
which the reasonableness of such rates may be mea-
sured, providing in relevant part that ‘‘[s]uch rates or
charges shall be sufficient in each year for the payment
of the expense of operation, repair, replacements and
maintenance of such system and for the payment of
the sums in this subsection required to be paid into the
sinking fund. . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-239 (a). In the
present case, the court found, and the evidence in the
record confirms, that the plaintiff ‘‘adhered to’’ that
statutory imperative and established ‘‘rates that [were]
lower than required to fund the short and long-term
needs of the [waterworks system].’’
Second, we reiterate the particular factual scenario
presented in this appeal, wherein a contractual relation-
ship for the provision of water services previously
existed between the parties and, during that contractual
time period, the plaintiff set new rates for the continued
use of its water services following the expiration of
that contractual period. In that context, the defendant’s
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Waterbury v. Watertown

‘‘unfettered power’’ argument rings hollow in light of the
undisputed facts that (1) the defendant was provided
ample notice of the plaintiff’s intention to increase the
rate for properties in the defendant municipality that
used its waterworks system,12 (2) the defendant was
under no obligation to continue procuring water service
from the plaintiff once their contractual relationship
concluded in 2018, and (3) the defendant, at that time,
was free to contract with other water service provid-
ers.13
In our view, the defendant’s construction of § 7-239
is predicated on a faulty premise—namely, that if a
municipality is authorized to set the rate that it charges
for the use of its waterworks system by properties
located in other municipalities, those properties are left
with no choice but to pay that rate.14 The defendant
has provided no legal authority or evidentiary basis for
that assertion. Moreover, the record before us contains
evidence that the defendant can obtain water services
from alternative providers and was not obligated to
continue its relationship with the plaintiff. At trial,
Mayor O’Leary testified that the defendant had the
option of procuring water services from the Connecti-
cut Water Company and Aquarion Water Company, two
alternative providers, albeit at rates higher than those
charged by the plaintiff.15 In its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court found Mayor O’Leary’s testimony ‘‘to be
reliable and credible.’’
12
As the court found, the defendant ‘‘was clearly forewarned in 2013 that,
when the 2013 agreements expired in 2018, [the defendant] would be treated
uniformly with [the plaintiff’s] other customers and charged the rates . . .
charged to [the plaintiff’s] residents.’’
13
In its memorandum of decision, the court specifically found that ‘‘[o]ther
sources for the supply of water’’ to properties in the defendant municipality
existed, but that they ‘‘would be substantially more expensive than the rates
charged by [the plaintiff] . . . .’’
14
At oral argument before this court, the defendant’s counsel characterized
the defendant as a ‘‘captive customer’’ of the plaintiff.
15
Mayor O’Leary further testified that, after negotiations between the
parties failed to produce an agreement in 2018, the plaintiff informed the
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

In addition, it bears emphasis that, at the time that
the rates in question were set by the plaintiff in 2015,
the defendant was a user of the plaintiff’s waterworks
system, both as an owner of property that is connected
to and serviced by the plaintiff’s water system; see foot-
note 11 of this opinion; and as the entity that delivered
water services from the plaintiff to properties in the
defendant municipality and collected payment from
their owners.16 Following the increase in rates that
became effective on July 1, 2018, the defendant elected
to continue its use of the plaintiff’s waterworks system
and declined to secure water services from alternative
providers.17
Given that context, we agree with the trial court that
the defendant’s construction of § 7-239 would create an
absurd and unworkable result. As the court observed:
‘‘[The defendant’s] position that [the plaintiff] can only
defendant that it would have to find ‘‘alternative sources’’ for water and
sewer services and that he ‘‘encouraged’’ the defendant to do so. When the
defendant elected to continue utilizing the plaintiff’s water and sewer ser-
vices following the expiration of the parties’ contractual agreements, Mayor
O’Leary testified that the plaintiff was left with ‘‘only . . . one option,’’
which was ‘‘[t]o shut the water off [to the defendant] and stop taking [the
defendant’s sewage].’’ When asked why he did not ‘‘direct that particular
course of conduct to take place,’’ Mayor O’Leary replied: ‘‘Because I didn’t
think it was right for the people of [the defendant municipality] or any
municipality to do—I couldn’t fathom doing that to a neighboring commu-
nity.’’
16
As the court found, the defendant ‘‘directly charges its residents for
water and sewer services and, thus, bears the cost and burden of collection.
[The defendant] also owns the pipes and other equipment, located within
[its] borders . . . which are used to distribute water and sewer services
within [the defendant municipality] to [its] residents.’’
17
The court found, and the record indicates, that the defendant ‘‘continued
to consume water and sewer services’’ provided by the plaintiff following
the expiration of their contractual agreements. The court also found that
the defendant partially paid for water and sewer services provided by the
plaintiff from July 1, 2018, through April 25, 2023, ‘‘at the rates provided for
in the [expired contractual] agreements despite the fact that [the defendant]
acknowledges that those agreements expired . . . on June 30, 2018, and
were of no effect in establishing rates thereafter.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Waterbury v. Watertown

charge [the defendant] for water and sewer pursuant
to an agreement of the parties places [the plaintiff] in
an untenable position. Since [the defendant] can refuse,
and has unilaterally refused, to agree on price, [the
plaintiff] would be forced to either cease the supply of
water and sewer services to [the defendant], thereby
allowing catastrophic issues to unfold for [the defen-
dant’s] residents, or capitulate to [the defendant’s] price
demands causing [the plaintiff] to supply [water and
sewer services] at rates that are shockingly below [its]
cost.’’ We do not believe that the legislature reasonably
could have intended such a result. In light of the plain
mandate of § 7-239—which empowers municipalities
like the plaintiff to set rates for the use of its waterworks
system that are sufficient to satisfy its operation, repair,
replacement and maintenance expenses, so long as they
are ‘‘just and equitable,’’ and to apply those rates to all
users connected to the waterworks system—we con-
clude that the court properly construed § 7-239 as
authorizing the plaintiff to set rates for the continued
use of its waterworks system by properties located in
the defendant municipality following the expiration of
the contract between the parties in 2018.
B
The foregoing analysis applies equally to § 7-255,
which concerns charges for sewer services.18 Section
18
General Statutes § 7-255 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A municipality’s]
water pollution control authority may establish and revise fair and reason-
able charges for connection with and for the use of a sewerage system. The
owner of property against which any such connection or use charge is levied
shall be liable for the payment thereof. Municipally-owned . . . property
which uses the sewerage system shall be subject to such charges under the
same conditions as are the owners of other property . . . . No charge for
connection with or for the use of a sewerage system shall be established
or revised until after a public hearing before the water pollution control
authority at which the owner of property against which the charges are to
be levied shall have an opportunity to be heard concerning the proposed
charges. . . . In establishing or revising such charges the water pollution
control authority may classify the property connected or to be connected
with the sewer system and the users of such system, including categories
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

7-255 (a) plainly and unambiguously authorizes a munic-
ipality to set ‘‘fair and reasonable charges’’ for the use
of its sewerage system. Like § 7-239 (a), that provision
broadly applies to all properties that are connected with
and use that system. Nothing in § 7-255 confines its
applicability to properties that are located within the
municipality that owns the sewerage system.19 If the
legislature intended to impose such a limitation, it
would have expressly done so. See Ulbrich v. Groth,
310 Conn. 375, 449, 78 A.3d 76 (2013); State v. Payne,
240 Conn. 766, 776, 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in
part on other grounds by State v. Romero, 269 Conn.
481, 849 A.2d 760 (2004).

For the same reasons articulated in part I A of this
opinion, we reject the construction of § 7-255 advanced
by the defendant and its related contention regarding
absurd or unworkable results.20 It would serve no useful
purpose to repeat that discussion. We therefore con-
clude that the court properly determined that § 7-255
authorized the plaintiff to set rates for the continued
use of its sewerage system by properties located in the
defendant municipality following the expiration of the
contract between the parties in 2018.
of industrial users, and . . . [m]ay give consideration to any factors relating
to the kind, quality or extent of use of any such property or classification
of property or users . . . . Any person aggrieved by any charge for connec-
tion with or for the use of a sewerage system may appeal to the superior
court . . . .’’
19
Moreover, although § 7-273 provides that any municipality ‘‘may contract
with any adjoining town or property owner therein for connection with and
the use of [its] sewerage system,’’ it does not obligate a municipality to do
so. Cf. General Statutes § 7-148 (c) (4) (granting municipalities ‘‘the power’’
to ‘‘(H) [p]rovide for or regulate the collection and disposal of . . . waste
material . . . by contract or otherwise’’ (emphasis added)).
20
In its principal appellate brief, the defendant argues that ‘‘[s]imilar con-
siderations establish that the trial court improperly construed § 7-255’’ and
repeats its assertion that the court’s interpretation creates an absurd result
by providing ‘‘the plaintiff nearly unfettered power to charge its neighbors
whatever it wants for sewer services.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Waterbury v. Watertown

II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
concluded that §§ 7-239, 7-255, and 7-258 impliedly
authorize the plaintiff to sue the defendant to collect
unpaid water and sewer service charges incurred by
properties in the defendant municipality. We disagree.
As previously noted, the parties contracted for the
provision of water and sewer services for more than
sixty years. It also is undisputed that the defendant
historically has acted as the collection agent for charges
incurred by properties in the defendant municipality
that use the plaintiff’s waterworks and sewerage sys-
tems. In its memorandum of decision, the court specifi-
cally found that the defendant ‘‘directly charge[d] its
residents for water and sewer services’’ provided by
the plaintiff’s waterworks and sewerage systems and
then tendered payment to the plaintiff for those ser-
vices.21
Despite that established practice—and despite the
fact that the defendant continued to make partial pay-
ment to the plaintiff for water and sewer charges
incurred by properties in the defendant municipality
following the expiration of the parties’ water and sewer
service contracts in 2018—the defendant on appeal con-
tends that the plaintiff lacks authority to sue the defen-
dant to recover unpaid water and sewer charges. Rather,
the defendant posits that the plaintiff’s sole remedy
to recover unpaid charges is to place liens on each
individual property and then bring actions to foreclose
21
Section 203 (B) of the parties’ 2013 contract for water services obligated
the defendant to ‘‘make payment of all charges described in this [a]greement
to [the plaintiff] within thirty (30) calendar days of its receipt of an invoice.’’
Article G of the parties’ 2013 contract for sewer services provided that
‘‘Sewer User Charges and Sewer User Surcharges shall be billed to [the
defendant] on a monthly basis’’ and that, ‘‘[i]f payment is not made within
thirty (30) calendar days of such due date, the payment shall be deemed
delinquent and subject to an interest penalty . . . .’’
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

on those liens in the Superior Court pursuant to §§ 7-
239 and 7-258.22
In its memorandum of decision, the court rejected
that assertion and concluded that the statutory authori-
zation to establish rates and charges necessarily includes
the ability to collect unpaid service charges. We concur
with that determination. Pursuant to the plain language
of §§ 7-239 (a) and 7-255 (a), owners of property that
use a municipal waterworks or sewerage system are
liable for all charges incurred. At the same time, General
Statutes § 7-148 (c) (2) expressly grants municipalities
‘‘the power’’ to ‘‘(B) regulate the mode of assessment
and collection of taxes and assessments . . . including
establishment of a procedure for the withholding of
approval of building application when taxes or water
or sewer rates, charges or assessments imposed by the
municipality are delinquent for the property for which
an application was made . . . .’’23 Accordingly, munici-
palities are authorized to regulate the manner in which
assessments and charges incurred by their property
owners for water and sewer services are collected.
22
General Statutes § 7-239 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The rates or
charges established pursuant to this section [for the use of a waterworks
system], if not paid when due, shall constitute a lien upon the premises
served and a charge against the owner thereof . . . .’’
General Statutes § 7-239 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The amount of any
such rate or charge [for the use of a waterworks system] which remains
due and unpaid for thirty days may, with reasonable attorneys’ fees, be
recovered by the legislative body in a civil action in the name of the munici-
pality against such owners. . . .’’
General Statutes § 7-258 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any . . . unpaid
. . . [sewer service] charge shall constitute a lien upon the real estate against
which such charge was levied from the date it became delinquent. . . . The
municipality may recover any such charges in a civil action against any
person liable therefor. . . .’’
23
Notably, the court found that water and sewer charges levied by the
defendant on properties in the defendant municipality contained two compo-
nents: the rate for water and sewer services provided by the plaintiff and
a separate charge for the defendant’s ‘‘own customer service and infrastruc-
ture costs.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Waterbury v. Watertown

In our view, §§ 7-239, 7-255, and 7-258 cannot be read
in isolation but, rather, must be read in light of the
grant of statutory authority contained in § 7-148 (c)
(2) (B) regarding municipal authority to proscribe the
manner in which assessments and charges for water
and sewer services are collected. ‘‘It is a basic tenet of
statutory construction that statutes should be con-
strued, where possible, so as to create a rational, coher-
ent and consistent body of law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Russo v. Waterbury, 304 Conn. 710,
726, 41 A.3d 1033 (2012); see also Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn.
403, 428, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (‘‘we read related statutes
to form a consistent, rational whole, rather than to
create irrational distinctions’’); In re Valerie D., 223
Conn. 492, 524, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (‘‘the legislature
in enacting statutes is presumed to be aware of the
existence of other legislation on the same or related
issues . . . and [s]tatutes are to be interpreted with
regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature
is presumed to have created a consistent body of law’’
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted));
Robb v. Watertown, Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Docket No. 085166 (November 21, 1990) (2
Conn. L. Rptr. 830, 831) (construing §§ 7-148 (c) (2) (B),
7-148 (c) (4) (G) and 7-239 together and concluding that
‘‘[t]he statutory scheme [authorizes] the expenditure of
[a municipality’s] general fund revenues for a general
purpose acquisition of water resources, while requiring
users to pay user rates for the expenses related to their
use of water’’).
Nothing in § 7-148 (c) (2) (B), § 7-239, § 7-255, or
§ 7-258 prohibits the defendant from permitting direct
collection of water and sewer service charges by an
outside entity, such as a water company or municipal
provider. Indeed, § 7-258 (a) expressly authorizes that
practice and provides in relevant part: ‘‘[F]or the pur-
pose of collecting [service] charges any municipality
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

may enter into agreements with any water company or
municipal water department furnishing water in such
municipality for the purchase from such water company
or municipal water department . . . and such agree-
ment may designate such water company or municipal
water department as a billing or collecting agent of
the collector of sewerage system connection and use
charges in the municipality. Any water company or
municipal water department may enter into and fulfill
any such agreements and may utilize for the collection
of such charges any of the methods utilized by it for
the collection of its water charges.’’ The defendant,
therefore, had the option, but was not obligated, to
provide for the direct collection of water and sewer
charges by a water company or municipal provider like
the plaintiff.
When a municipality elects to collect water and sewer
service charges incurred by properties within its geo-
graphical boundaries and then makes payment for those
charges to the municipal provider—as the record
unequivocally indicates the defendant did here follow-
ing the expiration of the contract between the parties in
2018—the municipal provider necessarily may recover
unpaid service charges from the collecting municipality.
In this regard, we are mindful that ‘‘[a] municipality has
only those powers that have been expressly granted to
it by the state or that are necessary for it to discharge
its duties and to carry out its objects and purposes.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. Wood-
ridge Lake Sewer District, supra, 218 Conn. 148.
The present case is not one in which individual prop-
erty owners in the defendant municipality declined to
pay water and sewer service charges. Rather, the defen-
dant, on behalf of every user in the defendant municipal-
ity, made the decision not to pay in full the rates set
by the plaintiff for water and sewer services provided
after June 30, 2018. In such circumstances, it would be
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
Waterbury v. Watertown

absurd to interpret §§ 7-239, 7-255, and 7-258 to require
the plaintiff to file liens on the thousands of individual
properties in the defendant municipality that use its
services and then commence foreclosure actions on
each of those properties.24 That construction is unwork-
able. We therefore conclude that, to carry out the pur-
poses of §§ 7-239, 7-255, and 7-258, a municipality that
provides water and sewer services to properties in
another municipality necessarily is permitted to bring
an action against that other municipality to recover
unpaid charges when that other municipality has elected
to collect payment for such charges incurred within its
geographical boundaries.
III
The defendant alternatively argues that, even if the
plaintiff was authorized to maintain the present action,
the court erroneously found the plaintiff’s water and
sewer service rates to be reasonable and equitable. That
claim is unavailing.
At the outset, we note that ‘‘a trial court’s findings
regarding the reasonableness of utility rates is governed
by [the] clearly erroneous standard of appellate review.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Highgate Condo-
minium Assn. v. Watertown Fire District, 210 Conn.
6, 21 n.7, 553 A.2d 1126 (1989). ‘‘A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
24
Courts properly may take judicial notice of the population of municipali-
ties in this state. See, e.g., D’Amico v. Willis, 13 Conn. App. 124, 127 n.2,
534 A.2d 1248 (1987) (taking ‘‘judicial notice of the [fact] that the city of
New Britain has a population of more than twenty-five thousand’’), cert.
denied, 207 Conn. 803, 540 A.2d 73 (1988); Nesko Corp. v. Fontaine, 19
Conn. Supp. 160, 162, 110 A.2d 631 (1954) (‘‘[i]t is established that judicial
notice may be taken of the . . . population of [a state’s] counties, cities
and villages’’). We take judicial notice of the fact that the defendant had an
estimated population of 21,790 in 2018. See Connecticut State Register and
Manual (2018) p. 596.
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is
the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and
determine credibility, we give great deference to its
findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not
examine the record to determine whether the [court]
could have reached a conclusion other than the one
reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable pre-
sumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reserve Realty,
LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 346 Conn. 391, 413–14,
291 A.3d 64 (2023).
Pursuant to § 7-239 (a), any rates or charges estab-
lished for the use of a municipal waterworks system
must be ‘‘just and equitable . . . .’’ Section 7-255 (a)
similarly requires that charges for the use of a municipal
sewerage system must be ‘‘fair and reasonable . . . .’’
As the defendant correctly notes in its principal appel-
late brief, those various terms are not defined in either
statute and precedent ‘‘treats them as different names
for the same thing . . . .’’ The focus of our inquiry,
then, is into the reasonableness of the rates set by the
plaintiff. See Barr v. First Taxing District, 151 Conn.
53, 58, 192 A.2d 872 (1963) (‘‘[w]hether a rate is reason-
able or unreasonable is primarily a question of fact,
depending largely on the circumstances of the particu-
lar case’’).
In its memorandum of decision, the court first noted
that General Statutes §§ 7-239 and 7-256 provide a base-
line for water and sewer rates set by the plaintiff, as
such rates should be ‘‘sufficient’’ to pay the operation,
repair, replacement, and maintenance expenses of the
waterworks system and the principal and interest
requirements of bonds and notes related to the sewer-
age system. The court then found that the rates set by
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27
Waterbury v. Watertown

the plaintiff for water and sewer services were reason-
able because they were ‘‘based upon a study by indepen-
dent experts . . . who studied [the plaintiff’s] water
and sewer operations, and recommended rates that
would be sufficient to fund the short and long-term
needs of the systems. . . . [The plaintiff] arrived at
water and sewer rates that were below those recom-
mended by [its] independent experts and below the
rates necessary to fund the short and long-term financial
needs of the [plaintiff’s] systems.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
Those findings are supported by evidence in the
record before us, particularly the March 31 and April
4, 2014 reports prepared by the independent water and
sewer consultants retained by the plaintiff in 2014 to
conduct studies and make recommendations on appro-
priate rates for water and sewer services. In those
reports, the consultants found that the plaintiff’s
existing rates for water and sewer services were sub-
stantially lower than other comparable providers in
Connecticut and were insufficient to meet the short-
term and long-term needs of the plaintiff’s waterworks
and sewerage systems. The consultants then provided
rate recommendations intended to meet those needs.25
In their report on the plaintiff’s waterworks system, the
consultants recommended a rate of $2.97 per hundred
cubic feet of water. Records of the plaintiff’s Board of
Alderman, which were admitted into evidence, never-
theless indicate that it adopted a rate of $2.52 per hun-
dred cubic feet for 2018 through 2021, and $2.65 per
hundred cubic feet for 2022. Although the consultants
recommended a rate of $3.52 per hundred cubic feet
of sewage in their report on the plaintiff’s sewerage
25
In the April 4, 2014 report, the consultants explained that ‘‘[t]he rates
presented . . . are calculated on a ‘break-even’ basis. This means that they
represent our best estimate for the rates needed to generate revenues equiva-
lent to the projected cost of running the [waterworks system] . . . .’’ The
March 31, 2014 report contained nearly identical language regarding the
plaintiff’s sewerage system rates.
Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

system, records of the plaintiff’s Board of Public Works,
which also were admitted into evidence, indicate that
the plaintiff adopted a rate of $2.472 per hundred cubic
feet for 2018 through 2022. That evidence demonstrates
that the plaintiff adopted rates for both water and sewer
services that were less than those recommended by
the independent consultants to meet the needs of their
waterworks and sewerage systems.
Records of the proceedings before the plaintiff’s
Board of Alderman and its Board of Public Works also
confirm that proper notice of the rates in question was
provided and public hearings were held in accordance
with the requirements of §§ 7-239 and 7-255. Moreover,
in his testimony at trial, Mayor O’Leary confirmed that
the rates adopted by the plaintiff were among the lowest
in the state and less than other providers such as the
Connecticut Water Company and Aquarion Water Com-
pany. That evidence substantiates the court’s determi-
nation that the rates set by the plaintiff for water and
sewer services were reasonable and equitable.
The defendant nevertheless maintains that the rates
set by the plaintiff failed to account ‘‘for the defendant’s
status as a wholesale user’’ of its water and sewer ser-
vices. Because it previously purchased water and sewer
services at a lesser rate than other users pursuant to
the contractual agreements between the parties, the
defendant claims that, following the expiration of those
contracts, it was entitled to discounted rates ‘‘that
reflect [its] status as a large, wholesale customer.’’
Contrary to that assertion, nothing in our General
Statutes obligates a municipality that provides water
or sewer services to classify particular users of its water
and sewer services or to provide discounted rates to
certain classes of users. As the court noted in its memo-
randum of decision, §§ 7-239 and 7-255 ‘‘permissively
provide that the relevant authority ‘may’ set different
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 29
Waterbury v. Watertown

rates for different classes of users and ‘may’ consider
various factors in establishing rates for classes of users.
. . . However, the statutes are clear that classes of
users are permissively allowed but not required and
that the considerations provided are also permissive
and not exclusive. Accordingly, the public authorities
may, but need not, establish classes of users and may
set the rates in their reasonable discretion, subject to
public notice and hearing, as is required to fund the
operations in the short and long-term.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; footnote omitted.) The use of a uniform rate struc-
ture for all users, therefore, remains an option for
municipal providers like the plaintiff.
At trial, the plaintiff submitted excerpts from a trea-
tise prepared by the American Water Works Association
concerning the use of uniform rates by water provid-
ers.26 That treatise explains that a uniform rate ‘‘is a
constant unit price for all metered volumetric units of
water’’ that ‘‘can be applied to all customer or service
classifications, such as residential, commercial, indus-
trial, wholesale, and so on.’’ American Water Works
Association, Principles of Water Rates, Fees, and
Charges—Manual of Water Supply Practices (7th Ed.
2017) c. IV.2, p. 109. It further notes that ‘‘[t]he uniform
rate structure has gained relatively wide acceptance.’’
Id., p. 113. In its memorandum of decision, the court
credited that evidence in concluding that ‘‘[i]t was rea-
sonable for [the plaintiff] to adopt a uniform system of
pricing’’ for its water and sewer services.
That evidence also undermines the defendant’s argu-
ment that the plaintiff was obligated to classify it as a
26
The defendant initially submitted a portion of that treatise into evidence
as exhibit QQ. In response, the plaintiff offered into evidence additional
pages of that treatise that pertained specifically to the use of uniform rates,
which had been omitted from the defendant’s exhibit. In its memorandum
of decision, the court found that the defendant’s selective omission of the
pages concerning uniform rates from exhibit QQ ‘‘undercut the defendant’s
credibility.’’
Page 28 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

wholesale user and charge properties in the defendant
municipality lower rates than it does for ones in the
plaintiff city because they use less services and infra-
structure. Because classification of users is permitted,
but not required, under §§ 7-239 and 7-255, the court
aptly noted that ‘‘there is no legal basis upon which
one can unilaterally demand lower rates merely because
one does not utilize all of the services offered.’’ On
appeal, the defendant has not provided any legal author-
ity indicating that municipal providers like the plaintiff
are prohibited from adopting a uniform rate structure
for water and sewer services.
In addition, we note a practical difficulty with the
defendant’s contention. As the court aptly observed:
‘‘[A]llowing [the defendant] to claim special status . . .
[as a wholesale user entitled to] reduced rates would
either promote similar requests from other potential
classes of users or impair the fairness of the [plaintiff’s]
rate system. . . . [The defendant] is not the only user
of [the plaintiff’s] water and sewer services that can
claim to use less infrastructure or services than other
customers. . . . [O]ther towns, large industrial users,
commercial users, and large residential complexes are
all charged by [the plaintiff] the same rates as each
other and the same rates charged to each individual
residence. Large industrial, commercial, and residential
complexes maintain their own water and sewer ‘distri-
bution system’ within their [own] property and com-
plexes. Should they be charged less because of the
foregoing or because they use very large volumes?
Other surrounding towns pay the standard rates even
though they deploy their own infrastructure and cus-
tomer service. Should they pay less than the standard
rates? On the other end of the scale, should the resi-
dence located next door to the sewer treatment facility
pay less than residences located further away from the
facility based upon pipe usage? Instead of engaging in
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 29

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 31
Waterbury v. Watertown

this endless level of gradation,27 [the plaintiff] has cho-
sen to impose uniform rates and the defendant has
pointed to no legal compulsion that prevents [that]
choice.’’ (Footnote altered.)
Also relevant to the question of whether the applica-
tion of uniform rates to properties in the defendant
municipality is reasonable and equitable is the fact that,
at all relevant times, the rates charged by the plaintiff
also applied to properties in other municipalities. The
court found, and the record confirms, that the same
rates applied to properties in Cheshire, Middlebury,
Naugatuck, and Prospect.
Lastly, we emphasize that the record contains ample
evidence to support the court’s finding that the plaintiff
provided advance notice to the defendant of both its
intent to move to a uniform rate structure once the
contractual agreements between the parties expired in
2018 and the defendant’s option to secure an alternative
provider if the plaintiff’s rates were not agreeable to
the defendant.28
27
‘‘The [trial] court notes that [the plaintiff’s] current accounting would
not support this level of gradation, and in fact does not support the level
of gradation sought by [the defendant], and [the defendant] knew this.’’
28
At trial, Mayor O’Leary testified that, during negotiations in 2013 that
resulted in those contractual agreements, he advised the defendant that
the plaintiff ‘‘wanted to move towards’’ a uniform rate schedule and have
properties in the defendant municipality pay the same rates as those in the
plaintiff city and other municipalities. He further testified that the parties
entered into the 2013 agreements with ‘‘an understanding’’ that, after those
agreements expired, the uniform rate structure that applied in the plaintiff
city and other municipalities would also apply to the defendant. In addition,
Mayor O’Leary testified that, after negotiations between the parties failed
to produce an agreement in 2018, the plaintiff informed the defendant that
it would have to find ‘‘alternative sources’’ for water and sewer services
and that he ‘‘encouraged’’ the defendant to do so. The court expressly
credited Mayor O’Leary’s testimony.
The record also contains a letter dated June 8, 2018, from Linda T. Wihbey,
the plaintiff’s corporation counsel, to the defendant’s town manager, in
which she noted that, ‘‘[f]or approximately one year, the [plaintiff] has
represented to [the defendant] and its designated negotiating representa-
tives, that [the plaintiff] was seeking rate equalization with [the defendant]
Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Waterbury v. Watertown

The record before us contains evidence to support
the court’s finding that the rates set by the plaintiff for
water and sewer services were reasonable and equita-
ble. Moreover, on our review of that record, we are not
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. Indulging every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of the correctness of the court’s rul-
ing, as we are obligated to do; see Reserve Realty, LLC
v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, supra, 346 Conn. 414; we
conclude that the court’s finding is not clearly errone-
ous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

similar to [other municipalities].’’ Wihbey then notified the town manager
that, effective July 1, 2018, the plaintiff would be applying a uniform rate
structure to users in all municipalities, including the defendant. Wihbey also
noted that the defendant retained the option of not securing water and
sewer services from the plaintiff, stating: ‘‘Should [the defendant] elect not
to enter into a contract with [the plaintiff] at the reasonable rates set by [the
plaintiff], please advise by June 15 so that we may facilitate any transitional
service arrangements with your new supplier.’’ In its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court credited that evidence.