State v. DeAngelo

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State v. DeAngelo

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
CHRISTOPHER DEANGELO
(AC 47032)
Suarez, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant acquittee, who previously had been found not guilty of certain
crimes by reason of mental disease or defect and who had been committed
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed from
the trial court’s judgment granting the state’s petition to extend his commit-
ment to the board pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593 (c)). He claimed that the
court improperly determined that the state met its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that, after having served his maximum term
of commitment, his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or oth-
ers. Held:

The trial court improperly granted the state’s petition to continue the defen-
dant’s commitment, as the state did not meet its burden of proving that the
defendant’s discharge would constitute an imminent danger to himself or
others, and, thus, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed
that court to deny the state’s petition.
Argued March 12—officially released July 22, 2025

Procedural History

Petition for an order extending the defendant’s com-
mitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the
court, Hall, J.; judgment granting the petition, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed;
judgment directed.
Kevin L. Semataska, assistant public defender, for
the appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was Margaret E. Kelley, state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Kirk W. Lowry filed a brief for the Connecticut Legal
Rights Project as amicus curiae.
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State v. DeAngelo

Opinion

BISHOP, J. The defendant, Christopher DeAngelo, as
an acquittee,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial
court granting the state’s petition to continue commit-
ment (petition) to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board (board)2 for an additional period
of five years. The dispositive issue in this appeal is
whether the court properly determined that the state
met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant, after serving his maximum
term of commitment, presently constitutes a danger to
himself or others.3 See, e.g., State v. Torell, 223 Conn.
1
General Statutes § 17a-580 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Acquittee’
means any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ See also State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400,
405, 645 A.2d 965 (1994).
2
‘‘The board is an administrative body consisting of a psychiatrist, a
psychologist, a probation expert, a layperson, an attorney who is a member
of the state bar, and a layperson with experience in victim advocacy. General
Statutes § 17a-581 (b). The purpose of this administrative body is to manage,
monitor and review the status of each acquittee to ensure the protection
of the general public. . . . That being its purpose, the board has general
and specific familiarity with all acquittees beginning with their initial commit-
ment . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torell, 223 Conn.
App. 21, 27 n.11, 307 A.3d 280 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 960, 312 A.3d
36 (2024); see also Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 677,
578 A.2d 1025 (1990).
3
The defendant also argues that (1) the court improperly presumed that
he was dangerous and placed the burden on him to prove the contrary in
violation of his constitutional right to due process, (2) the court’s interpreta-
tion of General Statutes § 17a-593 rendered it unconstitutionally void for
vagueness, and (3) the Connecticut constitution affords him greater protec-
tion than the federal constitution. The amicus curiae brief filed by the
Connecticut Legal Rights Project also argues that the defendant’s continued
commitment to the jurisdiction of the board amounts to a violation of his
constitutional rights.
As a result of our conclusion that the court improperly determined that
the state met its burden of proving that the defendant would constitute a
danger to himself or others, we need not address these constitutional claims.
It is well settled that ‘‘[w]e . . . do not engage in addressing constitutional
questions unless their resolution is unavoidable. Ordinarily, [c]onstitutional
issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a
case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492,
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State v. DeAngelo

App. 21, 38, 307 A.3d 280 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
960, 312 A.3d 36 (2024). On the basis of our thorough
review of the record in this matter, we determine that
there is no support for the court’s conclusion that the
state met its heightened4 burden and, therefore, that
the court improperly granted the state’s petition.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and remand the case with direction to deny the state’s
petition for the defendant’s continued commitment to
the jurisdiction of the board.
The record reveals that the conduct underlying the
defendant’s index offenses5 occurred on December 2,
1997, when he committed a robbery and larceny at
the First Union Bank in Derby. See State v. DeAngelo,
Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford,
Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 24, 2000). On
that date, the defendant entered the bank armed with
a pellet gun while wearing a disguise consisting of a
fake mustache and beard. He ordered the assistant man-
ager to fill his briefcase with money while also telling
her that he did not intend to hurt her. The assistant
501, 811 A.2d 667 (2002); see also In re Kaleb H., 306 Conn. 22, 26 n.3, 48
A.3d 631 (2012) (‘‘[t]his court has a basic judicial duty to avoid deciding a
constitutional issue if a nonconstitutional ground exists that will dispose
of the case’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see generally State v. Shane
K., 228 Conn. App. 105, 118, 322 A.3d 1094 (2024); Gonzalez v. Commissioner
of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 511, 522 n.13, 258 A.3d 97, cert. denied, 339
Conn. 909, 261 A.3d 745 (2021), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1238,
212 L. Ed. 2d 240 (2022); State v. Lopez, 177 Conn. App. 651, 662, 173 A.3d
485, cert denied, 327 Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017).
4
Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[the clear and convincing burden
of proof] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable
belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability
that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that
they are false or do not exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Perez, 276 Conn. 285, 308, 885 A.2d 178 (2005).
5
‘‘The psychiatric profession refers to the offenses that led to an
acquittee’s arrest as index offenses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Foster, 217 Conn. App. 476, 487 n.5, 289 A.3d 191, cert. granted, 346
Conn. 920, 291 A.3d 1041 (2023).
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State v. DeAngelo

manager then went to the safe, filled the briefcase with
$54,000, and delivered it to the defendant. After showing
the pellet gun to the assistant manager, the defendant
left the bank. Outside, as he was entering his motor
vehicle, police officers ordered him to halt. The defen-
dant ignored the officers’ commands. Instead, he began
to drive away with the officers giving chase. With the
defendant in flight, the officers fired their weapons at
the defendant’s motor vehicle, striking it several times.
During this pursuit, the defendant’s vehicle nearly hit
a Derby police officer.
Shortly thereafter, the defendant was apprehended
in a nearby parking lot. In addition to the pellet gun, the
police retrieved from the defendant’s vehicle a double
barrel shotgun loaded with one live round. The next
day, the state charged the defendant with, inter alia,
robbery in the first degree in violation of General Stat-
ues § 53a-134, larceny in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-122, and attempt
to commit assault in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-49 and General Statutes (Rev.
to 1997) § 53a-59.
The facts of the defendant’s offenses were uncon-
tested at his criminal trial. Additional evidence was
presented on behalf of the defendant that, in the months
before he committed these offenses, he was abusing
alcohol while also undergoing treatment for obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD). The defendant also was
taking large doses of antidepressant (Prozac) and anti-
anxiety (Xanax) medications that he had been pre-
scribed. The evidence further revealed that the defen-
dant had an adverse reaction to the medications, and
in combination with alcohol consumption, they caused
the defendant to exhibit manic behavior of psychotic
proportions and, ultimately, to commit the index
offenses. Consequently, the court, Arnold, J., found the
defendant not guilty by reason of mental disease or
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State v. DeAngelo

defect on February 24, 2000.6 The court specifically
noted that the defendant had voluntarily ingested the
Prozac and Xanax in accordance with his prescriptions.
Following the court’s judgment, the defendant was
referred to the Department of Mental Health and Addic-
tion Services for an evaluation pursuant to the terms
of General Statutes § 17a-582.7 See State v. DeAngelo,
Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford,
Docket No. CR-97-010866-S (June 20, 2000). The 2000
evaluation report was signed by a psychiatrist, the
Director of the Diagnostic Unit, and the Director of
the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley
Hospital (Whiting). The report stated that the defendant
suffered from a serious psychiatric illness. The report
also determined that the treatment of the defendant
with Prozac and Xanax, combined with his use of alco-
hol, resulted in a manic like episode culminating in the
6
General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides that, ‘‘[i]n any prosecution for an
offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time
the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial
capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the require-
ments of the law.’’ See also State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 540, 847 A.2d 862
(verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect establishes that
person committed act that constitutes criminal offense because of mental
illness), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).
Additionally, we note that, ‘‘[a]lthough § 53a-13 has been amended since
the events giving rise to the acquittee’s prosecution . . . that amendment
has no bearing on this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Torell, supra, 223 Conn. App. 24 n.2.
7
‘‘When an individual is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect, the individual—the acquittee—is committed to the custody of the
Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services for examination of
the acquittee’s mental condition. General Statutes § 17a-582 (a). Once the
examination is complete, a hearing is held, and the court determines whether
the examinee should be confined, conditionally released, or discharged.
General Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1) and (2). . . . State v. Vasquez, 194 Conn.
App. 831, 835–36, 222 A.3d 1018 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 922, 223
A.3d 61 (2020).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torell, supra,
223 Conn. App. 24 n.5.
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State v. DeAngelo

commission of the index offenses. The report con-
cluded that the defendant was a danger to himself and
to others and recommended his commitment to the
jurisdiction of the board for a period of time as deemed
appropriate by the court.
On June 19, 2000, the court held a commitment hear-
ing. The court considered the testimony of the numer-
ous mental health professionals and other witnesses,
as well as several exhibits that were admitted into evi-
dence, including the evaluation prepared in accordance
with § 17a-582, and found that ‘‘the [defendant] pres-
ently constitutes a danger to himself and others.’’ The
court issued a memorandum of decision in which it
detailed its findings and conclusions, ultimately com-
mitting the defendant to the jurisdiction of the board
and ordering that he be confined at Whiting for a maxi-
mum confinement period of ten years.8 The initial com-
mitment was set to expire on or about June 18, 2010. By
agreement of the parties, the defendant’s commitment
date has been extended multiple times.
On December 7, 2022, the state filed the petition for
continued commitment pursuant to General Statutes
§ 17a-593 (c) that is the subject of this appeal. It alleged
that the defendant ‘‘still remains mentally ill to the
extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to
himself or others.’’ Additionally, the state claimed that
the complete record of the board supports its position
8
‘‘See General Statutes § 17a-582; State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 382–83,
890 A.2d 559 (2006) (after acquittee has proven defense of mental disease
or defect, he or she may be committed to jurisdiction of board for maximum
term of commitment not to exceed maximum sentence that could have been
imposed had that individual been convicted); State v. Foster, 217 Conn. App.
476, 506 n.1, 289 A.3d 191 (Seeley, J., concurring) (same), cert. granted, 346
Conn. 920, 291 A.3d 1041 (2023); see generally State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508,
519–20, 847 A.2d 862 (review of statutory commitment scheme for acquittees
as set forth in General Statutes §§ 17a-580 through 17a-603), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).’’ State v. Torell, supra,
223 Conn. App. 25 n.6.
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State v. DeAngelo

that there is reasonable cause to believe that a contin-
ued commitment is in the best interests of the protec-
tion of society. On February 3, 2023, the board filed its
report in support of the state’s petition and recom-
mended that the court extend the defendant’s commit-
ment for an additional five year period.9
On August 16, 2023, the defendant filed a memoran-
dum of law arguing that the court should deny the
state’s petition. The defendant conceded that he is a
person with a mental illness;10 however, he argued that
‘‘there is nothing to suggest that he is presently danger-
ous to himself or others.’’ The defendant further noted
that the board recently had approved his application
for temporary leave, which it would not have been
authorized to do if he constituted a danger to himself
or others. See General Statutes § 17a-587 (a).11
The court, Hall, J., conducted a hearing on August
30 and September 11, 2023. At the conclusion of this
9
General Statutes § 17a-593 (d) provides: ‘‘The court shall forward any
application for discharge received from the acquittee and any petition for
continued commitment of the acquittee to the board. The board shall, within
ninety days of its receipt of the application or petition, file a report with
the court, and send a copy thereof to the state’s attorney and counsel for
the acquittee, setting forth its findings and conclusions as to whether the
acquittee is a person who should be discharged. The board may hold a
hearing or take other action appropriate to assist it in preparing its report.’’
10
The board’s report stated the following: ‘‘[The defendant’s] psychiatric
diagnoses are Bipolar I Disorder in Full Remission, Most Recent Episode
Depressed—Moderate with Anxious Distress with Atypical Features; [OCD];
Other Specified Personality Disorder with Mixed Antisocial, Borderline and
Narcissistic Features; Alcohol Use Disorder in Sustained Remission in a
Controlled Environment and Tobacco Use Disorder in Sustained Remission
in a Controlled Environment.’’ He is currently prescribed various psy-
chotropic medications. There does not appear to be any dispute that, due
to his current mental illness, the acquittee suffers from a psychiatric disabil-
ity. See, e.g., State v. March, 265 Conn. 697, 705–709, 830 A.2d 212 (2003).
11
General Statutes § 17a-587 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The board
shall grant the application [for temporary leave], subject to such conditions
and supervision as the board may set in the order for temporary leave,
if it concludes that the acquittee’s temporary leave, under the conditions
specified, would not constitute a danger to the acquittee or others. . . .’’
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proceeding, the court issued an oral decision granting
the state’s petition. At the outset, it observed that the
state had the burden of establishing, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the defendant ‘‘has a psychiatric
disability which leads him to pose an imminent danger
to himself and to others and the court must also deter-
mine whether or not that’s the case and also the effect
of a granting or denial of the position on the [defen-
dant’s] own health and well-being, to a lesser extent.’’12
The court then focused on the information contained
in the board’s September 5, 2023 report detailing the
defendant’s three previous temporary leaves, in which
he ‘‘did well in many respects but was recalled to the
care provider for various reasons’’ including alcohol
use and an arrest for a minor theft. It also explained
that, although the defendant had been approved for
a phase one temporary leave,13 albeit with extensive
conditions, the board had not approved him for a phase
two temporary leave or a conditional release. Finally,
the court noted its concern about the effect that not
having ‘‘direct institutional support’’ might have on the
defendant’s health and well-being. For these reasons,
the court granted the state’s petition, finding that it had
met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant posed an imminent danger
to the safety of himself and the community.
The next day, the court issued a written ‘‘supplement’’
for the purpose of emphasizing the rationale set forth
12
General Statutes § 17a-593 (g) provides: ‘‘The court shall make a finding
as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary
concern is the protection of society and its secondary concern is the safety
and well-being of the acquittee, make one of the following orders: (1) If
the court finds that the acquittee is not a person who should be discharged,
the court shall order the recommendation or application for discharge be
dismissed; or (2) if the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should
be discharged, the court shall order the acquittee discharged from custody.
The court shall send a copy of such finding and order to the board.’’ (Empha-
sis added.)
13
See footnote 14 of this opinion.
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State v. DeAngelo

in its oral decision. It noted that the state had presented
testimony from Paul Bryant, a psychiatrist. The defen-
dant called two psychologists, Drs. Brian Conover and
Claudia Krasnicki, to testify on his behalf. ‘‘All three
agreed that the defendant has done well, has been a
thoughtful and cooperative patient, and has engaged in
his treatment. The testimony of all three witnesses was
supplemented by a series of reports prepared for the
board and/or the court . . . .’’
The court further explained: ‘‘The witnesses appear
to have agreed . . . that, as currently managed under
board supervision, the defendant does not pose such a
danger to the community that he should not be granted
a temporary leave from direct institutional supervision
and care as part of a gradual reintroduction to unsuper-
vised treatment. Where the witnesses diverged was on
the issue of whether the defendant would pose a danger
to himself or others in the absence of his current man-
agement and support regimen under the supervision of
the board. Doctors Conover and Krasnicki testified that,
if discharged, the defendant would have available to
him the virtual equivalent of care and support he enjoys
now. They also expressed confidence that the defen-
dant would voluntarily avail himself of all that care
and support. Doctor Bryant testified that the defendant
would pose no danger to himself or others under his
current management and support regimen.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.)
The court iterated that the defendant had been
approved for temporary leave on three prior occasions,
in 2002, 2004 and 2011, but such leaves had been can-
celed by Whiting due to rule violations and arrest.
Finally, the court appeared to opine that a ‘‘gradual
shift’’ from the board’s management and supervision to
the defendant having full responsibility of his treatment
and living situation, the ‘‘generally preferred model,’’
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State v. DeAngelo

supported its decision to grant the petition. This appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.
The following legal principles guide our review of
this appeal. Our appellate courts have recognized that,
despite the significant differences in the purposes
between an order of commitment issued as a result of
an acquittal pursuant to § 53a-13 and a prison sentence
imposed as a result of a criminal conviction, the effect
of such a commitment is no less a deprivation of liberty.
See State v. Imperiale, 337 Conn. 694, 712–13, 255 A.3d
825 (2021); State v. Torell, supra, 223 Conn. App. 25
n.6. Our Supreme Court expressly has stated that the
statutory procedures for the recommitment of
acquittees, as set forth in § 17a-593 (c), implicate the
liberty interests of such individuals. State v. Long, 301
Conn. 216, 238, 19 A.3d 1242, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1084,
132 S. Ct. 827, 181 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2011); State v. Long,
268 Conn. 508, 524, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S.
969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).
In Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675,
578 A.2d 1025 (1990), our Supreme Court explained:
‘‘[T]he confinement of insanity acquittees, although
resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal
justice system, is not punishment for a crime. The pur-
pose of commitment following an insanity acquittal,
like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual’s
mental illness and protect him and society from his
potential dangerousness. The committed acquittee is
entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or
is no longer dangerous. . . . As he was not convicted,
he may not be punished. His confinement rests on his
continuing illness and dangerousness. Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 368–69, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1983).’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital,
supra, 683–84; see also State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378,
394, 890 A.2d 559 (2006); State v. Ardizzone, 215 Conn.
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State v. DeAngelo

App. 854, 866, 283 A.3d 982 (2022), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 905, 287 A.3d 1089 (2023).
In the present case, the state sought to extend the
defendant’s commitment pursuant to § 17a-593 (c),
which authorizes the state to seek the continuing con-
finement of an acquittee beyond his maximum term
of commitment. Our review of the defendant’s claim,
therefore, is based on the text of this statute, and judi-
cial opinions that have interpreted it. We begin with
the language of § 17a-593 (c), which provides: ‘‘If rea-
sonable cause exists to believe that the acquittee
remains a person with psychiatric disabilities or a per-
son with intellectual disability to the extent that his
discharge at the expiration of his maximum term of
commitment would constitute a danger to himself or
others, the state’s attorney, at least one hundred thirty-
five days prior to such expiration, may petition the
court for an order of continued commitment of the
acquittee.’’
In State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 645 A.2d 965 (1994),
our Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the state or the acquittee should bear the burden of
proof regarding the basis for a continuing commitment
beyond its original term. Id., 402. Speaking for a unani-
mous court, former Chief Justice Peters first discussed
the significant constitutional issues implicated, gener-
ally, by confinement and, specifically, the due process
entitlements of an acquittee whom the state seeks to
confine beyond the terms of an original commitment.
Id., 412–18. Former Chief Justice Peters stated: ‘‘These
constitutional concerns lead us to construe the maxi-
mum period of commitment authorized by § 17a-582 (e)
(1) (A) as a reasonably identified point of demarcation
beyond which the presumption of dangerousness ini-
tially accompanying an acquittee does not continue.
Accordingly, we conclude that § 17a-593 (c) impliedly
imposes the same burden on the state at a hearing for
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State v. DeAngelo

the continued commitment of an acquittee beyond his
current definite period of commitment as is imposed
in a civil commitment hearing under [General Statutes]
§ 17a-498 (c); namely, to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the acquittee is currently mentally ill and
dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely
disabled.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 425.
Subsequently, in State v. March, 265 Conn. 697, 830
A.2d 212 (2003), our Supreme Court noted that the term
‘‘dangerousness’’ as used in General Statutes § 17a-580
(5), includes the notion of immediacy. Id., 708–709.
Thus, ‘‘dangerousness’’ incorporates the notion that one
poses an imminent risk of danger to oneself or to oth-
ers. Id. The state, therefore, must prove that an acquittee
presents an imminent risk of ‘‘danger to self or to oth-
ers’’ to meet its burden of proving an acquittee’s danger-
ousness. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 709.
In State v. Harris, supra, 277 Conn. 378, a matter in
which the state sought to extend an acquittee’s period
of confinement, our Supreme Court iterated that the
element of ‘‘dangerousness’’ in this context includes an
imminent risk that the acquittee would harm himself
or herself or others; id., 388; and explained further that
the term ‘‘ ‘[i]mminent’ is defined as ‘ready to take place;
esp: hanging threateningly over one’s head. . . .’ Mer-
riam–Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993)
[p. 580].’’ Id., 389. In sum, to satisfy its burden before
the trial court in this matter, the state was obligated to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result
of his mental illness, the defendant posed a risk of
imminent physical injury to himself or others. See State
v. Warren, 100 Conn. App. 407, 416–17, 919 A.2d 465
(2007); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a-581-2 (a) (6).
We recognize that a trial court that must make a
determination of dangerousness in this context faces
a difficult task. Additionally, we are cognizant that ‘‘the
goals of a treating psychiatrist frequently conflict with
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State v. DeAngelo

the goals of the criminal justice system. . . . While the
psychiatrist must be concerned primarily with thera-
peutic goals, the court must give priority to the public
safety ramifications of releasing from confinement an
individual who has already shown a propensity for vio-
lence. As a result, the determination of dangerousness
in the context of a mental status hearing reflects a
societal rather than a medical judgment, in which the
rights and needs of the [acquittee] must be balanced
against the security interests of society. . . . The awe-
some task of weighing these two interests and arriving
at a decision concerning release rests finally with the
trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Corr, 87 Conn. App. 717, 725, 867 A.2d 124, cert.
denied, 273 Conn. 929, 873 A.2d 998 (2005); see also
State v. Warren, supra, 100 Conn. App. 433 (although
medical testimony may be helpful, issue of evaluating
dangerousness and prediction of acquittee’s future
behavior, for which there is no bright-line test, is
reserved for courts). Additionally, we note that, in
addressing the legal determination of dangerousness in
this context, ‘‘the court may and should consider the
entire record available to it, including the defendant’s
history of mental illness, his present and past diagnoses,
his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for
which he was prosecuted, the need for continued medi-
cation and therapy, and the prospects for supervision
if released.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Damone, 148 Conn. App. 137, 171, 83 A.3d 1227, cert.
denied, 311 Conn. 936, 88 A.3d 550 (2014); see also State
v. Jacob, 69 Conn. App. 666, 677, 798 A.2d 974 (2002).
We turn now to our standard of review. As we have
noted, in the case at hand, the state had the burden
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant presents a risk of imminent danger to himself
or to others due to his mental illness. The defendant
has not challenged the court’s finding that he suffers
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from a mental illness; therefore, we are concerned
solely with the issue of whether the state met its burden
of proving that the defendant would constitute an immi-
nent danger to himself or others if discharged from the
jurisdiction of the board. As an appellate court, we do
not find facts and we do not disturb the factual findings
made by the trial judge unless they are clearly errone-
ous. See State v. Ryder, 111 Conn. App. 271, 276, 958
A.2d 797 (2008). As we have often stated, ‘‘[a] finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence
in the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Whelan v. Brestelli, 230 Conn.
App. 683, 696, 331 A.3d 1220 (2025); see also State v.
Orr, 199 Conn. App. 427, 436–37, 237 A.3d 15 (2020).
Finally, we briefly discuss the clear and convincing
evidence standard. As our Supreme Court noted in
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745,
700 A.2d 1108 (1997), a factual innocence case, this
‘‘standard should operate as a weighty caution upon
. . . all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evi-
dence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 795. This court has
explained that ‘‘[t]he clear and convincing standard of
proof is substantially greater than the usual civil stan-
dard of a preponderance of the evidence, but less than
the highest legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is sustained if the evidence induces in the
mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts
asserted are highly probably true, that the probability
that they are true or exist is substantially greater than
the probability that they are false or do not exist. . . .
Although we have characterized this standard of proof
as a middle tier standard . . . and as an intermediate
standard . . . between the ordinary civil standard of
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a preponderance of the evidence, or more probably
than not, and the criminal standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, this characterization does not mean
that the clear and convincing standard is necessarily
to be understood as lying equidistant between the two.
Its emphasis on the high probability and the substan-
tial greatness of the probability of the truth of the
facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding
standard and should be understood as such.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Giovanni C., 120 Conn. App. 277, 279–80,
991 A.2d 638 (2010); see also State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn.
171, 211 n.22, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (intermediate stan-
dard is used when particularly important individual
rights are involved). Guided by these principles, we
now turn to the evidence produced at the hearing and
the court’s findings regarding the state’s petition for
continued commitment.
As indicated in the board’s report to the court dated
January 30, 2023, which was admitted into evidence as
exhibit 1 at the hearing, following his commitment in
2000, the defendant initially was confined in a maximum
security setting at Whiting. Shortly thereafter, the board
transferred him to Dutcher Services (Dutcher), which
is a less restrictive setting, at Whiting.
During the defendant’s periods of confinement, he
has been granted temporary leaves14 for specific periods
14
Bryant testified that a temporary leave is ‘‘the process in which the
hospital believes that one of their acquittees is ready for transition to the
community . . . . The first phase is called day temporary leaves, where
the acquittees leave the hospital and go into the community just to spend the
day. That usually starts off with about one day a week, and then progresses
to a few days a week, but they always come back to the hospital and spend
the night.
‘‘And, then, once someone has successfully done well on that for a period
of time, they then go to a phase two, or overnight temporary leave where they
will spend the night in the community. So, again, they’ll—it’ll be progressive
where they’ll start with one day and then that will increase up to seven
days a week where they’re essentially staying in the community except for
a weekly trip back to the hospital to check in with their treatment team.’’
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of time. One such leave that had been granted in 2002
was terminated after the defendant was arrested for
shoplifting in 2004. Another leave that was granted in
2007 was terminated one year later, when the defendant
attempted suicide. He began a third period of leave in
2011, which continued for three years, during which
time the defendant exhibited clinical stability. On the
basis of that success, the defendant was granted a con-
ditional release15 which allowed him to live outside of
Whiting full time and receive outpatient treatment at
the Connecticut Mental Health Center. But this period
of quietude ended in 2015, when the board learned that,
in spite of receiving therapeutic and community sup-
port, the defendant secretly had been consuming alco-
hol.16 He then was transferred, without objection, back
to Whiting.
In 2020, the defendant experienced profound depressive
symptoms and underwent electroconvulsive therapy.
Subsequently, the defendant began showing significant
improvement in self-care and participation in treatment
activities. Additionally, his anxiety and OCD symptoms
improved. Consequently, Whiting granted the defendant
the highest level of privileges, which allowed him access
to the Whiting’s grounds without supervision.
During the three year time period between February,
2020, and January, 2023, and specifically in 2020 and
2021, the defendant encountered a series of stressful
events, including a severe episode of COVID-19 that
necessitated treatment in the intensive care unit, a burst
15
Bryant described a conditional release as follows: ‘‘[T]he hospital is
saying . . . this person is really being treated in the community, they’re
doing well so we think that their treatment should move to the community
treatment team.’’
16
Bryant testified that the defendant would become more anxious and
overwhelmed as a commitment hearing approached, and, rather than alert
his treatment providers to his increased symptoms, would consume alcohol
as a coping mechanism.
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State v. DeAngelo

appendix that required surgical intervention, and the
death of his mother, who was his primary support.
Nevertheless, despite these traumatic events and the
attendant pressure on him, the board reported that the
defendant utilized his treatment team for support and
avoided any further depressive episodes. The defen-
dant’s providers monitored his increased anxiety symp-
toms, which did subside as he continued to participate
in individual and group therapy.
The state also introduced a letter from Whiting to
the board dated June 15, 2023, that was admitted into
evidence at the hearing as exhibit 3, stating that an
application for temporary leave had been made on the
defendant’s behalf. This application had not been acted
upon when the state filed its petition to extend the
defendant’s commitment. In response to the application
for temporary leave, the board issued a memorandum
of decision dated September 5, 2023, which was admit-
ted at the hearing on the state’s petition, designated as
exhibit 4. In this decision, the board noted that the
defendant ‘‘has consistently collaborated with hospital
and community staff with the goals of appropriately
engaging in available treatments and working towards
a place where he’s ready to begin a [t]emporary [l]eave
once again.’’ The board further observed that the defen-
dant ‘‘has maintained a full privilege level that allowed
him to have unsupervised pass times on hospital
grounds within his own custody for much of the day.
[The defendant] also went on several hospital super-
vised trips into the community and there were no associ-
ated concerns with him.’’ Although the board found
that the defendant had, in more recent years, gained
considerable insight into his behaviors and needs, and
had been fully engaged in all available therapies and
medicines, only phase one of the hospital’s application
for temporary leave was approved. In granting only
phase one of the application allowing the defendant
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day leaves from the hospital, but denying phase two,
which would have permitted overnights away from the
hospital, the board opined: ‘‘Due to the level of risk
that [the defendant] has presented both to himself and
to the community during previous attempts for commu-
nity reintegration, the [b]oard wants to ensure that [the
defendant] is appropriately supported and that deci-
sions are clinically validated and supported related to
his transition period, identified services and time-
frames. Therefore, the [b]oard finds that under the con-
ditions contained within this order . . . [the defen-
dant] would not constitute a danger to himself, or others
should he start to participate in treatment in the commu-
nity.’’
During the hearing on its petition, the state offered
the testimony of Bryant, who identified himself as an
employee of Yale University and a consulting forensic
psychiatrist for the Department of Mental Health and
Addiction Services. Bryant testified concerning the
defendant’s treatment and medication regime. As to the
defendant’s diagnoses, Bryant testified that he suffers
from bipolar disorder, OCD, personality disorder with
antisocial, borderline, and narcissistic traits, as well
as alcohol and tobacco abuse disorders in sustained
remission. Bryant offered his opinion that all of these
diagnoses and their symptoms are well managed under
the defendant’s treatment regime, including the current
medicines administered to him. He opined that, if the
defendant were to discontinue receiving the doses of
medicine prescribed for him, there would be a risk that
his symptoms would reemerge, including depressive or
manic behaviors. Notably, Bryant concluded that, in his
current circumstances in the hospital and under the
jurisdiction of the board, the defendant does not present
a substantial risk of danger to himself or any others.
Prescriptively, Bryant opined that a gradual reintroduc-
tion into the community would best suit the defendant’s
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State v. DeAngelo

needs. Significantly, he did not say that the defendant
posed an imminent danger to himself or to others. Bry-
ant acknowledged that the defendant had not engaged
in any threatening behavior, violence or aggression. His
testimony was couched in terms of risks of an increase
in the defendant’s symptoms should the defendant stop
taking the medicines prescribed for him and cease his
treatment. However, Bryant offered no testimony
regarding the risk of imminent danger to the defendant
or others if the defendant were to be released from the
jurisdiction of the board. Indeed, on cross-examination,
Bryant acknowledged that he had supported the appli-
cation filed on behalf of the defendant for a gradual,
two step temporary leave program that would initially
result in day passes and eventually, in phase two, grant
him the opportunity for overnight stays away from Whit-
ing. He then was asked this question: ‘‘If [the defendant]
currently posed an immediate risk of harming himself
or others, Whiting . . . would not be asking the [board]
to grant a [temporary leave] application. Is that cor-
rect?’’ Bryant answered: ‘‘Yes, I’d say that’s correct.’’
Further, on cross-examination, Bryant repeated his
opinion that the defendant is not a danger to himself
or to others with ‘‘his symptoms managed in the current
way.’’ Finally, in response to a question from the defen-
dant’s lawyer, Bryant acknowledged his belief that the
defendant did not meet the criteria for civil commitment
at that time.
Following Bryant’s testimony, the state rested. The
defendant then called Conover as his first witness. Con-
over is a clinical psychologist employed by Whiting. He
testified that he has served as the defendant’s individual
psychotherapist for approximately eight years. After
discussing the defendant’s progress over the past sev-
eral years following his return to Whiting in 2015, Con-
over stated his belief that the defendant no longer
needed to be under the supervision of the board. As
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State v. DeAngelo

reasons for this opinion, Conover noted the defendant’s
investment in his treatment, as well as his willingness
to collaborate with his treatment team. Conover con-
cluded by opining that, once free of board supervision,
the defendant would continue with his treatment on a
voluntary basis.
Much of the state’s questions during its cross-exami-
nation of Conover concerned the hospital’s temporary
leave program, which the board just had approved par-
tially for the defendant with the result that, once imple-
mented, he would have the opportunity to leave the
hospital during the daytime and to return in the evening.
Conover acknowledged that, generally, such a gradual
process is useful for individuals who have been con-
fined to the jurisdiction of the board. When asked if
the temporary leave process that transitions into com-
munity release would be beneficial to the defendant,
Conover answered that, in these particular circum-
stances, a gradual release into the community would
not benefit the defendant. Conover expressed, as the
basis of this conclusion, that, over time, the defendant
has gained insights into his illness. He commented that
the defendant ‘‘has demonstrated not only his ability
to identify those symptoms, but to respond to any kind
of increase in symptoms by reaching out to his treaters
and asking for help with those things, and, therefore,
the compulsory nature is not really necessary, and I
would say the same about his substance abuse.’’ Con-
over stated, as well, that the defendant is motivated to
remain sober and remain totally compliant with his
treatment plan for continued sobriety. Conover added
that the level of oversight the board presents in the
defendant’s situation is a stressor for him, and this
additional stress constituted a risk factor. Conover con-
cluded by stating his belief that the defendant should
be discharged from any further confinement without the
need for a gradual release as envisioned by the board.
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State v. DeAngelo

The second witness called on behalf of the defendant
was Krasnicki, a psychologist serving at Dutcher, where
the defendant is housed. She testified that she had
worked with the defendant for approximately twelve
years. On the basis of her extensive experience directly
with the defendant, she opined that he is not presently
a danger to himself or to the community. During cross-
examination, when asked about the defendant’s sobri-
ety, she pointed out that both liquor and other drugs
can be obtained by those confined to Whiting but that
the defendant has been committed to his sobriety and
the treatment necessary to remain alcohol free. Kras-
nicki also commented that the defendant has the strong
support of a brother and a sister who is like a second
mother to him and that, over time, he has developed a
personal relationship with his treaters at the hospital,
whom she said she believed the defendant would con-
tinue to see even if he were no longer under the board’s
control.
Our review of the trial testimony reveals that none
of the mental health professionals testified that he is
presently a danger to himself or to others. Bryant did
opine that, if the defendant ceased his treatment medi-
cation regimes, ‘‘there would be risk for exacerbation
of his bipolar disorder which could include depressive
symptoms or manic symptoms, could cycle between
the two. There would . . . we’d anticipate an increase
in OCD symptoms, which had been very severe in the
past for . . . [the defendant]. And he would also be
at an increased risk for relapse into his alcohol use
disorder.’’ This testimony, however, did not include an
opinion as to whether such increased risks were immi-
nent, or whether there was an imminent, increased risk
that the defendant might cease his treatment or medica-
tion if he were to be released from the jurisdiction of
the board. Further, there was no testimony regarding
an imminent risk of danger of physical harm to either
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State v. DeAngelo

the defendant or others. Finally, both of the defendant’s
treating psychologists opined that the ongoing stress
of being under the jurisdiction of the board actually
was having detrimental impact on the defendant’s
well-being.

On the basis of this record, the question before us is
whether the court’s determination that the state met
its burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing
evidence, that, as a result of his mental illness, the
defendant posed a risk of imminent physical injury to
himself or others was clearly erroneous. We conclude
that the state failed to present the necessary evidence
of an imminent risk of physical harm to the defendant
or others and, therefore, the court’s finding was improper.

To be sure, the record reflects that, during the defen-
dant’s commitment, he has been granted several tempo-
rary leaves from Whiting, and, while on these leaves,
he has participated in misconduct that had caused him
to return to a stricter form of confinement at Whiting.
As previously stated, the defendant’s first temporary
leave began in 2002, but was terminated in 2004 after
his arrest for shoplifting. His second temporary leave
began in 2007, but was terminated in 2008, after he
had attempted suicide and violated other terms of his
temporary leave. His third temporary leave began in
2011 and, as acknowledged by the state, for the follow-
ing three years of this leave, the defendant exhibited
clinical stability and treatment compliance. Thereafter,
in 2014, the defendant was granted a conditional release,
which allowed him to live full-time outside of Whiting
and to receive treatment at the Connecticut Mental
Health Center. This conditional release was terminated,
however, in 2015, when the board discovered that the
defendant had been consuming alcohol. It is notable,
however, that, in each of these situations, none of the
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State v. DeAngelo

defendant’s missteps occurred shortly after the com-
mencement of either the temporary leave or the condi-
tional release. In short, nothing in the history of these
failures suggests that, if freed from the jurisdiction of
the board, there is an imminent risk that the defendant
may become a danger to himself or others.
To the contrary, his current treatment providers testi-
fied that, in the years since his last conditional release,
the defendant has continued to mature and more fully
embrace his treatment regimens. Additionally, he now
receives two medications, disulfiram, commonly known
as Antabuse, and naltrexone, which dampen cravings
for alcohol consumption, and he is a willing participant
in the various therapies provided to him that will remain
available to him even after his discharge from confine-
ment. The trial court heard no evidence that the defen-
dant would discontinue either his treatment or medica-
tions if released from the jurisdiction of the board and,
as a result, present an imminent risk of danger to himself
or others.17
As noted, at the hearing before the trial court, Con-
over, who has treated the defendant for several years,
testified to his belief that the defendant does not pres-
ently need a period of gradual transition back into the
community on the basis of his commitment to his treat-
ment regime. And Krasnicki, a clinical psychologist who
has treated the defendant for twelve years, testified in
favor of his complete release from the jurisdiction of
the board. In addition to her belief that the defendant
does not need a gradual period of transition before
17
Bryant did testify that, if the defendant was to stop taking all of his
medications, there would be a risk of an increase of his bipolar disorder,
including depressive or manic symptoms, an increase in his OCD symptoms,
and increase for a relapse of his alcohol use disorder. His testimony, how-
ever, did not address the likelihood of the defendant ceasing to take all
of his prescribed medications and a corresponding increased risk in his
dangerousness.
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State v. DeAngelo

becoming free of the board’s oversight, Krasnicki
opined that the ongoing oversight is not in the defen-
dant’s best interest and could actually be detrimental
to him. She opined: ‘‘He, at this point in time, I feel is
strongly committed to his treatment, his recovery. I
don’t feel that having that layer of oversight at this point
is doing anything more but adding more stress which
is not added to his quality of life.’’
In its oral decision, the trial court referred to exhibit 4,
the board’s September 5, 2023 memorandum of decision
with respect to the defendant’s application for tempo-
rary leave. The court used this document as a basis to
summarize the defendant’s prior temporary leaves that
had been terminated for various reasons. The court
then specifically noted that, in approving the phase one
temporary leave, the board concluded the defendant
would not constitute a danger to himself or others if he
continued to participate in treatment. The court further
explained that the board had observed that the defen-
dant remained a person with a psychiatric disability
to the extent that his discharge or conditional release
would constitute a danger to himself or others without
the conditions imposed as a part of the phase one tem-
porary leave. The board’s memorandum of decision,
however, contained no evidence that the defendant
would pose an imminent risk of danger to himself or
others if he were granted a phase two temporary leave.
Rather, this document set forth the conclusory state-
ment that, ‘‘[d]ue to the level of risk that [the defendant]
has presented both to himself and to the community
during previous attempts for community reintegration,
the [b]oard wants to ensure that [the defendant] is
appropriately supported and that decisions are clini-
cally validated and supported related to his transition
period, identified services and timeframes.’’ This state-
ment, while perhaps sufficient to deny an application
for a phase two temporary leave, lacks the necessary
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State v. DeAngelo

detail to support a finding of dangerousness required
to grant a petition to extend a commitment beyond its
maximum term. Significantly, the board’s memorandum
of decision provided no support for its conclusion that
the defendant posed an imminent danger to himself or
others should he be released from the board’s jurisdic-
tion.
Next, the court expressed its concern regarding the
effect on the defendant’s health and well-being should
he no longer have the direct institutional support of the
board, noting the substantial amount of time that he
had been under its jurisdiction. While this may have
been a legitimate concern, particularly for his treatment
providers, the court did not cite to or refer specifically
to any evidence that a change in the defendant’s circum-
stances would result in his imminent dangerousness.
Again, the question is not whether a particular course
of treatment would be a ‘‘better’’ medical approach for
the defendant, but whether the defendant, if released
from the board’s jurisdiction, posed a risked of immi-
nent physical injury to himself or others due to his
mental illness. See State v. Warren, supra, 100 Conn.
App. 416–17.
In the September 12, 2023 written supplement to the
oral decision, the court remarked that the witnesses at
the hearing on the state’s petition diverged on the issue
of whether the defendant would pose a danger to him-
self or others. It further acknowledged that all three
professionals ‘‘expressed confidence’’ that the defen-
dant would continue to avail himself, on a voluntary
basis, of the care and support he received while under
the jurisdiction of the board. After citing to the board’s
September 5, 2023 memorandum of decision addressing
the application for a temporary leave, the court explained
that, given the preference for a gradual shift from the
oversight of the board to the defendant’s having full
responsibility for his treatment, its view was that the
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State v. DeAngelo

defendant should remain under the jurisdiction of the
board while this gradual shift occurred. It again failed
to connect this reasoning with the requirement that the
state establish an imminent danger to the defendant or
others. Simply stated, in both its oral remarks at the
September 11, 2023 hearing and in the written supple-
ment to its oral decision, the court relied on no evidence
regarding the imminent dangerousness element required
under our law.

To illustrate the lack of evidence of imminent danger-
ousness in this matter, it is useful to compare and con-
trast this defendant with other acquittees with similar
procedural histories. In State v. Foster, 217 Conn. App.
476, 289 A.3d 191, cert. granted, 346 Conn. 920, 291 A.3d
1041 (2023), this court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court granting the state’s petition to extend the
confinement of an acquittee who had been found not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Id., 478.
The underlying facts of that case, as recited by this
court, are instructive. ‘‘On January 16, 2001, [Franklin
Foster], then twenty-four years old, entered a Green-
wich middle school while in possession of two knives.
In a school hallway, [Foster] slapped, punched, and
kicked a male sixth grade student, and he lifted a female
sixth grade student over his head. [He] was on school
grounds without permission and his violent conduct
was unprovoked.’’ Id., 478–79. After Foster was found
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and
the appropriate referral for evaluation was made, the
court committed him to the jurisdiction of the board
for a period of time not to exceed ten years. Id., 479.
His commitment was continued by agreement several
times. Id. In 2018, he was granted a conditional release
and began living in the community. Id. In 2019, the state
filed a petition for continued commitment in which
it alleged ‘‘that reasonable cause existed that [Foster]
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State v. DeAngelo

continues to be a danger to himself or others if dis-
charged from confinement and that without continued
supervision by the board, [he] would quickly decompen-
sate and become a risk.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
On appeal, Foster claimed that the state failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that he was an
imminent threat to become a danger to himself or oth-
ers. Id., 482. The state, however, had adduced evidence
that, during Foster’s period of confinement, there had
been ‘‘several instances in which he intimidated, inap-
propriately touched, and made socially inappropriate
statements, often of a sexual nature, to female staff
members.’’ Id., 489. The trial court noted, as well, that
reports of instances of inappropriate conduct continued
up through the latest report that the board filed with
the court. Id., 490.
This court further stated ‘‘that there was evidence
before the [trial] court that, following [Foster’s] com-
mitment to the board, he used physical violence toward
other patients, he challenged another patient to engage
in a physical alteration, and he engaged in otherwise
threatening behavior toward others.’’ Id., 492. Further-
more, this court observed that there was evidence
before the court of Foster’s ‘‘noncompliance with pre-
scribed medication in a hospital setting.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id. Finally, the trial court in
Foster had explained that the board had stated that
without mandated safeguards, ‘‘which [Foster’s] treat-
ers continue to believe are required to address his risk,
he is likely to become noncompliant with treatment
and medication . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 493.
These findings and this history can readily be con-
trasted with the facts in the present case, beginning
with a comparison of the nature of the index offense
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State v. DeAngelo

in the present case to the continuing violent conduct
by Foster. To be sure, robbing the bank in 1997 was a
dangerous activity, given the use of a pellet gun, the
presence of a loaded shotgun in the defendant’s car,
and his brief attempt to elude capture. His conduct
while under the jurisdiction of the board, however, is
distinguishable from that found in other cases involving
acquittees such as Foster. His misconduct while on
leaves from confinement over the years did not include
any violence or threat of violence on his part.18 Addition-
ally, Foster’s history of noncompliance with his medi-
cine regimen is in stark contrast to the unrefuted evi-
dence that the defendant is not only medicine compliant
but is eager to continue with all of his therapeutic treat-
ments. In short, there was no evidence presented to the
court that the defendant will ‘‘quickly decompensate’’
if released from the jurisdiction of the board. Id., 479.
The state also relies partially on this court’s opinion
in State v. Dyous, 198 Conn. App. 253, 233 A.3d 1138,
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 948, 238 A.3d 17 (2020), another
case in which the state sought to extend the commit-
ment of an acquittee who had been found not guilty by
reason of mental disease or defect after his criminal
trial. Id., 254. Following the trial and the appropriate
referral, the court committed Anthony Dyous to the
jurisdiction of the board for a period not to exceed
twenty-five years. Id. Dyous had been charged with two
counts of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of
threatening in the second degree, and one count of
18
The state relies heavily on our reasoning in State v. Warren, supra, 100
Conn. App. 407, that a record that does not reveal any acts of physical
aggression does not preclude a finding of dangerousness. Id., 433. Although
we agree with that proposition, it nonetheless remains the state’s burden
of proving imminent dangerousness to self or others by clear and convincing
evidence in the context of a petition to continue commitment filed pursuant
to § 17a-593 (c). In other words, our conclusion that the court improperly
granted the state’s petition is not based solely on the absence in the record
of any action of physical aggression by the defendant.
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carrying a dangerous weapon. Id. The underlying facts,
as recited by our Supreme Court are as follows:
‘‘Between 1977 and the time of the incident [that]
resulted in his criminal commitment [Dyous] was hospi-
talized three times in psychiatric facilities. Thereafter,
in December, 1983, [Dyous] hijacked a bus carrying
forty-seven people, including a child. He threatened the
driver with a bomb and nerve gas and stated he had
been asked by God to deliver a message.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 255.
This court noted that, in 1986, Dyous escaped from
the Norwich State Hospital with a female peer with
whom he travelled to South Carolina, Texas, and finally
Mexico, where he was apprehended. Id. This court fur-
ther observed that, when found in Mexico, Dyous exhib-
ited symptoms of psychosis and that, once returned to
Whiting, he ‘‘was found to be grossly psychotic and
experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations as well
as grandiose and persecutory delusions.’’ Id. At Whiting,
he was involved thereafter in a violent incident that
resulted in his own injuries as well as injuries to staff
members and other patients. Id.
This court, on review, also tracked Dyous’ periods
of confinement and partial releases in the following
years, which included a positive drug screen for cocaine,
symptoms of psychosis, and failure to adhere to his
medicine regimen, including refusing to take his medi-
cations. Id. From time to time, he exhibited psychotic
and paranoid symptoms, as well as delusional thinking.
Id. Following his return to Whiting, he became violent
and was at one time placed in four-point restraints for
a period of six hours. Id. This court continued: ‘‘During
the next several years, [Dyous] remained at Whiting
and was involved in a series of assaults. From 1996
[through] 2005, [his] behavior at Whiting was character-
ized by chronic refusal to take medication, irritability,
mood lability, grandiosity, paranoid ideation, rule
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breaking, physical altercations with peers and refusal
to engage meaningfully in treatment.’’ Id., 256.
This court further noted that, ‘‘throughout his com-
mitment, [Dyous] has demonstrated little insight into
his illness and, instead, has sought to justify or rational-
ize his behavior. Additionally, despite a history of psy-
chotic episodes, [Dyous] remains steadfast in his oppo-
sition to taking antipsychotic medication [even]
[t]hough medication has been shown to ameliorate [his]
symptoms . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 257–58.
The appeal in Dyous arose after the trial court had
granted a 2017 petition by the state to further extend
[Dyous’] period of confinement. Id., 260. On appeal, this
court noted that, in granting the state’s petition, the
trial court took into consideration the seriousness of
the criminal conduct, as well as Dyous’ lack of participa-
tion in recommended treatment groups, poor insight
into his mental illness and refusal to take recommended
medication. Id. The trial court also referred to Dyous’
altercation with another patient in which Dyous had
acted in a confrontational and very aggressive man-
ner. Id.
In our view, the state’s reliance in the present case
on Dyous is misplaced. There, the state presented, and
the court found, ample evidence of Dyous’ continuing
dangerousness. In contrast, in the present case, there
is no evidence of the defendant’s present dangerousness
to himself or others; there is only the concern expressed
by the board and echoed by the court that the defendant
may at some future point stop following his medicine
regimen and may at some future point cease his thera-
pies with the result that he might then act in a manner
dangerous to himself or others. Although his index
offenses were significant, and they created a risk of
harm to others, they involved none of the violence that
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characterized the behaviors described in either State
v. Foster, supra, 217 Conn. App. 476, or State v. Dyous,
supra, 198 Conn. App. 253. Similarly, the history of the
defendant’s confinements and periodic releases evinced
no violent or antisocial behavior. Moreover, and import-
antly, while neither Foster nor Dyous demonstrated
insight into their mental illnesses, the psychologists
who have treated the defendant testified that he shows
great insight into his mental health condition and dem-
onstrates an unwavering commitment to his medicine
and treatment regime. In short, the Foster and Dyous
cases, both relied upon by the state, are of value only for
the stark contrasts they present to the circumstances
of the defendant before us.
Instead, we conclude that the present matter is more
analogous to a recent decision from the Superior Court.
In State v. Ali, Docket No. CR-04-108157-S, 2023 WL
4881439 (Conn. Super. July 3, 2023), the state filed a
petition to continue the commitment of the acquittee
pursuant to § 17a-593 (c). In 1983, the acquittee had set
fire to a residence after he had been denied permission
to join a card game with his mother and her friends.
Id., *1. He was acquitted of arson in the second degree
after the court found that ‘‘he lacked . . . substantial
capacity because of mental disease or defect to appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his
conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ Id. He
initially was committed to the jurisdiction of the board
for twenty years, and that commitment was extended
on several occasions. Id.
The court conducted a hearing on June 29, 2023,
regarding the state’s most recent petition to extend
the acquittee’s commitment. Id. Alexander Westphal, a
psychiatrist, testified as the state’s sole witness. Id.
Westphal indicated that the acquittee, who had been
granted the highest level of privileges available at the
hospital, was found to be in his best mental state, and
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there were no concerns that the acquittee posed a risk
to himself or others. Id. In denying the state’s petition,
the trial court relied on Westphal’s opinion that the
acquittee presently did not meet the standard for a civil
commitment, as well as concluding that a ‘‘risk couched
in the terms of a possibility is simply too thin a reed
to carry the weight of the state’s burden under these
circumstances.’’ Id., *2. Ultimately, the court deter-
mined that the state had not met its burden and ordered
that the acquittee was to be discharged from the custody
of the board at the conclusion of his current period of
commitment.19 Id., *3.
Similarly, in the present case, Bryant testified that
he did not have an opinion as to whether continued
commitment would be beneficial to the defendant. Bry-
ant further stated that, under the defendant’s current
treatment and management, he did not present an acute
risk of danger to himself or others. Bryant agreed on
cross-examination that, if the defendant presently
posed a risk of danger to himself or others, the hospital
would not have granted the application for a temporary
leave. Bryant also acknowledged that the defendant,
who also was granted the highest level of privileges on
hospital grounds, presently did not meet the standard
for a civil commitment. Finally, Bryant’s testimony did
not link or quantify, in any manner, the potential increased
risks of symptoms that the defendant may experience
to the risk of imminent physical injury to himself or
others. Rather, his testimony, and the letter from the
board recommending that the defendant’s commitment
be extended for another five year period, suggest that
the state’s motion should be granted because there has
not yet been a successful gradual transition period from
19
Although Ali, as a trial court opinion, is not binding on this court, we find
that the court’s reasoning that a mere possibility of a risk of dangerousness
is insufficient to justify the continued commitment of an acquittee in these
circumstances is applicable to the matter at hand.
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State v. DeAngelo

the hospital to the community. As previously noted,
although this certainly may be a laudable and prudent
therapeutic approach, it falls short of the demanding
standard that the state must meet under these particular
circumstances and to ensure that the defendant’s due
process rights are protected. We iterate that, in order
to extend the defendant’s commitment, the state was
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that his discharge would constitute an imminent danger
to himself or others. See State v. Torell, supra, 223 Conn.
App. 40.
The trial court appears to have been concerned pri-
marily with an abrupt transition from the ‘‘direct institu-
tional support provided under the auspices of the
[board]’’ and the defendant’s extensive involvement
with that entity to his being on his own in the commu-
nity. There was no evidence in the record, however,
that the defendant would move from the hospital to an
unsupported community setting. To the contrary, the
defendant’s psychologists testified that he indicated he
would continue his treatment with the hospital with
minimal changes, despite no longer being under the
jurisdiction of the board. We recognize that the trial
court was not required to accept this testimony, and
we are not at liberty to substitute our views of this
evidence in place of the trial court. Despite our limited
review, however, we conclude that absent from the
court’s analysis is a finding, based on clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that such a rapid transition would result
in a risk of imminent harm to himself or others. The
court’s reference to an unsupported and conclusory
statement reciting the appropriate legal standard from
the board’s report does not constitute evidence to meet
the rigorous standard applicable under these facts and
circumstances.
In State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400, the former chief
justice stated the following: ‘‘Freedom from unjustified
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State v. DeAngelo

governmental intrusions into personal security and
bodily freedom are basic, historically recognized liberty
interests that are protected by the federal constitution.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, [79–80], 112 S. Ct.
1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 492, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980). As a
matter of federal law, [i]t is clear that commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection; that is, the
nature of commitment [must] bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted. Foucha v. Louisiana, supra, [79]. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized involuntary com-
mitment to a mental institution, in particular, as involv-
ing more than a loss of freedom from confinement;
Vitek v. Jones, supra, [92]; due to its stigmatizing conse-
quences, and the potential exposure to invasive, com-
pulsory medical and psychiatric treatment. . . . The
law of federal due process accordingly imposes signifi-
cant constitutional constraints on involuntary commit-
ments. Even for the purpose of psychiatric treatment,
a state may not confine an individual, unless the individ-
ual is both mentally ill and dangerous. O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573–76, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 396 (1975).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 412–13.
It bears repeating that, although a gradual shift to the
community from the hospital may be preferable for
purposes of his treatment, the record and our mandated
application of the pertinent law do not support the
finding necessary to permit the state to extend further
the deprivation of the defendant’s liberty interest.
In the matter at hand, in which the defendant now
has been confined for twenty-five years following the
index offenses and fifteen years beyond the ten year
period of maximum confinement initially imposed by
the court, and in the absence of clear and convincing
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State v. DeAngelo

evidence that he is presently an imminent danger to
himself or to others, he is entitled to his freedom.
Accordingly, we conclude that the state failed to meet
the very demanding standard of clear and convincing
evidence. This standard operates ‘‘as a weighty caution
upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief when-
ever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonio A. v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 46, 88, 256
A.3d 684, cert. denied, 339 Conn. 909, 261 A.3d 744
(2021). On the basis of the principles set forth herein,
we conclude that state failed to meet its demanding
burden. Therefore, the court improperly granted the
petition to continue the defendant’s commitment.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to deny the state’s petition for continued
commitment.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.