In re Noah R.-R. (Appendix)

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In re Noah R.-R.

APPENDIX
IN RE NOAH R.-R.*
Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Juvenile Matters
File No. CP-21-019080-A

Memorandum filed December 19, 2024

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on petitioner’s motion to
terminate respondent father’s parental rights with
respect to his minor child. Petition granted.
Chelsea Ruzzo, assistant attorney general, for the
petitioner.
Joshua D. Michtom, assigned counsel, for the respon-
dent father.
Micoya G. Hutchins, assigned counsel, for the
minor child.
Opinion

HON. STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, JUDGE TRIAL REF-
EREE.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On March 7, 2023, the Commissioner of Children and
Families (commissioner) filed a petition in this court
to terminate the parental rights of [the respondents]
Madelei R. and Jorge R.-M. to the minor child [Noah].1
Trial of a TPR petition brought by the commissioner
in this court for a child in the [Department of Children
and Families’] custody is governed by General Statutes
* Affirmed. In re Noah R.-R., 233 Conn. App. 522, A.3d (2025).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book §§ 32-7 (a)
and 79a-12, the names of the parents and child in this matter will not be
disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection
only to persons having a proper interest therein, and upon order of the court.
1
For brevity’s sake, the court will sometimes refer to the petition for
termination of parental rights as a ‘‘TPR’’ petition.
In re Noah R.-R.
2
§ 17a-112. As grounds for termination, the petition
alleged failure to rehabilitate after an adjudication of
neglect and acts of omission or commission against
both respondents pursuant to subsections (j) (3) (B)
(i) and (C) of [§ 17a-112].

Neither respondent was present for the initial hearing
in the Superior Court on the termination petition and
they were both defaulted that day for not appearing,
2
General Statutes § 17a-112 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In respect to
any child in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in
accordance with section 46b-129, either the commissioner, or the attorney
who represented such child in a pending or prior proceeding, or an attorney
appointed by the Superior Court on its own motion, or an attorney retained
by such child after attaining the age of fourteen, may petition the court for
the termination of parental rights with reference to such child. . . . (i) The
Superior Court . . . may grant a petition for termination of parental rights
based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear
and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child,
and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination
of the parent’s parental rights with respect to such child. . . . (j) The Supe-
rior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and
Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify
the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-
111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is
not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section
17a-111b . . . that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the
best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by
the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or
uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has
been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to
the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child; [or] (C) the child has
been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission
including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe
physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary
for the child’s physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except
that nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a
child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission
or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights . . . . ’’
In re Noah R.-R.

but the court subsequently vacated those defaults when
the respondents did appear on May 9, 2023. That day,
both respondents were advised of their rights and
entered denials to the allegations of the petition. In due
course the case was assigned for trial before this judge
on May 7, 2024. On that date the commissioner with-
drew the petition as to the respondent Madelei R. Trial
on the TPR petition against Mr. R.-M. was continued
one week, until May 14, 2024.
On that later date, Mr. R.-M. submitted a plea of nolo
contendere to the adjudicatory allegations contained in
the termination petition. More specifically, he pleaded
nolo contendere to the following allegations in the peti-
tion:
• That the Department of Children and Families
(DCF or department) made reasonable efforts to locate
him and to reunify Noah with him;
• That Mr. R.-M. had been unwilling or unable to
benefit from reunification efforts;
• That DCF did not need to prove reasonable efforts
to reunify because the Superior Court for Juvenile Mat-
ters had previously approved a permanency plan for
Noah other than reunification;
• That Noah had previously been found neglected,
and after being provided specific steps Mr. R.-M. failed
to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that
would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
time, considering the age and needs of the child, he
could assume a [responsible] position in Noah’s life; and
• That Noah had been denied, by reason of an act
or acts of parental commission or omission, including
but not limited to . . . severe physical abuse or a pat-
tern of abuse . . . the care, guidance or control neces-
sary for [his] physical, educational, moral or emotional
well-being.
In re Noah R.-R.

After canvassing Mr. R.-M. thoroughly on his plea,
this court found that he had waived his right to trial on
adjudicatory issues and accepted his plea but reserved
making formal findings until issuance of its final deci-
sion. The court then proceeded to evidence on the
child’s best interest. The commissioner presented testi-
mony from DCF social worker Krista Westerman, and
the father also testified. In addition, the commissioner
introduced the following exhibits into evidence without
objection:
• Affidavit of DCF Social Worker Berta Ramos, dated
October 29, 2021 (exhibit (ex.) A);
• Neglect Social Study dated January 18, 2022 (ex. B);
• Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated July
7, 2022 (ex. C);
• Social Study in Support of Petition for Termination
of Parental Rights dated March 6, 2023 (ex. D);
• Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated August
8, 2023 (ex. E);
• Addendum to Social Study in Support of Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights dated December 12,
2023 (ex. F);
• Addendum to Social Study in Support of Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights dated March 26, 2024
(ex. G);
• Respondent father’s Specific Steps (ex. H);
• Psychological Consultation conducted by Dr. Inés
Schroeder, Psy.D., dated September 21, 2023 (ex. I);
• Respondent father’s Certified Conviction Criminal
History dated April 11, 2024 (ex. J);
• East Hartford Police Department Case/Incident
Report of Officer Brian Altamirano signed on November
In re Noah R.-R.

28, 2021, and two Supplementary Case/Incident Reports
of Officer Briahna Martin signed on November 29, 2021,
and April 26, 2022; (ex. K); and
• Affidavit of Dr. Nina Livingston, employed at the
Connecticut Children’s Specialty Group at Connecticut
Children’s Medical Center (CCMC), dated October 27,
2021 (ex. L).
Following the conclusion of evidence, the parties sub-
mitted written briefs. Upon review of those briefs, it
became apparent that the parties were operating under
different factual assumptions. The commissioner’s brief
made clear that the department was assuming that the
respondent father’s guilty plea and conviction on risk
of injury charges related to Noah’s injuries were compo-
nents of the petitioner’s proof that he had caused the
many injuries inflicted on Noah. See, e.g., Petitioner’s
trial brief, p. 2 (The respondent ‘‘failed to take account-
ability for and demonstrate insight as to the injuries he
inflicted upon Noah . . . . His repeated refusal to take
accountability for Noah’s injuries, even while he sits in
prison for this crime, is a serious child protection con-
cern for the department.’’); id., p. 14 (‘‘[e]qually, if not
more, concerning is the fact the respondent-father
refuses to take accountability for the injuries he
inflicted upon Noah’’). The respondent father’s trial
brief, on the other hand, asserted that the guilty plea
he entered into criminal court on the risk of injury
charges based on Noah’s injuries was pursuant to the
so-called Alford doctrine that permits a criminal defen-
dant to plead guilty without admitting actual guilt.3
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970). ‘‘The Alford doctrine allows a defendant to plead guilty without
admitting guilt. In pleading guilty, however, the defendant acknowledges
that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to
accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Boscarino, 86 Conn. App. 447, 451 n.4, 861 A.2d 579 (2004). ‘‘United States
Supreme Court cases have described Alford pleas as permitting a defendant
to plead guilty while protesting innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 69 n.8, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2002); Henderson v.
In re Noah R.-R.

There was no evidence offered at trial, however, that
the defendant had entered his guilty plea under the
Alford doctrine. The respondent’s brief was the first
reference of which the court is aware of his guilty plea
having been entered under that doctrine. The court
thus ordered supplemental briefing, which the court
considered necessary for a well reasoned decision.4 The
court also inquired of the parties whether they sought
the court to take judicial notice of the criminal proceed-
ing. Since then, the court has also received a transcript
of the trial. The last brief has now been filed, and the
court has taken judicial notice of the defendant’s Alford
plea and conviction in the criminal proceeding. Since
neither of the parents claimed Native American ances-
try, the federal and state Indian Child Welfare Acts do
not apply here. The court is not aware of proceedings
pending in any other court regarding the custody of
this child and has jurisdiction. The matter is now ready
for decision.
In considering the evidence, the court must assess
the credibility and weight of the evidence presented
and may also consider judicially noticed facts. The trial
court is not required to accept as true the testimony of
any witness, the contents of exhibits, or the information
contained in judicially noticed facts. ‘‘The sifting and
weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the
trier [of fact]. . . . The trier is free to accept or reject,
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 648 n.1, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976) (White,
Stewart, Blackmun and Powell, Js., concurring).’’ White v. Warden, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2011 WL 4347030, *5 n.17 (Conn. Super. August 17,
2011) (Bright, J.), aff’d, 145 Conn. App. 834, 77 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 310
Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013).
4
See Cowles v. Cowles, 71 Conn. App. 24, 26, 799 A.2d 1119 (2002) (holding
that 120 day time limit set forth in General Statutes § 51-183b for rendering
of opinion after trial of cause ‘‘begins to run from the date that the parties
file posttrial briefs or other material that the court finds necessary for a
well reasoned decision’’); see also Frank v. Streeter, 192 Conn. 601, 604–605,
472 A.2d 1281 (1984) (same); Bramwell v. Dept. of Correction, 82 Conn.
App. 483, 488, 844 A.2d 957 (2004) (same).
In re Noah R.-R.

in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.
. . . That determination of credibility is a function of
the trial court.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61
Conn. App. 329, 333, 764 A.2d 199 (2001).
The court has carefully considered the petition and
the totality of the evidence, assessed the credibility
of the two witnesses who testified and the exhibits
introduced into evidence, and considered the informa-
tion and materials judicially noticed according to the
standards required by law. The testimony of social
worker Westerman is found to be consistent with the
information contained in the exhibits or judicially
noticed, and that testimony and the contents of the
exhibits are found to be consistent and credible. The
father’s testimony focused on his explanation of why
he had pleaded guilty and his hope ‘‘to be a resource’’
for his son in the future. See trial transcript, p. 71–72.
Upon such consideration, and for the reasons described
below, the court finds that the following facts were
proven at trial by clear and convincing evidence.
I
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Under subsections (j) (1) and (3) of [§ 17a-112], in a
contested proceeding the commissioner must prove by
clear and convincing evidence both a statutory ground
for termination of parental rights and that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and
reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds
that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts or another statutory exception.
That portion of the trial is referred to as the adjudicatory
phase of the proceeding. See In re Michael R., 49 Conn.
App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn.
In re Noah R.-R.

919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998); In re William R. III, 65 Conn.
App. 538, 546, 782 A.2d 1262 (2001).
Subsection (j) (2) of [§ 17a-112] then requires clear
and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interest. ‘‘If the trial court determines that
a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds
to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase,
the trial court determines whether clear and convincing
evidence has proven that termination is in the best
interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn. App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d
1112 (1998). In making the dispositional decision in a
contested TPR proceeding, the court is required to
make and consider findings regarding seven factors
specified in § 17a-112 (k). See, e.g., In re Tabitha P.,
39 Conn. App. 353, 362, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
II
FACTS
Noah was born on August 18, 2021. For the first two
months of his life, he lived in East Hartford, Connecti-
cut, with his mother and father, the respondents named
in the termination petition. On October 25, 2021, his
parents took him to their pediatrician’s office, where
they reported swelling on his upper left thigh. An x-ray
there showed a fracture to his left femur. Both parents
told the doctor that they did not know the cause of the
injury but said that the father had been caring for the
child for the last two days while the mother worked.
The child was then taken by ambulance to [CCMC].
After x-rays and physical examination of the child there,
doctors found bruising to the left side of jaw and neck
and twenty-one fractures in various stages of healing.
The fractures were to Noah’s collar bone, ribs, upper
arm, forearms, one hand, fingers, thigh, lower legs, and
feet. Many of the injuries were more than ten days old,
others more than two weeks old, some between two
In re Noah R.-R.

and four weeks old, and one at least four weeks old. X-
rays of the left thigh showed a ‘‘comminuted fracture,’’
which the CCMC [Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect
Program] (SCAN) reported meant an ‘‘upper thigh break
with multiple pieces.’’ Ex. L, p. 12.
The doctor’s office, the Manchester Police Depart-
ment, and an EMT from the Manchester Fire Depart-
ment all made reports to DCF’s Careline about Noah’s
injuries, and the department assigned investigators to
assess the situation. East Hartford police officers also
began an investigation. The evidence contains informa-
tion about what the parents have said about the events
that led them to take Noah to the pediatrician on Octo-
ber 25, 2021. These include statements they both made
to the DCF investigating social worker on October 26,
what the father told Dr. Tokumi at CCMC and both
parents said to Dr. Livingston there on October 26,
what the parents said to East Hartford Police Officer
Altamirano in the late evening hours of October 25, or
early morning hours of October 26, what they later said
to East Hartford Police Officer Martin on October 26,
and what the mother told Officer Martin on February
21, 2022. Neither the parents nor any of the relatives
who sometimes cared for Noah have provided any
explanation for the injuries, except that Mr. R.-M. said
that earlier that evening he had dropped Noah while
bathing him in the sink, and both parents reported a
minor motor vehicle accident two weeks earlier during
which Noah had been in his car seat. Doctors have
discounted either of those incidents as the likely causes
of the many injuries to Noah.
When asked about the day in question, both parents
said that the mother had worked from 4 a.m. to 2 p.m.,
and the father had cared for the child in her absence.
(He later told police that ‘‘he works for a landscaping
company and due to the weather they were not work-
ing’’ that day. Ex. K, p. K-6.) The father had put the
In re Noah R.-R.

child in a car seat, picked the mother up from work,
and they all returned home. Both parents told DCF
that the father had been worried about Noah being
constipated and had called the pediatrician’s office that
day for advice. The father left the home for a while and
while out received a call back from the pediatrician,
and he later told police that, ‘‘when he returned home,
he began doing what the doctor recommended. Jorge
stated that he gave [Noah] 2 ounces of water, rubbed his
stomach, and performed bicycle motions with [Noah]’s
legs, then gave him a bath in the kitchen sink. Jorge
stated that [Noah] seemed to be uncomfortable when
he was performing the bicycle/pedaling motions but
was not crying. Jorge stated that after the bath he put
[Noah] to sleep and everyone in the house fell asleep.
Jorge stated that he was awaken by [Noah] crying. Jorge
stated that he went to change [Noah’s] diaper to see if
the doctor’s recommendations had worked. Jorge
stated when he was changing [Noah’s] [diaper] he
noticed his leg was swollen. Jorge stated that [Noah’s]
leg did not look like that when he had bathed him hours
before. Jorge stated that he showed Madelei and they
decided to take him to the hospital.’’ Ex. K, p. 6. (The
father said something slightly different to DCF: ‘‘Father
stated that he put his baby in the sink like the doctor’s
office advised, placed a towel around the sink as a
cushion and he gave him a bath and then moved his
legs like a bicycle.’’ Ex. A, p. 5.) CCMC confirmed that
the advice given by the primary care physician had been
‘‘bicycling legs, warm cloth on bottom, use thermome-
ter, one ounce of water.’’ Ex. L, p. 3.

Dr. Nina Livingston, from the CCMC SCAN program,
told DCF that ‘‘normal handling’’ of an infant would not
have caused these fractures, and that pain responses
such as crying and/or screaming would have been
expected from Noah after these various injuries. The
In re Noah R.-R.

doctors told DCF that the injuries were ‘‘highly suspi-
cious for inflicted injury.’’ Ex. A, p. 9. The fracture to
the left femur ‘‘would have required bending force.’’ Ex.
K, p. 13. Dr. Livingston later told the police that Noah
had sustained no new bone fractures while at CCMC,
thereby ‘‘showing that day to day handling’’ would not
have caused the ones detected at CCMC and negating
underlying ‘‘bone fragility issues’’ as their cause. Id.
The department decided to seek an order of tempo-
rary custody (OTC) and file a petition under General
Statutes § 46b-129 alleging that the child was neglected,
by being denied proper care and attention and living
under conditions injurious to his well-being, and abused
by having physical injuries inflicted by other than acci-
dental means and that were at variance with the history
given of them. The OTC was granted and the petition
filed on October 29, 2021.
Both parents appeared with counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing on the OTC held on November 5, 2021.
They were advised of their rights, entered pro forma
denials to the allegations of the petition, but agreed for
the OTC to be sustained. On July 20, 2022, both parents
entered nolo contendere pleas to the two allegations
of neglect, and Noah was adjudicated to have been
neglected and committed to the commissioner. On
March 7, 2023, the commissioner then filed the pending
TPR petition.
On June 3, 2022, Mr. R.-M. was arrested by East Hart-
ford police on charges of assault in the second degree
and risk of injury to a minor in connection with the
injuries inflicted on Noah. On November 29, 2023, he
entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine and was
convicted of the risk of injury charge, for which he
received a sentence of three years [of] incarceration,
suspended after eighteen months, with three years [of]
probation.
In re Noah R.-R.

III
ADJUDICATION
Mr. R.-M. having entered a plea of nolo contendere
to the adjudicatory allegations, Practice Book § 35a-1
(b) provides guidance on how the court should proceed.
That section provides in relevant part as follows: ‘‘An
admission to allegations or a plea of nolo contendere
may be accepted by the judicial authority. Before
accepting an admission or plea of nolo contendere, the
judicial authority shall determine whether the right to
trial has been waived, and that the parties understand
the content and consequences of their admission or
plea. If the allegations are admitted or the plea accepted,
the judicial authority shall make its adjudicatory finding
as to the validity of the facts alleged in the petition and
may proceed to a dispositional hearing. . . .’’ Practice
Book § 35a-1 (b). The court has reviewed the allegations
in the petition and considered the evidence provided in
the exhibits and through the testimony of social worker
Westerman and the respondent father. The information
contained in the exhibits is found to be consistent with
the testimony of social worker Westerman, and her
testimony and the contents of the exhibits are found
credible and proven to be true. The following facts
alleged in the petition, including those set forth in the
summary of facts and incorporated into the petition,
are found to state a sufficient and valid factual basis
for the adjudicatory allegations contained in the peti-
tion, and, by virtue of the evidence presented at trial,
were also proven by clear and convincing evidence:5
5
The meaning of the requirement contained in Practice Book § 35a-1 (b)
that the court should ‘‘make its adjudicatory finding as to the validity of
the facts alleged in the petition’’ (emphasis added) is not clear. In criminal
cases in this state, ‘‘a factual basis is not required to be established to accept
a nolo contendere plea.’’ State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981).
That same case states, however, that a court may nonetheless ‘‘in [its]
discretion . . . [insist] upon the establishment of a factual basis before
accepting a nolo plea.’’ Id., 365 n.13. In accepting the father’s plea of nolo
contendere here, this court stated as follows:
In re Noah R.-R.

• That [DCF] made reasonable efforts to locate Mr.
R.-M. and to reunify Noah with him;
• That Mr. R.-M. was unwilling or unable to benefit
from reunification efforts;
• That DCF did not need to prove reasonable efforts
to reunify because the Superior Court for Juvenile Mat-
ters previously approved, on October 25, 2022, a perma-
nency plan for Noah other than reunification;
• That pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) Noah had
previously been found neglected on July 20, 2022, and
after being provided specific steps Mr. R.-M. failed to
achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, con-
sidering the age and needs of the child, he could assume
a [responsible] position in Noah’s life; and
• That pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C) Noah had
been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental
commission or omission, including but not limited to
severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care,
guidance or control necessary for [his] physical, educa-
tional, moral or emotional well-being.
IV
DISPOSITION
‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
‘‘Upon a review of the allegations contained in the petition and in the
Summary of Facts, the court finds that they say that sufficient and valid
basis for the findings so alleged. And the court will accept the plea. And
the court will find that—actually, I’ll reserve the findings—specific findings
until my written decision.’’ Trial transcript, p. 16. In so stating, the court
reserved its right to find a factual basis for the respondent’s plea. Moreover,
such findings, even if unnecessary for making an adjudicatory determination
or accepting the respondent’s plea, are also pertinent to the court’s disposi-
tional findings in this case.
In re Noah R.-R.

Davonta V., 98 Conn. App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006),
aff’d, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). In finding
during the dispositional phase that it is in Noah’s best
interest for the parental rights of his father to be termi-
nated, the court has considered the evidence and testi-
mony related to circumstances and events up to and
including the date upon which the evidence in this mat-
ter was concluded.
A
Statutory Termination Factors
In making the dispositional decision regarding
whether to terminate a respondent’s parental rights to
this child in a contested termination proceeding, § 17a-
112 (k) requires the court to consider and make written
findings regarding seven factors specified in that stat-
ute. ‘‘The . . . factors serve simply as guidelines for
the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need
to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .
There is no requirement that each factor be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) In
re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 261, 829 A.2d 855
(2003).
1. ‘‘The timeliness, nature and extent of services
offered, provided and made available to the parent
and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion
of the child with the parent’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (1).
DCF offered timely and appropriate services to the
respondent to facilitate reunion with Noah. These
included referrals for individual counseling, supervised
visitations through the Quality Parenting Center [QPC]
at the Village, fatherhood engagement services at the
Village, and, after a six month hiatus in visitation
because of a protective order entered after he was
arrested, DCF supervised visits. After the mother dis-
closed intimate partner violence with Mr. R.-M., the
department referred him for domestic violence services
In re Noah R.-R.

at the Radiance program and later at [Community
Health Resource’s (CHR)] [Intimate Partner Violence
(IPV)] Fair program. The department also asked the
court to order a psychological evaluation, with one of
the purposes being to assess whether the father needed
treatment for domestic violence, substance abuse, or
mental health.
2. ‘‘[W]hether [DCF] has made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended’’—
§ 17a-112 (k) (2).
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Noah with
his father. It offered him regular visitation except for
the period of the protective order and referred him to
various reunification services.
3. ‘‘[T]he terms of any applicable court order
entered into and agreed upon by any individual or
agency and the parent, and the extent to which all
parties have fulfilled their obligations under such
order’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (3).
The specific steps ordered when children are
removed from parental custody or committed to the
department inform the parent of the actions that the
parent needs to take to regain custody and avoid termi-
nation of their parental rights. As the Appellate Court
noted in In re Shane M., 148 Conn. App. 308, 329, 84
A.3d 1265 (2014), aff’d, 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247
(2015), ‘‘[t]he specific steps are a benchmark by which
the court will measure the respondent’s conduct to
determine whether termination is appropriate pursuant
to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) See also In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644,
661, 953 A.2d 668 (2008) (same). Specific steps were
ordered on several occasions6 for Mr. R.-M. to undertake
6
The only specific steps introduced into evidence were those ordered by
this judge on December 5, 2022, after approving a permanency plan for
termination of parental rights and adoption. The court is also taking judicial
In re Noah R.-R.

in order to facilitate the return of Noah to his custody,
and he has complied as set forth below and as otherwise
detailed in this decision:
• Keep all appointments set by or with DCF.
Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or
unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)’s court-
appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.
Mr. R.-M. participated in at least two departmental
administrative case reviews, but would not agree to
allow DCF to conduct home visits without his attorney
being present.
• Keep whereabouts known to DCF, the child’s
attorney and your attorney.
Father generally complied, although one time he did
not promptly notify the department of changing his
address.
• Keep DCF apprised of any changes in the com-
position of your household members.
Mr. R.-M. has complied with this step and notified
the department when the mother and he did and did
not reside together.
• Take part in parenting and individual coun-
seling, make progress toward the identified treat-
ment goals, and cooperate with recommended ser-
vice providers.
The preliminary specific steps ordered at the time of
the ex parte OTC on October 19, 2021, directed Mr. R.-
M. to participate in individual therapy at Wheeler Clinic
or another provider and to participate in parenting ser-
vices. The goals identified on the specific steps form
were for him to demonstrate appropriate coping skills
and safe and appropriate parenting abilities. The final
notice of the contents of the specific steps entered as part of the underlying
§ 46b-129 proceeding.
In re Noah R.-R.

specific steps ordered upon Noah’s adjudication as
neglected and his commitment on July 20, 2022, again
ordered Mr. R.-M. to participate in parenting and indi-
vidual counseling. The final specific steps form identi-
fied the [QPC] at the Village for supervised visitation
and parenting services, fatherhood engagement ser-
vices through the Village, and [CHR] for parenting, men-
tal health and or substance use assessments. The July
20, 2022 final specific steps amended his goals in coun-
seling by adding for him to ‘‘provide home free of vio-
lence/abuse that meets child’s needs.’’
When DCF first began investigating Noah’s injuries,
Ms. R. told social worker investigator Paramentier that
after dating the father for five months she had intended
to end their relationship, which she described as having
a ‘‘lot of arguments when they were both jealous of each
other’’ although, she claimed, without any violence. Ex.
A, p. 6. She said that, ‘‘when she found out she was
pregnant, she and father had decided to try to make
it work as they were going to have a baby’’ but the
relationship since then had been ‘‘very stressful’’ since
father often did not have stable employment. Id. She
also told Paramentier that she had been in the process
of signing a new lease for a different apartment where
she would live just with Noah and the father would
live elsewhere. She made similar statements at CCMC
(‘‘Living situation: Child shares a home with his mother
and father. . . . Mother and father will be leaving their
current home at the end of this month. Mother will be
renting her own apartment . . . and father reports he
will most likely move in with his mother.’’ Ex. L, p. 4).
Despite those statements, however, the parents contin-
ued to live together until Mr. R.-M. was arrested on the
charges relating to Noah’s injuries.
The first therapist that the parents saw at CHR con-
tacted DCF on the day that Mr. R.-M. was arrested. The
therapist said that, ‘‘during therapy sessions, Ms. [R.]
In re Noah R.-R.

discussed being a victim of intimate partner violence.’’
She told the therapist that she had ended her relation-
ship with Mr. R.-M. upon his arrest. She also told the
therapist that she had been afraid to leave Mr. R.-M.
‘‘because she felt she needed him since she did not
know English well.’’ Ex. C, p. 11. The therapist told
DCF that Ms. R. had said that she needed help obtaining
housing that was separate from Mr. R.-M. Ms. [R.] had
also ‘‘reported Mr. R.-M. was stalking her on social
media and she reported blocking him from contacting
her.’’ The therapist told the department that, when she
encouraged Ms. [R.] to contact the police department
regarding the stalking, ‘‘she reported to her therapist
. . . that Mr. [R.-M.] threatened to have her deported
if she reported him to the police department.’’ Id. When
the therapist called Ms. R. to provide her with informa-
tion on intimate partner violence services, the therapist
heard Mr. R.-M.’s voice in the background, and when
the therapist attempted to address that with Ms. [R.],
she put the phone on mute and insisted Mr. R.-M. was
not there. Id. The therapist told DCF that Mr. R.-M.
‘‘[appeared] to be obsessed’’ with Ms. R., even to the
point of one time showing up at CHR during her appoint-
ment time. Id., 7.
Neither the October, 2021 nor the July, 2022 specific
steps contained any orders regarding intimate partner
violence. For example, the boxes on the specific steps
form to cooperate with restraining or protective orders
or DCF safety plans, to attend and complete an appro-
priate domestic violence program, and to address inti-
mate partner violence issues with a qualified therapist
were not checked on either order. After the department
had obtained the information recited above about inti-
mate partner violence in the parents’ relationship, the
court amended the order of final specific steps on
December 5, 2022. A copy of those specific steps was
entered into evidence as exhibit H. They included new
In re Noah R.-R.

orders for Mr. R.-M. to cooperate with any restraining
or protective order or DCF-approved safety plans, to
attend and complete an appropriate domestic violence
program, and to address intimate partner violence/
domestic violence with a qualified therapist. The goals
of his parenting and individual counseling were revised
to include that he should ‘‘demonstrate an understand-
ing of how intimate partner violence and physical abuse
impacts the child.’’ A new service provider was identi-
fied for him, Radiance-Innovative Services for Intimate
Partner Violence Offenders Services.
Mental health treatment: Mr. R.-M. did not consis-
tently attend or benefit from the individual therapy
ordered in the specific steps. He began therapy at CHR
in April, 2022, but stopped attending after two months.
After a six month lapse, he resumed therapy at CHR in
mid-September, 2022. His CHR sessions were modified
to biweekly in mid-February, 2023. Between September,
2022, and April, 2023, he missed seventeen of his
appointments. In April, 2023, his therapist at CHR told
DCF that her sessions with Mr. R.-M. were going to end
and there would be a gap in services for approximately
six weeks while another therapist was assigned, but
Mr. R.-M. did not resume therapy. He told DCF that he
stopped attending because he expected to be incarcer-
ated soon. Dr. Schroeder, who conducted the court-
ordered psychological evaluation, concluded that he
made only limited progress in his therapy because he
is ‘‘hard to engage,’’ has difficulty trusting his therapist,
and had attended therapy intermittently. She also
reported that he frequently blames other people for his
own problems, struggles to accept responsibility for his
actions, and has difficulty accepting critiques of his
actions. The contents of her evaluation contained in
exhibit I and its conclusions are consistent with the
other evidence about Mr. R.-M. and are found to be
credible.
In re Noah R.-R.

Domestic violence/intimate partner violence
services: The Radiance program mentioned in the spe-
cific steps is one that requires participants to refer
themselves. DCF gave him information about that pro-
gram, but Mr. R.-M. never went there. Later, DCF
referred him and Ms. R. to CHR’s IPV Fair program,
which works separately with both members of a couple
experiencing intimate partner violence, but one require-
ment of that program is that participants admit to having
experienced such issues in their relationship. Mr. R.-
M. has always denied any violence or issues of coercive
control in that relationship. He did tell DCF that he was
willing to participate in the program, however, as did
Ms. R., but initially neither of them was willing to
acknowledge domestic violence as an issue. In October,
2023, Ms. R. admitted to her therapist and DCF that
coercive control was a component of her relationship
with Mr. R., and the following month she filed for and
obtained a restraining order against him, which was
extended in July, 2024, for another year. While that
restraining order has been in effect, Mr. R.-M. has
repeatedly contacted her in violation of the order. Mr.
R.-M. never began any services at CHR IPV Fair before
he was imprisoned. The evidence shows that he has
made no progress on addressing these issues.
Parenting Services: DCF referred Mr. R.-M. to the
supervised visitation program at the [QPC], where he
participated between November, 2021, and May, 2022.
A protective order then prevented him from having any
contact with Noah until November, 2022, when DCF
was allowed to supervise his visits, after which it pro-
vided weekly visits until he was incarcerated. He also
attended and completed fatherhood engagement ser-
vices at the Village between May and August of 2022.
Social worker Westerman testified that he is always
appropriate and affectionate during his visits with
Noah. She said that Noah appears comfortable with Mr.
In re Noah R.-R.

R.-M., but not bonded with him. Westerman said that,
until Mr. R.-M. was incarcerated in February, 2024, he
had been having weekly visitations for ‘‘the better part
of a year’’ without concerns. Dr. Schroeder observed
him interacting with Noah as part of her evaluation,
and she commented that ‘‘he offered some positive ele-
ments of parenting that included engagement, support,
nurturance, grooming, and items for play. . . .’’ Ex. I,
p. 27.
• Submit to substance abuse assessment and
follow treatment recommendations; submit to
random drug testing if recommended; do not use
illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine.
DCF never asked Mr. R.-M. to engage in a substance
abuse assessment. The August, 2023 MRP social study
said he always appeared sober during interactions with
the department and that DCF had no concerns related
to substance abuse on his part. See ex. E, p. 8.
• Accept and cooperate with in-home support
services referred by DCF and make progress
toward treatment goals.
DCF did not offer or refer the father to any ‘‘in-home
support services.’’
• Cooperate with any active protective or
restraining orders; avoid more incidents of
domestic violence; attend and complete a domes-
tic violence program; address intimate partner
violence issues with a qualified therapist.
The father did not comply. After Ms. R. obtained a
restraining order against him, he repeatedly contacted
her in violation of the terms of that order. He never
attended or completed a domestic violence program.
• Visit with the child(ren) as often as DCF per-
mits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child
interaction during visits. Father has complied.
In re Noah R.-R.

• Cooperate with child’s therapy. Not applica-
ble here.
• Get and/or maintain adequate housing and
legal income.
The evidence on this is ambiguous. Mr. R.-M. told
DCF that he was employed, but DCF was never able
to verify his work status and when it asked him in April,
2023, to provide a copy of his job schedule, he did not
do so (at least through August, 2023, which is the last
date on which the court has evidence about this issue).
See ex. E, p. 8. He did provide DCF with the addresses
at which he was residing.
• Sign releases authorizing DCF to communi-
cate with service providers to monitor attendance,
cooperation and progress toward identified goals
and for use in future proceedings before this
court. Father complied.
• Immediately let DCF know about any
changes in the makeup of the household to ensure
that the change does not hurt the health and
safety of the child(ren). Father complied.
• No involvement in the criminal justice system.
Comply with probation or parole.
Father did not comply. On December 23, 2022, he
was arrested for larceny in the second degree, a class
C felony, for stealing merchandise from his employer.
• Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or
testing. The father cooperated with the court-ordered
psychological evaluation.
• Keep child(ren) in the state of Connecticut
while case is going on unless you get advance
permission from DCF or the court. Not applicable
since child is in DCF custody.
In re Noah R.-R.

• Supply names and addresses of grandpar-
ents and of persons the parent would like DCF to
consider as a placement resource. Father complied.
4. ‘‘[T]he feelings and emotional ties of the child
with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian
of such child’s person and any person who has exer-
cised physical care, custody or control of the child
for at least one year and with whom the child has
developed significant emotional ties’’—§ 17a-112
(k) (4).
Noah has not been in Mr. R.-M.’s custody since the
child was two months old. The child apparently has no
memory of his injuries, and he is reported by social
worker Westerman to be comfortable with and unafraid
of Mr. R.-M. during visitations. In its March, 2023 TPR
social study, the department acknowledged that, as of
that point, Noah had ‘‘a close emotional tie’’ to both of
his parents. Ex. D, p. 21. Since Noah had seen his father
weekly for the past year as of the time of trial and Mr.
R.-M. is reported to be affectionate and appropriate
during those visitations, Noah still probably has positive
feelings for and emotional ties to Mr. R.-M. Noah is
closely bonded with his foster mother, however, and
has lived with her since approximately one month after
his removal from parental care in late 2021.
5. ‘‘[T]he age of the child’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (5).
Born on August 18, 2021, Noah was three years and
eight months old at the time of trial and is now four
years and four months old.
6. ‘‘[T]he efforts the parent has made to adjust
such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or condi-
tions to make it in the best interest of the child to
return such child home in the foreseeable future,
including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to
which the parent has maintained contact with the
In re Noah R.-R.

child as part of an effort to reunite the child with
the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contri-
butions, and (B) the maintenance of regular con-
tact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (6).
Mr. R.-M. attended some of the services to which the
department referred him and that were intended to
address the reasons that Noah was removed and kept
from his parents’ custody. As discussed above, how-
ever, he did not make significant progress toward
addressing his mental health issues and never under-
took any domestic violence services. He had regular
contact with Noah through the QPC supervised visita-
tion program and DCF supervised visits except for the
six month period when the criminal protective order
prohibited contact.
7. ‘‘[T]he extent to which a parent has been pre-
vented from maintaining a meaningful relationship
with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct
of the other parent of the child, or the unreason-
able act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (7).
There is no evidence of any unreasonable acts or
conduct on the part of anyone or of either parent’s
economic circumstances interfering with the ability of
either one to have a meaningful relationship with Noah.
B
Best Interest of The Child
The final element of the termination of the parental
rights statute, § 17a-112 (j), requires that, before grant-
ing a petition for such termination, the court must find
‘‘by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (2) termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child . . . .’’ The
best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact
In re Noah R.-R.

specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion
to consider all the different and individualized factors
that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determin-
ing that terminating Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights is in
Noah’s best interest, the court has considered numer-
ous factors, including ‘‘the child’s interest in sustained
growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity
and stability of [his] environment’’; Capetta v. Capetta,
196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); his age and needs;
the length of his time in foster care; the contact he had
with his parents after removal; the potential benefit
or detriment of Noah retaining a connection with his
biological father; his genetic bond to his father; see,
e.g., In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d
484 (1999); his needs for permanency and stability; see,
e.g., In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 493–95, 940 A.2d
733 (2008); and the seven statutory factors and the
court’s findings thereon. The court has also balanced
Noah’s intrinsic needs for safety, stability and perma-
nency against the potential benefit of maintaining a
legal connection with his biological father. See Pamela
B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998)
(child’s physical and emotional well-being must be
weighed against interest in preserving family integrity),
abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296
Conn. 186, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).
When the underlying neglect petition was filed, Noah
was only two months old. By the time of trial three
plus years later, he was nearing four years of age. Since
removal from his parents’ custody, he lived for a month
in nonrelative foster care and ever since then he has
resided in foster care in the home of his paternal aunt,
Mr. R.-M.’s sister, whom the department has identified
as a potential adoptive resource. Despite his early and
severe injuries, he today shows no residual effects of
what happened. He has no known medical or develop-
mental issues. Because he is not yet talking much, the
In re Noah R.-R.

foster family arranged for him to be evaluated by Birth-
to-Three services, which found no developmental prob-
lems.
Noah is thus like most other children his age. He has
the same needs as they do for necessities and material
goods such as food, clothing, and shelter. The evidence
about the father’s work history is sketchy, but nothing
in the evidence suggests that Mr. R.-M. could not meet
these types of needs. All children also need medical
care, and the father’s history of overlooking his child’s
many injuries, combined with his doubts about whether
his son was even injured, raise serious doubt about Mr.
R.-M.’s willingness or capacity to meet this need. Like
all children of his age, Noah also has the more intangible
needs such as for love, guidance, safety, stability, con-
sistency, and permanency. He needs caretakers who
will nourish him and guide him toward reaching his
maximum potential. The evidence suggests that Mr. R.-
M. loves his child, and the information about his interac-
tions with Noah during visitations and the interactional
session that was part of the court-ordered psychological
evaluation shows that Mr. R.-M. knows how to and is
able to interact positively and affectionately with his
child during those sessions.
One of a parent’s paramount obligations, however,
is to do his best to keep his child safe and not to harm
his child. During the first two months of his life, Noah
was injured on numerous occasions and when exam-
ined by CCMC doctors was found to have twenty-one
fractures that had occurred on different occasions over
at least a one month period. These fractures were all
over his body—a fracture to his right collarbone that
was more than two weeks old (and according to Dr.
Livingston possibly a birth injury); a possible healed
fracture of one of his right ribs; a fracture of unknown
age to his right upper arm; two fractures of both his
right and left forearms, all more than two weeks old and
In re Noah R.-R.

‘‘most likely around [four] weeks old’’; four fractures
to the bones in his right hand, one of uncertain age and
the others more than ten days old; fractures to the third
and fourth fingers of his right hand that were more than
ten days old; fractures to his right tibia (shin) and right
fibula (described in Dr. Livingston’s letter as ‘‘the other
lower leg bone next to the tibia,’’ both ‘‘most likely [two
to four] weeks old’’; three fractures on his left foot that
were more than ten days old; two fractures of his left
thigh, one less than ten days old and which ‘‘most likely
occurred on day of presentation’’ (the fracture reported
on October 21) and the other ‘‘most likely more than
[four] weeks old’’; and a fracture to the left tibia that
was probably between two and four weeks old. The
injuries that resulted in these fractures would have been
painful to Noah and resulted in pain responses such as
crying or screaming. Ex. A, p. 12. Bruises from some
of these injuries were still evident when the CCMC
doctors evaluated him. Dr. Livingston told DCF that
normal handling of a child would not have caused these
injuries and that medical examination and tests had
found no cause for them, leading her initially to charac-
terize them as ‘‘highly suspicious for inflicted injury.’’
Id. After conducting a follow-up assessment of Noah a
year later, Dr. Livingston reported to the department
that ‘‘Noah had a normal follow up physical and devel-
opmental exam. No radiological evidence of fractures
was noted. Noah is now walking/falling with no addi-
tional fractures or interval disease in the past year. This
is strong evidence of normal bone health. . . . Noah’s
injuries are diagnostic for inflicted injury.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Ex. D, p. 9.
Mr. R.-M. has repeatedly denied causing these injur-
ies—to DCF, to the police, to Dr. Schroeder during
the psychological evaluation, and at trial on the TPR
petition. He did plead guilty to and has been convicted
of the charge of risk of injury based on those injuries,
In re Noah R.-R.

however. He testified at trial here that he had pleaded
guilty to that charge only because he had also been
arrested on a larceny charge, was ‘‘offered a deal that
involved pleading to both charges,’’ and had faced a
possible sentence of five to ten years of incarceration
if he was convicted after trial but had been offered a
sentence of seven years [of] incarceration suspended
after eighteen months if he pleaded guilty to both
charges. See trial transcript, p. 71. The petitioner’s trial
brief appeared to regard his guilty plea and conviction
as tantamount to establishing that he had in fact
inflicted those injuries on his son. See, e.g., Petitioner’s
posttrial brief, pp. 2–3. The respondent’s posttrial brief,
however, asserted that he had entered his guilty plea
under the Alford doctrine.
The law is clear that there are differences between
a straight guilty plea,7 a plea of nolo contendere,8 and
7
A criminal defendant who enters a regular guilty plea admits having
committed the charged offense. A court may accept a guilty plea only upon
finding that there is a factual basis for such a plea. See Practice Book § 39-
21 (captioned ‘‘Factual Basis for Plea,’’ stating [that] ‘‘[t]he judicial authority
shall not accept a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea’’).
8
‘‘A plea of nolo contendere is distinct from a plea of guilty inasmuch as
the latter may be regarded as a verbal admission by the accused, and, as such,
may be admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. It does not, however,
conclusively establish negligence, and the accused is not precluded from
explaining his plea. . . . By contrast, a plea of nolo contendere is merely
a declaration by the accused that he will not contest the charge, and even
though followed by a finding of guilty and the imposition of a fine or other
penalty, is not admissible, either as a verbal admission or an admission by
conduct. . . . Nor is it admissible to affect a party’s credibility, as evidence
of an arrest, or as res judicata establishing that the plaintiff was engaged
in a criminal act. . . . Pleas of nolo contendere may be entered for reasons
of convenience and without much regard to guilt and collateral conse-
quences. . . . Even though the plea may be regarded as a tacit admission,
its inconclusive and ambiguous nature dictates that it should be given no
currency beyond the particular case in which it was entered.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171
Conn. 705, 711–12 n.4, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97
S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977). Unlike a straight guilty plea, a plea of
nolo contendere does not require that the trial court find a factual basis for
In re Noah R.-R.
9
an Alford plea. Whether his conviction in the criminal
the plea. As explained in State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981): ‘‘In
[Alford] . . . Justice White succinctly pointed out the distinction between
a guilty plea and a nolo contendere plea, and why a factual basis may not
be desirable for the acceptance of the latter. In his majority opinion, he
explained that: Throughout its history . . . the plea of nolo contendere has
been viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the
defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for
leniency. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 preserves this distinction in its require-
ment that a court cannot accept a guilty plea unless it is satisfied that there
is a factual basis for the plea; there is no similar requirement for pleas of
nolo contendere, since it was thought desirable to permit defendants to
plea nolo without making any inquiry into their actual guilt . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)
We agree with the distinction made by Justice White in Alford and by the
federal rules and hold that, although our own rules may be unclear, a factual
basis is not required to be established to accept a nolo contendere plea.
9
See White v. Commissioner of Correction, 145 Conn. App. 834, 847–48
n.3, 77 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013) (‘‘Under
North Carolina v. Alford, [400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)],
a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to
being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.
Commissioner of Correction v. Gordon, 228 Conn. 384, 385 n.1, 636 A.2d
799 (1994). A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron
in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s
evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry
of a guilty plea nevertheless. State v. Palmer, [196 Conn. 157, 169 n.3, 491
A.2d 1075 (1985)]. In [Alford], the United States Supreme Court treated such
guilty pleas as the functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere. State
v. Rish, 17 Conn. App. 447, 456, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802,
559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38
(1989). Our Supreme Court has indicated that [a] plea of nolo contendere
has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty on all further proceedings within
the indictment. . . . The only practical difference is that the plea of nolo
contendere may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a
subsequent criminal or civil case. . . . State v. Martin, 197 Conn. 17, 20–21
n.7, 495 A.2d 1028 (1985). Our Supreme Court has also indicated that a
factual basis is not required to be established to accept a nolo contendere
plea. State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114 (1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981). In 1989, this court
concluded in Rish that [a]s a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is the
functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea may not
be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent civil case.
State v. Rish, supra, [456]. Likewise, in 2002, this court concluded that as
Alford pleas and pleas of nolo contendere [are] the functional equivalent
In re Noah R.-R.

proceeding could be considered as proof in this pro-
ceeding that he committed those injuries is a significant
fact, and the court thus sought, as necessary for a well
reasoned decision, additional posttrial briefs from the
parties on whether a guilty plea under the Alford doc-
trine or a subsequent conviction would have any legal
or factual significance in this proceeding. The last of
those briefs was filed on December 13, 2024. All parties
have agreed that the court should take judicial notice
of the criminal proceedings,10 and the court has accord-
ingly taken judicial notice that the respondent father’s
[plea of] guilty to the risk of injury charge was under
the Alford doctrine. Upon review of the parties’ briefs
and after conducting its own research, the court con-
cludes that the law in Connecticut is unclear on the
significance of his plea and conviction in this proceed-
ing.11 In view of our Supreme Court’s statement that
of one another . . . a factual basis is not required for Alford pleas . . . .
Baillargeon v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 716, 730 n.11,
789 A.2d 1046 (2002). A court may nevertheless, in its discretion, require a
factual basis before accepting a nolo contendere or Alford plea. Id., 730 n.10;
see also State v. Godek, supra, 365 n.13. (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
10
See the petitioner’s supplemental posttrial brief, pp. 2–3; the respondent
father’s motion for judicial notice, dated December 13, 2024; and the letter
from the child’s counsel dated December 13, 2024, adopting the petition-
er’s position.
11
The commissioner’s brief argues that the court may treat the father’s
Alford plea ‘‘as if he had pled guilty to the risk of injury charges.’’ Petitioner’s
supplemental posttrial brief, p. 2. It cites the case of State v. Faraday, 268
Conn. 174, 842 A.2d 567 (2004) as support for that proposition. Faraday is
one of a series of cases holding that an Alford guilty plea may be used,
in subsequent proceedings for violation of probation, to establish ‘‘that a
conviction following a jury verdict is indistinguishable from a conviction
following a guilty plea or Alford plea for purposes of eliminating any contro-
versy over whether the criminal conduct underlying a violation of probation
has occurred.’’ State v. T.D., 286 Conn. 353, 366, 944 A.2d 288 (2008). On
the other hand, in State v. Solomon, 150 Conn. App. 458, 469–72, 91 A.3d
523, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 908, 100 A.3d 401 (2014), the court held that
the trial court had erroneously allowed admission of a party’s guilty plea
under the Alford doctrine to the offense of criminal possession of a firearm
to establish, in a civil proceeding, that the same individual had admitted
knowing possession of that firearm. The respondent father’s supplemental
posttrial brief in the present case correctly points out that § 4-8A (a) (2) of
In re Noah R.-R.

the ‘‘inconclusive and ambiguous nature’’ of an Alford
plea ‘‘indicates that it should be given no currency
beyond the particular case in which it was entered’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) Lawrence v. Koz-
lowski, 171 Conn. 705, 712 n.4, 372 A.2d 110 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d
1066 (1977); this court will not regard the father’s plea
and conviction as evidence that he inflicted the injuries
on Noah.
Nonetheless, all these injuries happened to Noah
while he was in Mr. R.-M.’s (and Ms. R.’s) care. On
numerous occasions during Noah’s second month of
life, this child was repeatedly injured. Dr. Livingston’s
opinion that these injuries were ‘‘inflicted,’’ which this
court finds credible, means that someone was causing
the injuries to Noah. He would have cried each time.
The parents both told DCF that Noah had cried a lot
during that month. Someone in that household or caring
for Noah was injuring him, repeatedly, so harshly as to
break the baby’s bones, but his parents were ignoring
his cries of pain. Mr. R.-M. was living in a home where
his own baby was repeatedly injured and would have
been crying out from those injuries. During the psycho-
logical evaluation, moreover, he even ‘‘questioned
whether his son really suffered [twenty-one] fractures
as he has no lasting problems.’’ Ex. I, p. 16.
The facts proven at trial here—that Mr. R.-M. contin-
ues to deny having committed those injuries and to
question whether they actually occurred—show that he
the Connecticut Code of Evidence expressly provides that an Alford plea
itself or any statements Mr. R.-M. made in connection with that plea are
inadmissible in any other proceeding. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-8A (stating
as follows: ‘‘(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following shall not be
admissible in a civil or criminal case against a person who has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal case or participated in plea
negotiations in such case, whether or not a plea has been entered . . . (2)
a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea entered under the Alford doctrine
or any statement made in conjunction with such a plea’’).
In re Noah R.-R.

continues to pose a safety risk to his son in unsuper-
vised settings. Since he did not admit causing the injur-
ies, there is no way of knowing for sure who inflicted
these injuries on his son, and, if Mr. R.-M. was the
one who did so, whether he had acted intentionally or
negligently, out of rage, sadistic pleasure, or care-
lessness. But his unwillingness to recognize both that
Noah had been injured and that somebody had inflicted
those injuries on Noah shows that he is not today pre-
pared or able to keep his son safe in his care.
Our courts have long held that ‘‘the failure to
acknowledge and make progress in addressing the
issues that led to a child’s removal may be one of many
contributing factors to a court’s determination that a
parent has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of per-
sonal rehabilitation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 492, 308 A.3d
604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
Similarly, a parent’s continued unwillingness to accept
responsibility for the reasons a child was found to have
been neglected and committed to DCF ‘‘reasonably may
bear on whether reunification or termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interest.’’ In re Allison G.,
276 Conn. 146, 164, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005). ‘‘In abuse and
neglect cases, it is well established that the failure to
accept responsibility reasonably may be considered as
an indication that there is a risk that the abuse will
continue.’’ Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290
Conn. 545, 566, 964 A.2d 1213 (2009). Even if Mr. R.-M.
was not the person who inflicted those injuries on his
son, Mr. R.-M. was one of the two people responsible
for keeping Noah safe and protecting him from harm.
He did not meet that responsibility, and his son was
repeatedly injured as a result. Even if it was possible
that Mr. R.-M. had been unaware during that month
that his son was repeatedly being injured, and probably
crying out from those injuries, his refusal now to
In re Noah R.-R.

acknowledge those injuries shows that he does not
accept responsibility for not having paid enough atten-
tion to his child then to notice what was happening
and had happened to his son. If he had paid enough
attention, maybe he could have protected his child from
any or more injuries or sought medical care sooner.
His refusal now to acknowledge that his son was hurt
so badly and so many times also shows a fundamental
lack of concern about his son’s safety or welfare.
The case of In re Egypt E., 327 Conn. 506, 175 A.3d
21, cert. denied sub nom. Morsy E. v. Commissioner,
Dept. of Children and Families, 586 U.S. 818, 139 S.
Ct. 88, 202 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2018), presents somewhat
different facts but discusses the same implications of
not accepting the significance of injuries to a child in
the parent’s care. In that case, a seven week old child
was found by doctors to have incurred numerous frac-
tures and bruises while in the parents’ care. The com-
missioner then brought petitions to terminate the par-
ents’ parental rights to that child and her sibling. Initial
judgments in favor of the commissioner were over-
turned on appeal, and a new trial ordered. See In re
Egypt E., 322 Conn. 231, 140 A.3d 210 (2016). On the
final day of the second trial, the respondent father
‘‘ ‘reluctantly’ admitted responsibility for the injuries
. . . .’’ In re Egypt E., supra, 327 Conn. 522. The trial
court noted that his ‘‘admission was unacceptably gen-
eral and still evinced an unwillingness to face the
details of what had occurred.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.
At that trial, the respondent mother testified that,
‘‘although for the prior three years she had been unsure
about what had happened to Mariam, she now acknowl-
edged that [the father] had inflicted the child’s injuries.’’
Id., 521. The trial court concluded that ‘‘neither of the
respondents, at present, seemed to comprehend why
removing Egypt from the home was necessary to pro-
tect her, instead cling[ing] to the fact that Egypt was
In re Noah R.-R.

uninjured as a way to protect themselves from the
awareness of the truth of Mariam’s significant injur-
ies and their failure to provide safety for both chil-
dren.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 522. In affirming the trial
court’s decision to terminate the respondents’ parental
rights, our Supreme Court noted the trial court’s find-
ings as follows: ‘‘The trial court found that [the mother]
had taken no action to inform herself about Mariam’s
injuries, that she could not confront the truth and that
she had made ‘absolutely no progress’ toward the goal
of learning how to keep her children safe. It found
further that [the mother’s] failure to acknowledge what
had occurred meant that she could not be safely
reunited with her children. The court found that [the
father] similarly could not comply with the specific
steps that he had been given. As the court explained,
‘[b]oth parents in their own individual ways demon-
strate a remarkable capacity for self-deception. Even
as each admitted [that] he or she now was ready to
acknowledge [the father] as the source of the injuries
to Mariam, each stated that awareness in very similar
detached words. Such observable . . . lack of candor
keeps them, the court concludes, from putting the needs
of their children first, admitting their faults and thereby
permitting the possibility of careful reunification with
their children.
‘‘ ‘This is the fatal flaw that has prevented reunifica-
tion throughout these lengthy proceedings. It is at the
heart of [the respondents’] inability and unwillingness
to benefit from the services offered to them. It means
that their children, even now, could not reasonably and
safely be returned to them.’ ’’ Id., 522–23.
Similarly, the father’s stated doubts here about
whether these injuries even occurred show his ‘‘unwill-
ingness to face the details of what had occurred.’’ They
show that he does not understand and accept why
In re Noah R.-R.

removing Noah from his custody was necessary to pro-
tect his son. The doubt that he expressed about Noah
actually being injured, despite the documented medical
proof, is, just as In re Egypt E., a way of protecting
himself from an awareness of Noah’s many, significant
injuries and, regardless of whether he was the one
inflicting those injuries, of his own failure to keep his
child safe. Here, as in that case, expressing those doubts
shows an unwillingness to put the needs of his son
first. Those doubts also explain why he made so little
progress in his mental health treatment. His failure to
acknowledge his responsibility for not having protected
his son means that he could not safely be reunited or
even left unattended with Noah.
The posttrial brief submitted by the respondent father
acknowledges that the state has a legitimate interest
in safety, stability, and permanency: ‘‘[W]here a court
interferes with a child’s relationship with his parent, it
must do so only to keep that child safe, stable, and
prospering.’’ Father’s posttrial brief, pp. 5, 7. That brief
argues that withdrawal of the TPR petition as to the
mother means that [the] termination of the father’s
parental rights to Noah would not advance the child’s
interest in permanency. Whether permanency for Noah
would be obtained through adoption by the current
foster mother or reunification with the biological
mother was, the brief maintained, unclear as of the
end of the current trial. That brief thus asserts that
‘‘termination is unnecessary’’ to further the govern-
ment’s legitimates interests here. See id., p. 5. That
assertion ignores the fact, however, that termination
does further both the state’s and the child’s legitimate
interests, statutory grounds for termination having been
established, in the child’s safety and well-being.
Without expressly so arguing, the father’s brief
implies that the court should import a ‘‘least restrictive
means analysis’’ into the current determination as to
In re Noah R.-R.

whether termination is in Noah’s best interest. See id.,
p. 7. Although our appellate courts have never adopted
a least restrictive requirement for TPR proceedings,
and the meaning of such a standard when applied to a
termination proceeding is not clear, safety of the child
would surely be a minimum requirement for applying
any such analysis.
Not terminating Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights would
mean that he maintained the legal right to seek revoca-
tion of commitment and return of the child to his care
and, even if the child were in the care and custody of
someone else, visitation with Noah. The court agrees
with the position argued by the commissioner that ‘‘ter-
mination can aid stability and lessen disruption for
abused and neglected children by preventing unfit par-
ents from subjecting them to further litigation.’’ Peti-
tioner’s posttrial reply brief, p. 3, citing In re Davonta
V., supra, 285 Conn. 495–96 (stating as follows: ‘‘[e]ven
if no adoption is forthcoming, termination can aid stabil-
ity and lessen disruption because a parent whose rights
have been terminated no longer may file a motion to
revoke the commitment of the child to the custody of
the commissioner . . . or oppose an annual perma-
nency plan’’ (citation omitted)).
The number of injuries to Noah makes it likely that
someone with regular access to him was the one causing
the injuries. The evidence shows that Noah did have
other caretakers than the parents during the month
long period when the injuries occurred. (The maternal
grandmother is the only such person mentioned in the
OTC affidavit, as she told DCF that she ‘‘cares for said
infant ‘‘Monday–Thursday and every other Saturday
from 6:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.’’ Ex. A, p. 11.) CCMC could
not date the precise time for the older injuries, but that
was not the case for the fractured leg that led the par-
ents to take Noah to the doctor on October 25.
According to CCMC’s Dr. Friedman, ‘‘given the injury
In re Noah R.-R.

to this baby’s leg, she believed said infant would have
experienced swelling immediately.’’ Id., 6. The bone in
Noah’s femur ‘‘was broken into several pieces.’’ Id., 3.
The injury ‘‘was most likely to have been caused by a
blow to his left posterior left femur.’’ Id. Mr. R.-M. even
acknowledged that when changing Noah’s diaper he
‘‘noticed his left leg was swollen and knew there could
be something wrong [and] he could feel bones inside
his son’s leg crunching when he touched them.’’ Id.
Dr. Livingston also agreed that, based on the parents’
reports of Noah’s symptoms, the injury that led to his
hospitalization ‘‘most likely occurred on the day of pre-
sentation.’’ Ex. L, p. L-12. Both parents having repeat-
edly said that they were the only ones taking care of
Noah in the hours just before they noticed his swollen
leg, their statements lead, in light of the doctor’s opin-
ions of its recency, to the inescapable conclusion that
one (or both) of them had caused that injury.
The father’s nolo contendere plea removed the neces-
sity to prove the adjudicatory allegations by clear and
convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase of the
proceeding to establish statutory grounds for termina-
tion. For the dispositional purposes of deciding whether
termination has been proven to be in Noah’s best inter-
est, however, it is highly significant in this case that
the factual information contained in the exhibits offered
at trial proved clearly and convincingly that the adjudi-
catory allegations here, even if unnecessary to be
proven in the adjudicatory phase, were nonetheless
both true and essential to the dispositional decision:
that Mr. R.-M. has not addressed the reasons that Noah
was removed from his care; that he did not meaningfully
engage in many of the necessary rehabilitative services
offered to offer a possibility of reunification; that he
was unwilling and unable to benefit from many of the
reunification services offered by the department and
ordered by the court; that he was not ready at the time
In re Noah R.-R.

of trial to assume a responsible position in Noah’s life
and will not be ready to do so for the foreseeable future,
a fact he conceded in his own testimony;12 and that, by
acts of omission or commission on his part that while
the child was in his care and custody, he denied Noah,
even if he did not cause those injuries, the guidance and
control necessary for the child’s physical well-being.
Although the focus of the dispositional phase is the
child’s best interest, here the parent’s conduct is highly
significant to that decision. The specific facts that
underlie and prove the adjudicatory allegations to be
true support the conclusion that termination is in
Noah’s best interest. Compliance with specific steps
intended to help a parent address the reasons they
lost custody of their child provides the court with a
nonbinding benchmark or guideline on whether termi-
nation is appropriate, and Mr. R.-M.’s failure to take the
orders contained in the specific steps further supports
a finding that termination is in Noah’s best interest.
Mr. R.-M.’s unwillingness to acknowledge that Noah
suffered these injuries shows no awareness of how
serious they were or his responsibility for not causing
or preventing them and for not noticing them earlier
and seeking medical care sooner. It is thus not surpris-
ing that for the first few months of his mental health
treatment, he rarely discussed the injuries to Noah,
showed no emotion when he did discuss them, but
instead focused on Ms. R. His second therapist also
reported that for at least the first two months of that
therapy he again did not discuss the injuries to Noah.13
12
On direct examination, Mr. R.-M. was asked the following question by
his attorney and gave the following answer:
‘‘Q. So, I want to turn to talk to you a little about Noah. From what you’ve
said, it seems pretty clear that you’re not going to be around for him any
time soon.
‘‘A. Correct.’’ Trial transcript, pp. 71-72.
13
‘‘On 09/14/22, Mr. [R.-M.] re-engaged in mental health services through
CHR and was assigned to Sarah Hermonot. Mr. [R.-M.] has been attending
therapy regularly since 09/14/22. Prior to the Administrative Case Review
held on 11/22/22, Mr. [R.-M.] was not discussing Noah during his therapeutic
In re Noah R.-R.

Someone unwilling to notice for so long or to acknowl-
edge that his child was injured is unlikely to benefit
from services that could prevent the recurrence of such
conduct in the future. The evidence showed that Mr.
R.-M. was not willing to participate meaningfully in
many of the services offered by DCF or to which the
department referred him in accordance with the spe-
cific steps. He did not attend counseling consistently
and, even though he eventually agreed to participate in
CHR’s domestic violence program, IPV Fair, he was not
willing to admit that intimate partner violence was an
issue in his relationship with Ms. R. Just as in the In
re Egypt E. case, the respondent’s inability and unwill-
ingness to benefit from services means that Noah would
not be safe in his care. Although the father’s brief argues
that termination ‘‘deprives [Noah] of a potentially bene-
ficial future relationship’’; p. 5; there could be no ‘‘poten-
tially beneficial future relationship’’ with someone who
continues to pose a safety risk because of an unwilling-
ness to accept responsibility and seek personal change.
The father essentially asks the court to speculate, with-
out any evidentiary basis, that someday he will be will-
ing to accept his own responsibility for what happened
to Noah and his failure to have protected his son.

Noah’s best interest should not and does not rely
on such speculation, however. His best interest lies in
orders that secure his interest in being safe and advance
his needs for stability and permanency. Terminating
Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights removes barriers to perma-
nency for Noah and directly furthers Noah’s interests
in safety and security. The commissioner proved clearly
and convincingly that termination of the respondent
father’s parental rights is in Noah’s best interest.
sessions.’’ Ex. D, Social Study in Support of Termination of Parental Rights,
p. 7.
In re Noah R.-R.

V
ORDERS
The court having accepted the father’s nolo conten-
dere plea to the adjudicatory allegations, the court hav-
ing further determined that the adjudicatory allegations
in the petition provide a valid and sufficient factual
basis for the necessary adjudicatory findings and having
considered all the evidence offered at trial and further
found by clear and convincing evidence that the adjudi-
catory allegations were proven to be true and that,
upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances
presented, that it is in Noah’s best interest to terminate
the parental rights of the respondent, it is hereby
ORDERED:
The commissioner’s petition for termination of the
parental rights of the respondent Jorge R.-M. to his
minor child Noah is hereby GRANTED, and judgment
may enter terminating his parental rights to this child.

In re Noah R.-R.

APPENDIX
IN RE NOAH R.-R.*
Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Juvenile Matters
File No. CP-21-019080-A

Memorandum filed December 19, 2024

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on petitioner’s motion to
terminate respondent father’s parental rights with
respect to his minor child. Petition granted.
Chelsea Ruzzo, assistant attorney general, for the
petitioner.
Joshua D. Michtom, assigned counsel, for the respon-
dent father.
Micoya G. Hutchins, assigned counsel, for the
minor child.
Opinion

HON. STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, JUDGE TRIAL REF-
EREE.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On March 7, 2023, the Commissioner of Children and
Families (commissioner) filed a petition in this court
to terminate the parental rights of [the respondents]
Madelei R. and Jorge R.-M. to the minor child [Noah].1
Trial of a TPR petition brought by the commissioner
in this court for a child in the [Department of Children
and Families’] custody is governed by General Statutes
* Affirmed. In re Noah R.-R., 233 Conn. App. 522, A.3d (2025).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book §§ 32-7 (a)
and 79a-12, the names of the parents and child in this matter will not be
disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection
only to persons having a proper interest therein, and upon order of the court.
1
For brevity’s sake, the court will sometimes refer to the petition for
termination of parental rights as a ‘‘TPR’’ petition.
In re Noah R.-R.
2
§ 17a-112. As grounds for termination, the petition
alleged failure to rehabilitate after an adjudication of
neglect and acts of omission or commission against
both respondents pursuant to subsections (j) (3) (B)
(i) and (C) of [§ 17a-112].

Neither respondent was present for the initial hearing
in the Superior Court on the termination petition and
they were both defaulted that day for not appearing,
2
General Statutes § 17a-112 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In respect to
any child in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in
accordance with section 46b-129, either the commissioner, or the attorney
who represented such child in a pending or prior proceeding, or an attorney
appointed by the Superior Court on its own motion, or an attorney retained
by such child after attaining the age of fourteen, may petition the court for
the termination of parental rights with reference to such child. . . . (i) The
Superior Court . . . may grant a petition for termination of parental rights
based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear
and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child,
and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination
of the parent’s parental rights with respect to such child. . . . (j) The Supe-
rior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and
Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify
the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-
111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is
not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section
17a-111b . . . that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the
best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by
the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or
uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has
been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to
the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child; [or] (C) the child has
been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission
including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe
physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary
for the child’s physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except
that nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a
child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission
or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights . . . . ’’
In re Noah R.-R.

but the court subsequently vacated those defaults when
the respondents did appear on May 9, 2023. That day,
both respondents were advised of their rights and
entered denials to the allegations of the petition. In due
course the case was assigned for trial before this judge
on May 7, 2024. On that date the commissioner with-
drew the petition as to the respondent Madelei R. Trial
on the TPR petition against Mr. R.-M. was continued
one week, until May 14, 2024.
On that later date, Mr. R.-M. submitted a plea of nolo
contendere to the adjudicatory allegations contained in
the termination petition. More specifically, he pleaded
nolo contendere to the following allegations in the peti-
tion:
• That the Department of Children and Families
(DCF or department) made reasonable efforts to locate
him and to reunify Noah with him;
• That Mr. R.-M. had been unwilling or unable to
benefit from reunification efforts;
• That DCF did not need to prove reasonable efforts
to reunify because the Superior Court for Juvenile Mat-
ters had previously approved a permanency plan for
Noah other than reunification;
• That Noah had previously been found neglected,
and after being provided specific steps Mr. R.-M. failed
to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that
would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
time, considering the age and needs of the child, he
could assume a [responsible] position in Noah’s life; and
• That Noah had been denied, by reason of an act
or acts of parental commission or omission, including
but not limited to . . . severe physical abuse or a pat-
tern of abuse . . . the care, guidance or control neces-
sary for [his] physical, educational, moral or emotional
well-being.
In re Noah R.-R.

After canvassing Mr. R.-M. thoroughly on his plea,
this court found that he had waived his right to trial on
adjudicatory issues and accepted his plea but reserved
making formal findings until issuance of its final deci-
sion. The court then proceeded to evidence on the
child’s best interest. The commissioner presented testi-
mony from DCF social worker Krista Westerman, and
the father also testified. In addition, the commissioner
introduced the following exhibits into evidence without
objection:
• Affidavit of DCF Social Worker Berta Ramos, dated
October 29, 2021 (exhibit (ex.) A);
• Neglect Social Study dated January 18, 2022 (ex. B);
• Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated July
7, 2022 (ex. C);
• Social Study in Support of Petition for Termination
of Parental Rights dated March 6, 2023 (ex. D);
• Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated August
8, 2023 (ex. E);
• Addendum to Social Study in Support of Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights dated December 12,
2023 (ex. F);
• Addendum to Social Study in Support of Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights dated March 26, 2024
(ex. G);
• Respondent father’s Specific Steps (ex. H);
• Psychological Consultation conducted by Dr. Inés
Schroeder, Psy.D., dated September 21, 2023 (ex. I);
• Respondent father’s Certified Conviction Criminal
History dated April 11, 2024 (ex. J);
• East Hartford Police Department Case/Incident
Report of Officer Brian Altamirano signed on November
In re Noah R.-R.

28, 2021, and two Supplementary Case/Incident Reports
of Officer Briahna Martin signed on November 29, 2021,
and April 26, 2022; (ex. K); and
• Affidavit of Dr. Nina Livingston, employed at the
Connecticut Children’s Specialty Group at Connecticut
Children’s Medical Center (CCMC), dated October 27,
2021 (ex. L).
Following the conclusion of evidence, the parties sub-
mitted written briefs. Upon review of those briefs, it
became apparent that the parties were operating under
different factual assumptions. The commissioner’s brief
made clear that the department was assuming that the
respondent father’s guilty plea and conviction on risk
of injury charges related to Noah’s injuries were compo-
nents of the petitioner’s proof that he had caused the
many injuries inflicted on Noah. See, e.g., Petitioner’s
trial brief, p. 2 (The respondent ‘‘failed to take account-
ability for and demonstrate insight as to the injuries he
inflicted upon Noah . . . . His repeated refusal to take
accountability for Noah’s injuries, even while he sits in
prison for this crime, is a serious child protection con-
cern for the department.’’); id., p. 14 (‘‘[e]qually, if not
more, concerning is the fact the respondent-father
refuses to take accountability for the injuries he
inflicted upon Noah’’). The respondent father’s trial
brief, on the other hand, asserted that the guilty plea
he entered into criminal court on the risk of injury
charges based on Noah’s injuries was pursuant to the
so-called Alford doctrine that permits a criminal defen-
dant to plead guilty without admitting actual guilt.3
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970). ‘‘The Alford doctrine allows a defendant to plead guilty without
admitting guilt. In pleading guilty, however, the defendant acknowledges
that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to
accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Boscarino, 86 Conn. App. 447, 451 n.4, 861 A.2d 579 (2004). ‘‘United States
Supreme Court cases have described Alford pleas as permitting a defendant
to plead guilty while protesting innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 69 n.8, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2002); Henderson v.
In re Noah R.-R.

There was no evidence offered at trial, however, that
the defendant had entered his guilty plea under the
Alford doctrine. The respondent’s brief was the first
reference of which the court is aware of his guilty plea
having been entered under that doctrine. The court
thus ordered supplemental briefing, which the court
considered necessary for a well reasoned decision.4 The
court also inquired of the parties whether they sought
the court to take judicial notice of the criminal proceed-
ing. Since then, the court has also received a transcript
of the trial. The last brief has now been filed, and the
court has taken judicial notice of the defendant’s Alford
plea and conviction in the criminal proceeding. Since
neither of the parents claimed Native American ances-
try, the federal and state Indian Child Welfare Acts do
not apply here. The court is not aware of proceedings
pending in any other court regarding the custody of
this child and has jurisdiction. The matter is now ready
for decision.
In considering the evidence, the court must assess
the credibility and weight of the evidence presented
and may also consider judicially noticed facts. The trial
court is not required to accept as true the testimony of
any witness, the contents of exhibits, or the information
contained in judicially noticed facts. ‘‘The sifting and
weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the
trier [of fact]. . . . The trier is free to accept or reject,
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 648 n.1, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976) (White,
Stewart, Blackmun and Powell, Js., concurring).’’ White v. Warden, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2011 WL 4347030, *5 n.17 (Conn. Super. August 17,
2011) (Bright, J.), aff’d, 145 Conn. App. 834, 77 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 310
Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013).
4
See Cowles v. Cowles, 71 Conn. App. 24, 26, 799 A.2d 1119 (2002) (holding
that 120 day time limit set forth in General Statutes § 51-183b for rendering
of opinion after trial of cause ‘‘begins to run from the date that the parties
file posttrial briefs or other material that the court finds necessary for a
well reasoned decision’’); see also Frank v. Streeter, 192 Conn. 601, 604–605,
472 A.2d 1281 (1984) (same); Bramwell v. Dept. of Correction, 82 Conn.
App. 483, 488, 844 A.2d 957 (2004) (same).
In re Noah R.-R.

in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.
. . . That determination of credibility is a function of
the trial court.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61
Conn. App. 329, 333, 764 A.2d 199 (2001).
The court has carefully considered the petition and
the totality of the evidence, assessed the credibility
of the two witnesses who testified and the exhibits
introduced into evidence, and considered the informa-
tion and materials judicially noticed according to the
standards required by law. The testimony of social
worker Westerman is found to be consistent with the
information contained in the exhibits or judicially
noticed, and that testimony and the contents of the
exhibits are found to be consistent and credible. The
father’s testimony focused on his explanation of why
he had pleaded guilty and his hope ‘‘to be a resource’’
for his son in the future. See trial transcript, p. 71–72.
Upon such consideration, and for the reasons described
below, the court finds that the following facts were
proven at trial by clear and convincing evidence.
I
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Under subsections (j) (1) and (3) of [§ 17a-112], in a
contested proceeding the commissioner must prove by
clear and convincing evidence both a statutory ground
for termination of parental rights and that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and
reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds
that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts or another statutory exception.
That portion of the trial is referred to as the adjudicatory
phase of the proceeding. See In re Michael R., 49 Conn.
App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn.
In re Noah R.-R.

919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998); In re William R. III, 65 Conn.
App. 538, 546, 782 A.2d 1262 (2001).
Subsection (j) (2) of [§ 17a-112] then requires clear
and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interest. ‘‘If the trial court determines that
a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds
to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase,
the trial court determines whether clear and convincing
evidence has proven that termination is in the best
interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn. App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d
1112 (1998). In making the dispositional decision in a
contested TPR proceeding, the court is required to
make and consider findings regarding seven factors
specified in § 17a-112 (k). See, e.g., In re Tabitha P.,
39 Conn. App. 353, 362, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
II
FACTS
Noah was born on August 18, 2021. For the first two
months of his life, he lived in East Hartford, Connecti-
cut, with his mother and father, the respondents named
in the termination petition. On October 25, 2021, his
parents took him to their pediatrician’s office, where
they reported swelling on his upper left thigh. An x-ray
there showed a fracture to his left femur. Both parents
told the doctor that they did not know the cause of the
injury but said that the father had been caring for the
child for the last two days while the mother worked.
The child was then taken by ambulance to [CCMC].
After x-rays and physical examination of the child there,
doctors found bruising to the left side of jaw and neck
and twenty-one fractures in various stages of healing.
The fractures were to Noah’s collar bone, ribs, upper
arm, forearms, one hand, fingers, thigh, lower legs, and
feet. Many of the injuries were more than ten days old,
others more than two weeks old, some between two
In re Noah R.-R.

and four weeks old, and one at least four weeks old. X-
rays of the left thigh showed a ‘‘comminuted fracture,’’
which the CCMC [Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect
Program] (SCAN) reported meant an ‘‘upper thigh break
with multiple pieces.’’ Ex. L, p. 12.
The doctor’s office, the Manchester Police Depart-
ment, and an EMT from the Manchester Fire Depart-
ment all made reports to DCF’s Careline about Noah’s
injuries, and the department assigned investigators to
assess the situation. East Hartford police officers also
began an investigation. The evidence contains informa-
tion about what the parents have said about the events
that led them to take Noah to the pediatrician on Octo-
ber 25, 2021. These include statements they both made
to the DCF investigating social worker on October 26,
what the father told Dr. Tokumi at CCMC and both
parents said to Dr. Livingston there on October 26,
what the parents said to East Hartford Police Officer
Altamirano in the late evening hours of October 25, or
early morning hours of October 26, what they later said
to East Hartford Police Officer Martin on October 26,
and what the mother told Officer Martin on February
21, 2022. Neither the parents nor any of the relatives
who sometimes cared for Noah have provided any
explanation for the injuries, except that Mr. R.-M. said
that earlier that evening he had dropped Noah while
bathing him in the sink, and both parents reported a
minor motor vehicle accident two weeks earlier during
which Noah had been in his car seat. Doctors have
discounted either of those incidents as the likely causes
of the many injuries to Noah.
When asked about the day in question, both parents
said that the mother had worked from 4 a.m. to 2 p.m.,
and the father had cared for the child in her absence.
(He later told police that ‘‘he works for a landscaping
company and due to the weather they were not work-
ing’’ that day. Ex. K, p. K-6.) The father had put the
In re Noah R.-R.

child in a car seat, picked the mother up from work,
and they all returned home. Both parents told DCF
that the father had been worried about Noah being
constipated and had called the pediatrician’s office that
day for advice. The father left the home for a while and
while out received a call back from the pediatrician,
and he later told police that, ‘‘when he returned home,
he began doing what the doctor recommended. Jorge
stated that he gave [Noah] 2 ounces of water, rubbed his
stomach, and performed bicycle motions with [Noah]’s
legs, then gave him a bath in the kitchen sink. Jorge
stated that [Noah] seemed to be uncomfortable when
he was performing the bicycle/pedaling motions but
was not crying. Jorge stated that after the bath he put
[Noah] to sleep and everyone in the house fell asleep.
Jorge stated that he was awaken by [Noah] crying. Jorge
stated that he went to change [Noah’s] diaper to see if
the doctor’s recommendations had worked. Jorge
stated when he was changing [Noah’s] [diaper] he
noticed his leg was swollen. Jorge stated that [Noah’s]
leg did not look like that when he had bathed him hours
before. Jorge stated that he showed Madelei and they
decided to take him to the hospital.’’ Ex. K, p. 6. (The
father said something slightly different to DCF: ‘‘Father
stated that he put his baby in the sink like the doctor’s
office advised, placed a towel around the sink as a
cushion and he gave him a bath and then moved his
legs like a bicycle.’’ Ex. A, p. 5.) CCMC confirmed that
the advice given by the primary care physician had been
‘‘bicycling legs, warm cloth on bottom, use thermome-
ter, one ounce of water.’’ Ex. L, p. 3.

Dr. Nina Livingston, from the CCMC SCAN program,
told DCF that ‘‘normal handling’’ of an infant would not
have caused these fractures, and that pain responses
such as crying and/or screaming would have been
expected from Noah after these various injuries. The
In re Noah R.-R.

doctors told DCF that the injuries were ‘‘highly suspi-
cious for inflicted injury.’’ Ex. A, p. 9. The fracture to
the left femur ‘‘would have required bending force.’’ Ex.
K, p. 13. Dr. Livingston later told the police that Noah
had sustained no new bone fractures while at CCMC,
thereby ‘‘showing that day to day handling’’ would not
have caused the ones detected at CCMC and negating
underlying ‘‘bone fragility issues’’ as their cause. Id.
The department decided to seek an order of tempo-
rary custody (OTC) and file a petition under General
Statutes § 46b-129 alleging that the child was neglected,
by being denied proper care and attention and living
under conditions injurious to his well-being, and abused
by having physical injuries inflicted by other than acci-
dental means and that were at variance with the history
given of them. The OTC was granted and the petition
filed on October 29, 2021.
Both parents appeared with counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing on the OTC held on November 5, 2021.
They were advised of their rights, entered pro forma
denials to the allegations of the petition, but agreed for
the OTC to be sustained. On July 20, 2022, both parents
entered nolo contendere pleas to the two allegations
of neglect, and Noah was adjudicated to have been
neglected and committed to the commissioner. On
March 7, 2023, the commissioner then filed the pending
TPR petition.
On June 3, 2022, Mr. R.-M. was arrested by East Hart-
ford police on charges of assault in the second degree
and risk of injury to a minor in connection with the
injuries inflicted on Noah. On November 29, 2023, he
entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine and was
convicted of the risk of injury charge, for which he
received a sentence of three years [of] incarceration,
suspended after eighteen months, with three years [of]
probation.
In re Noah R.-R.

III
ADJUDICATION
Mr. R.-M. having entered a plea of nolo contendere
to the adjudicatory allegations, Practice Book § 35a-1
(b) provides guidance on how the court should proceed.
That section provides in relevant part as follows: ‘‘An
admission to allegations or a plea of nolo contendere
may be accepted by the judicial authority. Before
accepting an admission or plea of nolo contendere, the
judicial authority shall determine whether the right to
trial has been waived, and that the parties understand
the content and consequences of their admission or
plea. If the allegations are admitted or the plea accepted,
the judicial authority shall make its adjudicatory finding
as to the validity of the facts alleged in the petition and
may proceed to a dispositional hearing. . . .’’ Practice
Book § 35a-1 (b). The court has reviewed the allegations
in the petition and considered the evidence provided in
the exhibits and through the testimony of social worker
Westerman and the respondent father. The information
contained in the exhibits is found to be consistent with
the testimony of social worker Westerman, and her
testimony and the contents of the exhibits are found
credible and proven to be true. The following facts
alleged in the petition, including those set forth in the
summary of facts and incorporated into the petition,
are found to state a sufficient and valid factual basis
for the adjudicatory allegations contained in the peti-
tion, and, by virtue of the evidence presented at trial,
were also proven by clear and convincing evidence:5
5
The meaning of the requirement contained in Practice Book § 35a-1 (b)
that the court should ‘‘make its adjudicatory finding as to the validity of
the facts alleged in the petition’’ (emphasis added) is not clear. In criminal
cases in this state, ‘‘a factual basis is not required to be established to accept
a nolo contendere plea.’’ State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981).
That same case states, however, that a court may nonetheless ‘‘in [its]
discretion . . . [insist] upon the establishment of a factual basis before
accepting a nolo plea.’’ Id., 365 n.13. In accepting the father’s plea of nolo
contendere here, this court stated as follows:
In re Noah R.-R.

• That [DCF] made reasonable efforts to locate Mr.
R.-M. and to reunify Noah with him;
• That Mr. R.-M. was unwilling or unable to benefit
from reunification efforts;
• That DCF did not need to prove reasonable efforts
to reunify because the Superior Court for Juvenile Mat-
ters previously approved, on October 25, 2022, a perma-
nency plan for Noah other than reunification;
• That pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) Noah had
previously been found neglected on July 20, 2022, and
after being provided specific steps Mr. R.-M. failed to
achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, con-
sidering the age and needs of the child, he could assume
a [responsible] position in Noah’s life; and
• That pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C) Noah had
been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental
commission or omission, including but not limited to
severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care,
guidance or control necessary for [his] physical, educa-
tional, moral or emotional well-being.
IV
DISPOSITION
‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
‘‘Upon a review of the allegations contained in the petition and in the
Summary of Facts, the court finds that they say that sufficient and valid
basis for the findings so alleged. And the court will accept the plea. And
the court will find that—actually, I’ll reserve the findings—specific findings
until my written decision.’’ Trial transcript, p. 16. In so stating, the court
reserved its right to find a factual basis for the respondent’s plea. Moreover,
such findings, even if unnecessary for making an adjudicatory determination
or accepting the respondent’s plea, are also pertinent to the court’s disposi-
tional findings in this case.
In re Noah R.-R.

Davonta V., 98 Conn. App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006),
aff’d, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). In finding
during the dispositional phase that it is in Noah’s best
interest for the parental rights of his father to be termi-
nated, the court has considered the evidence and testi-
mony related to circumstances and events up to and
including the date upon which the evidence in this mat-
ter was concluded.
A
Statutory Termination Factors
In making the dispositional decision regarding
whether to terminate a respondent’s parental rights to
this child in a contested termination proceeding, § 17a-
112 (k) requires the court to consider and make written
findings regarding seven factors specified in that stat-
ute. ‘‘The . . . factors serve simply as guidelines for
the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need
to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .
There is no requirement that each factor be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) In
re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 261, 829 A.2d 855
(2003).
1. ‘‘The timeliness, nature and extent of services
offered, provided and made available to the parent
and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion
of the child with the parent’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (1).
DCF offered timely and appropriate services to the
respondent to facilitate reunion with Noah. These
included referrals for individual counseling, supervised
visitations through the Quality Parenting Center [QPC]
at the Village, fatherhood engagement services at the
Village, and, after a six month hiatus in visitation
because of a protective order entered after he was
arrested, DCF supervised visits. After the mother dis-
closed intimate partner violence with Mr. R.-M., the
department referred him for domestic violence services
In re Noah R.-R.

at the Radiance program and later at [Community
Health Resource’s (CHR)] [Intimate Partner Violence
(IPV)] Fair program. The department also asked the
court to order a psychological evaluation, with one of
the purposes being to assess whether the father needed
treatment for domestic violence, substance abuse, or
mental health.
2. ‘‘[W]hether [DCF] has made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended’’—
§ 17a-112 (k) (2).
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Noah with
his father. It offered him regular visitation except for
the period of the protective order and referred him to
various reunification services.
3. ‘‘[T]he terms of any applicable court order
entered into and agreed upon by any individual or
agency and the parent, and the extent to which all
parties have fulfilled their obligations under such
order’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (3).
The specific steps ordered when children are
removed from parental custody or committed to the
department inform the parent of the actions that the
parent needs to take to regain custody and avoid termi-
nation of their parental rights. As the Appellate Court
noted in In re Shane M., 148 Conn. App. 308, 329, 84
A.3d 1265 (2014), aff’d, 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247
(2015), ‘‘[t]he specific steps are a benchmark by which
the court will measure the respondent’s conduct to
determine whether termination is appropriate pursuant
to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) See also In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644,
661, 953 A.2d 668 (2008) (same). Specific steps were
ordered on several occasions6 for Mr. R.-M. to undertake
6
The only specific steps introduced into evidence were those ordered by
this judge on December 5, 2022, after approving a permanency plan for
termination of parental rights and adoption. The court is also taking judicial
In re Noah R.-R.

in order to facilitate the return of Noah to his custody,
and he has complied as set forth below and as otherwise
detailed in this decision:
• Keep all appointments set by or with DCF.
Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or
unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)’s court-
appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.
Mr. R.-M. participated in at least two departmental
administrative case reviews, but would not agree to
allow DCF to conduct home visits without his attorney
being present.
• Keep whereabouts known to DCF, the child’s
attorney and your attorney.
Father generally complied, although one time he did
not promptly notify the department of changing his
address.
• Keep DCF apprised of any changes in the com-
position of your household members.
Mr. R.-M. has complied with this step and notified
the department when the mother and he did and did
not reside together.
• Take part in parenting and individual coun-
seling, make progress toward the identified treat-
ment goals, and cooperate with recommended ser-
vice providers.
The preliminary specific steps ordered at the time of
the ex parte OTC on October 19, 2021, directed Mr. R.-
M. to participate in individual therapy at Wheeler Clinic
or another provider and to participate in parenting ser-
vices. The goals identified on the specific steps form
were for him to demonstrate appropriate coping skills
and safe and appropriate parenting abilities. The final
notice of the contents of the specific steps entered as part of the underlying
§ 46b-129 proceeding.
In re Noah R.-R.

specific steps ordered upon Noah’s adjudication as
neglected and his commitment on July 20, 2022, again
ordered Mr. R.-M. to participate in parenting and indi-
vidual counseling. The final specific steps form identi-
fied the [QPC] at the Village for supervised visitation
and parenting services, fatherhood engagement ser-
vices through the Village, and [CHR] for parenting, men-
tal health and or substance use assessments. The July
20, 2022 final specific steps amended his goals in coun-
seling by adding for him to ‘‘provide home free of vio-
lence/abuse that meets child’s needs.’’
When DCF first began investigating Noah’s injuries,
Ms. R. told social worker investigator Paramentier that
after dating the father for five months she had intended
to end their relationship, which she described as having
a ‘‘lot of arguments when they were both jealous of each
other’’ although, she claimed, without any violence. Ex.
A, p. 6. She said that, ‘‘when she found out she was
pregnant, she and father had decided to try to make
it work as they were going to have a baby’’ but the
relationship since then had been ‘‘very stressful’’ since
father often did not have stable employment. Id. She
also told Paramentier that she had been in the process
of signing a new lease for a different apartment where
she would live just with Noah and the father would
live elsewhere. She made similar statements at CCMC
(‘‘Living situation: Child shares a home with his mother
and father. . . . Mother and father will be leaving their
current home at the end of this month. Mother will be
renting her own apartment . . . and father reports he
will most likely move in with his mother.’’ Ex. L, p. 4).
Despite those statements, however, the parents contin-
ued to live together until Mr. R.-M. was arrested on the
charges relating to Noah’s injuries.
The first therapist that the parents saw at CHR con-
tacted DCF on the day that Mr. R.-M. was arrested. The
therapist said that, ‘‘during therapy sessions, Ms. [R.]
In re Noah R.-R.

discussed being a victim of intimate partner violence.’’
She told the therapist that she had ended her relation-
ship with Mr. R.-M. upon his arrest. She also told the
therapist that she had been afraid to leave Mr. R.-M.
‘‘because she felt she needed him since she did not
know English well.’’ Ex. C, p. 11. The therapist told
DCF that Ms. R. had said that she needed help obtaining
housing that was separate from Mr. R.-M. Ms. [R.] had
also ‘‘reported Mr. R.-M. was stalking her on social
media and she reported blocking him from contacting
her.’’ The therapist told the department that, when she
encouraged Ms. [R.] to contact the police department
regarding the stalking, ‘‘she reported to her therapist
. . . that Mr. [R.-M.] threatened to have her deported
if she reported him to the police department.’’ Id. When
the therapist called Ms. R. to provide her with informa-
tion on intimate partner violence services, the therapist
heard Mr. R.-M.’s voice in the background, and when
the therapist attempted to address that with Ms. [R.],
she put the phone on mute and insisted Mr. R.-M. was
not there. Id. The therapist told DCF that Mr. R.-M.
‘‘[appeared] to be obsessed’’ with Ms. R., even to the
point of one time showing up at CHR during her appoint-
ment time. Id., 7.
Neither the October, 2021 nor the July, 2022 specific
steps contained any orders regarding intimate partner
violence. For example, the boxes on the specific steps
form to cooperate with restraining or protective orders
or DCF safety plans, to attend and complete an appro-
priate domestic violence program, and to address inti-
mate partner violence issues with a qualified therapist
were not checked on either order. After the department
had obtained the information recited above about inti-
mate partner violence in the parents’ relationship, the
court amended the order of final specific steps on
December 5, 2022. A copy of those specific steps was
entered into evidence as exhibit H. They included new
In re Noah R.-R.

orders for Mr. R.-M. to cooperate with any restraining
or protective order or DCF-approved safety plans, to
attend and complete an appropriate domestic violence
program, and to address intimate partner violence/
domestic violence with a qualified therapist. The goals
of his parenting and individual counseling were revised
to include that he should ‘‘demonstrate an understand-
ing of how intimate partner violence and physical abuse
impacts the child.’’ A new service provider was identi-
fied for him, Radiance-Innovative Services for Intimate
Partner Violence Offenders Services.
Mental health treatment: Mr. R.-M. did not consis-
tently attend or benefit from the individual therapy
ordered in the specific steps. He began therapy at CHR
in April, 2022, but stopped attending after two months.
After a six month lapse, he resumed therapy at CHR in
mid-September, 2022. His CHR sessions were modified
to biweekly in mid-February, 2023. Between September,
2022, and April, 2023, he missed seventeen of his
appointments. In April, 2023, his therapist at CHR told
DCF that her sessions with Mr. R.-M. were going to end
and there would be a gap in services for approximately
six weeks while another therapist was assigned, but
Mr. R.-M. did not resume therapy. He told DCF that he
stopped attending because he expected to be incarcer-
ated soon. Dr. Schroeder, who conducted the court-
ordered psychological evaluation, concluded that he
made only limited progress in his therapy because he
is ‘‘hard to engage,’’ has difficulty trusting his therapist,
and had attended therapy intermittently. She also
reported that he frequently blames other people for his
own problems, struggles to accept responsibility for his
actions, and has difficulty accepting critiques of his
actions. The contents of her evaluation contained in
exhibit I and its conclusions are consistent with the
other evidence about Mr. R.-M. and are found to be
credible.
In re Noah R.-R.

Domestic violence/intimate partner violence
services: The Radiance program mentioned in the spe-
cific steps is one that requires participants to refer
themselves. DCF gave him information about that pro-
gram, but Mr. R.-M. never went there. Later, DCF
referred him and Ms. R. to CHR’s IPV Fair program,
which works separately with both members of a couple
experiencing intimate partner violence, but one require-
ment of that program is that participants admit to having
experienced such issues in their relationship. Mr. R.-
M. has always denied any violence or issues of coercive
control in that relationship. He did tell DCF that he was
willing to participate in the program, however, as did
Ms. R., but initially neither of them was willing to
acknowledge domestic violence as an issue. In October,
2023, Ms. R. admitted to her therapist and DCF that
coercive control was a component of her relationship
with Mr. R., and the following month she filed for and
obtained a restraining order against him, which was
extended in July, 2024, for another year. While that
restraining order has been in effect, Mr. R.-M. has
repeatedly contacted her in violation of the order. Mr.
R.-M. never began any services at CHR IPV Fair before
he was imprisoned. The evidence shows that he has
made no progress on addressing these issues.
Parenting Services: DCF referred Mr. R.-M. to the
supervised visitation program at the [QPC], where he
participated between November, 2021, and May, 2022.
A protective order then prevented him from having any
contact with Noah until November, 2022, when DCF
was allowed to supervise his visits, after which it pro-
vided weekly visits until he was incarcerated. He also
attended and completed fatherhood engagement ser-
vices at the Village between May and August of 2022.
Social worker Westerman testified that he is always
appropriate and affectionate during his visits with
Noah. She said that Noah appears comfortable with Mr.
In re Noah R.-R.

R.-M., but not bonded with him. Westerman said that,
until Mr. R.-M. was incarcerated in February, 2024, he
had been having weekly visitations for ‘‘the better part
of a year’’ without concerns. Dr. Schroeder observed
him interacting with Noah as part of her evaluation,
and she commented that ‘‘he offered some positive ele-
ments of parenting that included engagement, support,
nurturance, grooming, and items for play. . . .’’ Ex. I,
p. 27.
• Submit to substance abuse assessment and
follow treatment recommendations; submit to
random drug testing if recommended; do not use
illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine.
DCF never asked Mr. R.-M. to engage in a substance
abuse assessment. The August, 2023 MRP social study
said he always appeared sober during interactions with
the department and that DCF had no concerns related
to substance abuse on his part. See ex. E, p. 8.
• Accept and cooperate with in-home support
services referred by DCF and make progress
toward treatment goals.
DCF did not offer or refer the father to any ‘‘in-home
support services.’’
• Cooperate with any active protective or
restraining orders; avoid more incidents of
domestic violence; attend and complete a domes-
tic violence program; address intimate partner
violence issues with a qualified therapist.
The father did not comply. After Ms. R. obtained a
restraining order against him, he repeatedly contacted
her in violation of the terms of that order. He never
attended or completed a domestic violence program.
• Visit with the child(ren) as often as DCF per-
mits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child
interaction during visits. Father has complied.
In re Noah R.-R.

• Cooperate with child’s therapy. Not applica-
ble here.
• Get and/or maintain adequate housing and
legal income.
The evidence on this is ambiguous. Mr. R.-M. told
DCF that he was employed, but DCF was never able
to verify his work status and when it asked him in April,
2023, to provide a copy of his job schedule, he did not
do so (at least through August, 2023, which is the last
date on which the court has evidence about this issue).
See ex. E, p. 8. He did provide DCF with the addresses
at which he was residing.
• Sign releases authorizing DCF to communi-
cate with service providers to monitor attendance,
cooperation and progress toward identified goals
and for use in future proceedings before this
court. Father complied.
• Immediately let DCF know about any
changes in the makeup of the household to ensure
that the change does not hurt the health and
safety of the child(ren). Father complied.
• No involvement in the criminal justice system.
Comply with probation or parole.
Father did not comply. On December 23, 2022, he
was arrested for larceny in the second degree, a class
C felony, for stealing merchandise from his employer.
• Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or
testing. The father cooperated with the court-ordered
psychological evaluation.
• Keep child(ren) in the state of Connecticut
while case is going on unless you get advance
permission from DCF or the court. Not applicable
since child is in DCF custody.
In re Noah R.-R.

• Supply names and addresses of grandpar-
ents and of persons the parent would like DCF to
consider as a placement resource. Father complied.
4. ‘‘[T]he feelings and emotional ties of the child
with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian
of such child’s person and any person who has exer-
cised physical care, custody or control of the child
for at least one year and with whom the child has
developed significant emotional ties’’—§ 17a-112
(k) (4).
Noah has not been in Mr. R.-M.’s custody since the
child was two months old. The child apparently has no
memory of his injuries, and he is reported by social
worker Westerman to be comfortable with and unafraid
of Mr. R.-M. during visitations. In its March, 2023 TPR
social study, the department acknowledged that, as of
that point, Noah had ‘‘a close emotional tie’’ to both of
his parents. Ex. D, p. 21. Since Noah had seen his father
weekly for the past year as of the time of trial and Mr.
R.-M. is reported to be affectionate and appropriate
during those visitations, Noah still probably has positive
feelings for and emotional ties to Mr. R.-M. Noah is
closely bonded with his foster mother, however, and
has lived with her since approximately one month after
his removal from parental care in late 2021.
5. ‘‘[T]he age of the child’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (5).
Born on August 18, 2021, Noah was three years and
eight months old at the time of trial and is now four
years and four months old.
6. ‘‘[T]he efforts the parent has made to adjust
such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or condi-
tions to make it in the best interest of the child to
return such child home in the foreseeable future,
including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to
which the parent has maintained contact with the
In re Noah R.-R.

child as part of an effort to reunite the child with
the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contri-
butions, and (B) the maintenance of regular con-
tact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (6).
Mr. R.-M. attended some of the services to which the
department referred him and that were intended to
address the reasons that Noah was removed and kept
from his parents’ custody. As discussed above, how-
ever, he did not make significant progress toward
addressing his mental health issues and never under-
took any domestic violence services. He had regular
contact with Noah through the QPC supervised visita-
tion program and DCF supervised visits except for the
six month period when the criminal protective order
prohibited contact.
7. ‘‘[T]he extent to which a parent has been pre-
vented from maintaining a meaningful relationship
with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct
of the other parent of the child, or the unreason-
able act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent’’—§ 17a-112 (k) (7).
There is no evidence of any unreasonable acts or
conduct on the part of anyone or of either parent’s
economic circumstances interfering with the ability of
either one to have a meaningful relationship with Noah.
B
Best Interest of The Child
The final element of the termination of the parental
rights statute, § 17a-112 (j), requires that, before grant-
ing a petition for such termination, the court must find
‘‘by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (2) termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child . . . .’’ The
best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact
In re Noah R.-R.

specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion
to consider all the different and individualized factors
that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determin-
ing that terminating Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights is in
Noah’s best interest, the court has considered numer-
ous factors, including ‘‘the child’s interest in sustained
growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity
and stability of [his] environment’’; Capetta v. Capetta,
196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); his age and needs;
the length of his time in foster care; the contact he had
with his parents after removal; the potential benefit
or detriment of Noah retaining a connection with his
biological father; his genetic bond to his father; see,
e.g., In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d
484 (1999); his needs for permanency and stability; see,
e.g., In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 493–95, 940 A.2d
733 (2008); and the seven statutory factors and the
court’s findings thereon. The court has also balanced
Noah’s intrinsic needs for safety, stability and perma-
nency against the potential benefit of maintaining a
legal connection with his biological father. See Pamela
B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998)
(child’s physical and emotional well-being must be
weighed against interest in preserving family integrity),
abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296
Conn. 186, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).
When the underlying neglect petition was filed, Noah
was only two months old. By the time of trial three
plus years later, he was nearing four years of age. Since
removal from his parents’ custody, he lived for a month
in nonrelative foster care and ever since then he has
resided in foster care in the home of his paternal aunt,
Mr. R.-M.’s sister, whom the department has identified
as a potential adoptive resource. Despite his early and
severe injuries, he today shows no residual effects of
what happened. He has no known medical or develop-
mental issues. Because he is not yet talking much, the
In re Noah R.-R.

foster family arranged for him to be evaluated by Birth-
to-Three services, which found no developmental prob-
lems.
Noah is thus like most other children his age. He has
the same needs as they do for necessities and material
goods such as food, clothing, and shelter. The evidence
about the father’s work history is sketchy, but nothing
in the evidence suggests that Mr. R.-M. could not meet
these types of needs. All children also need medical
care, and the father’s history of overlooking his child’s
many injuries, combined with his doubts about whether
his son was even injured, raise serious doubt about Mr.
R.-M.’s willingness or capacity to meet this need. Like
all children of his age, Noah also has the more intangible
needs such as for love, guidance, safety, stability, con-
sistency, and permanency. He needs caretakers who
will nourish him and guide him toward reaching his
maximum potential. The evidence suggests that Mr. R.-
M. loves his child, and the information about his interac-
tions with Noah during visitations and the interactional
session that was part of the court-ordered psychological
evaluation shows that Mr. R.-M. knows how to and is
able to interact positively and affectionately with his
child during those sessions.
One of a parent’s paramount obligations, however,
is to do his best to keep his child safe and not to harm
his child. During the first two months of his life, Noah
was injured on numerous occasions and when exam-
ined by CCMC doctors was found to have twenty-one
fractures that had occurred on different occasions over
at least a one month period. These fractures were all
over his body—a fracture to his right collarbone that
was more than two weeks old (and according to Dr.
Livingston possibly a birth injury); a possible healed
fracture of one of his right ribs; a fracture of unknown
age to his right upper arm; two fractures of both his
right and left forearms, all more than two weeks old and
In re Noah R.-R.

‘‘most likely around [four] weeks old’’; four fractures
to the bones in his right hand, one of uncertain age and
the others more than ten days old; fractures to the third
and fourth fingers of his right hand that were more than
ten days old; fractures to his right tibia (shin) and right
fibula (described in Dr. Livingston’s letter as ‘‘the other
lower leg bone next to the tibia,’’ both ‘‘most likely [two
to four] weeks old’’; three fractures on his left foot that
were more than ten days old; two fractures of his left
thigh, one less than ten days old and which ‘‘most likely
occurred on day of presentation’’ (the fracture reported
on October 21) and the other ‘‘most likely more than
[four] weeks old’’; and a fracture to the left tibia that
was probably between two and four weeks old. The
injuries that resulted in these fractures would have been
painful to Noah and resulted in pain responses such as
crying or screaming. Ex. A, p. 12. Bruises from some
of these injuries were still evident when the CCMC
doctors evaluated him. Dr. Livingston told DCF that
normal handling of a child would not have caused these
injuries and that medical examination and tests had
found no cause for them, leading her initially to charac-
terize them as ‘‘highly suspicious for inflicted injury.’’
Id. After conducting a follow-up assessment of Noah a
year later, Dr. Livingston reported to the department
that ‘‘Noah had a normal follow up physical and devel-
opmental exam. No radiological evidence of fractures
was noted. Noah is now walking/falling with no addi-
tional fractures or interval disease in the past year. This
is strong evidence of normal bone health. . . . Noah’s
injuries are diagnostic for inflicted injury.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Ex. D, p. 9.
Mr. R.-M. has repeatedly denied causing these injur-
ies—to DCF, to the police, to Dr. Schroeder during
the psychological evaluation, and at trial on the TPR
petition. He did plead guilty to and has been convicted
of the charge of risk of injury based on those injuries,
In re Noah R.-R.

however. He testified at trial here that he had pleaded
guilty to that charge only because he had also been
arrested on a larceny charge, was ‘‘offered a deal that
involved pleading to both charges,’’ and had faced a
possible sentence of five to ten years of incarceration
if he was convicted after trial but had been offered a
sentence of seven years [of] incarceration suspended
after eighteen months if he pleaded guilty to both
charges. See trial transcript, p. 71. The petitioner’s trial
brief appeared to regard his guilty plea and conviction
as tantamount to establishing that he had in fact
inflicted those injuries on his son. See, e.g., Petitioner’s
posttrial brief, pp. 2–3. The respondent’s posttrial brief,
however, asserted that he had entered his guilty plea
under the Alford doctrine.
The law is clear that there are differences between
a straight guilty plea,7 a plea of nolo contendere,8 and
7
A criminal defendant who enters a regular guilty plea admits having
committed the charged offense. A court may accept a guilty plea only upon
finding that there is a factual basis for such a plea. See Practice Book § 39-
21 (captioned ‘‘Factual Basis for Plea,’’ stating [that] ‘‘[t]he judicial authority
shall not accept a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea’’).
8
‘‘A plea of nolo contendere is distinct from a plea of guilty inasmuch as
the latter may be regarded as a verbal admission by the accused, and, as such,
may be admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. It does not, however,
conclusively establish negligence, and the accused is not precluded from
explaining his plea. . . . By contrast, a plea of nolo contendere is merely
a declaration by the accused that he will not contest the charge, and even
though followed by a finding of guilty and the imposition of a fine or other
penalty, is not admissible, either as a verbal admission or an admission by
conduct. . . . Nor is it admissible to affect a party’s credibility, as evidence
of an arrest, or as res judicata establishing that the plaintiff was engaged
in a criminal act. . . . Pleas of nolo contendere may be entered for reasons
of convenience and without much regard to guilt and collateral conse-
quences. . . . Even though the plea may be regarded as a tacit admission,
its inconclusive and ambiguous nature dictates that it should be given no
currency beyond the particular case in which it was entered.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171
Conn. 705, 711–12 n.4, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97
S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977). Unlike a straight guilty plea, a plea of
nolo contendere does not require that the trial court find a factual basis for
In re Noah R.-R.
9
an Alford plea. Whether his conviction in the criminal
the plea. As explained in State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981): ‘‘In
[Alford] . . . Justice White succinctly pointed out the distinction between
a guilty plea and a nolo contendere plea, and why a factual basis may not
be desirable for the acceptance of the latter. In his majority opinion, he
explained that: Throughout its history . . . the plea of nolo contendere has
been viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the
defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for
leniency. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 preserves this distinction in its require-
ment that a court cannot accept a guilty plea unless it is satisfied that there
is a factual basis for the plea; there is no similar requirement for pleas of
nolo contendere, since it was thought desirable to permit defendants to
plea nolo without making any inquiry into their actual guilt . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)
We agree with the distinction made by Justice White in Alford and by the
federal rules and hold that, although our own rules may be unclear, a factual
basis is not required to be established to accept a nolo contendere plea.
9
See White v. Commissioner of Correction, 145 Conn. App. 834, 847–48
n.3, 77 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013) (‘‘Under
North Carolina v. Alford, [400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)],
a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to
being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.
Commissioner of Correction v. Gordon, 228 Conn. 384, 385 n.1, 636 A.2d
799 (1994). A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron
in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s
evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry
of a guilty plea nevertheless. State v. Palmer, [196 Conn. 157, 169 n.3, 491
A.2d 1075 (1985)]. In [Alford], the United States Supreme Court treated such
guilty pleas as the functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere. State
v. Rish, 17 Conn. App. 447, 456, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802,
559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38
(1989). Our Supreme Court has indicated that [a] plea of nolo contendere
has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty on all further proceedings within
the indictment. . . . The only practical difference is that the plea of nolo
contendere may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a
subsequent criminal or civil case. . . . State v. Martin, 197 Conn. 17, 20–21
n.7, 495 A.2d 1028 (1985). Our Supreme Court has also indicated that a
factual basis is not required to be established to accept a nolo contendere
plea. State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 364, 438 A.2d 114 (1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981). In 1989, this court
concluded in Rish that [a]s a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is the
functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea may not
be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent civil case.
State v. Rish, supra, [456]. Likewise, in 2002, this court concluded that as
Alford pleas and pleas of nolo contendere [are] the functional equivalent
In re Noah R.-R.

proceeding could be considered as proof in this pro-
ceeding that he committed those injuries is a significant
fact, and the court thus sought, as necessary for a well
reasoned decision, additional posttrial briefs from the
parties on whether a guilty plea under the Alford doc-
trine or a subsequent conviction would have any legal
or factual significance in this proceeding. The last of
those briefs was filed on December 13, 2024. All parties
have agreed that the court should take judicial notice
of the criminal proceedings,10 and the court has accord-
ingly taken judicial notice that the respondent father’s
[plea of] guilty to the risk of injury charge was under
the Alford doctrine. Upon review of the parties’ briefs
and after conducting its own research, the court con-
cludes that the law in Connecticut is unclear on the
significance of his plea and conviction in this proceed-
ing.11 In view of our Supreme Court’s statement that
of one another . . . a factual basis is not required for Alford pleas . . . .
Baillargeon v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 716, 730 n.11,
789 A.2d 1046 (2002). A court may nevertheless, in its discretion, require a
factual basis before accepting a nolo contendere or Alford plea. Id., 730 n.10;
see also State v. Godek, supra, 365 n.13. (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
10
See the petitioner’s supplemental posttrial brief, pp. 2–3; the respondent
father’s motion for judicial notice, dated December 13, 2024; and the letter
from the child’s counsel dated December 13, 2024, adopting the petition-
er’s position.
11
The commissioner’s brief argues that the court may treat the father’s
Alford plea ‘‘as if he had pled guilty to the risk of injury charges.’’ Petitioner’s
supplemental posttrial brief, p. 2. It cites the case of State v. Faraday, 268
Conn. 174, 842 A.2d 567 (2004) as support for that proposition. Faraday is
one of a series of cases holding that an Alford guilty plea may be used,
in subsequent proceedings for violation of probation, to establish ‘‘that a
conviction following a jury verdict is indistinguishable from a conviction
following a guilty plea or Alford plea for purposes of eliminating any contro-
versy over whether the criminal conduct underlying a violation of probation
has occurred.’’ State v. T.D., 286 Conn. 353, 366, 944 A.2d 288 (2008). On
the other hand, in State v. Solomon, 150 Conn. App. 458, 469–72, 91 A.3d
523, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 908, 100 A.3d 401 (2014), the court held that
the trial court had erroneously allowed admission of a party’s guilty plea
under the Alford doctrine to the offense of criminal possession of a firearm
to establish, in a civil proceeding, that the same individual had admitted
knowing possession of that firearm. The respondent father’s supplemental
posttrial brief in the present case correctly points out that § 4-8A (a) (2) of
In re Noah R.-R.

the ‘‘inconclusive and ambiguous nature’’ of an Alford
plea ‘‘indicates that it should be given no currency
beyond the particular case in which it was entered’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) Lawrence v. Koz-
lowski, 171 Conn. 705, 712 n.4, 372 A.2d 110 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d
1066 (1977); this court will not regard the father’s plea
and conviction as evidence that he inflicted the injuries
on Noah.
Nonetheless, all these injuries happened to Noah
while he was in Mr. R.-M.’s (and Ms. R.’s) care. On
numerous occasions during Noah’s second month of
life, this child was repeatedly injured. Dr. Livingston’s
opinion that these injuries were ‘‘inflicted,’’ which this
court finds credible, means that someone was causing
the injuries to Noah. He would have cried each time.
The parents both told DCF that Noah had cried a lot
during that month. Someone in that household or caring
for Noah was injuring him, repeatedly, so harshly as to
break the baby’s bones, but his parents were ignoring
his cries of pain. Mr. R.-M. was living in a home where
his own baby was repeatedly injured and would have
been crying out from those injuries. During the psycho-
logical evaluation, moreover, he even ‘‘questioned
whether his son really suffered [twenty-one] fractures
as he has no lasting problems.’’ Ex. I, p. 16.
The facts proven at trial here—that Mr. R.-M. contin-
ues to deny having committed those injuries and to
question whether they actually occurred—show that he
the Connecticut Code of Evidence expressly provides that an Alford plea
itself or any statements Mr. R.-M. made in connection with that plea are
inadmissible in any other proceeding. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-8A (stating
as follows: ‘‘(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following shall not be
admissible in a civil or criminal case against a person who has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal case or participated in plea
negotiations in such case, whether or not a plea has been entered . . . (2)
a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea entered under the Alford doctrine
or any statement made in conjunction with such a plea’’).
In re Noah R.-R.

continues to pose a safety risk to his son in unsuper-
vised settings. Since he did not admit causing the injur-
ies, there is no way of knowing for sure who inflicted
these injuries on his son, and, if Mr. R.-M. was the
one who did so, whether he had acted intentionally or
negligently, out of rage, sadistic pleasure, or care-
lessness. But his unwillingness to recognize both that
Noah had been injured and that somebody had inflicted
those injuries on Noah shows that he is not today pre-
pared or able to keep his son safe in his care.
Our courts have long held that ‘‘the failure to
acknowledge and make progress in addressing the
issues that led to a child’s removal may be one of many
contributing factors to a court’s determination that a
parent has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of per-
sonal rehabilitation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 492, 308 A.3d
604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
Similarly, a parent’s continued unwillingness to accept
responsibility for the reasons a child was found to have
been neglected and committed to DCF ‘‘reasonably may
bear on whether reunification or termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interest.’’ In re Allison G.,
276 Conn. 146, 164, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005). ‘‘In abuse and
neglect cases, it is well established that the failure to
accept responsibility reasonably may be considered as
an indication that there is a risk that the abuse will
continue.’’ Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290
Conn. 545, 566, 964 A.2d 1213 (2009). Even if Mr. R.-M.
was not the person who inflicted those injuries on his
son, Mr. R.-M. was one of the two people responsible
for keeping Noah safe and protecting him from harm.
He did not meet that responsibility, and his son was
repeatedly injured as a result. Even if it was possible
that Mr. R.-M. had been unaware during that month
that his son was repeatedly being injured, and probably
crying out from those injuries, his refusal now to
In re Noah R.-R.

acknowledge those injuries shows that he does not
accept responsibility for not having paid enough atten-
tion to his child then to notice what was happening
and had happened to his son. If he had paid enough
attention, maybe he could have protected his child from
any or more injuries or sought medical care sooner.
His refusal now to acknowledge that his son was hurt
so badly and so many times also shows a fundamental
lack of concern about his son’s safety or welfare.
The case of In re Egypt E., 327 Conn. 506, 175 A.3d
21, cert. denied sub nom. Morsy E. v. Commissioner,
Dept. of Children and Families, 586 U.S. 818, 139 S.
Ct. 88, 202 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2018), presents somewhat
different facts but discusses the same implications of
not accepting the significance of injuries to a child in
the parent’s care. In that case, a seven week old child
was found by doctors to have incurred numerous frac-
tures and bruises while in the parents’ care. The com-
missioner then brought petitions to terminate the par-
ents’ parental rights to that child and her sibling. Initial
judgments in favor of the commissioner were over-
turned on appeal, and a new trial ordered. See In re
Egypt E., 322 Conn. 231, 140 A.3d 210 (2016). On the
final day of the second trial, the respondent father
‘‘ ‘reluctantly’ admitted responsibility for the injuries
. . . .’’ In re Egypt E., supra, 327 Conn. 522. The trial
court noted that his ‘‘admission was unacceptably gen-
eral and still evinced an unwillingness to face the
details of what had occurred.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.
At that trial, the respondent mother testified that,
‘‘although for the prior three years she had been unsure
about what had happened to Mariam, she now acknowl-
edged that [the father] had inflicted the child’s injuries.’’
Id., 521. The trial court concluded that ‘‘neither of the
respondents, at present, seemed to comprehend why
removing Egypt from the home was necessary to pro-
tect her, instead cling[ing] to the fact that Egypt was
In re Noah R.-R.

uninjured as a way to protect themselves from the
awareness of the truth of Mariam’s significant injur-
ies and their failure to provide safety for both chil-
dren.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 522. In affirming the trial
court’s decision to terminate the respondents’ parental
rights, our Supreme Court noted the trial court’s find-
ings as follows: ‘‘The trial court found that [the mother]
had taken no action to inform herself about Mariam’s
injuries, that she could not confront the truth and that
she had made ‘absolutely no progress’ toward the goal
of learning how to keep her children safe. It found
further that [the mother’s] failure to acknowledge what
had occurred meant that she could not be safely
reunited with her children. The court found that [the
father] similarly could not comply with the specific
steps that he had been given. As the court explained,
‘[b]oth parents in their own individual ways demon-
strate a remarkable capacity for self-deception. Even
as each admitted [that] he or she now was ready to
acknowledge [the father] as the source of the injuries
to Mariam, each stated that awareness in very similar
detached words. Such observable . . . lack of candor
keeps them, the court concludes, from putting the needs
of their children first, admitting their faults and thereby
permitting the possibility of careful reunification with
their children.
‘‘ ‘This is the fatal flaw that has prevented reunifica-
tion throughout these lengthy proceedings. It is at the
heart of [the respondents’] inability and unwillingness
to benefit from the services offered to them. It means
that their children, even now, could not reasonably and
safely be returned to them.’ ’’ Id., 522–23.
Similarly, the father’s stated doubts here about
whether these injuries even occurred show his ‘‘unwill-
ingness to face the details of what had occurred.’’ They
show that he does not understand and accept why
In re Noah R.-R.

removing Noah from his custody was necessary to pro-
tect his son. The doubt that he expressed about Noah
actually being injured, despite the documented medical
proof, is, just as In re Egypt E., a way of protecting
himself from an awareness of Noah’s many, significant
injuries and, regardless of whether he was the one
inflicting those injuries, of his own failure to keep his
child safe. Here, as in that case, expressing those doubts
shows an unwillingness to put the needs of his son
first. Those doubts also explain why he made so little
progress in his mental health treatment. His failure to
acknowledge his responsibility for not having protected
his son means that he could not safely be reunited or
even left unattended with Noah.
The posttrial brief submitted by the respondent father
acknowledges that the state has a legitimate interest
in safety, stability, and permanency: ‘‘[W]here a court
interferes with a child’s relationship with his parent, it
must do so only to keep that child safe, stable, and
prospering.’’ Father’s posttrial brief, pp. 5, 7. That brief
argues that withdrawal of the TPR petition as to the
mother means that [the] termination of the father’s
parental rights to Noah would not advance the child’s
interest in permanency. Whether permanency for Noah
would be obtained through adoption by the current
foster mother or reunification with the biological
mother was, the brief maintained, unclear as of the
end of the current trial. That brief thus asserts that
‘‘termination is unnecessary’’ to further the govern-
ment’s legitimates interests here. See id., p. 5. That
assertion ignores the fact, however, that termination
does further both the state’s and the child’s legitimate
interests, statutory grounds for termination having been
established, in the child’s safety and well-being.
Without expressly so arguing, the father’s brief
implies that the court should import a ‘‘least restrictive
means analysis’’ into the current determination as to
In re Noah R.-R.

whether termination is in Noah’s best interest. See id.,
p. 7. Although our appellate courts have never adopted
a least restrictive requirement for TPR proceedings,
and the meaning of such a standard when applied to a
termination proceeding is not clear, safety of the child
would surely be a minimum requirement for applying
any such analysis.
Not terminating Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights would
mean that he maintained the legal right to seek revoca-
tion of commitment and return of the child to his care
and, even if the child were in the care and custody of
someone else, visitation with Noah. The court agrees
with the position argued by the commissioner that ‘‘ter-
mination can aid stability and lessen disruption for
abused and neglected children by preventing unfit par-
ents from subjecting them to further litigation.’’ Peti-
tioner’s posttrial reply brief, p. 3, citing In re Davonta
V., supra, 285 Conn. 495–96 (stating as follows: ‘‘[e]ven
if no adoption is forthcoming, termination can aid stabil-
ity and lessen disruption because a parent whose rights
have been terminated no longer may file a motion to
revoke the commitment of the child to the custody of
the commissioner . . . or oppose an annual perma-
nency plan’’ (citation omitted)).
The number of injuries to Noah makes it likely that
someone with regular access to him was the one causing
the injuries. The evidence shows that Noah did have
other caretakers than the parents during the month
long period when the injuries occurred. (The maternal
grandmother is the only such person mentioned in the
OTC affidavit, as she told DCF that she ‘‘cares for said
infant ‘‘Monday–Thursday and every other Saturday
from 6:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.’’ Ex. A, p. 11.) CCMC could
not date the precise time for the older injuries, but that
was not the case for the fractured leg that led the par-
ents to take Noah to the doctor on October 25.
According to CCMC’s Dr. Friedman, ‘‘given the injury
In re Noah R.-R.

to this baby’s leg, she believed said infant would have
experienced swelling immediately.’’ Id., 6. The bone in
Noah’s femur ‘‘was broken into several pieces.’’ Id., 3.
The injury ‘‘was most likely to have been caused by a
blow to his left posterior left femur.’’ Id. Mr. R.-M. even
acknowledged that when changing Noah’s diaper he
‘‘noticed his left leg was swollen and knew there could
be something wrong [and] he could feel bones inside
his son’s leg crunching when he touched them.’’ Id.
Dr. Livingston also agreed that, based on the parents’
reports of Noah’s symptoms, the injury that led to his
hospitalization ‘‘most likely occurred on the day of pre-
sentation.’’ Ex. L, p. L-12. Both parents having repeat-
edly said that they were the only ones taking care of
Noah in the hours just before they noticed his swollen
leg, their statements lead, in light of the doctor’s opin-
ions of its recency, to the inescapable conclusion that
one (or both) of them had caused that injury.
The father’s nolo contendere plea removed the neces-
sity to prove the adjudicatory allegations by clear and
convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase of the
proceeding to establish statutory grounds for termina-
tion. For the dispositional purposes of deciding whether
termination has been proven to be in Noah’s best inter-
est, however, it is highly significant in this case that
the factual information contained in the exhibits offered
at trial proved clearly and convincingly that the adjudi-
catory allegations here, even if unnecessary to be
proven in the adjudicatory phase, were nonetheless
both true and essential to the dispositional decision:
that Mr. R.-M. has not addressed the reasons that Noah
was removed from his care; that he did not meaningfully
engage in many of the necessary rehabilitative services
offered to offer a possibility of reunification; that he
was unwilling and unable to benefit from many of the
reunification services offered by the department and
ordered by the court; that he was not ready at the time
In re Noah R.-R.

of trial to assume a responsible position in Noah’s life
and will not be ready to do so for the foreseeable future,
a fact he conceded in his own testimony;12 and that, by
acts of omission or commission on his part that while
the child was in his care and custody, he denied Noah,
even if he did not cause those injuries, the guidance and
control necessary for the child’s physical well-being.
Although the focus of the dispositional phase is the
child’s best interest, here the parent’s conduct is highly
significant to that decision. The specific facts that
underlie and prove the adjudicatory allegations to be
true support the conclusion that termination is in
Noah’s best interest. Compliance with specific steps
intended to help a parent address the reasons they
lost custody of their child provides the court with a
nonbinding benchmark or guideline on whether termi-
nation is appropriate, and Mr. R.-M.’s failure to take the
orders contained in the specific steps further supports
a finding that termination is in Noah’s best interest.
Mr. R.-M.’s unwillingness to acknowledge that Noah
suffered these injuries shows no awareness of how
serious they were or his responsibility for not causing
or preventing them and for not noticing them earlier
and seeking medical care sooner. It is thus not surpris-
ing that for the first few months of his mental health
treatment, he rarely discussed the injuries to Noah,
showed no emotion when he did discuss them, but
instead focused on Ms. R. His second therapist also
reported that for at least the first two months of that
therapy he again did not discuss the injuries to Noah.13
12
On direct examination, Mr. R.-M. was asked the following question by
his attorney and gave the following answer:
‘‘Q. So, I want to turn to talk to you a little about Noah. From what you’ve
said, it seems pretty clear that you’re not going to be around for him any
time soon.
‘‘A. Correct.’’ Trial transcript, pp. 71-72.
13
‘‘On 09/14/22, Mr. [R.-M.] re-engaged in mental health services through
CHR and was assigned to Sarah Hermonot. Mr. [R.-M.] has been attending
therapy regularly since 09/14/22. Prior to the Administrative Case Review
held on 11/22/22, Mr. [R.-M.] was not discussing Noah during his therapeutic
In re Noah R.-R.

Someone unwilling to notice for so long or to acknowl-
edge that his child was injured is unlikely to benefit
from services that could prevent the recurrence of such
conduct in the future. The evidence showed that Mr.
R.-M. was not willing to participate meaningfully in
many of the services offered by DCF or to which the
department referred him in accordance with the spe-
cific steps. He did not attend counseling consistently
and, even though he eventually agreed to participate in
CHR’s domestic violence program, IPV Fair, he was not
willing to admit that intimate partner violence was an
issue in his relationship with Ms. R. Just as in the In
re Egypt E. case, the respondent’s inability and unwill-
ingness to benefit from services means that Noah would
not be safe in his care. Although the father’s brief argues
that termination ‘‘deprives [Noah] of a potentially bene-
ficial future relationship’’; p. 5; there could be no ‘‘poten-
tially beneficial future relationship’’ with someone who
continues to pose a safety risk because of an unwilling-
ness to accept responsibility and seek personal change.
The father essentially asks the court to speculate, with-
out any evidentiary basis, that someday he will be will-
ing to accept his own responsibility for what happened
to Noah and his failure to have protected his son.

Noah’s best interest should not and does not rely
on such speculation, however. His best interest lies in
orders that secure his interest in being safe and advance
his needs for stability and permanency. Terminating
Mr. R.-M.’s parental rights removes barriers to perma-
nency for Noah and directly furthers Noah’s interests
in safety and security. The commissioner proved clearly
and convincingly that termination of the respondent
father’s parental rights is in Noah’s best interest.
sessions.’’ Ex. D, Social Study in Support of Termination of Parental Rights,
p. 7.
In re Noah R.-R.

V
ORDERS
The court having accepted the father’s nolo conten-
dere plea to the adjudicatory allegations, the court hav-
ing further determined that the adjudicatory allegations
in the petition provide a valid and sufficient factual
basis for the necessary adjudicatory findings and having
considered all the evidence offered at trial and further
found by clear and convincing evidence that the adjudi-
catory allegations were proven to be true and that,
upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances
presented, that it is in Noah’s best interest to terminate
the parental rights of the respondent, it is hereby
ORDERED:
The commissioner’s petition for termination of the
parental rights of the respondent Jorge R.-M. to his
minor child Noah is hereby GRANTED, and judgment
may enter terminating his parental rights to this child.