State v. Rivas

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State v. Rivas

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAMUEL
A. RIVAS, JR.
(AC 47400)
Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss because the state’s seven month delay in
executing its arrest warrant violated his right to due process. Held:

The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as the
defendant failed to present the court with a sufficient factual record to
demonstrate that he suffered actual, substantial prejudice as a result of the
state’s preaccusation delay and, thus, a violation of his right to due process..

The prosecution of the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs did not violate his prior plea agreement
with the state as to a charge of interfering with an officer that arose out of
the same criminal incident, the defendant having presented no evidence to
establish a reasonable belief that the plea agreement had terminated all of
his criminal liability flowing from his conduct during that same incident.
Argued April 14—officially released July 1, 2025

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs and with improper use of a registra-
tion, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New London, geographical area number twenty-
one, where the court, Hon. Arthur C. Hadden, judge
trial referee, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss;
thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court,
Hon. Arthur C. Hadden, judge trial referee, on a condi-
tional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs; judgment of guilty; subsequently, the state
entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining charge,
and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
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State v. Rivas

Ruth Burke, deputy assistant public defender, with
whom, on the brief, was Jennifer Bourn, chief of legal
services, for the appellant (defendant).
Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci,
state’s attorney, and Sarah Bowman, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Samuel A. Rivas,
Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered
following his conditional plea of nolo contendere to the
charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of General
Statutes § 14-227a.1 On appeal, he claims that the trial
court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the
charge because (1) the state’s delay in executing the
warrant for his arrest (preaccusation delay) violated
his right to due process, and (2) the prosecution violated
an earlier plea agreement he had entered into with the
state.2 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judg-
ment of the court.
1
General Statutes § 14-227a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . No person
shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both
if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an
elevated blood alcohol content. . . .’’
The defendant also was charged with improper use of a registration in
violation of General Statutes § 14-147 (c). The state entered a nolle prosequi
as to that charge.
2
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant sets forth three claims:
the trial court improperly (1) declined to rely on representations by counsel
and information in the court file in considering whether the preaccusation
delay violated his due process rights; (2) failed to conclude that the preaccu-
sation delay violated his due process rights; and (3) determined that the
prosecution did not violate the defendant’s prior plea agreement. Because
the first two claims are sufficiently interrelated, for ease of discussion, we
address those claims together.
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State v. Rivas

The following facts, as stated by the prosecutor at
the time that the defendant entered his conditional plea
of nolo contendere, and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. ‘‘[On] March [3, 2022], [at] approximately
10:30 p.m., officers . . . observed a gray Lexus stuck
sideways . . . in the middle of the roadway. A check
revealed that the registration did not belong to that type
of vehicle. Emergency lights were initiated . . . [and]
officers approached the operator side of the vehicle.
They observed a male later identified as this defendant
seated in the driver’s seat, keys in the ignition, [and
the] engine on. Officers knocked on the driver’s side
window. The [defendant] opened the door. He looked
at the police officers. Officers observed his eyes to be
bloodshot and glossy.
‘‘[The] defendant started to exit the vehicle. Immedi-
ately, officers asked him to stay in the driver’s seat. He
continued to stand up and get out of the vehicle. Officers
observed the defendant to be off balance and confused,
[he] stated, what, and puffed out his chest [and] then
made a fist with both of his hands. His speech was slow,
slurred, and incoherent at times. Officers attempted to
talk to the defendant and gather details of what was
going on; however, the defendant was very agitated
[and] appeared to stare off in the distance. Again, the
defendant put his hands in the front pocket of his
hooded sweatshirt. He was asked to remove his hands.
He did not comply.
‘‘The defendant walked toward the officers, stood
immediately in front of [one officer], appeared disori-
ented, and had difficulty with speech. At that time, he
then stated to the officer . . . I run this shit, made a fist
with his hands, and swung at the officer in an attempt
to punch the officer in his face. At that time, other
officers attempted to subdue this defendant. The defen-
dant continued to resist the officers as he tensed his
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State v. Rivas

body when being placed in the cruiser; a struggle did
ensue.
‘‘While en route to the police station, the defendant
fell asleep in the cruiser. Upon being asked to exit the
cruiser on arrival, he was agitated, tensed his body,
perspiring, had a dry mouth, and then appeared to
become lethargic again, and [his] eyes glazed over. He
had a blank stare and dazed appearance. After several
minutes, the defendant stood up out of the vehicle and
became paranoid. He was staring off and saying, no,
no. several times. [He] [a]ppeared to be hallucinating,
as he was not talking to any of the officers as he was
saying that.
‘‘The defendant was assisted into the booking area.
[The officers] attempted to communicate with him but,
due to his current state at that time, they were unable
to perform standard field sobriety tests. They deter-
mined at that time, due to his level of impairment, he
would be transported to [a hospital]. At the . . . emer-
gency room, the defendant slipped in and out of con-
sciousness, was confused and lethargic, unaware of his
surroundings, and could not provide basic information.
. . . [At] approximately 3:30 a.m., the defendant
became alert and was able to take part in normal conver-
sation. Officers at that time determined he was able to
provide information, [they] read him his [Miranda]3
rights and asked him questions according to that time.
‘‘The defendant stated that he had used [phencycli-
dine (PCP)] earlier in the night, [but he] did not give
an exact time or location. The officer was a trained drug
recognition expert. PCP is a dissociative anesthetic,
and [the officer] recognized [that] the signs of impair-
ment that the defendant was exhibiting were in fact
signs of that drug. They did order a urine record or
3
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
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State v. Rivas

test; however, one of the medical professionals at [the
hospital] cancelled that.’’ (Footnote added.)
While the defendant remained at the hospital, the
state charged him with one count of interfering with
an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a4
on the basis of his conduct during the arrest on March
3, 2022. He was released on a nonsurety bond. Subse-
quently, in a separate case, the state charged the defen-
dant with, inter alia, interfering with an officer on the
basis of an incident on March 5, 2022. On March 7, 2022,
the defendant appeared in court on both cases. See
State v. Rivas, Superior Court, judicial district of New
London, geographical area number twenty-one, Docket
Nos. K-21-NCR-XX-XXXXXXX-S and K-21-NCR-XX-XXXXXXX-
S. The court, K. Murphy, J., released the defendant on
a conditional promise to appear.
On April 1, 2022, the state sought an arrest warrant,
which is the subject of the present matter, charging the
defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-
227a and improper use of a registration in violation of
General Statutes § 14-147 (c)5 in connection with the
March 3, 2022 incident. On April 4, 2022, the court issued
a warrant for the defendant’s arrest on these charges.
The police, however, did not execute the arrest warrant
at that time.
General Statutes § 53a-167a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
4

guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists,
hinders or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of
such peace officer’s or firefighter’s duties. . . .’’
Although § 53a-167a (a) has been amended since the events at issue; see
Public Acts 2022, No. 22-117, § 12; that amendment has no bearing on the
merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
5
Although § 14-147 (c) has been amended since the events at issue; see
Public Acts 2023, No. 23-40, § 16; that amendment has no bearing on the
merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
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State v. Rivas

It is undisputed that, on September 20, 2022, the
defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty
to two counts of interfering with an officer in violation
of § 53a-167a for his conduct on March 3 and 5, 2022
(plea agreement). The court, Papastavros, J., accepted
the defendant’s pleas and sentenced him to a total effec-
tive term of seven months of incarceration. It is also
undisputed that, at the time of the sentencing, the defen-
dant had other criminal charges pending against him
in several jurisdictions in Connecticut.
On November 23, 2022, the defendant was released
from custody. That same day, the police executed the
April 4, 2022 warrant and arrested the defendant on
charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs and improper use of a
registration.
On December 8, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the charges. In the motion, he first argued
that the police had unreasonably delayed the execution
of the April 4, 2022 arrest warrant in violation of his due
process rights. He additionally argued that the charges
violated the earlier plea agreement, which he claimed
encompassed all criminal liability flowing from the
March 3, 2022 incident. In opposition to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the state argued that, considering the
defendant’s then pending cases in other jurisdictions
in Connecticut, the preaccusation delay was neither
unreasonable nor prejudicial. The state additionally
argued that the charges of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and
improper use of a registration did not violate the earlier
plea agreement because those motor vehicle charges
were separate from and unrelated to the earlier charges
for interfering with an officer.
On January 18, 2024, following oral arguments, the
court, Hon. Arthur C. Hadden, judge trial referee,
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State v. Rivas

denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the record.
The court stated: ‘‘There’s been no evidentiary hearing,
there’s been no evidence presented. Given that, the
court cannot make any factual findings. Keep in mind
that the statements of counsel, either verbal or in writ-
ing, in a memorandum of law, are not evidence and
cannot be the basis for the court making findings of
facts. So, all of the comments that have been made
regarding the facts of this case have never been estab-
lished to this court. So, the court cannot make findings
of fact, and therefore cannot apply the law to the facts,
because, as things stand at this moment, there are no
facts before this court. So, the motion must be dis-
missed on that basis alone.
‘‘In the alternative . . . based on the arguments that
counsel have provided, the precedents that have been
cited [related to preaccusation delay] do not appear to
apply to this particular case, which does not involve a
statute of limitations issue. As far as the plea agreement
and the claim of lack of due process, and the claim
that there was a single plea agreement, that is also not
appropriate in this instance. . . . [T]he defendant was
charged with interfering with a police officer based
upon his conduct subsequent to a motor vehicle stop,
both at the scene of [the] stop and later on at the police
station. That’s totally separate and distinct from the
operation of the motor vehicle and the offense[s] that
arose from the operation of the motor vehicle. . . .
They are separate incidents at separate times. . . .
‘‘So, [the] motion is denied based upon the fact that
I have no factual basis, [and] I have no ability to make
findings of fact. In the alternative, I would also indicate
that I do not believe the precedent set by the cases
cited applies to this case because it is not a case where
the statute of limitations is involved, and it is also not
a case where there was a single incident.’’
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State v. Rivas

Later that day, the defendant entered a conditional
plea of nolo contendere to operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The court
subsequently sentenced him to six months of incarcera-
tion, execution suspended after the mandatory forty-
eight hours to serve, followed by one year of probation.
This appeal followed.
As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of
review governing our resolution of this appeal.
‘‘Because a motion to dismiss effectively challenges the
jurisdiction of the court, asserting that the state, as a
matter of law and fact, cannot state a proper cause of
action against the defendant, our review of the court’s
legal conclusions and resulting denial of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss is de novo. . . . Factual findings
underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schimanski, 344
Conn. 435, 447, 280 A.3d 92 (2022).
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
erly denied his motion to dismiss because the preaccu-
sation delay violated his right to due process. We con-
clude that the defendant did not present a sufficient
factual basis to demonstrate a due process violation.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. ‘‘The role of due process protec-
tions with respect to preaccusation delay has been char-
acterized as a limited one. . . . [T]he [d]ue [p]rocess
[c]lause does not permit courts to abort criminal prose-
cutions simply because they disagree with a prosecu-
tor’s judgment as to when to seek an indictment. . . .
This court need only determine whether the action com-
plained of . . . violates those fundamental concep-
tions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
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State v. Rivas

political institutions . . . and which define the com-
munity’s sense of fair play and decency . . . . The due
process clause has not replaced the applicable statute
of limitations . . . [as] . . . the primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal charges. . . .
‘‘[T]o establish a due process violation because of
preaccusation delay, the defendant must show both that
actual substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and
that the reasons for the delay were wholly unjustifiable,
as where the state seeks to gain a tactical advantage
over the defendant. . . . [P]roof of prejudice is gener-
ally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due
process claim . . . . [Additionally] the due process
inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well
as the prejudice to the accused.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, 199 Conn. App. 172,
180, 235 A.3d 655, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d
281 (2020).
In the present case, the defendant argues that the
court ‘‘erred in declining to rely on uncontested repre-
sentations of counsel about the procedural history of
the case and information in the court file as the factual
basis for the legal arguments relevant to the motion to
dismiss.’’ He contends that ‘‘the preaccusation delay of
seven months that ran concurrent with . . . the eight
month prosecution of [the defendant] for crimes arising
out of the same criminal episode caused actual, substan-
tial prejudice in his ability to negotiate and knowingly
enter his [earlier] guilty plea without notice that [his]
conduct [on March 3, 2022] . . . was subject to a sepa-
rate, pending prosecution.’’ He further asserts that
‘‘[t]he prejudice suffered in this case manifested as a
disadvantage in [his] bargaining power, contradicted
his reasonable expectation that his [September 20,
2022] plea severed all subsequent criminal liability, and
damaged his ability to defend himself in both the initial
and the subsequent prosecution.’’ We are not persuaded
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State v. Rivas

that the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to
support his allegations of prejudice.
Our case law is clear that the defendant bears the
burden of ‘‘develop[ing] a record showing the reasons
for the delay and that he suffered actual prejudice
because of the delay. Only after the defendant has made
some indication on the record that the delay was wholly
unjustifiable and that he suffered actual prejudice
because of the delay can [this court] review the defen-
dant’s claim to determine whether, in fact, a constitu-
tional violation exists.’’ State v. Gay, 87 Conn. App. 806,
813–14, 867 A.2d 26, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873
A.2d 999 (2005). Conclusory statements concerning the
cause or effect of the preaccusation delay are insuffi-
cient to ‘‘substantiate either of these requirements.’’
State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 522, 498 A.2d 76 (1985);
id. (holding that trial court properly denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss because there was ‘‘a complete
absence of proof concerning the cause or effect of the
[preaccusation] delay’’); see also State v. Haynes, 8
Conn. App. 361, 364, 513 A.2d 160 (1986) (holding that
trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dis-
miss because ‘‘[n]o facts or evidence were ever pre-
sented to the court to substantiate’’ claim that preaccu-
sation delay ‘‘prejudiced the defendant or was, in any
way, connected to obtaining a tactical advantage over
him by the state’’).
The defendant in the present case presented no evi-
dence to the trial court to demonstrate that he had
suffered actual substantial prejudice as a result of the
preaccusation delay. Although defense counsel argued
before the trial court that the delay prejudiced his ability
to negotiate the earlier plea agreement and that evi-
dence relevant to the present case was ordered
destroyed at the September 20, 2022 proceeding,6 ‘‘mere
6
The defendant argues that he suffered prejudice as a result of the preaccu-
sation delay because evidence relevant to the present case was destroyed
after he pleaded guilty to interfering with an officer. To establish that evi-
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State v. Rivas

representations by counsel are not evidence.’’ State v.
Hanna, 19 Conn. App. 277, 278, 562 A.2d 549 (1989).
Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the defen-
dant had failed to present a factual record to demon-
strate that the preaccusation delay violated his right to
due process.
II
The defendant alternatively claims that the trial court
improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the
prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs violated his earlier
plea agreement. He argues that the state, in reaching
the earlier plea agreement, ‘‘induced the defendant to
reasonably believe that no further criminal liability
would flow from the same incident’’ and that the court
dence was destroyed, the defendant requests that this court take judicial
notice of the transcript from his September 20, 2022 proceeding, during
which he pleaded guilty to interfering with an officer. ‘‘The doctrine of
judicial notice is not a hard and fast one. It is modified by judicial discretion.
. . . Courts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of fact. Whether
they will do so or not depends on the nature of the subject, the issue involved
and the apparent justice of the case.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Arriaga v. Commissioner of Correction, 120 Conn. App.
258, 264, 990 A.2d 910 (2010), appeal dismissed, 303 Conn. 698, 36 A.3d 224
(2012). ‘‘As a general rule, this court will not take judicial notice of facts
that were not available to the trial court,’’ including transcripts of separate
proceedings that the defendant failed to bring to the attention of the trial
court. State v. Siano, 20 Conn. App. 369, 375, 567 A.2d 1231 (1989), aff’d,
216 Conn. 273, 579 A.2d 79 (1990).
In the present case, although the defendant raised this argument during
the motion to dismiss hearing, he never presented the transcript to the trial
court. We, therefore, decline to take judicial notice of the transcript on
appeal for the purpose of supplementing the factual record, including
whether evidence was destroyed. See id., 376 (‘‘[b]ecause the trial court
was unaware of this transcript and because it did not contain generally
known facts, we will not take judicial notice of it’’); see also Moore v.
Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. App. 487, 519, 321 A.3d 470 (declin-
ing to take judicial notice of transcripts and court file from underlying
criminal case because ‘‘we cannot . . . take judicial notice of materials for
the purpose of weighing evidence and inferring facts’’), cert. granted, 350
Conn. 924, 326 A.3d 247 (2024).
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State v. Rivas

improperly determined that the present case is distin-
guishable from State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. 215, 579
A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 826, 582 A.2d 205
(1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S. Ct. 1315, 113
L. Ed. 2d 248 (1991). We disagree that the prosecution
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs violated the earlier plea agreement.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
legal principles governing plea agreements. ‘‘Plea agree-
ments are an essential and necessary part of the admin-
istration of justice . . . . This essential tool of the
criminal justice system will lose its efficacy if the state’s
performance of the agreement is contrary to the reason-
able expectations of the defendant. . . . Because a
defendant waives several constitutional rights when
[she] elects to plead guilty to a criminal offense, the
choice of a guilty plea is of profound significance. . . .
If the state makes promises to the defendant in order
to induce a guilty plea, those promises must be fulfilled
. . . and [t]he breaking of a promise made by the prose-
cutor as a result of plea negotiations is sufficient to
invalidate a conviction.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 218–19.
‘‘It is well settled that [p]rinciples of contract law
and special due process concerns for fairness govern
our interpretation of plea agreements. . . . [T]he pri-
mary goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the
intent of the parties . . . . In ascertaining that intent,
we employ an objective standard and look to what the
parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the
plea agreement on the basis of their words and conduct,
and in light of the circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the agreement and the purposes they sought
to accomplish.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Kallberg, 326 Conn. 1, 14–15,
160 A.3d 1034 (2017).
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State v. Rivas

In Nelson, ‘‘the defendant was driving . . . when she
lost control of her vehicle . . . and struck . . . [the]
victim . . . . The defendant . . . was subsequently
charged, inter alia, with assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle . . . . [Before trial] defense coun-
sel, the state’s attorney and . . . the attorney who rep-
resented the victim and his family, met in a pretrial
conference with the trial judge in his chambers to dis-
cuss a plea agreement. At that conference, [the attorney
for the victim and his family] informed all present that
the victim was still hospitalized in grave condition and
that he might not live. At the conclusion of the confer-
ence, the trial judge indicated that he would accept the
plea. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the assault
charge pursuant to the agreement.’’ State v. Nelson,
supra, 23 Conn. App. 216. ‘‘The victim [subsequently]
died from his injuries . . . [and] a warrant was issued
for the defendant’s arrest on the charge of manslaughter
in the second degree with a motor vehicle. The defen-
dant moved to dismiss the information on the grounds
that . . . the state had waived any rights to bring addi-
tional charges when it agreed to the [earlier] plea bar-
gain. . . . The [trial] court concluded that it would not
hold the state to predicting the victim’s death, and it
denied the motion to dismiss.’’ Id., 217.
On appeal, ‘‘the defendant argue[d] that the agree-
ment under which she pleaded guilty to assault barred
her reprosecution on a manslaughter charge because,
in bargaining for the plea, the state induced in her a
reasonable belief that no further charges would be
brought if the victim were to die. She argue[d] that
the second prosecution thus violated her due process
guarantees.’’ Id., 217–18. In considering this claim, this
court stated: ‘‘Where, as here, there is a dispute as to
the terms of a plea agreement, our analysis turns on
the real intent of the parties, and most significantly, of
[the defendant] . . . . The defendant argues that she
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State v. Rivas

reasonably believed that the plea agreement terminated
all her criminal liability flowing from the accident.
Despite the state’s silence as to what would happen if
the victim died, its conduct strongly implied that it
shared the defendant’s interpretation of the plea agree-
ment. The trial court found that the parties were aware
of the victim’s precarious condition. While it is true that
at the sentencing hearing the victim’s mother spoke of
his eventual recovery, the state and the defendant had
to be aware that this was by no means a certainty.
Under the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the
state to enunciate what was and was not covered by
the agreement lest the defendant be allowed to go to
plea under the impression that the criminal portion of
this tragic episode was closed. If the state was reserving
a right to reprosecute in the event of the victim’s death,
it could have, and should have, said so. It did not even
remotely imply that this was its intent.
‘‘We take particular note of the fact that, at the conclu-
sion of the [earlier] sentencing, the state moved to have
certain evidence in the case destroyed. . . . The
destruction of any evidence seized at a crime scene is
consistent with a belief that no further charges will be
brought and lends credence to the defendant’s claim
that she reasonably believed her plea ended her criminal
liability. Furthermore, we think it significant that the
parties agreed to a specific term of imprisonment. We
question whether the defendant would have given her
assent to a prison term if she thought that additional,
more serious charges could be brought later.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 219–20. The court concluded that,
‘‘[u]nder the facts of this case . . . it would be unjust
to the defendant for us to vacate her plea when she
has already been punished for the crime to which [she]
confessed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
220–21. This court, therefore, reversed the defendant’s
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State v. Rivas

judgment of conviction of manslaughter in the second
degree with a motor vehicle. Id., 221.
The defendant argues that the present case is similar
to Nelson because, (1) ‘‘at the time of the interfering
guilty plea, the state moved for evidence to be
destroyed’’; (2) ‘‘the parties agreed to a specific term
of seven months of imprisonment at the initial plea’’;
and (3) ‘‘the state, during the prosecution of the interfer-
ing charge and negotiation of the plea, never implied
or indicated to the court or defense counsel that it was
its intent to bring additional charges arising from the
incident.’’ We are not persuaded.
In the present case, the defendant’s conduct during
the March 3, 2022 incident gave rise to different types
of criminal liability. The charge of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
was based on, inter alia, the following observations
of the police officers present on March 3, 2022: the
defendant’s vehicle was stopped in the middle of a
roadway; the defendant was in the driver’s seat of the
vehicle with the ignition turned on; the defendant admit-
ted to an officer that he had used PCP earlier that
evening; and the defendant exhibited behavior and
symptoms consistent with PCP use. Additionally, the
defendant had previously pleaded guilty to two counts
of interfering with an officer, one of which was prem-
ised on, inter alia, the following observations of the
officers present on March 3, 2022: the defendant did
not comply with the officers’ orders to remain in his
vehicle and to remove his hands from his pocket; the
defendant made fists with his hands and puffed out his
chest; the defendant stated, ‘‘what,’’ and, ‘‘I run this
shit,’’ to the officers; the defendant attempted to punch
an officer in the face; and the defendant struggled
against the officers while they placed him in the patrol
car and when they asked him to exit the patrol car at
the station. As this court indicated in Nelson, the issue of
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
State v. Rivas

whether the subsequent prosecution violated the earlier
plea agreement turns on the intent of the defendant
and the state in entering into the agreement.
Unlike the defendant in Nelson, the defendant in the
present case has not presented any evidence to suggest
that he reasonably believed that his earlier plea agree-
ment, which concerned only interfering with an officer,
terminated all his criminal liability flowing from his
conduct on March 3, 2022. He has not, for example,
identified any statements or conduct by the state during
the plea negotiations implying that it would not sepa-
rately prosecute the defendant for additional criminal
liability related to his operation of the motor vehicle.
Although the defendant asserts that the state moved to
destroy evidence related to the present case at the time
that he pleaded guilty to interfering with an officer, the
defendant has not provided a sufficient factual basis
for this allegation. See footnote 6 of this opinion. Even
if the fact that the defendant agreed to a specific term
of imprisonment supports a belief that the earlier plea
agreement covered all criminal liability arising from
the March 3, 2022 incident, the defendant has failed to
present any evidence that the state induced that belief.
Moreover, the fact that the state did not enunciate its
intention to prosecute the defendant for additional
criminal liability does not, by itself, give rise to a reason-
able belief that it would not do so. See In re Keijam
T., 226 Conn. 497, 507, 628 A.2d 562 (1993) (rejecting
as overbroad defendant’s argument that, pursuant to
Nelson, ‘‘the state is estopped from charging a greater
offense than that pleaded to in relation to a particular
incident if the state has failed to reserve the right to
future prosecution in a plea agreement’’).
Because the defendant has not presented any evi-
dence to establish a reasonable belief that the earlier
plea agreement terminated all his criminal liability flow-
ing from his conduct on March 3, 2022, we conclude
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State v. Rivas

that the prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs did not violate
the earlier plea agreement. Therefore, the trial court
properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.